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Mega sports events have become important tools for cities seeking to enhance their 
global position, undertake regeneration and promote tourism and there is intense 
competition to win the rights to host events, particularly the Olympics, World Athletics 
Championships and FIFA World Cup. Using the case of the abandoned Lee Valley 
National Athletics Centre (LVNAC) project and the loss of the rights to stage the 2005 
World Athletics Championships in London as a case study, this thesis sets out. to 
explore the inter-relationships between governance, sport and the city, with a particular 
focus on mega sports events. A qualitative approach was adopted to enable processes to 
be explored and to tease out linkages between different aspects of governance, levels of 
governance, sport and governance and the various interested parties. This thesis is 
multi-disciplinary in its approach, using concepts from a variety of disciplines including 
social policy, geography, urban studies and politics. It is underpinned by an integrative 
theoretical framework drawing elements primarily from urban regime theory, theories 
of policy networks and multi-level governance. 
This thesis is based on the premise that the key to understanding the failure of the 
LVNAC project as well as the development of other mega sporting projects lies in 
understanding the prevailing governance arrangements. A working hypothesis was 
developed to guide the thesis, which is that the relative failure of the UK to bid for, and 
stage mega-sports events in the recent past is rooted within aspects of the network style 
of governance that evolved in London and other UK cities. In order to explore this 
proposition and to more fully understand the failure of the LVNAC project this thesis 
compares how other nations and cities (both within the UK and abroad) approach mega- 
sports events and their experiences of staging mega sports events. Drawing on 
documentary sources and semi-structured interviews with key players involved with the 
LVNAC project, the 'story' of the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre is told. The 
analysis of the LVNAC project locates the project within the evolving governance 
arrangements for London- the re-instatement of city-wide government and election of 
the Mayor in 2001. Comparison is made with the subsequent successful London bid for 
the 2012 Olympics. 
This thesis demonstrates the importance of governance issues throughout the whole 
mega sports events process and at all levels of governance. In particular this thesis has 
shown that three elements of governance -leadership, vision and strategy -play a critical 
role in securing and delivering successful mega sports events. The failure of the 
LVNAC project was the result of failures on all these fronts whilst the success of the 
London Olympic bid was largely because these elements were in place. This thesis 
highlights the critical role played by cities but also the continuing importance of central 
government in the mega sporting events process. Furthermore, this thesis has 
demonstrated the value of studying an apparent failure. So often the emphasis within 
policy and political arenas is on learning from success and consequently failures are 
often overlooked as a source of positive knowledge. 
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Preface 
This thesis began quite simply as a study of the community impacts of the development 
of a large stadium - namely the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre (LVNAC) in 
Enfield, north London. However, events soon took over, altering the course of the 
LVNAC and consequently the thesis. The 'story' of mega sports events in the UK and 
London in the past five years or so has as many twists and turns as a soap opera and 
probably as many characters. Here I would like to set the scene to the thesis by giving a 
'flavour' of what happened: the complexities and inter-connections, the dynamic nature 
of policy and politics and the way in which global events impinge on all aspects of 
policy. 
The 'story' begins in December 1999 with the decision of the then Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport, Chris Smith, to remove athletics from the English National 
Stadium development at Wembley and the proposal to build a National Athletics 
Centre. From the outset doubts were raised as to whether the LVNAC would ever see 
the light of day: the UK and London more specifically did not have a good track record 
on mega sports projects. The site of the National Athletic Centre was chosen at the end 
of March 2000 and less than two weeks later the International Association Athletic 
Federations (IAAF) awarded the rights to stage the 2005 World Athletic Championships 
to London: the first UK city to secure this prestigious event. The plan was to hold them 
at the yet to be built LVNAC. A few weeks later in May 2000 Londoners elected their 
first mayor - Ken Livingstone former leader of the Greater London Council - and the 
Greater London Authority. Livingstone was elected as an independent having been 
stopped from becoming the Labour candidate and he had been expelled from the Labour 
party. Thus, within the space of a few weeks London gained the World Athletics 
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Championships, a mayor and a unitary authority (after an absence of more than a 
decade). 
Despite these doubts by the time the thesis began (May 2001) a great deal of work had 
been done: the design had been launched, the outline planning application submitted, 
and electoral pledges made to deliver a world class event. However, a capital gap 
remained and there were other outstanding issues e. g. transport. In June 2001 New 
Labour were re-elected for a second term and the ensuing cabinet reshuffle saw a new 
team at the Department of Media, Culture and Sport (DCMS): out went Chris Smith, 
Secretary of State and 'architect' of the LVNAC and also Kate Hoey as Sports Minister 
and in came Tessa Jowell as Secretary of State and Richard Cabom as Sports Minister. 
Both the newcomers were seen by commentators as lacking in sports credentials. One of 
the first announcements made by Tessa Jowell was a review of the LVNAC project to 
be conducted by Patrick Carter which was to run along side his investigation of the 
troubled Wembley National Stadium development. For many this review was a clear 
signal that the 'writing was on the wall' for the LVNAC. 
Elsewhere Manchester had ran into difficulties with their preparations for the 2002 , 
Commonwealth Games and there were concerns that the UK would not be able to 
deliver a high quality event. Meanwhile members of the LVNAC project team were in 
Edmonton, Canada leaming at first hand about staging the World Athletics 
Championships. However, the LVNAC team were unaware that the DCMS was already 
in negotiation with Sheffield as alternative venue for the 2005 World Athletic 
Championships. At the end of August 2001 Carter delivered his report to the DCMS and 
Sport England but it was not until October that the results were revealed: the LVNAC 
project was cancelled. At a now famous meeting at Heathrow airport central 
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government acting against the advice of sporting bodies informed the IAAF of the 
situation and suggested Sheffield as an alternative. As predicted the IAAF rejected this 
plan and reopened the bidding. It was the first time in the modem sporting era that a 
major economic power had reneged on a promise to. hold a mega sports event. This 
incident was seen as highly damaging for the UK's reputation within international sport 
and a blow to future ambitions to host other events, in particular the Olympics. 
However, events elsewhere had overtaken the world and the news of the demise of the 
LVNAC project was relegated to the depths of the broad sheets (page 30 of The 
Guardian) by the coverage of the impact of the terrorist attacks on the USA of 
September 1 Ph 200 1. The events of "9111 " led directly to a, 61 billion security bill for the 
organisers of the 2004 Athens Olympics (BBC, 2004a) as well as many alarmist 
headlines in the months preceding the Games. 
The decision of October 2001 to abandon the LVNAC project left me with a problem - 
no stadium to study. Although I could have found another stadium development'(the 
plans to relocate Arsenal football club were in the pipeline), the fact that the UK and 
London had yet again run into trouble with a mega-project opened so many questions 
that I decided to investigate why, using the LVNAC as a case study. Moreover, whilst 
the LVNAC was collapsing the WNS development was stalled and questions remained 
as to whether Manchester could 'pull off the Commonwealth Games in 20 02 and this 
all begged the question- quite why did this keep happening? I thus set about 
restructuring my thesis and started down a very different road to the one I had set out on 
- studying the failure of the LVNAC project. 
After the initial furore died down it appeared as thought the LVNAC project would be 
consigned to history along with the UK ambitions to stage mega events in the near 
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future. Indeed questions were raised as to whether the UK would ever be capable of 
delivering a 'big project'. However a number of events - the success of Manchester 
Commonwealth Games, the DCMS/SU review of mega sport events (DCMS/SU, 2002), 
a strong pro- London Olympic bid lobby - combined to mean that mega sports events 
remained on the agenda and made the process of writing this thesis both interesting and 
challenging: hardly a week went by without a new development particularly as the time 
to submit a bid for the 2012 Olympics drew nearer. Although the cost-benefit study 
(Arup, 2002) commissioned by the key stakeholders (government, Mayor of London 
and British Olympic Association (BOA)) was generally well received perhaps not 
surprisingly many including central government were wary of going down the mega- 
event road. A great debate ensued with the pro and anti- camps being giving numerous 
opportunities to voice their opinions in the media. Objectors often raised the spectres of 
the LVNAC project and the WNS and also voiced concerns about the potential high 
costs of hosting the Olympics. A vocal champion of a London Olympic bid was the 
Mayor of London who wanted to use the Games as a vehicle for regeneration and to 
consolidate London's position as a global city which was very much against the grain of 
the DCMS/SU report (2002). Central government remained guarded talking about how 
they need to take into account "winnability", "affordability" and "deliverability" and the 
BOA made it clear that without the total 'buy in' (i. e. solid financial and political 
support) of central government there would be no bid. 
Although over time government support seemed to be increasing it was a difficult one 
to 'call' and the debate continued throughout the autumn and early winter and an 
announcement was eagerly awaited from the Cabinet in January 2003. However, once 
again world events were to push sport off the agenda. The growing crisis in Iraq and the 
increasing likelihood of war meant the Olympic decision was postponed. The war with 
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Iraq meant that the decision was further delayed and it was not until May 2003 that the 
government announced its intention to support a bid. The name of London was put 
forward as an applicant city by the BOA in July 2003 and although the government 
stated its support of the bid the general perception was that this support was at best 
'lukewarm'. In May 2004 London was selected as a candidate city along with Paris, 
New York, Madrid and Moscow. Livingstone also secured a second terin in office, this 
time within the Labour fold, stating that he would work with government to bring the 
Olympics to London. However, the London bid was criticised on a number of fronts, 
particularly transport, and Lord Sebastian Coe was brought in as Chair- a former 
Olympic gold medallist, ex-MP, member of the IAAF committee he was thus well 
linked into both international sporting and UK political networks. 
Coe made a number of changes to the team bringing in the likes of Jim Sloman chief 
operating officer for Sydney 2000 Olympics. The bid was also reworked prior to 
submitting the candidate file in November 2005 and the bid took on a new momentum. 
From the start Paris were the favourites and remained so throughout the process, 
although London's position was seen to strengthen over time as support from politicians 
and public grew. In the months preceding the decision Coe along with others including 
Tessa Jowell, Ken Livingstone and also the Prime Minister, Tony Blair and his wife 
Cherie Blair lobbied hard on behalf of the London bid. The PM's decision to attend the 
IOC session on the eve of hosting a G8 summit in Scotland was taken as a sign of his 
commitment - it seemed that the PM really was 'on board'. On July 6h 2005 Jacques 
Rogge, IOC President announced that London would host the 2012 Summer Olympics. 
The jubilation was to be short lived as the next day London found itself under attack 
from terrorists and within weeks another attempt (fortunately unsuccessful) was made to 
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bomb the transport system. Once again the world was given a stark remainder of the 
vulnerability of cities to acts of terrorism. 
When the LVNAC project was abandoned and the rights to host the World Athletics 
Championships were lost I think few would have predicted that within four years the 
same government would be celebrating securing the 'big prize' - the Summer 
Olympics. In part this thesis is about what has happened - at national and city level - to 
take us from the failure of the LVNAC to the success of London Olympic bid. It is also 
about how we learn in both research and policy terms from failure, not just from the 
LVNAC but also from other cities and nations that have embarked on the risky business 
of staging mega sports events. 
I was able to work full time on this research (2001 - 2004) as a PhD student thanks to a 
studentship from Middlesex University. 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
This thesis is about the inter-relationships between governance, sport and the city, with 
a particular focus on mega-sporting events. More specifically this thesis is about the 
failure of a particular project- the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre project and the 
loss of the rights to stage the 2005 World Athletics Championships in London -but more 
importantly it is also about how we can learn from failure. This chapter will describe the 
background to the study, introduce the key concepts that will be developed throughout 
the thesis and outline how each chapter contributes to the overall thesis. In addition, the 
term 'mega-event' will be defined and the evolution of mega-events briefly discussed. 
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Winning and losing the World Athletics Championships 
In Spring 2000 the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) awarded 
the prestigious 2005 World Championships in Athletics (generally known as the World 
Athletics Championships) to London. It was the first time that a UK city had secured the 
rights to host the World Athletics Championships (WAC). Staging the Championships 
involved the construction of a new National Athletics Centre on the site of the existing 
Lee Valley Leisure Centre at Picketts Lock, Enfield, north London- the Lee Valley 
National Athletics Centre (LVNAC)l. However, in October 2001 the Government 
announced that the development would not be proceeding. The main reasons given were 
that problems with transport infrastructure, athletes' accommodation and financing 
1 The Lee Valley National Athletics Centre was often referred to as Picketts Lock in the media and by 
politicians but in this thesis its 'official' title will be used. 
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meant that it was unlikely that the project could be delivered to standard within time. 
The IAAF withdrew the games from London and refused to allow the Championships to 
be transferred to another UK city. The bidding process re-opened and although the UK 
was invited to submit a new bid, they declined to do so and the 2005 World Athletics 
Championships were subsequently awarded to Helsinki, Finland. 
The abandonment of the LVNAC project was the first time in the modem sporting era 
that a major economic power had failed to meet a promise to host a. mega-sports event 
(BBC, 2001a). However, for London it was the latest in the line of large-scale sporting 
and cultural projects to encounter difficulties. For example, both the Millennium Dome 
and English National Stadium at Wembley (commonly known as Wembley National 
Stadium) had been dogged with problems over financing, cost-overruns, delays in 
construction and uncertainties over their legaqy function. 
Why is this unfortunate episode of interest? 
A) Shifts in the relationship between sport and the city 
Urban sports policy in Britain and other advanced economies has altered considerably in 
the last two decades. There has been a shift of focus from the delivery of sport for all 
and sporting welfare provision to the use of sport as a tool of economic development 
and an emphasis on sport and urban entrepreneurialism (Henry and Gratton, 2001; 
Henry, 2001). Sport is increasingly seen as a central strategy for large cities to promote 
their image and global position, undertake regeneration and tackle problems of social 
exclusion. Mega-sporting events in particular are seen as a key means of city marketing 
and large-scale regeneration although the processes and outcomes have proved to be 
deeply controversial. Burbank et al (2001) have termed this pursuit of a high profile 
event to act as a stimulus to, and rationale for, local development, the mega-event 
strategy. They argue that this potentially high risk strategy for stimulating local 
economic growth has arisen from a combination of factors, in particular increased 
global economic competition and reduced government financial support to cities which 
results in strong competition for jobs and capital (Burbank et al, 2001). Furthermore, the 
huge media coverage of these events means that the attention of the world is focused on 
the host city and thus staging an event provides a supreme opportunity for the host city 
to 'sell' itself globally. Competition between cities to host mega sporting events is fierce 
(Whitelegg, 2000; Burbank et al, 2001), in particular for the 'big three' that is the 
Olympic Games, the World Athletics Championships and the FIFA (Fidiration 
Internationale de Football Association) World Cup. 
London as a global city is well placed to bid for and secure such events but in fact UK 
and London do not have a strong track record. The award of the 2012 Olympics to 
London may have changed this but at the time of the failure of the LVNAC project the 
situation was very different. In simple terms the UK had never won a competitive bid 
for the OlyrnpiCS2 (although Birmingham and Manchester had both submitted bids in 
recent years), England failed in its bid to host the 2006 FIFA World Cup and had never 
staged the World Athletics Championships. Although preparations were underway for 
Manchester to host the Commonwealth Games in 2002 the most recent and significant 
events hosted in the UK were the 1996 UEFA (Union of European Football 
Associations) Championships (commonly known as Euro'96) and the FIFA World Cup 
in 1966. Moreover, the LVNAC episode was regarded as damaging to the UK and 
London's reputation and standing generally and more specifically to its chances of 
securing a mega-sporting event: in 2001 even a bid for the 2012 Olympics appeared to 
2 7bis has of course changed with the award of the 2012 Games. The Olympics were last staged in post- 
war London in 1948 and were dubbed the 'austerity games'. 
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be a remote possibility 3. All this raised questions. Firstly, why had the UK generally and 
London in particular experienced so many difficulties in securing and realising mega- 
sporting events? Secondly, what was required to enable the UK and London to secure 
and deliver such projects? Finally, for some there was a fundamental doubt that the UK 
and London could ever stage a successful mega-sports event. Over the course of this 
thesis as the plans to bring the Olympics to London in 2012 began to take shape and as 
the bid gathered momentum these questions became even more pertinent. 
b) Changes in urban governance 
At the same time as there have been changes in the ways in which cities use sport, there 
have also been changes in the way cities are governed. There has been a general shift 
from 'government' to 'governance', with a broader range of actors being involved in the 
process of governing. These shifts in governance have raised fundamental conceptual 
questions relating to democracy, accountability and the exercise of power, and the 
changing role of the state. 
What has emerged in cities is a particular form of governance, based on intense 
interaction between large numbers of partners including statutory, voluntary and private 
organisations - this has been termed 'network mode' of governance. Kleinman, Gordon 
and Hall (2002) argue that although network governance has become increasingly 
common throughout the UK it took on a particular form in London for several reasons. 
Firstly, between 1986-2000 London lacked a unitary authority and networking was a 
practical response to the absence of an overall strategic body. Secondly, the economic 
and political importance of London as the capital and the history of relations between 
3 For example, Tony Banks, former Sports Minister said in an interview following the collapse of the 
LVNAC project "... we probably won't be able to mount a bid for the 2012 Olympic Games" (BBC, 
2001b). 
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central government and London over the centuries shaped its form. The absence of a 
unitary authority made London one of the few major cities in the world without 
metropolitan government (Travers et al, 1991). What emerged was a complex system, 
but one with little democratic accountability or strategic co-ordination (Newman and 
Thomley, 1997; Hebbert, 1998; Tomaney, 2001). 
All this raises several interrelated questions. Firstly, why has sport and city regeneration 
and promotion become so entwined? Secondly, what is the role of governance 
arrangements in the realisation of mega sporting events? And more specifically why the 
UK and London have been so ineffective in realising mega sporting projects? 
Using the LVNAC project as a case study, this thesis sets out to explore the 
relationships between governance, sport and the city, with the aim of ftu-thering 
understanding of these relationships, particularly in relation to the hosting of mega- 
sporting events. Although governance changes at national, regional and city level have 
been well described, our understanding of what these changes mean is less well 
developed. This thesis by focusing on these governance changes will help us better 
understand and conceptualise them and to identify significant elements of these 
governance changes. Furthermore, it is only by understanding the nature of urban and 
sport governance that we will be able to identify the potentialities and constraints on 
bidding for and staging mega-sporting events in the UK generally, and in London 
specifically. 
At this point it would probably be useful to clarify what is meant by the term mega- 
event and how it will be used within this thesis. In the next section, the various 
definitions and meanings ascribed to this term will be discussed and the development of 
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mega-events over time sketched out. Following on from this, the research questions will 
be set out and an outline of how each chapter contributes to the overall thesis will be 
given. 
MEGA-EVENTS: TERMINOLOGY, DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION 
Mega-events' are large cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which 
have dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance" (Roche, 
2000, p. 1). A number of terms are used, often interchangeably, to describe large-scale 
cultural events. For example, the Olympic Games have been referred to as a 'hallmark 
event' (e. g. Waitt, 1999; Owen, 2002), as a'mega-event' (e. g. Burbank et al, 2001; 
Hiller, 2000; Roche, 2000) and as a 'large-scale' event (e. g. French and Disher, 1997). 
There are further inconsistencies in the use of terminology, for example, for Roche 
(2000) mega-events and hallmark events are not one and the same, but different in scale 
and targeted at different markets (see Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1 Public events: types and dimensions according to Roche 2000 
Type of event Example of event Target Type of media interest 
attendancelmarket 
Mega Event Expos Global Global TV 
Olympics 
FIFA World Cup 
(Soccer) 
Special Event Grand Prix (Formula 1) World Regional/ International/ 
World Regional Sport National National TV 
(e. g. Pan-Am Games) 
Hallmark Event National sport event Regional Local TV 
(e. g. Australia Games) 
Big City Sport/Festival 
Community Event Rural Town Event Regional/ Local Local TV/Press 
Local Community Local Local 
Event 
Source: Roche (2000), p. 4. 
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In a review of UK sports policy the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) 
and the Strategy Unit (SU) drew a distinction between mega and major events (see 
Figure 1.2). It is this classification and tenninology that will be used within this thesis. 
For the DCMS/SU (2002) the key features of mega sporting events appear to be the 
high level of infrastructure investment required and what they term the "winnability" 
i. e. the chances of winning the bid to host in the face of competition from other cities 
and nations (p. 150). Both Roche (2000) and DCMS/SU (2002) highlight the global 
nature of mega events. 
Figure 1.2: Defining features and categories of mega and major events 
Mega events- these consist of the Summer Olympics, FIFA World Cup, UEFA European 
Championships, IAAF World Athletics championships and the Commonwealth Games. 
These events are awarded after competitive bidding to an International Federation. Most 
tend to involve significant infrastructure investment. 
Major events (all others) can be split into the following three categories: 
" Calendar events - events that are a regular part of the international calendar for that 
sport, e. g. The Wimbledon Tennis Championships, the British Formula I Grand Prix, 
Test Series in Cricket. 'Mere is no bidding for these events - they are an established 
part of the circuit. They are generally considered to be commercially successM. 
" One off-events- events that attract substantial interest in the UK and international TV 
rights e. g. the Rugby Union and Cricket World Cups. Bidding for these events is 
usually competitive. 
Showcase events- bidding for these events can be competitive and include events that: 
have the potential to boost the development of sport in the UK; provide the UK with a 
good chance of winning medals; and can improve the image and influence of UK sport 
overseas and/or involve regions of the UK e. g. the World Judo Championships, the 
World Disability Athletics Championships, and the European Show Jumping 
Championships. 
Source: DCMS/SU (2002), p. 149. 
Although there are slight variations in what is classed as a mega-event, the elite events 
are generally regarded as the Olympics, FIFA World Cup and World Athletics 
Championships (WAC). However, although these three tend to be grouped together 
there are significant differences between them. Firstly, the Olympics and WAC are city 
located events and awarded to cities, whilst the World Cup is staged in multi-urban 
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centres and awarded to nations. Secondly, although the Olympics carry instant global 
recognition, the WAC are not so effective, as Henry and Gratton (2001) observe: "Most 
sports fans could cite the location of the last six or eight summer Olympic games, while 
many would have difficulty in identifying the last four locations for the World Athletics 
Championships" (pp. 4-5). Indeed, given the high profile media coverage of not just the 
Olympics themselves but also of the bidding process, it is likely that even people with 
little interest in sport would be able to name prospective Olympic cities as well as recent 
hosts. The FIFA World Cup is not city based and although it does provide income and 
recognition for host cities it is not of the same magnitude as the Olympics. Thirdly, in 
terms of television viewing the FIFA World Cup is the number one event. The 2002 
FIFA World Cup Korea/Japan was broadcast to 213 countries, with over 4 1,100 hours 
of dedicated programming and cumulative audience of 28.8 billion viewers (FIFA, No. 
date). Although television coverage and viewing numbers for the WAC are increasing 
(IAAF, 2005, p. 5) they still pale into insignificance when compared to those for either 
the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup 4. Vast amounts of money are made from the sale 
of broadcasting rights for mega-sports events, indeed for the past three decades it has 
been the greatest source of revenue for the Olympic movement (IOC, 2005, p. 2). 
This all perhaps begs the question as to why the WAC consistently features in the 'top 
three? The answer to this probably lies in the powerful position that the IAAF holds 
within the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The IAAF is the richest and most 
powerf6l of the federations (Hill, 1993) and represents a sport that is a central plank of 
the Summer Olympics. Thus, the WAC is a highly prestigious event and is perhaps 
viewed by some cities as a stepping stone to the 'big prize' - the Olympics. The 
4 The 2004 Athens Olympics was broadcast to 220 countries and watched by approximately 4.2 billion' 
people (IOC, 2005, p. 2). The 2005 Wo'rld Athletics Championships held in Helsinki was watched by a 
cumulative audience of 57 million viewers which represented a 50% increase on Paris 2003 (IAAF, 2005, 
p. 5). 
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Olympics (primarily the Summer Games) dominates the literature. This is a reflection of 
the long history of the Olympics which means there is ample material but also the 
potential of the Olympics to transform a city, either physically, its image or its position 
within the global urban hierarchy. 
It is important to note that the 'top three' or even the top spot are not fixed; rather mega- 
events are a dynamic phenomenon. Shoval has traced the development of mega events 
from "Expo genre to Olympic genre" (Shoval, 2002, p. 587) and the key phases and 
developments are presented in Figure 1.3. The first mega event, I the 'Great Exhibition 55 
was held in London in 18 5 1. It was the first World Fair or Exposition and it involved 
the construction of a venue (Crystal Palace). Its success led to a long series of World 
Exhibitions in leading cities of Europe and North America. Their main objective was to 
showcase the industrial achievements and political strength of the different world 
powers (Roche, 2000). The Olympics began as a 'side show' to World Exhibitions and 
it was not until the advent of mass media, which enabled live broadcasts to be relayed 
around the world, that sporting events began to establish themselves. As television 
increased the fortunes of sPorting events (quite literally through lucrative broadcast and 
sponsorship deals) it reduced the international status and impact of 'Expos' (Roche, 
2000), and cities turned to the Olympics to fulfil their aspirations. As will be discussed 
in Chapters Two and Seven, smaller 'second tier' cities, such as Los Angeles and 
Barcelona have used the Olympics as a vehicle for place marketing and economic 
development. 
Shoval (2002) identifies a recent shift, with top tier cities entering the race to host the 
Olympics and other mega sports events and this was reflected in the candidate list for 
Its full title was 'The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations'. 
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the 2012 Summer Olympics, with London, New York and Paris all in the running. In 
addition, Paris hosted the 2003 World Athletics Championships, bid for the 2008 
Olympics Games and France was host to the 1998 FIFA World Cup. Thus, once again 
the leading cities are using mega-events (albeit a different event) to consolidate and 
reassert their positions in the global urban hierarchy. 
Figure 1.3: Shoval's four phases of mega-event development 1851 -present day 
Phase Time period Premier Event Developments Hosts 
I Heyday of 1851-1939 World Fairs and Showcase for Top tier European 
'Expos' Exhibitions leading industrial and North 
politic powers American cities 
2 Decline of 1948-1984 World Fairs and Radio/TV gave a Smaller, 2 
nd tier 
'Expos' Exhibitions cheaper means of cities from around 
presenting the world 
technological 
achievements 
3 Rise of the 1984-2000 Olympics Commercial 2nd tier cities 
Olympics success of Los trying to improve 
Angles Olympics their national/ 
spurred cities to international 
bid positions 
4 Pre-eminence of 2000 & the future Olympics Bids from top tier Up to 2008 2 
nd 
the Olympics cities trying to tier cities but 
reassert their 2012 likely to be 
positions a top tier city 
Source: Compiled by author using and adapting Shoval (2002) 
It is also important to note that other sporting events have also grown in scale and 
stature over time. For example, the size and scope of the Commonwealth Games has 
increased. Recent events including the end of apartheid in South Africa and conclusion 
of the Cold War have increased the political and economic significance of the 
Commonwealth Games (House of Commons, 1999). The 2002 Manchester 
Commonwealth Games (MCG) were the largest ever staged (CPC, 2002). This was 
largely in response to the 1998 Commonwealth Games hosted by Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia which were seen to raise the 'benchmark' and as a consequence Manchester 
revised its original plans. The impact of this scaling up of the MCG will be considered 
in detail in Chapter Seven. 
II 
So having clarified what a mega-event is and described the evolution of mega-events, 
let us now turn our attention to the questions that this thesis seeks to address. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis is based on the premise that the key to understanding the failure of the 
LVNAC, as well as the development and delivery of other mega sporting projects lies in 
understanding the prevailing governance arrangements. F rorn this premise a working 
hypothesis was developed to underpin and guide the study, which is that the relative 
failure of the UK to bid for, and stage mega-sporting events in the recent past is rooted 
within aspects of the style of network governance that has evolved in London and other 
UK cities. There are three main research questions and a number of sub-questions: 
1) Is there a particular style(s) of governance associated with securing and 
delivering successful mega-spo, rtS events? 
What are thefeatures ofgovernance systems thatpromote the ability to secure 
and deliver successful mega-sports events? In relation to mega sports events 
what counts as 'successful'and what counts as failure'? nat are thefeatures 
ofgovernance systems that limit the ability to secure and deliver successful 
mega- sports events? 
ý) What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the network style of 
governance in relation to bidding for and delivering mega-sports events? 
nat are the keyfeatures of urban governance? What are the keyfeatures of 
sports governance? 
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3) In the specific case of London, how do the arrangements for urban and sports 
governance influence how events are bid for and delivered? 
How have urban and sports governance arrangements changed in London over 
recent years? What are the similarities and differences with governance 
arrangements in other UK and global cities? What is particular about the case 
ofLondon? 
The next section outlines the structure of the thesis. The structure of the thesis reflects 
the steps taken during the research process, from its origins laid out in this chapter 
through its theoretical underpinnings, research design and methodology to the findings 
and conclusions. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
In order to further understanding of the relationships between governance, sport and the 
city we need to capture the different dimension, scales and inter-connections, 
complexities and the dynamic nature of governance and urban politics. Consequently, 
the theoretical framework and the research design and methods used within this thesis 
were adopted in order to capture these sport, governance and city relations. The decision 
making process involved in the choice of both the theoretical framework and the 
methodological approach will form part of the discussion in the relevant chapters. 
The purpose of Chapter Two - 'Governance, urban politics and sport' -is to explain the 
theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. Firstly, changes in city governance are outlined, 
followed by a discussion of theories that have the potential to help us understand the 
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connections between governance, urban politics and sport. Three alternative theoretical 
perspectives are sketched out and their strengths and weaknesses identified. These are 
urban regime theory, policy networks, multi-level governance. Secondly, the inter- 
relationships between governance, urban politics and sport are briefly examined in order 
to identify the nature of these relationships and also the key issues that the theoretical 
framework needs to be able to address. Having considered alternative theoretical 
explanations and identified the key elements that the theoretical framework needs to 
take account of, the chapter concludes by setting out an integrative theoretical 
framework that guides the research. The integrative theoretical framework combines 
elements from the different theoretical perspectives considered as a way of ensuring that 
all the key issues are covered. 
The purpose of Chapter Three - Methods - is to set out the research design and the 
methods adopted and explain the rationale behind these choices. This chapter explains 
how the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two was operationalised and it also 
presents a reflexive account of conducting the research, issues that were anticipated and 
also those that arose during the course of the research and how they were addressed. 
The objective of Chapter Four -'Case study: the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre' 
- is to set the scene to the case study and the findings. First, the governance of London 
since 1963 will be briefly described in order to locate the LVNAC project within the 
wider London context. Second, background infonnation about the Upper Lee Valley 
and Enfield, including its location, socio-economic profile and the main issues facing 
the area is provided. Finally, the 'story' of the LVNAC project, from its origins to its 
demise is told. The key issues that faced the project are highlighted along with the major 
players, critical events and decisions. 
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Chapter Five -'The Lee Valley National Athletics Centre: findings from the case 
study'- presents the research findings from the case study. This chapter draws upon both 
the interview data and documentary sources, and builds upon the themes and issues 
identified from the wider literature. For the purposes of clarity Chapter Five is divided 
into two broad sections, with the first section focusing on governance issues and the 
second section concentrating on sports issues. There are of course points of convergence 
and overlap. The final section draws together the twelve explanations given for the 
failure of the LVNAC project in readiness for the next step in analysis. These twelve 
explanations fall into three categories and for the purpose of the next stage of analysis 
were grouped together: central goverrunent and governance; London and city 
govemance; and sports governance. 
The next stage of analysis entailed revisiting the wider literature on mega sports events 
and considering the explanations for the failure of the LVNAC project in the light of the 
experiences of other nations, cities and events in order to assess what are the key 
elements for success in mega-sporting projects and to gain insights into the relationship 
between the success or failure of mega sporting projects and governance issues. This 
analysis is presented in the subsequent two chapters -Six and Seven. 
In Chapter Six - 'The nation state and sport' - the focus is on national and cultural 
issues in relation to sports governance in general and mega-sporting events in particular. 
Specifically this chapter examines first, the role and approach of central government to 
mega-sports events in different nations. Second, it examines how the particularities of 
sports governance relate to national and international contexts. Finally, this chapter will 
consider the 'value' of sport within national and political cultures. 
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In Chapter Seven- 'Cities and mega-sports events' - the spotlight shifts from the level 
of the nation state to the city and the role played by cities in bidding for and hosting 
mega-sports events. This chapter picks up and develops the governance issues 
highlighted in Chapter Two. 'Firstly, consideration will be given to the role and 
approach of city-level goverm-nent to mega-sports events, how this varies and impacts 
on the form of the event and its legacy and also how this has evolved over time. 
Secondly, two cases - Sydney Olympics 2000 and Manchester Commonwealth Games 
2002 - will be examined in more detail. These comparators were chosen because they 
were both major precursors to the LVNAC project and actively informed thinking on 
mega events at the time. Finally, the specifics of London will be examined. The focus 
will be on the changing relationship between sport and governance from the pre-Mayor 
period (1986-2000), through the establishment of the Mayor (2000-2003) to the 
maturing Mayoralty (2003 onwards) and its significance for mega-sports events, in 
particular the LVNAC project and the London Olympic bid. 
The purpose of Chapter Eight -'Discussion: Conclusions and way forward'- is to draw 
together the findings of the study, set out what has been learnt and also suggest possible 
ways of taking this knowledge forward in both the research and policy arenas. Firstly, a 
brief summary of the thesis is provided and the research questions are re-visited. The 
rest of the chapter is divided into three main sections focusing in turn on methodology, 
governance and sport. For each area in turn the conclusions are set out, along with 
policy implications and ideas for ftirther research. 
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Chapter Two 
Governance, urban politics and sport 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the interrelationships between governance, urban politics and 
sport, consider alternative theoretical perspectives and set out the theoretical framework 
that will guide this thesis. Firstly, changes in city governance will be outlined, followed 
by a discussion of theories that have the potential to help us understand the 
interconnections between governance, urban politics and sport. The discussion will 
focus on three bodies of work - urban regime theory, policy networks and multi-level- 
governance - and for each theoretical approach the main components will be set out and 
strengths and weaknesses identified. 
Secondly, the various interrelationships between governance and sport will be 
considered. At a city wide level sport is used as a tool for economic development and 
place marketing, primarily through pursuing a mega-event strategy. At a neighbourhood 
level sport has been used as a tool to promote social inclusion as well as to provide 
opportunities for residents to participate in sport and physical exercise. Both at the city 
level and neighbourhood level developments are shaped by and conducted within a 
multiplicity of national policy frameworks concerned with neighbourhood renewal, 
economic development and sports development. Furthermore, in relation to mega- 
events it is international sporting bodies (e. g. IOC, FIFA) that set the terms and make 
the key decisions (i. e. award the rights to host an event). This all adds up to a highly 
complex, multi-levelled system with numerous points of articulation and potential for 
overlap, tension and conflict as players with differing interests and priorities try to 
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forward their plans. What is both important and interesting is how these issues are 
approached, defined and resolved (or not as the case may be) as it reveals much about 
what drives cities and the priorities of those who make the key decisions and shape the 
city. Finally, drawing together the theories and the issues raised in the discussion about 
the interrelationships, the theoretical framework will be set out. 
GOVERNANCE 
Governing contemporary Britain is a complex and challenging task. Over time there has 
been a shift in the pattern of governance, so that: 'Twenty years ago political institutions 
and political leaders were more self reliant and it was assumed - for good reasons - that 
the state governed Britain' (Pierre and Stoker, 2000, p. 29), whilst today, although the 
state retains a key role, governance now involves the interaction of a broad and complex 
network of actors. These changes have occurred at national, regional and city level, and 
are reflected in the increasing use of the tenn 'governance' rather than 'govermnent'. 
The traditional use of governance and its dictionary entry define it as a synonym for 
government, but in the growing Work on governance there is re-direction in its use and 
import: "A change in the meaning of government, referring to a process of governing; 
or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is 
govemed" (Rhodes, 1997, p. 48). 
Governance is essentially about process rather than institutional structures (Osbome and 
Gaebler, 1992; Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001). Furthermore, the role of govenunent is 
changing. It increasingly involves what Osborne and Gaebler (1992) terrn 'steering' 
rather than 'rowing', or to use the terms commonly used by British politicians it is 
about 'enabling' rather than 'providing'. In practical terms this means that the 
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goverment role is to facilitate and control rather than always be direct providers of ' 
services. However, as Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) observe although governance 
implies a different approach to the business of government it does not necessarily 
involve less government. Table 2.1 encapsulates the key changes in the shift from 
goveniment to govemance. 
Figure 2.1: From government to governance: the shifting focus 
Old government New governance 
The state The state and civil society 
The public sector Public, private and voluntary (or "third" sectors) 
Institutions Processes 
Organisational structures Policies, outputs, outcomes 
'Rowing', providing 'Steering', enabling 
Commanding, controlling, directing Leading, facilitating, collaborating, bargaining 
Hierarchy and authority Networks and partnerships 
Source: Leach and Percy-Smith (2001), p. 5. 
Theoretical work on governance reflects the interest of social scientists in the shifting 
pattern in styles of governing (Stoker, 1998). However, as Pierre and Stoker (2000) 
comment governance remains a 'slippery' concept and reviews of the literature 
conclude that the term is used in number of ways and has a variety of meanings 
(Rhodes, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2000). A key issue is the distinction between 
govenunent and govemance. Rosenau (1992, pp. 3-6) argues that govemment refers to 
"activities backed by formal govenunent", whereas governance relates to "activities 
backed by shared goals". Thus, governance is a more "encompassing phenomenon" as it 
includes not only governmental organisations but also "informal, 
non-govenunental organisations"An this way, you get govemance without govemment 
when there are "regulatory mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function 
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effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority". Although 
government and governance both consist of rule systems and steering mechanisms 
through which authority is exercised there are crucial differences between these systems 
and mechanisms. Rosenau (2004) argues that the rule systems of governments are 
formal structures, institutions that deal with a wide range of issues that are pertinent to 
the people that are being governed. Whilst governance is a broader concept, referring to 
ccany collectivity -private or public-that employs informal as well as formal steering 
mechanisms to make demands, frame goals, issue directives, pursue policies and 
generate compliance" (Rosenau, 2004, p. 3 1). 
'Governance', whist primarily about processes rather than institutions and structures, 
also reflects the growing complexity and fragmentation of government, which is now 
increasingly multi-levelled. For example, supranational organisations such as the 
European Union now play a key role in the governance of the UK, and devolution 
means that Scotland and Wales now have a UK and national level of government, whilst 
there have also been attempts to develop regional and city governance. Modem 
government is also increasingly fragmented and segmented within and across levels. 
Governance involves a broad range of organisations including central government 
departments, local government, quasi-public bodies, voluntary sector and the private 
sector. This governance is both multi-agency and multi-level and within this more 
complex system there is rarely a clear chain of command or hierarchy of authority. 
Public policies and services now require a great deal of co, -operation between 
organisations and this takes several forms, such as multi-agency working, formal 
partnerships and less formal policy networks. Table 2.2 surnmarises the shift from what 
was dubbed the 'Westminster model" with a single, homogeneous UK government 
responsible to a sovereign Parliament, to the new system of governance. 
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Figure 2.2: The Westminster model and the new British governance 
The Westminster model The new British governance 
The unitary state The 'differentiated polity' 
Parliamentary sovereignty The devolution of power 
Ministerial responsibility Delegation of authority 
Central-local relations Multi-level governance 
Homogeneity, uniformity Diversity, fragmentation 
Hierarchical authority Partnerships, networks, 'joined up' government. 
Source: Leach and Percy-Smith, 2001, p. 7. 
However, as Newman (2001) notes in relation to New Labour's approach to policy 
making, these changes are underpinned by contradictory forces. So whilst there have 
been moves to decentralise power and develop consensual models of working, at the 
same time measures have been taken to centralise powers and to have tight control over 
processes and outcome. Thus there is fundamental tension between decentralisation and 
centralisation running through the New Labour project with the government pulling in 
both directions (Newman, 2001). 
Goveming the new urban political environment: directly elected mayors 
One aspect of this shift which is of particular relevance to this thesis is the growing 
interest in the UK in directly elected mayors. Although a feature of cities in the USA 
and European nations (e. g. France, Germany) they have not been part of the political 
landscape of UK cities. Debates about the merits or otherwise of elected mayors 
developed during the 1990si, with those in favour arguing that they represent a new 
1 Michael Heseltine, Conservative Secretary of State for the Environment in John Major's government 
was a strong advocate of elected mayors. He first proposed the idea in a consultation paper (DoE, 1991), 
although the Major government did not follow-up the idea. In 1995 the Commission for Local 
Democracy also recommended the adoption of the elected Mayoral model as part of a package of reforms 
aimed at invigorating local democracy (Commission for Local Democracy, 1995). 
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fonn of urban leadership, offer greater accountability, visibility and electoral 
competition (Tomaney, 2001). The promotion of elected mayors can be viewed as 
reflective of the shift from 'government to governance' and the requirements of a new 
political environment (Stoker, 2000). Stoker argues that: 
Mayors deliver a leadership capacity suited to the new tasks and challenges that 
face local politics and governance ... Local politicians need to be champions for 
service improvement, facilitating the expression of voices in diverse 
conununities and reconciling differences, developing partnerships to ensure their 
achievement. Leadership in these new circumstances is not about seizing control 
of the state machine: it is about building coalitions, developing networks and 
steering in a complex environment. (Stoker, 2000). 
Proponents of elected mayors pointed to examples to support their case, in particular 
Guiliani in New York and Riordan in Los Angeles both of whom forged successful 
partnerships with private sector actors in order to forward urban regeneration 
programmes. Pimlott and Rao (2002) argue that the American experience has been most 
influential in shaping British thinking about mayors, although of course there remain 
questions of transferability from one political culture to another and the influence and 
importance of local tradition and circumstances. 
Several typologies of mayoral leadership have been developed, perhaps most notably by 
Yates (1977) who started with the premise that mayors differed along two dimensions: 
first, the amount of political and financial resources they have at their disposal to tackle 
the problems they face; and second, their style. Yates (1977) identified four ideal types 
that corresponded with patterns of mayoral leadership in large cities in the USA that 
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still have resonance in contemporary America and Europe (Pimlott and Rao, 2002). The 
four ideal types are as follows: the 'crusader 'with high activism and low resources; the 
'boss' with high resources and low activism; the 'broker' with low resources and 
passive style and the 'entrepreneur' with high resources and activist posture. Although 
for many the 'boss' system is seen to typify the American city, Pimlott and Rao (2002) 
argue that its heyday is long gone. Boss regimes were opaque, closed to influence, 
working through a political party, upheld by the spoils system and a feature of 
American cities when they were strongholds of heavy indus try and ethnic politics, with 
the 'boss' being reliant on block support from the blue-collar work force 2. Pimlott and 
Rao (2002) argue that the 'boss' tended to have great power but little vision about how 
to use for the benefit of the city 3. 
Piml. ptt and Rao (2002) suggest that in fact the 'broker' with neither resources or 
ambitions is more typical of the American experience with many mayors doing little 
more than ratifying agreements reached by competing interest groups. The third 
category the 'crusader' represents a distinct type of leadership in which visionary 
ambition is unimpeded by the lack of power required to achieve it. The 'crusader' 
mayor is generally represented as charismatic, a populist and a reformer. 'Crusaders' 
were a feature of the response to the urban crisis of the 1960s. However, as Pimlott and 
Rao (2002) note over time 'crusader' mayors often find their attempts at refonn 
frustrated and realise that survival has to take precedence over reform4. The fourth 
category the 'entrepreneur' represents the idealised image of a successful mayor but the 
2 Social changes in the structure of the city, for the example, the emergence of a number of highly 
differentiated interest groups and also desire for more accountability and transparency contributed to an 
end of the 'boss' system (Pimlott and Rao, 2002). 
3 The 'boss' was personified by the first Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago. 
4 For example, Mayor John Lindsay in New York cut through bureaucracy concentrating power into the 
hands of a few close aides and tried to introduce strong 'scientific' management. However, they found 
their ambitions for change thwarted and their challenges to the existing bureaucracy inadequate. 
Furthermore their rhetorical commitment to the poor and apparent contempt of the white middle class led 
to political polarization and a loss of popularity in the city (Pimlott and Rao, 2002), 
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necessary combination of political resources and political activism is rare (Pimlott and 
Rao, 2002). Pimlott and Rao (2002) give the example of Herbert Morrison, Labour 
leader of the Greater London Council (GLC) froml934-19405. However, they also note 
that this model was highly personal and although his successors had his formal powers 
they lacked his authority and were not able to build upon his successes (Pimlott and 
Rao, 2002). 
Another way in which mayors have been conceptualised is as 'strong' and 'weak' 
particularly in relation to the council (e. g. Svara, 1990, Judd and Swanstrom, 1994) 
There are five features that can be used to form a continuum between strong and weak 
mayors (Svara, 1990; Judd and Swanstrom, 1994): control over budgets; control over 
policy; powers of appointment of senior staff; direction of lines of authority and 
accountability; and existence of other elected officials. Although the strong/weak 
continuum (see Figure 2.3) is a- useful way of categorising the strength of mayors in 
relation to their councils and allows for comparison, a number of shortcomings have 
been identified. 
Figure 2.3: The strong-mayor/weak mayor-continuum 
Strong mayor Weak Mayor 0 
Mayor controls budgets 
Mayor controls policy 
Mayor appoints staff 
Mayor directs bureaucracy 
Mayor and council only elected actors 
Mayor and council share control of budget 
Mayor and council share control of policy 
Council appoints staff 
Council directs bureaucracy 
Many elected actors 
Source: Sweeting, 2003, p. 468. 
5 According to Pimlott and Rao (2002) Morrison is often mistakenly seen as an archetypical 'boss'. 
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The model focuses on the formal powers and structures of municipal government. Thus 
it fails to take into account the informal powers of mayors 6, the important part played by 
actors from outside the fonnal structures or the relationships with these outside agencies 
(Sweeting, 2003). The model also ignores the relationships between central and local 
government which in the UK context is a crucial omission (Sweeting, 2003). 
Sweeting (2003) proposes an extension of the model (see Figure 2.4) arguing that any 
assessment of the 'strength' of mayors needs to take into account both the internal 
structures of the local authority within which the mayor acts and the ability and capacity 
of the mayor to extend their power to act beyond the formal boundaries of office. 
Figure 2.4: Two dimensions of mayoral strength 
strong 
mayor 





I Power limited to office 
I 




Using these two dimensions Sweeting (2003) identifies four types of mayor. Type I 
mayors are strong in relation to their council, their power extends well beyond the 
confines of their office and they operate in an autonomous environment. Type 2 mayors 
are weak in the sense they share control over the council bureaucracy with other elected 
6 According to this model Chicago is formally a weak mayor city but as already noted Mayor Daley the 
'boss' Mayor was able to amass and wield a great deal of power. 
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officials. Nevertheless they are very influential beyond their office and their authorities 
shave autonomy from other levels of government. Type 3 mayors are strong inside their 
council but have limited influence in local governance and do not oPerate in an 
autonomous environment. Finally type 4 mayors are weak in terms of their relationship 
with their councils but also have little influence beyond the council and limited local 
autonomy. 
The LVNAC project coincided with UK's first experiment with a directly elected mayor 
- the Mayor of London - and these typologies provide frameworks in which to consider 
the mayoral system. They point to the critical role of political and financial resources, 
the value of informal as well as formal powers, the importance of relationships with 
other levels of governance (e. g. central government) and actors outside the 
administration (e. g. private sector) and the degree of influence the mayor has outside 
office. Furthermore, they highlight the importance of the style and personality of the 
incumbent mayor. Indeed, Pimlott and Rao (2002) argued the success or failure of the 
London experiment will be largely due to the first few mayoral incumbents and 
particularly the first -Ken Livingstone: 
The formal political resources at his disposal are limited while his own 
political style is interventionist, flamboyant, even charismatic. Time will show 
whether Livingstone turns out to be a 'crusader' or is forced to retreat to a 
'brokers' role. (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, p. 20). 
The role and structure of the Mayor and GLA will be described in Chapter Four, whilst 




There are a number of competing and overlapping bodies of theoretical work which 
seek to explain these changes, some in general terms and others specifically at the urban 
level. The following examination does not attempt to be exhaustive rather it focuses on 
theoretical perspectives that seem to be particularly useful for this thesis. It should be 
noted that the literature drawn upon is English language, US influenced social science 
material. The first body work of work to be considered, urban regime theory, as its 
name implies, focuses on city governance. Of the three bodies of work considered here, 
it is perhaps the most coherent, it has been extensively applied and is of particular 
interest as it has been used as a framework to analyse, mega-event strategies (e. g. 
Burbank et al, 2001). However, it has a number of limitations, which will be discussed 
along with the suggestions that have been made to improve its explanatory power. The 
other two bodies of work - on multi-level governance and policy networks- have proved 
to have excellent descriptive powers of the changes in governance outlined above, but 
there are debates as to whether they constitute theories or are best described as models 
or conceptual frameworks. A number of suggestions have been made about how to 
strengthen their explanatory power. One of the main criticisms of these theories is that 
they under theorise the role of the nation state and brief consideration will be given to 
the literature on theories of the state. 
What are the central tenets of urban reaime theory? 
Urban regime theory originated in the United States and is most closely associated with 
the work of Clarence Stone on Atlanta (Stone, 1989). Within the literature there appears 
to be no agreement as to what constitute the central tenets of urban regime theory. 
However, by means of an extensive literature review Mossberger and Stoker (2001) 
27 
sought to clarify the core components of regime theory. Mossberger and Stoker (200 1, 
p. 829) concluded that "urban regimes are coalitions based on informal networks as well 
as formal relationships, and they have the following core properties: 
9 partners drawn from government and non-governmental sources, requiring, but not 
limited to business participation; 
& collaboration based. on social production- the need to bring together fragmented 
resources for the power to accomplish tasks; 
a identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of the participants 
in the coalition; 
*a longstanding pattern of cooperation rather than a temporary coalition". 
According to regime theory there is a division of labour between state and market in 
which ownership of productive assets lies primarily in the hands of the private sector, 
while the machinery of government is subject to popular control (Stone, 1989). Stone is 
interested in the interface between the public and private sectors and he describes the 
regime as the 'organism' which mediates the relationship between popular control of the 
political process and private control of the economy (Stone, 1993). It should be noted 
that this division of labour applies primarily to developed capitalist societies with 
democratic political systems and is thus not universal. 
Regime theory assumes that the effectiveness of local government depends greatly on 
the co-operation of non-governmental actors and on the combination of state capacity 
, Arith non-governmental resources (Stone, 1993). Stone defines a regime as "an informal 
yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a 
sustained role in making governing decisions" (Stone, 1989, p. 4, original emphasis). 
Collaboration is achieved not only through formal channels, but also through informal 
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networks. The emphasis is on the management of interests, and there is a recognition 
that not all members have the same 'wants' of the regime but that they co-operate 
together to achieve a set of policies. This "civic co-operation" (Stone, 1989, p. 5) can be 
understood using Stone's social production model of Power. Stone (1989, p. 229) 
described the political power sought by regimes as the "power to" or the capacity to act, 
rather than "power over" others or social control. This, Ward comments "is clearly 
distinguishable from the community power paradigm's social control model, where the 
emphasis is on exerting control over the public" (1996, p. 429). 
Several typologies of urban regimes have been developed (e. g. Stone, 1993; Stoker and 
Mossberger, 1994). Stoker and Mossberger (1994) formulated a threefold typology of 
urban regimes: organic regimes that strive to protect the status quo, instrumental 
regimes that tend to be short term and to form around a concern to forward a specific 
project, and symbolic regimes, that occur in cities trying to change direction (see Figure 
2.5). Instrumental regimes predominate in the American literature and perhaps are best 
typified by Stone's (1989) description of Atlanta. Organic regimes characterise cities 
with a tightly knit social f4bric, high degree of consensus and less need for change, 
primarily small towns and suburbs and are thus not very relevant to analysing large 
complex cities. Symbolic regimes "attempt to change fundamenWly a city's ideology or 
image. 7beir purpose is transition" (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994, p. 201). They may be 
cprogrqssive' cities striving to change the ideology of local governance, or cities trying 
to 'revitalise' their fortunes with a change of image. Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) 
used this concept of 'symbolic regime' to examine Sheffield's transformation from 
'City of Steel' to 'City of Sport' (see below for discussion). 
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Figure 2.5: A typology of urban regimes 
Defining characteristics Regime types: 
Organic Instrumental Symbolic 
Purpose Maintenance of status Project realization Redirection of ideology 
quo or image 
Main motivation of Localdependency Tangible results Expressive politics 
participants 
Basis for sense of Tradition and social Selective incentives Strategic use of 
common purpose cohesion symbols 





Local Exclusive orientation Exclusive orientation Inclusive orientation 
Nonlocal Indenendent Dei)endent Deoendent 
Source: Stoker and Mossberger (1994, p. 199). 
Contributions of regime theoly 
Mossberger and Stoker (2001) argue that the key contribution of urban regime theory 
in the United States was to break the impasse created by the stalemate between the 
pluralists and elitists, whilst in Britain, urban regime theory helped to move urban 
politics away from its narrow focus on the fonnal institutions of govenunent (Harding, 
1994). So whatever the shortcomings of regime theory it provided a framework to 
analyse urban politics beyond the confines of formal government institutions. British 
research using the regime theory approach may not necessarily find urban regimes that 
equate with Stone's findings in Atlanta (Stone, 1989), but it has uncovered broad 
informal coalitions, helped map out the key players in local urban politics and examined - 
the relationships between the various actors (e. g. DiGaetano, 1997; John and Cole, 1998; 
Strange, 1997). 
In more general terms, the social production model of power has led to a new 
understanding of the way in which power operates in urban settings. Stone's(1980) 
social production model of power provided a way in which to understand how groups 
with diverse and sometimes conflicting interests can come together and work towards a 
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common goal - for example, a mega sporting event. One of the reasons for the interest 
in urban regime theory within Britain was the increasing requirement for local 
authorities to work in partnerships with business, with non-governmental organisations 
and community groups. Urban regime theory provided a conceptual framework to 
examine these burgeoning partnerships. 
Central to urban regime theory is the pivotal role of business: this again, reflects its 
American roots but as noted above until recently British political science has not 
considered the possibility that business 'mattered' or was interested in local economic 
development and urban politics. Whilst acknowledging the weaker position of British 
business compared to their American counterparts, Harding (1994) asserts that it is 
unreasonable: "to argue that local authorities and business interests in the United 
Kingdom are, or ever have been, completely unconcerned with the relative economic 
vitality of their localities" (p. 366). In Britain from the 1980s onwards there were moves 
on the part of central government to draw business into the heart of local economic 
development through initiatives such as Urban Development Corporations (UDCs). 
These initiatives involve local authorities working in 'partnership' with business and are 
a prominent feature of contemporary urban governance. Studies of sport and urban 
regimes (e. g. Cochrane'et al, 1996; Henry and Paramio-Salacines, 1999; Burbank et al, 
2001) (see below for more detail) highlight that private sector actors are often integral to 
a bid and so any analysis must take their role into account 
Critiques and limitations of urban regime theoly 
Although regime theory has been a dominant paradigm in the field of urban politics, it 
has not escaped criticism. Even those who embrace regime theory acknowledge that it 
has limitations. Regime theory has been described as 'soft' (Bailey, 1999) and this in 
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part explains its wide appeal but this softness can also create difficulties (Mossberger 
and Stoker, 2 001). Regime theory has been subject to wide interpretation and a number 
of authors argue, that at times, it has been 'misapplied' (e. g. Davies, 200 1; John and 
Cole, 1998; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Stoker, 1995). Mossberger and Stoker (2001) 
argue that the core criteria (see above) need to be observed in the application of the 
urban regime concept. However, it could be argued that the 'misapplication' of urban 
regime theory reflects a lack of conceptual clarity, in other words, regime theory is at 
'fault' rather than those who have used it. 
Urban regime theory has been criticised for being ethnocentric. The question of whether 
regime theory can transported from the USA and applied in Europe, and the UK in 
particular, is a recurrent theme, with some authors arguing that it can be (e. g. John and 
Cole, 1998; Dowding et al, 1999; DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999), whilst others 
(e. g. Ward 1996) that it can not. The argument against its transfer centres on the 
different policy environments that exist across the twosides of the Atlantic. On the one 
hand, when Stone, one of the key proponents of regime theory constructed a typology of 
regimes he limited its application to America, drawing on the work of Keating to argue: 
"I have not crafted the typology to cross national experience because differences in 
central government, structure, national policy, and party system can mean that locality- 
to-locality comparisons across nations are extremely complicated" (Stone, 1993). On 
the other hand, John and Cole (1998) in their study of Leeds (UK) and Lille (France) 
argue that "rather than weakening regime theory, comparative analysis illuminates its 
central theoretical insights" (p. 3 82). John and Cole (1998) suggest that researchers can 
not simply dismiss regime theory by claiming that North America is a unique and by 
emphasising the dominance of European state structures. 
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For Ward (1996) a key theoretical weakness of urban regime theory is that it is localist 
and that by focusing on local economic development, regime theory has ignored' 
structural factors and over-simplified the problem of scale in either regime formation or 
regime sustenance. Ward (1996) argues that regime theory needs to move away from 
focusing on 'local' players and include higher-level authorities who participate in 
'local' economic development and to consider the role of the nation state and supra- 
national state in formation of regimes. In similar vein regime theory has been criticised 
for neglecting "the ways in which external or nonlocal forces shape the processes and 
structures of urban governance" ( Di Gaetano, 1997, p. 865 ) and thus fails to examine 
the role of the state in setting and controlling the parameters for regime fonnation 
(MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In relation to local development Burbank et al (2001) 
in their study of three American Olympic cities highlighted that it was external actors 
(e. g. IOC, non-local multinational corporations, state and federal government) rather 
than local regime actors that determined its form and outcome. Sites (1997) concluded 
from his study of New York City that regime theory focuses on political leadership, 
coalition building and local-state initiatives, at the expense of broader social, economic 
and political forces, including market and community pressures, national-state 
retrenchment and economic restructuring. 
Regime theory has been developed inductively through case studies. Explanation has 
been sought through empirical observations and Ward (1996) argues this has limited 
explanatory power even within the context of American regime formation. Others (e. g. 
Mossberger and Stoker, 2001) argue that the accumulation of and comparison of case 
studies expands explanatory power. For example, within the literature there appears to 
be a general agreement that regime change was not well theorised in Stone's (1989) 
original exposition (e. g. DiGaetano, 1997; Stoker, 1995; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). 
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Indeed, it was this limited ability to explain or predict regime formation, maintenance or 
transition that led Dowding et al (1999) to describe regime theory as more a concept or 
model. Mo§sberger and Stoker (2001) assert that cross-case analysis has shown that 
regime formation and transition is related to demographic changes (DeLeon, 1992; 
DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; Orr and Stoker, 1994; Whelan et al, 1994), economic 
restructuring (DeLeon, 1992; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999; Orr and Stoker, 1994), 
federal grant policies (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999; Orr and Stoker, 1994; Whelan 
et al, 1994), and political mobilization, particularly in progressive or social refon-n 
coalitions (DeLeon, 1992; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999). However, Mossberger 
and Stoker (2001) do concede that cross-case comparison can be difficult because of the 
varied usage of the concept. This in turn is related to the 'softness' of the concept that 
leaves it open to interpretation. 
The majority of theorizing has been in the form of typologies (e. g. Stone, 1993; Stoker 
and Mossberger, 1994), which have their limitations (Ward, 1996). Ward (1996) argues 
that while typologies can ftu-ther understanding of the possible policy, they do not add 
to the knowledge of the processes that underpin regime formation, e. g. at what level do 
these processes operate? Several authors (e. g. Lauria, 1997; Ward, 1996) have 
advocated theorising regime theory alongside other, more abstract theories, such as 
regulation theory in order to enhance its explanatory power. Others (e. g. Pierre, 1999) 
have used the concept of urban governance as a means of drawing together regime 
theory, theories of the local state, and urban political economy into a wider analytical 
framework. However, others (e. g. Goodwin and Painter, 1997, Painter, 1997) caution 
against trying to simply fasten regime theory onto regulation theory. 
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So what would regulation theory add to our understanding that urban regime theory 
does not? A key criticism of urban regime theory is its failure to adequately analyse the 
role of the central state, whereas regulation and regulation inspired theories, such as 
Jessop's (e. g. 1990; 1997; 2001) strategic-relational approach (SRA) emphasises the 
roles played by the state in the mediation of political and economic life (Goodwin et al 
2002). SRA was developed as means of analysing the complexities of economic and 
political re-structuring in Western Europe in the last two decades. As a starting point 
Jessop (1997) takes Gramsci's notion of an 'integral state' and argues that the economy 
is embedded in the state and conversely state strategy is embedded in economic activity. 
For Jessop (1990) the state is a multi-sited and multi-scaled set of social relations and 
thus the state can only be viewed as a series of social relations. Therefore, the state: 
has no power- it is merely the institutional ensemble: it only has a set of 
I institutional capacities and liabilities which mediate that power, the power of the 
state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state. These forces 
include state managers as well as class forces, gender groups as well as regional 
interest, and so forth (Jessop, 1990, p. 269-270). 
Thus, the state should be seen as a 'peopled organisation' (Peck, 200 1) rather than 
something governed by abstract institutional logic. Furthermore, state personnel are not 
passive agents rather they can shape, revise or resist broader political projects (Jessop, 
2001; Jones et al, 2004). 
SRA suggests three interrelated processes, denationalisation, de-statisation and 
internationalisation of policy regimes, are undermining the nation state's dominance. 
The denationalisation of the state is reflected in the 'hollowing out' of the nation state, 
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which is the result Jessop (1994) argues of two contradictory trends. Although the 
nation state remains politically significant and retains much of its national sovereignty, 
its capacities to project its own power even within its own national border are weakened 
by firstly, the shift towards internationalised, flexible (but also regionalised) production 
systems and secondly, by the increasing challenge posed by risks arising from the 
global environment. This loss of autonomy creates both the need for supra-national co- 
ordination and also the space for sub-national resurgence. The result is that "powers of 
nation states are being limited through a complex displacement of powers upward, 
downward and outward" (Jessop, 1994, p. 24). In some instances, state capacities are 
being transferred to one of an increasing number of pan-regional; pluri-national or 
international bodies with a widening range of powers. Other capacities are devolved to 
restructured local or regional levels of governance within the nation state, whilst others 
are being usurped by horizontal networks of power -local and regional - which by pass 
central states and connect localities or regions in several nations (Jessop, 1994, pp. 24- 
25). It should be stressed that Jessop does not imply that the 'hollowing out' of the 
nation state will lead to the 'death' of the nation state. 
For Jessop the de-statisation of the political system is reflected in the shift from 
government to governance which is associated with a relative decline in the central 
state's direct management and funding of economic and social projects, and the 
concomitant engagement of quasi-state and non-siate actors in public-private 
partnerships. Internationalisation of policy regimes relates to the increasingly important 
role played by international policy communities and networks and also the strategic 
significance of the international and global contexts in which state actors now operate 
and the processes of international policy transfer. SRA has been employed to analyse 
amongst others, the shifting contours of London's governance in the late 1990s 
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(MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999) and the impact of devolution on the institutions and 
strategies of economic governance in the UK (Goodwin et al, 2002). 
Sport and urban regimes 
Although the role of sport in the construction of urban regimes and the role of regimes 
in the development of sport strategies has not received a great deal of attention, there are 
a few key studies that are worth examining. Schimmel (2001) conducted a study of the 
sport led growth strategy of Indianapolis, USA. Indianapolis suffered as the backbone 
of its economy - heavy manufacturing - declined and used sport to transform both its 
image and its fortunes. What emerged, Schimmel (2001) argues, is "one of the most 
intensive and successful growth coalitions in the US" (p. 264) which led to the extensive 
construction of sports facilities and the hosting of sporting events. Although the strategy 
was 'sold' as one where the city as a whole would benefit uniformly, Schimmel (200 1) 
highlighted the uneven distribution of benefits, with those groups (e. g. African- 
Americans) whose interests and concerns were not those of the urban elite being 
excluded from the planning process. 
Pelissero et al's (1991) study of regime activities and stadium construction in Chicago 
concluded that the way in which stadium issues were incorporated into the urban agenda 
reflected more general ideas about the urban regime as a mediator of development 
policy. Whilst acknowledging that the political decisions made about professional sport 
franchises were not unique to sport, they argued that its high visibility and popularity 
meant that sport presented specific problems for the urban regime. In particular, 
politicians did not want to have to answer to fans (and potential voters) for losing a 
franchise to another city (Pelisserio, et al, 1991). 
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Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) used an urban regime theory approach, specifically 
Stoker and Mossberger's (1994) concept of a symbolic regime (see Figure 2.5), to 
evaluate the role of sport in the construction of a symbolic regime in 1980s Sheffield, 
UK. In 1991 Sheffield hosted the Sixteenth World Student Games(WSG)7 The bid was 
a result of a fledgling public-private partnership and the Games formed the spearhead of 
a campaign to re-invent Sheffield using a major sporting event as the vehicle. The WSG 
produced the first significant partnerships between local government and business 
groups, and despite the financial difficulties associated with the WSG (the city council 
was left with considerable debts), the partnership survived albeit in a new form (Henry 
and Puamio-Salcines, 1999). Henry and Paramio-Salcines (1999) concluded that it was 
hard to deny the importance of symbolic politics in Sheffield since the mid- 198 Os and 
also that Sheffield appears to fit closely with Stoker and Mossberger's conception of a 
'symbolic regime' in terms of mode and functioning. 
Sheffield's experience with the WSG highlights that the presence of business players 
does not necessarily mean that private sector finance will beý forthcoming and the 
burden of funding the WSG fell primarily onto the city council. It may be that the 
private sector lacked confidence in a new partnership that had no track record at all, let 
alone in delivering an international sporting event. Central government did not provide 
direct financial assistance with the hosting of the WSG. However Sheffield. was able to 
continue with the somewhat lukewarm support it received from some arms of the 
central government (i. e. Sports Council) (Henry and Paramio-Salcines, 1999). 
7 The first World Student games were held in 1923 in Paris, and since then (apart from the war years) they 
have been held biennially (Foley, 1991) and like the Olympics they have grown dramatically over the 
years. The Universiade (as it is more fort-nally known) is a festival of sport and culture and the host city is 
left to develop the culture side of the festival (Foley, 1991). 
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Burbank et al (2001) used regime theory as a theoretical framework in which to 
examine the impact of hosting the Olympic Games on local politics in three American 
cities: Los Angeles (LA), Atlanta and Salt Lake City. Burbank et al (2001) concluded 
that the existence of a growth regime was vital to an Olympic bid, because without an 
established business-govenunent network in place to provide the necessary funding, an 
Olympic bid just would not happen. They argue that although the initiation of a mega- 
event strategy is a by-product of regime politics, the existence of a growth regime is not 
enough to set a city down the mega-event path, another vital ingredient is required and 
that: "is a desire among growth elites to establish or modify the city's image" (Burbank 
et al, 200 1, pp. 169-170). 
Whilst Burbank et al (2001) acknowledge that the roots of the mega-event strategy lie 
in regime politics they argue that the nature of mega-event development is not fully 
captured by the view of urban politics given by regime theory. In particular, Burbank et 
al (2001) argue that whilst regime theory maintains that local development policy is 
primarily determined by local actors, this perspective does not equate with the 
experience of the case study cities. In fact once a mega-event had been secured, its 
success depends less on regime players and more on external actors. This means that the 
ability of regime players to deliver benefits to the city becomes dependent on the action 
of regime outsiders. Burbank et al (2001) conclude that in theoretical terms, there is a 
need to broaden the spatial scale and develop the understanding of linkages between 
political actors, in order to produce a more comprehensive explanation of urban politics 
as cities increasingly compete for consumption oriented business (i. e. leisure, 
entertainment, tourism and sports) in the global economy. They argue: "The variety of 
In 2001 it was reported to the House of Commons Select Committee that the city has a continuing 
annual debt burden of E22 million from the cost of providing facilities for that event (HC 286-1,200 1, p. 
ix). 
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intergovernmental and intersectoral relations that are built into the structure of the 
mega-event strategy highlights the need for regime theory to integrate the complexity of 
interdependence into analyses of the political arrangements of cities" (Burbank et al, 
2001, p. 170). As Burbank et al (2001) highlight, one of the shortcomings of regime 
theory is that, whilst it highlights the existence of coalitions of diverse actors, it does 
not, adequately theorise the connections and relations between actors. Attention will 
now turn to the concept of policy networks as a means of examining these connections 
and relationships. 
Policy Networks 
Within political science the concept of policy networks has been used to analyse public 
policy in Britain, Europe and the USA and it focuses on the relationships between 
organisatiqns. There are, or course, differences in the approach to networks within the 
literature. Rhodes argues that the "system of local government was transformed into a 
system of local governance involving complex sets of organisations drawn from public 
and private sectors" (1991,1992 quoted in -1997 and emphasis added, p. 5 1). Inter- 
organisational linkages are the defining characteristic of service delivery and Rhodes 
uses the term 'network' to describe the several interdependent actors involved in 
delivering services. Networks have become increasingly prominent and important 
among British governing structures as the government has created agencies, bypassed 
local government, encouraged public-private partnerships and used special-bodies to 
deliver services. For Rhodes (1997) governance is about managing networks and 
network management is not confined to the public sector. The network form of 
governance highlights "reputation, trust, reciprocity and mutual interdependence" 
(Larson, 1992). Networks are thus "an alternative to, not a hybrid of, markets and 
hierarchies and they span the boundaries of the public, private and voluntary sectors" 
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(Rhodes, 1997, p. 52). Crucially this use of governance suggests that networks are self- 
organising - that they are autonomous and self-governing. Rhodes (1990) distinguishes 
five types of network, ranging from highly integrated policy communities characterised 
by stable relationships, restrictive membership, vertical independence and relative 
insularity, to more loosely integrated issue networks, which are distinguished by a large 
number of participants and limited interdependence. 
The contribution of policy networks 
Policy network analysis is meso-level concept and it has been suggest that the meso- 
level is the most productive level for analysing policy making in Britain (Rhodes, 
1997). Two main arguments are advanced to support this claim. Firstly, that macro-level 
theories are often abstract and are applied without sufficient attention being paid to 
mediating processes. Secondly, that micro-level theories often ignore the impact of 
broader structural factors on micro-level decision making settings. So that operating at 
the meso-le'Vel, it is argued, ensures that policy scientists address macro- and micro- 
level questions. Evans (2001) suggests that the use of meso-level analysis: "is a de facto 
recognition that much contemporary policy making takes places within multi-layered, 
self-organizing networks" (p. 542). For MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) a key strength of 
the policy network approach is the recognition that the government is "not an 
undifferentiated whole" (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992, p. 196), and that individual 
departments pursue their own autonomy, although within government constraints. 
Policy networks focus on relationships between organisations and the implication is that 
much policy is the result of bargaining between organisations and mutual influence 
rather than because of decision making by an individual office holder or single 
institution. Although not a new concept, Leach and Percy-Smith (2001) argue that 
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policy networks is particularly useful in a system characterised by extensive 
institutional fragmentation in which co-operation between organisations is vital to get 
anything done. 
Critiques and limitations of poligy networks 
The concept of policy networks has been criticised for being descriptive rather than 
explanatory, with Dowding (1995; 200 1) arguing that the notion of a policy network is a 
simply a metaphor. An important criticism is that it does not tell us anything about the 
distribution of power and influence within networks. However, Rhodes (1997), a key 
proponent of the concept, argues that networks should be examined in terms of the type 
and distribution of resources between participants and links analysis with his power- 
dependence model of central-local or intergovernmental relations. For Rhodes networks 
"are rooted in resource exchange" (1997, p. 37), with each organisation possessing 
resources which can be used in bargaining with each other, and each being dependent 
on the resources of the others to achieve policy objectives. 
Another important question is the role of government in policy networks. Rhodes links 
his analysis of the role of policy networks to the 'hollowing out of the state', in which 
the powers of nation states are being limited through a complex displacement of powers 
upwards (e. g. the supra-national bodies like the EU), downward (e. g. to regional 
government) and outward (e. g. horizontal networks which bypass central states and 
connect localities or regions in several nations) (Jessop, 1994). In suggesting that 
networks are 'self organising' and referring to 'governance without government', Leach 
and Percy-Smith (2001) argue that Rhodes is implying that communities Can often 
tackle their own problems and meet their own needs without government involvement. 
From this perspective governance means the marginalisation of the state and the fon-nal 
42 
institutions ot government at all levels (Leach and Percy-Smith, 200 1). However,. other 
authors maintain that the state plays a leading role, for example by setting priorities and 
defining objectives (Pierre and Peters, 2000). Taylor (2000) has criticised the 
'hollowing out' thesis and the assumption that policy networks mean a reduction in the 
role of the state. Taylor (2000) argues that governments can dominate networks, for 
example by setting their parameters and objectives and also impose their value 
preferences through control of financial resources, legislation and political legitimacy 
(p. 5 1). Taylor concludes that some high profile cross -agency taskforces (e. g. Social 
Exclusion Unit) involve 'filling in' rather than 'hollowing out' and give the governinent 
a more 'hands on' directive role. Goodwin et al (2002) in a study of economic 
governance post-devolution concluded that "hollowing out is not unidimensional: as 
one element of the state is being hollowed out, other elements are being 'filled in "' 
(pp. 28-29, original emphasis), so that rather than reducing its power the state is simply 
relocating it. 
Proponents (e. g. Bassett, 1996) acknowledge that the concept cannot account for the 
emergence of new interests and the longer term dynamics of network change. MacLeod 
and Goodwin (1999, p. 512) argue that within the policy network approach there is little 
"conceptual space" to examine the political struggles which are inherent in the 
production of networks and that it tells us little of the broader socioeconomic context 
within which policy networks operate. These limitations have been recognised by 
proponents, for example, Evans (2001) cautions against using meso-level analysis in 
isolation from other levels of analysis, arguing that the approach is limited in the 
variables it can examine and the causal pathways it can establish. Moreover, some 
proponents, have proposed integrating micro-theories of individual/grOup behaviour and 
macro-level analysis with meso-level policy networks (e. g. Marsh and Stoker, 1995; 
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Evans, 200 1). However, MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) caution against assuming that 
macro theories of the state and political economy (e. g. regulation theory) can be bolted 
on to the policy networks approach, arguing that this fails to acknowledge the "potential 
ontological, epistemological and methodological incompatibilities inherent with this 
venture" (p. 512). 
Multi-level govemance 
The concept of multi-level governance (MLG) is the "new kid on the political science 
theoretical bloc" (Goodwin et al, 2002, p. 21). It emerged from analysis of the European 
Union (EU) with Gary Marks (1992) first using the term to capture developments in EU 
structural policy after its reform in 1988. In developing the multi-govemance approach 
Marks drew on studies of both domestic politics and international politics, rather than 
just international relations as earlier work on the EU had. Since the early 1990s 
increasing attention has been paid within political science to the role of sub-national 
actors in the European political system (e. g. Keating and Hooghe, 1994). 
Hooghe and Marks (2001, p. 3-4) set out the three central tenets of the multi-level 
governance model in relation to the EU. First, that while nation states continue to be 
central actors in policy making, decision-making competencies are shared and contested 
by actors organised at different territorial levels rather than monopolised by national 
governments. Second, collective decision making among states in the EU involves a 
significant loss of control for individual national governments. Third, political arenas 
are interconnected, both fonnally and informally, rather than nested. Subnational actors 
operate in both national and supranational arenas, creating transnational networks in the 
process. 
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Pierre and Stoker (2000) starting from a "baseline definition of multi-level governance 
is that it refers to negotiated exchanges between systems of government at different 
institutional levels" (p. 30), expand, suggesting that multi-level governance: 
o Is a co-ordinating instrument in instituti. onal systems where hierarchical conunand 
and control mechanisms have been relaxed or abolished; 
o Draws on bargaining rather than submission; 
* Draws on public-private mobilisation rather than public sector specificity; 
In addition multi-level governance makes no pre-judgements about the hierarchical 
order of institutions - e. g. local or regional coalitions of actors can by-pass the nation 
state level and pursue their interests in international arenas. (Pierre and, Stoker, 2000, 
p. 30) 
Multi-level governance originated as a description of the EU structures, but devolution 
and institutional reform at the regional tier of government has led to it being widely 
applied. For example, the concept of multi-level governance has been applied at the 
city level as a means of capturing the complex, overlapping, intersecting nature of 
governance in contemporary cities (e. g. Syrett and Baldock, 2001 on London). Whilst 
Bache and Flinders (2004a) use multi-level governance as an organising perspective to 
study changes in British goverment and politics and Welch and Kennedy-Pipe (2004) 
applied the concept to the study of international relations. 
Multi-level govemance views state power and authority as 'dispersed' rather than 
'concentrated' and political action occurs "at and between levels of governance" (Jones 
and Clark, 2001, p. 206). Although multi-level govemance emphasises the role of the 
subnational tier in the EU, multi-level governance does not suggest that the regions are 
replacing nation states rather: 
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Subnational empowerment is one dynamic of power dispersion in the European 
Union, in which political control has spun away to strengthen European 
institutions, and in which national state institutions have retained significant 
control over resources (Hooghe, 1996, p. 18). 
In relation to British governance Bache and Flinders (2004a) concluded- paraphrasing 
Hooghe and Marks (2001: 3-4)- that whilst "the British State remains the central actor 
in policy making, decision making competencies in Britain are increasingly shared and 
contested by actors organized at different territorial levels rather than monopolized by 
national goverm-nents" (Bache and Flinders, 2004a, p. 106). 
Contribution of multi-level govemance 
Whether multi-level governance constitutes a theory or not is a matter of great debate. 
Some writers such as George (2004) argue that it provides a theory of what sort of 
organisation the EU is: "It is hypothesized to be an organisation in which the central 
executives of states do not do all the governing but share and contest responsibility and 
authority with other actors, both supranational and subnational" (p. 125). Whilst others 
(e. g. Jessop, 2004; Fairbrass and Jordan, 2004) maintain that multi-level governance is 
not a fully-fledged theory. 
Pierre and Stoker (2000) concede that the contribution of multi-level governance may 
not be at the level of causal analysis or a new normative theory, but for them the value 
lies in its capacity to provide a frainework for understanding changing processes of 
governing. They draw on Judge et al (1995) who suggest that conceptual frameworks: 
46 
..... provide a language and frame of reference through which reality can be 
examined and lead theorists to ask questions that might not otherwise occur. The 
result, if successful, is new and fresh insights that other frameworks or 
perspectives might not have yielded. Conceptual frameworks can constitute an 
attempt to establish a paradigm shift (Judge et al, 1995, p. 3). 
Similarly, Bache and Flinders (2004a) argue "that multi-level governance provides an 
increasingly suitable organizing perspective for the study of British governance" (p. 94). 
However, they caution that as an organizing perspective is explicitly not a theory, multi- 
level governance can not be expected to provide a comprehensive explanation of British 
governance (Bache and Flinders, 2004a, p. 94). What multi-level governance can do is 
help our understanding of dynamic processes and identify key variables (Bache and 
Flinders, 2004a). 
Thus, the multi-level governance perspective 'works' if it helps us to identify important 
questions as well as come up with 'answers'. Multi-level governance challenges the 
assurnptions of traditional studies of governance and gets us to look at the way in which 
we are governed through a different lens (Pierre and Stoker, 2000). It raises questions 
about the role of non-state actors and also highlights the variation in patterns and 
influence in different cases that state-centric approaches may disregard (Bache and 
Flinders, 2004b). In this way, theories of multi-level governance can help in 
understanding the new structures of governance, for example as the result of devolution 
in the UK, by emphasising the importance of the new scales of government and the 
linkages between the scales (Goodwin et al, 2002). 
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Critiques and limitations of multi-level govemance 
Quite what the use ýusefulness) of multi-level governance as a concept seems to be is 
contested. Used at a high level of generality Smith (1997) accepts that multi-level 
governance helps us to get started in a world where nobody appears to be 'in charge'. 
However, once you get to the level of specific cases Smith argues that you are left 
wondering "what it helps you study and what it actually aims to explain? " (Smith, 1997, 
p. 712, original emphasis). From his studies of the impact of EU Structural Funds within 
three regions in France, Smith (1997) concluded that whilst multi-level governance 
provided a useful framework its explanatory power was somewhat limited. Smith 
(1997) identified a number of problems with the concept. Firstly, Smith (1997) argues, 
studies by authors such as Marks tend to be more about inter-governmentalism than 
multi-level governance, and this has skewed empirical research with the consequence 
that little work has been done on the form that subnational politics takes within the 
multi-level system. Furthermore, it appears that little research has been conducted 
within regions. Rhodes (1997, p. 140) advances similar criticisms, accusing Marks 
(1996) of avoiding the "theory laden notion of policy networks" and although multi- 
level governance has been used to describe changes in EU government structure it has 
not been used to explain variations in structure or why it has changed. Secondly, Smith 
concludes that current approaches to the study of multi-level governance paradoxically 
focus on government rather than governance. This means too much attention is paid to 
the emergence of formal mechanisms for policy making at the subnational level, and too 
little to the informal networks, forums and alliances that emerge. This 'empirical blind 
spot' means that opportunities to develop theory are missed. 
Peters and Pierre (2004) raise a number of concerns about the lack of conceptual clarity 
and the use and in their view the misuse of the term multi-level governance. They argue 
that most analytical models of multi-level governance have replaced a state-centric and 
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constitutional perspective with one in which institutions are rendered irrelevant. They 
argue that "the institutional 'grip' on political processes within the state and between 
domestic and supra-national actors, although recently relaxed, remains strong and can 
be further strengthened by the state if and when considered necessary" (Peters and 
Pierre, 2004, p. 75). According to Goodwin et al (2002) multi-level governance 
assumes that the state has power of its own and not in relation to forces acting in and 
through its apparatus. Also that multi-level governance tends to ignore horizontal 
relationships, or interstate issues, between scales and is thus unable to account for 
uneven development wid-dn scales. 
Jessop (2004) writing from a SRA perspective has three main criticisms of the multi- 
governance approach. Firstly, that it tends to be at the "pre-theoretical stage of critique" 
so that it is "clearer what the notion of governance is against than what it is for" (p. 61). 
Secondly, that because governance theories are often connected with problem solving 
and crisis management they tend to overlook the problems of governance failure. 
Thirdly, Jessop (2004) suggests that the shift in governance is being countered by the 
increased role of governments in what he terms meta-steering and meta-governance-that 
is shaping and regulating governance and setting the 'ground rules' - and that empirical 
studies have paid little attention to meta-governance. 
Summ 
From this examination of the changing nature of governance and various explanatory 
frameworks, it is evident that modem governance is a highly complex process. It is also 
clear that a broad range of actors are involved, that these actors operate at various 
spatial scales, both informal and formal mechanisms are important and that governance 
involves bargaining and co-operation. Although there is debate about the exact role of 
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the state, it is evident that the state still plays a central role. All these frameworks have 
their strengths and weaknesses, for example, both ýhe concepts of policy networks and 
multi-level governance provided us with useful descriptions and given the complexity 
of modem governance this is no mean feat. However, their explanatory powers are 
perhaps somewhat limited. Regime theory's focus on local actors and local context at 
the expense of external actors and the broader context weakens its descriptive and 
theoretical power. However, these frameworks do provide signposts, can help identify 
different Styles of governance and enable us, within this study, to examine the various 
interrelationships between governance and sport. How these different theoretical 
perspectives can be used to advance this thesis will be considered at the end of this 
chapter, but first attention will turn to the various ways in which cities use sport. 
CITIES AND SPORT 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview and highlight the key issues and 
debates in readiness for further discussion later in the thesis. Cities and sport have been 
long interconnected primarily through city-based teams (e. g. football, baseball), but 
recent decades have seen sport in general and mega-sports events in particular playing 
an increasingly high profile and wider role within cities. So why are cities interested in 
sport and more specifically mega-sports events? From the literature it is possible to 
identify three main reasons: 
* Global competition 
a Regeneration and economic development 
* Promoting healthy communities 
What is evident from the literature is that there are tensions between these objectives 
and also that assumptions have been made about how 'good' mega-sports events are at 
delivering these different objectives. In order to better understand why mega-sports 
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events have become so important to cities and the tensions that have arisen it is 
necessary to locate these developments within the broadet context of globalisation. 
Globalisation. 9 has been described as the "widening, deepening and speeding up of 
world interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary life" (Held et al, 1999, p. 2) and 
it is a much debated and contested concept. As Short (200 1) notes the existence, extent, 
meaning and measurement of economic, cultural and political globalisation is central to 
much recent social theorising. However, there is widespread agreement that over recent 
decades the world has become increasingly economically interconnected with markets 
transcending both the borders and interests of nation states. At the same time the 
capacity for individual nations to regulate their internal economics and shape the way in 
which they interact with external structures has de6reased. Kantor (1987) suggested that 
cities had become 'captives' of a highly competitive economic environment in which 
the traditional factors (e. g. geography) that once influenced the location of business in a 
specific place matter much less. The capacity of capital to switch locations means that 
cities are increasingly interchangeable units that can be played off against each other 
and made to compete for capital investment (Kantor, 1987). In this competitive 
envirom-nent cities have to create the urban conditions that will attract and retain 
businesses. Lever (2001) argues that the central state alone can not co-ordinate the 
specific local conditions required by mobile capital so that the city government's ability 
to negotiate with supraregional and supranational capital and to shape local conditions 
are crucial to a city's development prospects. Cox (1993) has termed this new 
relationship between local government, the economic development of cities and 
economic globalisation the new urban politics (Cox, 1993). 
9 Globalisation has been defined in a number of ways and this reflects the breadth of the globalisation 
literature which spans a number of social science disciplines including political science, economics and 
sociology. 
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Furthermore, Castells argues that rapid advances in computer technology and 
telecommunications rnean that networks have been able to "reconfigure themselves in 
real-time, on a global-local scale, and permeate all domains of social life" (Castells, 
2004, p. 221) so that we now live in a "network society, not an information society or a 
knowledge society" (Castells, 2004, p. 5). Although network society is organised on a 
global scale not all countries or people are connected, however all countries are 
influenced and subject to the logic, interests and conflicts of this network society 
(Castells, 2004). 
Global competition -cities and mega-sports events 
Wi thin a globalising economy cities 
Lve to offer incentives to business, either by 
trying to make the city more economically attractive (e. g. tax inducements, transport 
facilities) and /or improvements in soft infrastructure (e. g. cultural and leisure facilities) 
and enhancement of the city's image by improving the landscape (Boyle and Rogerson, 
2001). This leaves cities engaged in process of open competition and mega events are a 
key means by which they compete with each other on the global stage and although 
mega-sports events have a long historylo they have increased in size, scope, profile and 
importance for cities within the context of globalisation (Short, 2003). Indeed, Short 
(2003) considers the Olympic Games as a "concrete example of globalization" (p. 1) 
arguing that the Games "not only actualise some of the forces and many of the 
paradoxes of globalization, they also exemplify the complex intersections of cultural 
and political, as well as the more commonly studied, economic globalization" (pp. 1 -2). 
Furthermore, Short (2003) argues that the Olympics are a prime example of what has 
been termed glocalisation - that is the connections between the local and global --ý'as the 
global spectacle is centered in a specific city, while the hosting of the event tends to 
'0 For example the first Olympic Games of the modem era were held in Athens in 1896. 
52 
reconnect the city into global space of flows" (p. 17). Beriatos and Gospodini (2004) 
suggest that when hosting mega-events cities combine and promote built heritage and 
innovative design of space to produce a new "glocalised" urban landscape dominated by 
two extremes -that of tradition with local spatial references and innovation with global 
spatial references. Beriatos and Gospodini (2004) examined the preparations for the 
2004 Olympics hosted by Athens, and found unlike most other mega-event cities (e. g. 
Barcelona) Athens had not clustered its competitive landscape transformations in one of 
two sites but had scattered them across the city. The impact of this different approach 
will of course only be apparent with time. 
Sport and particularly mega-events are favourite tools of civic boosters, as they can 
place a city on the map, boost its image and inefease its status, especially on the 
international stage, promote tourism, generate considerable global publicity and create 
new infrastructures (Andranovich et al, 2001; Mitelegg, 2000; Cochrane et al, 1996; 
Thornley, 2002; Essex and Chalkley, 2004; Newman and Thornley, 2004). Mega sports 
events are favoured by civic boosters who advocate pro-growth strategies for long term 
economic development and job creation, Los Angeles (LA), host to the 1932 and 1984 
Olympic Games, has been described as a "boosters paradise" (Burbank et al, 2001), and 
a place where political power has always been linked with the creation and promotion of 
the city's image. The 1984 LA Games are illustrative of the use of a mega-eve'nt to 
'boost' a city. The efforts to bring the Olympics to LA were the product of a business- 
led growth coalition that worked for many years to bring the Games to LA. 
The Games were attractive for three reasons. Firstly, the Games were an opportunity to 
for LA to display its attractions on a global stage. Secondly, the Games were a means of 
bringing in new visitors and increasing revenues. Thirdly, they were a way of enhancing 
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the city's position in history and contemporary society (Andranvovich et al, 2001). For 
the Mayor the Olympics represented an opportunity for LA to become a world class city 
and moreover the organisers offered to bring them to the city at no cost to the LA 
taxpayers (Andranovich et al, 2001). The LA Games will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Seven, but here it is important to note they were private sector led, and a huge 
commercial success and this was crucial in renewing the interest of potential hosts in 
staging the Olympics. 
However, this strategy is. a high risk one and the 'returns' are by no means guaranteed. 
The literature is littered with examples of cities that have suffered financially or had 
their image tarnished rather than enhanced. The cities of Montreal and Sheffield were 
both left with debts that they were still paying at the turn of the 21" century (House of 
Commons, 2001 a, p. ix; Preuss, 2003, p. 254). Not only did hosting the 1976 Olympics 
leave Montreal in dire financial straits but it also made other cities reluct ant to host the 
Olympics and as a result Los Angeles was the only candidate city. The 1996 Atlanta 
Olympics, like those held in LA were the product of a growth-led coalition that 
regarded the Olympics as an opportunity to improve the image of Atlanta, an 
economically thriving city that lacked status, not only on the international stage, but 
even within America because of its lack of cultural attractions (Whitelegg, 2000, p. 803). 
Instead Atlanta suffered the ignominy of not being declared the 'best Games ever' 
(Whitelegg, 2000). The shape and form of the Atlanta Games reflected its 'booster' 
origins, with the emphasis being on facilities likely to make the city more attractive to 
visitors (tourists and conventioneers) and their needs were given priority over those of 
residents (Burbank et al, 2001). The organisational structure for the Atlanta Games was 
complex and the fragmented organisational structure led to a lack-of co-ordination and 
these organisational difficulties were reflected in the operation of the Games 
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themselves, e. g. athletes taken to the wrong venue, security breaches (Chalkley and 
Essex, 1999). 
Regeneration and economic development 
Many cities including Manchester, Sheffield and Barcelona have adopted mega-event 
strategies as a means of stimulating local economic development (Peck and Tickell, 
1995; Cochrane et al, 1996; Henry, 2001; Marshall, 1996; Van den Berg et al, 2002). 
This has involved major investment in sport infrastructure" with the aim of attracting 
tourists, drawing in inward investment and changing the image of a city, rather than 
encouraging the local community to participate in sport (Gratton et al, 2005). For both 
Manchester and Sheffield there was a desire to re-brand the city, to banish the images of 
a grimy, industrial city in decline and to be seen as vibrant, a place to invest and also to 
push them up the urban hierarchy (Peck and Tickell, 1995; Cochrane et al, 1996; Henry 
and Paramio-Salcines, 1999; Henry, 2001). Manchester unsuccessfully pursued the 
Olympic dream three times 12 but went on to host the Commonwealth Games in 2002 
(MCG 2002) using the games as a vehicle for a major regeneration programme (see 
discussion in Chapter Seven). Barcelona, a city in economic crisis suffering from the 
effects of large scale industrial closures and high levels of unemployment (Marshall, 
1996, p. 149) used the 1992 Olympic Games as a catalyst for urban regeneration and 
economic development. Interestingly, it was not the first time the city has used an 
international event as a vehicle for urban renewal 13 . Unlike LA and Atlanta where the 
private sector led the organisation of the Games and strongly influenced the shape and 
outcomes of the Games, in Barcelona, the public sector was the main driver and the 
11 For example, Sheffield invested E147 million in sporting facilities to host the World Student Games in 
1991. 
12 Manchester missed out to Birmingham as Britain's bid city for the 1992 Olympics and then as British 
candidate city for the 1996 and 2000 Games to Atlanta and Sydney respectively. 
13 The Universal Exhibitions of 1888 and 1929 were used as platforms for urban redevelopment. 
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programme of urban renewal was seen as having social as well as economic gains 
(Marshall, 1996). Thus governance arrangements can be important in both driving bids 
through and subsequently delivering events, and in also setting the 'tone' of the project. 
Mega-events are now regarded as a key tool of economic development for cities. 
Although strong claims have been made for the economic and social benefits of hosting 
mega-events it is evident that translating these claims into reality is not a 
straightforward process, as the DCMS/Strategy Unit report noted: "The benefits of 
hosting mega sporting events, whether economic, social or cultural are difficult to 
measure and the available evidence is limited" (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 43). Furthermore, 
although the benefits for the city as a whole are trumpeted by organisers, it is evident 
from the literature that the benefits of hosting mega-events are often unequally 
distributed and in some cases they serve to further marginalise the most disadvantaged 
residents of a city. For example, Atlanta was criticised for prioritising the needs of 
business over local communities, with the result that the promised neighbourhood 
renewal did not materialise (French and Disher, 1997; Whitelegg, 2000). Moreover, 
Olympic developments meant that many homeless people were displaced and the 
shelters set up to help them shut down (NWtelegg, 2000; Burbank et al, 2001). In other 
cases (e. g. Sydney, LA) residents from poorer areas who opposed mega-event 
developments met vAth little success, whilst resistance from middle class areas met with 
more success (e. g. re-location of venue or modification of plans) (Owen, 2002; Lenskyi, 
2000; Burbank et al, 2000). 
Barcelona is often upheld as a shining example of how to harness a mega-event to the 
benefit of a city and its inhabitants: "The Barcelona Olympics provide a model of how 
a sporting event can play a pivotal role in urban renewal and regeneration, transforming 
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a dilapidated industrial area into a vibrant community and spreading economic benefits 
across society" (House of Commons, 1999, p. xiv). However, critics' point out that the 
development associated with the Games did little to address the city's housing problem, 
despite the Mayor's promise that a large proportion of the housing in the Olympic 
Village would be social housing (this idea was abandoned because it clashed with the 
private development of the housing areas) (Marshall, 1996, p. 15 1). On balance, 
Marshall (1996) concludes that a majority of residents did benefit from the 
developments (e. g. better transport infrastructure, upgraded telephone system) although 
some projects (e. g. housing) benefited richer residents. 
Sport and the promotion of healLhy communities 
Having considered how sport can be harnessed to deliver city-wide benefits, attention 
will now be paid to the use of sport to benefit particular neighbourhoods and groups of 
people. Sport is increasingly seen as a key tool for promoting social inclusion and 
cohesion and also in tackling the adverse health effects of physical inactivity. Although 
mega-sports events are often presented as a means of increasing sports participation 
there is to date little evidence to support these claims (Coalter, 2004). 
Sport and social inclusion 
Although the focus of the following section will be on contemporary Britain, the 
growing interest amongst policy makers in Britain is not unique, for example, in France 
sport has been used as a means of promoting social inclusion and national solidarity, 
particularly amongst alienated young men of Northern African origin (Dine, 2000; 
Dine, 2003). 
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In 1997 New Labour was elected to power and high on its agenda was tackling social 
exclusion, which was described by the new Social Exclusion Unit as: 
a shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or an area suffer a 
combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low 
incomes, poor housing, high crime, bad health and family breakdown 
(Cabinet Office, 2000) 
The government recognised that the causes of social exclusion were multiple and cut 
across the functionally based responsibilities of government departments and thus what 
was required was a 'joined up' approach (Houlihan and White, 2002). Sport has been 
identified as a tool for promoting social inclusion and improving social cohesion by 
both central government (DCMS, 1999: SEU, 2001; DCMS/SU, 2002) and local 
government (Long and Sanderson, 2001) and is a component of many of the initiatives 
aimed at promoting social inclusion and neighbourhood renewal (e. g. New Deal for 
Communities, Sports Action Zones, Health Action Zones). The claimed benefits of 
sport are wide ranging and far reaching, and a review of the community sport literature 
by Long and Sanderson (2001) pr6duced a long list including reduction in crime, 
vandalism and 'delinquency' and improving employment prospects, which they drew 
together, suggesting that: "... the major aim of community development (is) the 
enhancement of skills and confidences of groups of people such as they are empowered 
to take control of their lives and act collectively to address social and economic 
deprivation" (p. 189). In other words it is more- about life skills than sport - sport is 
merely the vehicle. 
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The evidence to support these claims is sparse, in part because there has been little 
research or evaluation of such schemes (Collins et al, 1999) and also because some of 
the benefits are intangible and difficult to demonstrate (DCMS/SU, 2002). Although 
some schemes appear to have short term benefits (DCMS, 1999), it is too soon to know 
whether these benefits will be significant or sustained (Collins, 2003). Furthermore, 
many projects are short-term (this is often linked to funding sources) and as Collins 
(2003) argues the usual "three years duration is no where near long enough to yield 
outcomes of significant social change" (p. 82). Although more effort has been put into 
studying the schemes specifically aimed at youth crime reduction and there is case study 
evidence that such schemes can have an impact, there are number of challenges to 
demonstrating the benefits. In particular, the difficulties of establishing a causal 
relationship when the intervention is one of a range being used and the lack of on-going 
monitoring and evaluation (DCMS/SU, 2002). The DCMS/SU (2002) highlight that 
"locally provided ongoing sports programmes with credible leadership seem to have the 
best chance of reducing crime on a permanent basis" (p. 60). They also point out that 
there is a lack of skilled leaders and that there are questions over the suitability of 
programmes for other groups (e. g. girls). 
Sports projects are usually one strand of a wide-ranging scheme that involves a myriad 
of partners, many of which "would not usually recognise each other on the street" 
(Loney, 2003, p. 23) let alone have experience of working together. For example, the 
Football Association are working with New Deal for Conununities in Manchester 
(Loney, 2003). As Collins (2003) argues these partnerships or networks are often not 
between equals and sport is often a minor partner, for example in regeneration schemes, 
and partnerships can be fragile. Such partnerships can be unwieldy. Collins (2003) cites 
an example of a Sport England project that has 39 partners "satisfying so many can be a 
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managerial nightmare, if not an impossibility" (p. 82). It is, thus, inevitable that 
compromises will have to be made. What is of course interesting is in what areas they 
are made and by whom. 
Sport and healthier lifestyles 
There has been a flurry of reports from the medical profession and government 
(Donaldson, 2003: Donaldson, 2004; Royal College of Physicians, 2004; Wanless, 
2002; Wanless, 2004; House of Commons, 2004) highlighting increases in rates of 
obesity and the associated adverse effects on health (e. g. heart disease, type-2 diabetes). 
Both diet and low levels of physical activity have been identified as major contributors 
to the rise in obesity in both adults and children. These reports highlight the complex 
nature of the problem and how individual behaviour, government policy and the actions 
of the food industry have combined to create an increasingly "obesogenic environmenf' 
(House of Commons, 2004). For example, transport and planning policies at all levels 
of government have created urban environments that are not conducive to walking or 
cycling. 
Although a great deal of attention has been focused on the role of diet, in particular calls 
for manufacturers to reduce the fat, sugar and salt content of their products, as well for 
individuals to alter their diet, another key message is the need for adults and children to 
be more physically active (Donaldson, 2004; Royal College of Physicians, 2004; 
Wanless, 2002; Wanless, 2004; House of Commons, 2004). A broad definition of 
physical exercise has been adopted encompassing walking, dancing as well as more 
'formal' sports such as football and swimming (e. g. Donaldson, 2004). There is strong 
evidence to support the claims for the health benefits of physical activity on both an 
individual and population level (DCMS/SU, 2002). These recent reports are highly 
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critical of the simplistic view of obesity taken by Ministers including Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport and the lack of government co-ordination on this complex 
issue. A strong message from these reports is that what is required is a 'joined up' 
approach, because the 'solutions' cut across departments and involve issues of urban 
and transport planning, public health, education, food policy as well as health and sport 
provision. 
Organisers have made great claims that mega-sporting events 'inspire' the general 
population to participate in sport. However, the little data there is on the impact of 
mega-sports events on participation does not support these claims. Veal (2003) in an 
analysis of sports participation in Australia (1995 -2002) found that in the year following 
the Sydney Olympics, although seven Olympic sports experienced a small increase, 
nine experienced a decline and the pattern for non-Olympic sports was similar. Coalter 
(2004) argues that survey data 14 from Manchester indicates that hosting the 2002 
Commonwealth Games had no measurable impact on mass participation (Coalter, 
2004). Hindson, Gidlow and Peebles (1994) investigated the impact of the Olympic 
Games on sports clubs membership by surveying 35 sports clubs in New Zealand in the 
period following the Summer Olympics held in Barcelona and the Winter Games held 
in Albertville. The impact was limited with only three clubs experiencing an increase in 
competitive membership and two for social (recreational) sport and Hindson, et al 
(1994) concluded that the 'trickle down' effect was not automatic. Moreover, they 
identified a number of supply side failures, with clubs relying on a 'trickle down' effect 
and very few clubs taking active steps to use the Olympics as a tool to lever more 
people in. Hindson et al (1994) also question the assumption that elite level athletes can 
act as role models and inspire people to take up sport. Indeed they argue that sporting 
14 Research conducted by MORI in 2004. 
61 
excellence can act to reduce non-participants' feelings of self efficacy leading them to 
feel that they do not have the skills required to take part in sport. The DCMS/SU review 
of sport policy concluded that "it would seem that hosting an event is not an effective, 
value for money method of achieving ... a sustained increase in mass participation" 
(DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 75). Coalter (2004) suggests that unless mega-sporting events are 
embedded into a broader strategy for sport development they are unlikely to have any 
general impact and at best a limited sports-specific impact. 
In summary, the literature suggests that sport can play a part in improving health, 
promoting social inclusion and tackling social problems (e. g. youth crime). The 
evidence for the health benefits is strong, but in relation to social inclusion the evidence 
is not so robust, but this is not to argue that benefits do not exist but rather that the 
evidence is not available. This is in part because data have not been collected 
systematically, and many of the projects are small-scale and local in nature, run on tight 
budgets that do not include the type of comprehensive evaluation required to tease out 
the intangible benefits of such projects. Obesity and physical inactivity are currently ihe 
subject of intense debate, and featured strongly in the Public Health White Paper - 
Choosing Health: Making Healthier Choices Easier (DoH, 2004 and subsequent Action 
Plans, for example, Choosing Activity (DoH, 2005). The VNte Paper contains a plethora 
of proposals aimed at promoting physical activity and improving dietary intake in both 
adults and children. Given the complexity of the problem, the 'solutions' require action 
by a myriad of inter-connecting actors including all levels of government, public, 
voluntary and private sectors and whether they will be able to deliver them remains to 
be seen. Evidence to date questions the assumption that sporting benefits will 'trickle 
down' from mega-sports events and the indications are that hosting mega-sporting 
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events Can only contribute to a meaningful increase in mass participation if there are 
part of a wider, pro-active long tenn strategy. 
These debates have led Coalter (2004) to argue that there are a number of increasingly 
unconnected 'worlds of sport: 
a "Sporting events/spectacle (driven by economic and political imperatives). 
* Sporting excellence (driven by talent identification and specialist sports science 
support and, in some cases banned drugs). 
* Recreational sport and clubs (driven by competition, enjoyment of sport, 
sociability and local authority investment in facilities). 
a Social inclusion, government-driven policies which attempt to use sport for 
instrumental purposes (e. g. crime reduction; health improvement) that are more 
likely to be provided by youth workers or health professionals than coaches" 
100). 
However, there appears to be a tendency to put these 'worlds of sport' together under 
the one umbrella of 'sport' and not recognise the differences. This leads to unrealistic 
claims being about what can be achieved by hosting a mega sports-event in relation to 
global competition, regeneration and economic development and also promoting 
healthy communities. As we have seen from the literature there are tensions between 
these different objectives and mega-sports events cannot do all of this, all of the time. 
Generally mega sports events are good at promoting cities within the context of global 
inter-city competition. Although mega-sports events have proved to be a successful 
engine for economic development and regeneration the process is not unproblematic - 
and the benefits are neither guaranteed nor necessarily evenly distributed. In terms of 
delivering social and health goals mega-sports events ýave a poor record. Tensions over 
the pursuit of sporting mega events reflect policy and governance tensions more widely 
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between the quest for economic development and position in a global economy on the 
one hand and the interests of communities, the promotion of socially cohesive 
neighbourhoods and quality of life issues on the other. 
National and intemational govemance of sport 
Whether a city regards sport as primarily a matter of providing facilities for the city's 
residents, a tool for improving social cohesion and preventing social ills or as a way to 
reinvigorate the city, it has to work within the same national framework for sports 
governance. Just as governance of a nation or a city varies from place to place, so does 
the governance of sport. Furthermore, the arrangements made for the governance of 
sport often reflect more general governance arrangements. 
Within industrial countries, including Australia, New Zealand and those in North 
America and the European Union, five overlapping types of arrangement can be 
identified (Houlihan, 1997). First, there are countries where a central government 
department plays a major role in the execution of sport policy. Examples include France 
and Greece, both of which have strong ministries responsible for sport. Second, there 
are countries where the administration of public policy is more fragmented and the 
policy developments are initiated at least in part at the sub-national level. This category 
consists primarily of countries with federal governance systems such as Canada where 
the provincial/state governments have a great deal of autonomy in relation to sport and 
recreation. Despite this autonomy, the influence of central policy objectives is evident, 
in particular in the pursuit of policies that are eligible for central funds. 
The third category comprises countries where considerable authority for sport is 
delegated to a quango (a quasi-autonomous national governmental organisation) or 
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similar semi-independent organisation. For example, in Spain sport is delegated to the 
highly autonomous Higher Sports Council, which is accountable to the Ministry of 
Culture. The UK also falls into this category with Sport Councils operating at 'arm's 
length' from central government but, as in Spain, being accountable to a central 
government department. The fourth category comprises countries where the 
responsibility for sport is shared between a non-govemmental organisation (NGO) and 
govermnent. Examples of this category are Gennany and the Netherlands, where NGOs 
both command significant financial resources independent of government, usually from 
the subscriptions obtained from a large and successful nýtwork of sports clubs or 
through commercial sponsorship. However, in addition the government provides 
generous funding to support the sports development work of the NGO. There are also 
countries, for example, Sweden and Norway, where the NGOs have the primary 
responsibility for sport and operate largely independent of government. 
The fifth category comprises those countries where there is minimal government 
involvement. Houlihan (1997) identifies USA and Italy as the prime examples of this 
category. In the USA there are two key organisations responsible for sport, the US 
Olympic Committee which is responsible for elite-level athletes in Olympic sport and 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association which controls college-level competition 
which is the main breeding ground for top-class athletes. In Italy, the National Olympic 
Committee is independent of government and in conjunction with the main sports 
federations is responsible for co-: ordinating both elite and mass participation sport. 
Explaining the variation is difficult but Houlihan (1997) identifies a number of factors, 
including salience of sport to the government and main political parties, wealth, 
tradition of voluntary organisation, and political, geographic and demographic 
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characteristics. Houlihan (1997) concludes that in general, those countries where sport 
is politically salient establish quangos, whilst those which are geographically compact 
or have small populations tend to rely on a centralised authority and those where the 
level of disposable income is high rely on NGOs. However, there are important . 
exceptions, for example, the high level of central control in France and the absence of a 
centralised authority in Italy. As Houlihan (1997) argues: "As a result it is important to 
explore the particular mix of factors that have produced the distinctive pattern of policy 
making and administration of sport" (p. 68). In Chapter Six the governance of sport in 
the UK will be considered in more detail. 
Individual sports have national governing bodies that over sees rules and competitions 
and delivers funds, with the emphasis being on coaches, officials and administrators. 
Examples from the UK include the Football Association and UK Athletics which are the 
NGBs for their respective sports. In addition to having national governing bodies, sports 
also have world governing bodies and the governance of sport goes well beyond the 
boundaries of nation states. The world governing bodies make the decisions as to which 
cities will host the 'big three' - the Olympics, the FIFA World Cup and World Athletes 
Championships. Although many have quite modest origins they are now large and 
powerful institutions. For example, the world governing authority of athletics, the 
International Association of AtWetics Federations (IAAF) began in 1912 in response to 
a perceived need for a body to oversee an athletics programme, standardise technical 
equipment. and world records (IAAF, 2005b). It began with 17 members but now has 
over 211, headquarters in Monaco and no longer relies on membership fees, as it now 
receives considerable income from sponsorship and the sale of broadcasting rights for 
the extensive competition programme it runs (IAAF, 2005b). The IAAF began as the 
International Amateur Athletics Federation (the name was changed in 2001) but during 
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the last quarter of the twentieth century athletics became increasingly professionalised 
and the concept of amateurism was abandoned in the 1980s- athletes can now earn 
considerable prize money. 
Mega sports events illustrate the importance of 'multi-level' governance - with key 
power at the international level - but critically, power is not vested in the nation state 
rather in powerful associations. 'State' centric readings of governance thus need to be 
sensitive to the power of multi-national corporations and other powerful institutions 
(including the IAAF, FIFA, IOC). Further consideration will given to the role of 
international governing bodies in Chapter Six. 
UTILISING THEORY: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK 
It is clear that if we are going to further our understanding of the relationships between 
governance, sport and the city, particularly in relation to hosting mega sports events we 
need to be able to capture different dimensions, scales and inter-connections. The 
theoretical framework needs to be able to deal with broader changes in national 
governance arrangements and the increasingly high profile of major cities within a 
globalised world. It also needs. to be able to manage the ppculiarities of sport which is 
both a major global industry and something that is important to people's everyday lives 
and their quality of life. Each of the theoretical approaches outlined earlier in the 
chapter have their strengths and weaknesses but none of them alone can 'do' the job. 
For example, adopting an urban theory approach could lead to inadequate theorising 
about the connections between local actors and the wider institutional context. 
However, by drawing on the strengths it should be possible to formulate a framework 
that enables the key questions to be addressed and a 'rounded' analysis to emerge. 
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Having considered the shift from 'government' to 'governance', the increasing use of 
sport by cities as a tool of economic development and examples of city-based mega- 
events, it possible to identify five factors which are of particular importance for this 
thesis: 
> The role of central govermnent; 
); - The local context and local actors in the political process; 
> The role of networks of individuals and institutions; 
> The importance of scale and governance operating both at different levels and also 
between scales; 
> The nature of sectoral relationships i. e. between private, public and voluntary 
sectors. 
In order to inform and advance this study, any theoretical framework needs to take 
account of these factors, The integrative theoretical framework that underpins the 
research and analysis is set out in Figure 2.6. The next section will revisit the various 
theoretical approaches and outline how they contribute to this thesis. 
Mega-events are primarily city based events and as urban regime theory is concerned 
with how cities are governed it provides a useful point of departure which other authors 
have used to examine such events (e. g. Burbank et al, 2001). Urban regime theory looks 
beyond formal government structures to show that city governance involves much more -- 
than these formal structures. Regime theory draws attention to the importance of 
alliances between players with diverse interests (e. g. business, local government, non- 
governmental organisations) and how theY can work together (or not as the case may 
be), through formal and informal channels, to accomplish tasks e. g. staging a mega- 
sporting event. Whilst acknowledging that the role of business in urban governance 
differs between nations, all the examples given above clearly demonstrate that business 
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is integral to staging mega sports events. Indeed business actors are often involved in 
the initiation of a bid and even in cases (e. g. Barcelona) where the public sector took the 
lead, private sector funding was crucial. Having identified that the private sector is a key 
player, it then leads us onto a number of questions about the relationship between 
business actors and government, the influence of the private sector on the shape of an 
event, associated developments and its legacies. 
Regime theory emphasises the need for long term co-oPeration between actors, rather 
than a temporary coalition. In relation to mega-events actors are often gathered together 
to pursue a bid, some of whom know each other but others are unknown. From the 
examples above, e. g. LA, it does appear that it is rare for a new partnership to succeed 
first time, with cities often bidding repeatedly before securing an event. Interestingly, 
Sheffield's fledgling private-public partnership secured an event early on, but ran into 
difficulties when it came to securing private finance, and it appeared that there was little 
confidence in the partnership. Once again this leads us onto thinking about not just the 
length of time of alliances but how they evolve (i. e. what shapes them, how does the 
membership alter) and where the power lies. 
However, urban regime theory does have its drawbacks, in particular in downplaying 
the influence of external factors on urban governance. Cities do not operate in isolation, 
they work within frameworks set down by sub-national government, national 
government, supra-national government, operate within a global economy and are in 
competition with each other for resources and investment. As Burbank et al (2001) 
demonstrated mega sporting events are external to the city and so every step of the way 
cities are dependent on external forces, from the international sporting body that awards .. 
the event and sets out the terms, through to the multinational corporations that provide 
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Figure 2.6: Constructing an integrative theoretical framework: the contributions 
of theories of governance and urban politics to studying governance, sport and the 
city. 
Policy network approach Governance 
Identification and mapping of * From government to 
networks governance -looking beyond 
Evolution of networks formal government institutions 
Interdependence of networks 0 Role of informal mechanisms 
Trust, reciprocity and co- 0 Fusion of public-private 
operation interests 
Bargaining rather than 0 Broad range of actors 
command. 
Governance, sport and 
the city: what makes for 
success and failure in 
relation to mega-sports 
events? 
Multi-level governance 
Urban regime theory 
0 The details and nuance of local 
" Descriptive powers of MLG picture 
" Nested tiers of government (local, 0 Coalitions between diverse 
sub-national, national, supra- players 
national) 0 Role of business in city 
" No fixed hierarchical order of governance 
government 0 Concept of social production of 
" State power dispersed rather than power and civic co-operation 
concentrated' Symbolic regimes- using sport to 
" Co-ordinating instrument transform a city 
Source: Compiled by author 
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sponsorship. Also, with very rare exceptions (e. g. LA), cities staging mega sporting 
events are dependent upon the support and assistance of sub-national and national 
government. Burbank et al (2001) concluded there is a need to broaden the spatial scale 
and develop the understanding of linkages between players in order to deliver a more 
rounded explanation of urban politics. 
Work on governance, policy networks and also on multi-level governance can help 
address the limitations of regime theory by providing conceptual frameworks for 
understanding the connections and relations between players (as individuals and as 
organisations), the interdependent nature of these relationships, and the changing nature 
of governance. In the first instance, these approaches allow the networks and multi-level 
governance structures to be described, which given their complexity is an important 
starting point. Both of these approaches operate at the meso-level which makes them 
particularly relevant for this study as they include an appreciation of broader structural 
factors, so often overlooked by micro-theories whilst at the same time acknowledging 
the role of mediating processes which macro-level theories often ignore. It is essential 
that this study can locate both the specific case of LVNAC and London's record on 
sporting events more generally, within the broader context whilst still retaining the local 
detail. Multi-level governance draws attention not only to the multi-level nature of 
governance but also that the role, power and place of institutions are not fixed rather 
they are fluid and involve bargaining and negotiation. 
All the theoretical positions considered have at some stage been criticised. for not 
possessing sufficient explanatory power. Although some authors have suggested 
combining one theory with another, e. g. multi-level governance with theories of the 
state, many warn against trying to simply bolt different theories together, arguing that 
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what is required is the development and refinement of existing theories, taking into 
account the insights offered by alternative approaches (Goodwin and Painter, 1997; 
MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). However, policy networks, multi-level governance and 
regime theory all provide ways of thinking about questions, can alert you to questions 
that otherwise you may have not considered and help map out the complexities of 
contemporary urban governance which is exactly what is needed in this thesis. By 
integrating elements from the different approaches, the theoretical framework provides 
a lens through which to look at specifics of the LVNAC project, London and also to 
situate both within the broader context. 
Another important 'quality' of a theoretical framework is that it should enable the 
researcher to learn, facilitate the advancement of theoretical understanding and thus 
contribute to knowledge. In this study an integrative approach has been adopted to 
avoid giving a partial account and to help capture the complexities and dynamic nature 
of governance and urban politics. So although the LVNAC project can be. seen as piece 
of recent 'history' and perhaps the product of a certain set of circumstances, the issues 
are still 'alive' as is evident in the debates about the UK and London's attempts to 
secure and stage mega sporting events. For example, there was a great deal of activity in 
relation to the 2012 London Olympic bid (i. e. reports from various actors, government 
statements), but also in terms of broader sporting issues (e. g. review by the DCMS/SU, 
2002) and reform of sporting bodies (e. g. Sport England). In this way, this study should 
help us to understand the past better, identify the factors that helped secure the 2012 
Olympic, suggest ways in which this success can bebuilt upon in order to strengthen 






This chapter will outline the research design and methods used, explain why they were 
adopted, and also present a reflexive account of conducting the research. Firstly, the 
research questions and the working hypothesis that- underpins the study will be set out. 
Secondly, the research design and methods used will be described. This will be 
followed by an account of the process of carrying out the research, including the 
problems encountered and the steps taken to overcome or ameliorate them. Research 
evolves, from the first idea through to the completed study and this is especially true of 
studies of contemporary policy and events. However, one has to balance the need to 
respond and adapt to shifts in policy and politics vAth the need to retain the focus of the 
research. 
WORKING HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Working hypothesis 
Following on from the theoretical foundations set out in the previous chapter (2) and 
background reading, investigation and thought a working hypothesis was developed to 
underpin and guide the thesis: 
The relative failure of the UK to bid for, and stage mega-sporting events in the 
recent past is rooted within aspects of the style of network governance that has 
evolved in London and other UK cities. 
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Research questions 
The working hypothesis gave rise to three main questions and a number of sub- 
questions: 
1) Is there a particular style(s) of governance associated writh securing and 
delivering successful mega-sports events? 
What are thefeatures ofgovernance systems thatpromote the ability to secure 
and deliver successful mega-sports events? In relation to mega sports events 
what counts as 'successful'and what counts as failure'? What are thefeatures 
ofgovernance systems that limit the ability to secure and deliver successful 
mega- sports events? 
2) What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the network style of 
governance in relation to bidding for and delivering mega-sports events? 
What are the keyftatures of urban governance? nat are the keyftatures of 
sports governance? 
3) In the specific case of London, how do the arrangements for urban and sports 
governance influence how events are bid for and delivered? 
How have urban and sports governance arrangements changed in London over 
recent years? nat are the similarities and differences with governance 




As noted in Chapter Two, although there is growing interest in sport, governance and 
the city, work to date is limited (Cochrane et al, 1996; Dulac and Henry, 2001). At the 
time this study began (2001) there was no work on London. However since then, work 
has started to emerge as a result of London's bid for the 2012 Olympics (e. g. Vigor et 
al, 2004). A qualitative approach is well suited to questions that require exploration, 
where there is a need for a detailed, close up view and for studying phenomena in their 
natural setting (Creswell, 1998). Therefore, a qualitative approach was adopted to 
enable processes to be explored and to tease out the linkages between different aspects 
of governance, levels of governance, sport and governance and the various interested 
parties. For this study a qualitative case study design was used. Yin has described the 
research design as "the logic that links the data to be collected (and the conclusions to 
be drawn) to the initial questions of a study" (Yin, 1994, p. 18) and argues that every 
empirical study has an implicit, if not explicit, research design. The primary purpose of 
a research design is to ensure that the evidence addresses the initial questions (Yin, 
1994). 
Case study research 
Like many terms 'case study' has been used in a variety of ways, although it is usually 
used to identify a specific form of inquiry, one that contrasts with the other two main 
types of social research: the experiment and the social survey (Harnmersley and Gomm, 
2000). Case study methodology involves the investigation of a small number of 
naturally occurring social situations or 'cases' and the collection and analysis of a large 
amount of detailed information about each case (Hammersley and Gomm, 2000), and 
has been described as "the social research equivalent of the spotlight or the microscope" 
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(Hakim, 2000, p. 59). The case(s) are bound by time and activity and data collection 
occurs over a sustained period of time (Stake, 1995) and case studies are often described 
as an exploration of a 'bounded system' (e. g. Creswell, 1998). Although for this study a 
qualitative approach was adopted, case studies can use a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Yin, 1994). Stake (1995) argues that there are many ways to do 
case studies and he emphasises the 'arbitrariness' of methods and urges the researcher 
to use those methods that fit their circumstances and style of operation (p. xii). 
The case study is a common research strategy in a number of different disciplines, 
including political science, sociology, economics and planning, and "in all of these 
situations, the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand 
complex social phenomena7' (Yin, 1994, p. 3). A case study is a particularly useful 
strategy "when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has 
little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within 
some real-life context" (Yin, 1994, p. 1). In this study the 'case' was of a recent attempt 
to bring a mega-sporting event to London - the 2005 World Athletics Championships 
(WAC) to the new Lee Valley National Athletics Centre (LVNAC). Yin (1994) argues 
that there has been a misconception that case studies are only appropriate for the 
descriptive phase of an investigation and that other research strategies (i. e. surveys, 
experiments) are required in order-to produce descriptions or explanations. Yin (1994) 
suggests that some of the best case studies have been both descriptive (e. g. Whyte's 
(1943/55) Street Corner Society) and explanatory (e. g. Allison's (1971) Essence of 
decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis). 
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Designing a case study 
Yin (1994) identifies five elements of the research design. Firstly, the study questions, 
as noted above case studies are particularly appropriate to 'how' and 'why' questions. 
The starting point for research was the seemingly simple questions of why has London 
not been able to secure and stage mega-sporting events? This question gave rise to a 
number of other questions (posed above). The research questions set out at the start of 
this chapter also contain the second element - the proposition - in this case that the 
failure to stage major sporting events is rooted in some aspects of the network style of 
governance. The third element, the unit ofanalysis, is linked to definition of what the 
ccase' is. A case may be an individual, an organisation, a process or as in this study a 
specific event or project - to develop a National Athletics Stadium and stage the World 
Athletics Championships. Boundaries have to be set around the case, for example time 
boundaries to define the beginning and end of the case and who (organisations and 
individuals) to include and exclude. The fourth and fifth elements - linking data to 
propositions and criteriafor interpreting thefindings - have been the least well 
developed in case studies and "represent the data analysis steps in case study research, 
and a research design should lay foundation for this analysis" (Yin, 1994. p. 25). 
Creswell (1998) poses the question "to what extent do qualitative researchers use a 
social science theory to guide their studies or frame questions? " (P. 84). Creswell 
conceptualises different approaches (e. g. ethnography, case study) on a continuum 
based on whether they are used before the study (i. e. before asking questions and 
gathering data) or after the study (i. e. after data collection). Creswell (1998) places case 
studies on the mid-point of the continuum, because qualitative case studies have 
employed theory in different ways. So that, theory might be absent from the study, with 
a focus on a description of a case and its issues (e. g. Stake, 1995), used to guide the 
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study in an explanatory way (e. g. Yin, 1994) or used toward the end of a study (e. g. 
Asmussen and Creswell, 1995). In this study, prior to data collection, time was spent 
reviewing the literature, thinking about and discussing the competing theories that could 
inform the case study and constructing the integrative theoretical framework set out in 
Chapter Two. 
Selectinp, the 'case' 
There are different reasons for focusing on a particular case, for example, it may be 
because of its uniqueness that it requires study - an intrinsic case study, or as in this 
study, the case is used instrumentally to illustrate the issues - an instrumental case study 
(Stake, 1995). In selecting cases Stake (1995) argues that the first criterion should be to 
maximise what we can learn and choose cases that are likely to lead to understandings, 
to assertions and perhaps to modifying generalisations. There are also practical 
considerations in relation to resources (time, money, researchers), access and how 
receptive the potential respondents are (Stake, 1995). The case can be single case or 
multiple (sometimes referred to as collective). The decision as to whether to do a single 
or multiple cases depends partly on the issue of interest and each type has its advantages 
and disadvantages. One key consideration is depth over breadth, Creswell (1998) notes: 
"I am reminded how the study of more than one case dilutes the overall analysis; the 
more cases an individual studies, the greater the lack of depth in any single case" (p. 63). 
However, the evidence from multiple cases is often regarded as more convincing and 
thus the overall study might be thought to be mord robust (Herriott and Firestone, 
1983). There are also practical considerations, multiple cases studies usually require 
extensive resources and time and thus may be impractical for a single student or a sole 
researcher (Yin, 1994, p. 45). 
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Not all cases work out well. It is sometimes necessary to choose another case or modify 
the original plan (Stake, 1995). 1 set out thinking that I would study two projects -that 
of the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre and Wembley National Stadium. However, 
from the outset I did have doubts over the practical. ities of studying WNS given its scale 
and the controversy surrounding it. My initial interest had been in the LVNAC project 
and over time I had gathered information and made informal contacts, so that when it 
came to developing the study and conducting interviews Lee Valley seemed to be the 
natural starting point. Furthermore, I felt it encapsulated the issues of interest and it was 
a clearly bounded case: a line had been drawn under the LVNAC project, a decision had 
been made not to proceed and people have had time to reflect on the process. I also 
thought that doing the Lee Valley would allow me to assess both the feasibility and the 
value of studying WNS. As the fieldwork progressed I became increasingly unsure of 
both the feasibility and the value of an in-depth study of WNS. Access was an important 
factor. Although for the LVNAC project I had been able to access many of the key 
players particularly at the local level, I was experiencing problems accessing some 
organisations and politicians most of whom had played a key role in both the LVNAC 
and VINS projects. In relation to the WNS, given the on-going controversy and 
uncertainty surrounding this highly politicised project I thought it was unlikely that I 
would be granted access to the necessary organisations and individuals. These 
suspicions were confirmed by the comments of respondents in interviews and in 
informal conversations. I dreaded being left with half a case study. I therefore decided 
not to proceed with an in-depth case study of the WNS project, although it still formed 
an integral part of the case study because of its close links with the LVNAC project. 
The WNS development has been the subject of a number of Select Committee enquiries 
(House of Commons, 1999; House of Commons, 2000; House of Commons, 2001 a; 
House of Commons, 2001b; House of Commons, 2002a), the Carter Report (HC 479, 
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200 1) (although 'commercially sensitive' material was not published) and extensive 
media coverage which provides context and comparison to the LVNAC project. 
Context 
It is important in a case study to set out the context of the case clearly, to give the reader 
a sense of "being there" (Stake, 1995, p. -63). This involves situating the case within its 
setting, which may be its physical setting or the social, historical and/or economic 
setting for the case (Creswell, 1998). For the LVNAC project this involves setting out 
the history of the project and its links with other projects (such as WNS), describing the 
proposed stadium development and the surrounding area, a brief socio-economic profile 
of the Upper Lee Valley and the changes in the governance of London (see Chapter 
Four). Case studies involve extensive data collection from multiple sources such as 
interviews, observations, archival records and documents (Yin, 1994, Creswell, 1998). 
It is thus important to pick a case where sufficient material can be amassed - hence my 
concern that I would not be able to do this with WNS development, not because it is not 
there, but because I would not be able to access it. 
Analysis 
Analysis in case study research can be holistic, that is of the entire case study or an 
embedded analysis of a specific aspect(s) of the case (Yin, 1994). Through the data 
collection a detailed description of the case emerges, as do an analysis of themes or 
issues and interpretation or assertions about the case (Stake, 1995). In this study, the 
analysis reflects the muiti-levelled nature of governance and considers the national and 
sub-national frameworks and how they articulate (or do not as the case may be). The 
aim was to produce what Geertz (1973) termed a 'thick description', that is one that 
provides the information necessary for a reader to understand the findings. Geertz 
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(1973) also emPhasised the importance of considering the context in which actors 
operate. Thick descriptions are viewed as essential if informed comparisons are to be 
made about different cases (Lincoln and Guba, 1979). This approach enables the 
complexities of the cases to be captured and facilitates the examination of the 
interactions, conflicts and contradictions. 
ValLdi1y 
Throughout the process of research, steps have to be taken to check the accuracy and 
credibility of the findings - that they are valid (Creswell, 2003). Or put simply: "Do we 
have it right? " (Stake, 1995, p. 107). There are a number of strategies that can be used to 
validate qualitative research, Creswell (2003) identifies eight primary strategies (that 
vary in frequency of use and ease of implementation) and recommends adopting one or 
more in the 'real world'. In this case study the following strategies were employed, 
firstly, triangulation, which involves examining data from different sources and using it 
to build a coherent justification for themes. Second, producing a rich, thick description 
of the findings in order to 'transport' the reader to the setting and give the discussion an 
element of shared experiences. Thirdly, presenting negative or discrepant information 
that runs counter. to themes. In the real world there are always different views and 
discussing contrary information can add to the credibility of the account. 
METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION 
As noted above case studies involve extensive data collection. 
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Literature review 
A broad review of the literature was conducted. Firstly, the merits and shortcomings of 
various theories of governance and urban politics were considered in order to construct 
a theoretical framework for the study. Following on from thisý the key changes and 
debates in national governance; sub-national governance; governance in sport and sport 
and regeneration were mapped out. Reviewing the literature is not only about 
establishing what is known about a topic but it is also an important part of formulating 
the research questions (Yin, 1994). Previous research was used to help to clarify and 
develop the research questions. An important component of this thesis was the re- 
examination of the literature on mega sports events in the light of the case study 
findings. This was done to enable the explanations identified in the case study as 
contributing to the failure of the LVNAC project to be explored and developed in a 
comparative context. As well as revisiting the literature as the study progressed, fiMher 
literature was examined. 
Using documentM sources (literature and policy documents) 
In order to set out the broader context and allow for comparisons to be made over time, 
and between countries, published literature and documents were used to do the 
following. Firstly, in relation to bidding for and staging major sporting events a brief 
comparison was made of the UK, and London in particular, with other countries and 
cities e. g. USA, Barcelona (Spain), Sydney (Australia), Manchester (UK). The aim was 
assess the claims for and legacies of mega-sporting events and the relationship between 
governance arrangements and the realisation of such events. Further comparisons with 
other countries e. g. France, Australia and USA and vvith other cities in the UK e. g. 
Manchester helped tease out the governance issues and clarified to what extent the 
issues are specific to contemporary London. The vast majority of the published 
82 
literature is concerned with the staging of the Olympics (e. g. Andranovich et al, 2001; 
Whitelegg, 2000; Chalkley and Essex, 1999). There is also a considerable North 
American literature on the development of sport stadiums, with concerns being raised 
about the public subsidy of these privately owned stadiums and the role of city 
government (e. g. Baade and Dye, 1988; Keating, 1997; Pelissero et al, 1991). Secondly, 
the evolution of UK governance in general, and London's governance in particular, was 
traced over the past 15-20 years and landmark events (i. e. legislation, 
establishment/abolition of structures and organisations) were identified. Thirdly, an 
examination was made of the sport policy and sports governance literature. 
DocumentM evidence 
Documentary evidence from a variety of sources was collected and examined. For 
example, policy documents, reports and statements produced by local, regional and 
national goveniment, House of Commons Select Committee reports, government 
reviews, websites, press releases from bodies such as Sport England, UK Athletics, 
Football Association, and the national and local press. In the first instance this allowed: 
* Mapping out the key stages of the project (e. g. securing funding), critical decisions 
(e. g. commissioning of reviews) and any barriers and delays to the process (e. g. 
problems with financing, delays with planning). 
e Identification of the keyplayers (organisations, individuals and their affiliations), 
how and when they became involved in the project, any changes in who are the key 
players (e. g. changes of personnel) and the circumstances that led to the changes 
(e. g. dismissal, resignation, reshuffling). 
a Preliminary mapping ofnetworks concemed with the project, the overlaps and 
interconnections (organisations and individuals). 
* Development ofan interview schedule and identification of potential respondents. 
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The documentary analysis and interviewing were interconnected - the first reading of 
documents helped identify what issue to explore and the documents were revisited 
following the interviews and further analysis of the documents conducted as part of the 
case study analysis. 
Comparison 
An important element of this thesis is comparison; with other nations, other cities and 
other mega-sporting events and projects. Sugden and Tomlinson (1999) argue that 
comparison allows researchers "to learn more about the 'other' both horizontally across 
space and vertically through time" (p. 387). In this way it was possible to make links 
between the specific case of the LVNAC project and other mega sporting projects in the 
UK and other nations, including the London Olympic bid as it unfolded. What is also 
interesting is that constant comparison is a key feature of the mega-sports event process 
and is related to the highly competitive nature of the process. Bid nations and cities 
make comparisons across time, examining what others have done before them and 
across space, considering what their rivals are planning to do. In this way nations and 
cities are hoping to learn from the experiences of others and also to ensure that they are 
submitting a competitive bid. This process was evident in the bid for the 2012 Olympic 
and is continuing as London prepares to host the 2012 Games. 
The comparison undertaken within this thesis took on several forms and was not a linear 
process, rather it involved going back and forth between the data and literature as 
concepts emerged and were refined. First, brief comparisons were made between cases 
to produce an overview. For example, ten mega-events were compared on a range of 
key elements identified from the findings of the case study and the literature. This 
overview (set out in Figure 6.1) highlighted differences and similarities between various 
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nations and cities and acted as a 'stepping- stone' to further analysis, including the 
development of a typology of national goverrunent approaches to mega-sports events. 
The comparative overview provided important direction for the research as it helped 
identify key areas for Rifther examination. Secondly, more general comparisons were 
made between nations, for example in relation to sports governance and sports policy 
(see Chapters Two and Six) and this not only highlighted the variety of approaches 
taken by different nations but also helped understand the specifies of the UK's 
approaches to sport. The third form of comparison was more detailed and focused in 
nature and undertaken to further understanding of specific questions. For example, to 
gain a better insight into the role of city level governance in the mega-sports event 
process selected case studies were considered in more depth. Two cases were 
examined- Sydney Olympics and Manchester Commonwealth Games- they were 
chosen because as well as demonstrating important differences in city governance, they 
were both major precursors to the LVNAC project and actively informed thinking on 
mega events at the time (see Chapter Seven for details). The emergence of the London 
Olympic bid enabled a further strand of comparison to be developed between the 
LVNAC project and the London Olympic bid which proved to be very constructive By 
comparing the LVNAC and the London Olympic bid it was possible to consider what if 
any lessons had been learrit from the LVNAC project and to compare the role of central 
government in the two projects. In relation to securing and hosting mega sports events 
the case study had highlighted the difficulties caused by the lack of a unitary authority 
for London and the London Olympic bid provided an opportunity to explore the London 




In-depth, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with key players, some of 
which by virtue of the senior position they occupied, because they held public office or 
the resources they controlled, could be termed 'elite'. Semi-structured interviews were 
chosen for several reasons. Semi-structured interviews enable the respondent to bring 
up issues which they feel are important, whilst at the same time ensuring that the 
researchers 'core' questions are covered (Fielding and Thomas, 2001; Duke, 2002) and 
can also save time when it is at a premium (Duke, 2002). Furthermore, semi-structured 
interviews are thought to be more effective than highly structured or unstructured ones 
when interviewing elites as they allow the researcher to retain control (Ostrander, 1995; 
Hirsch, 1995). 
The interview schedule was drawn up after the review of the literature, the examination 
of documents relating to the project and informal discussion with knowledgeable 
parties. The schedule was piloted and revised accordingly (see Appendix 1). The 
questions asked were aimed at eliciting information about who the key players were, the 
networks involved, the role played by different players including central government, 
regional and local goverrunent and the relationships and interactions between players 
(individuals and institutions). Respondents were asked to give their account of the 
project - their involvement, what they saw as the key issues, the key players, their hopes 
and aspirations, how and where decisions were made, critical events, the reasons for the 
cancellation and the consequences of the decision. 
The interview sample was selected by a combination of identification of people 
involved in the projects and snowballing. Snowball or network sampling involves 
asking a member of the population to be studied to nominate other respondents (Arber, 
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2001; Burgess, 1984). The nominated respondents are approached for interview, and 
also asked to identify further potential respondents; this continues until no ftulher. 
respondents are nominated. Snowball sampling can only be used when the target 
population are involved in some kind of network with others who share the 
characteristic of interest, in this case all were involved in the LVNAC project. As Arber 
(2001) notes, this is both a strength and a potential weakness of the approach. One 
advantage is that it reveals a network of contacts that can itself be studied. Within this 
study what was interesting was who respondents nominated but also who they did not 
(there were some noteworthy omissions). The possible reasons for these omissions (e. g. 
the 'value' assigned to another individual's opinion or role) became more apparent as 
the study progressed and the nature of the relationships between actors revealed. A 
potential drawback is that it only includes those within a connected network of 
individuals. As snowballing involves personal recommendations that vouch for the 
legitimacy of the researcher, it is an approach frequently used when trying to find a 
sample of people engaged in illegal or stigmatised behaviour e. g. drug users, sex 
workers (Lee, 1993). In this study it was used to help open doors that otherwise may 
have remained shut - the case under scrutiny was recent and politically sensitive - 
because individuals vouched for my credibility as a 'proper' researcher as opposed for 
instance, to a journalist seeking a sensationalist story. 
It was important to include people who were involved from the outset and were aware 
of the 'history' of the project. Furthermore, it was essential to include people from the 
different 'layers' of organisations, for example, senior people with strategic 
responsibilities and with an overview of the process, as well as those who are 
responsible for. day-to-day delivery. Duke (2002) in her research on the development of 
prison drug policy found not only did junior members of staff have more specific and 
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intricate knowledge of policy than 'key' policy players, but they were also more willing 
to 'talk'. From the outset it was envisaged that the majority of respondents would be 
interviewed once. All respondents were asked if they could be contacted by e-mail or 
telephone if any points needed clarification. 
The first step in identifying potential respondents was to examine information about the 
Lee Valley National Athletic Centre project. This included the local and national press, 
websites and Newsletters produced by a variety of sources such as UK Athletics 
(UKA), the Lee Valley Regional Park Authority (LVRPA) and central government. 
Another important source of 'names' were the reports of the House of Commons Select 
Committee, into staging major international sporting events (House of Conu-nons 1999; 
House of Commons, 200 1 a), the development of the Wembley National Stadium 
(House of Commons, 2000) and the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre and the 
staging of the 2005 World Athletics Championships (House of Commons, 2001b). 
These reports included the proceedings of the Committee, the minutes of the oral 
evidence received and the written evidence submitted (in the form of memoranda and 
letters). 
In this way an initial list was generated but even at first glance it was apparent that it 
was dominated by senior figures (e. g. Chief Executives) and politicians, that is the 
'elites'. What was missing were those with a more day to day involvement in the 
project. Not only did I think it was important to include people from different layers of 
organisations with varying responsibilities but also for several reasons I did not want to 
start with the elite. Firstly, I thought I would be more able to secure an interview with 
an elite if I had already conducted others interviews, partly as I would have been 
'vetted' and 'approved' by others and also because of the knowledge Lwould have 
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gained from earlier interviews. Secondly, I thought I would go into the interview with 
more confidence and clarity, I was aware that I would only gpt one chance and I wanted 
to be able to make the optimum use of it. In this way I hoped to avoid the dangers of 
being too deferential, being drawn in by their articulateness and allowing elites to 'just 
talk' and thus control the interview (Thomas, 1995; Hirsch, 1995; Ostrander, 1995). 
So having produced an initial list I needed to broaden that list. I went about this by 
using local contacts I had made in the early stages of the development of the research . 
proposal. In April 20011 had attended one of the public consultations held about the 
proposed development of the LVNAC where I had picked up written information and 
also had a long conversation with a member of staff from the LVRPA. I explained my 
interest in the project and the staff member had given me his card and said I was 
welcome to contact him at a later date. When contacted not only did he agree to be 
interviewed but he also suggested several of his colleagues who had been intricately 
involved in the project and were able to give me detailed accounts. In the summer of 
20011 found a piece about the North London Strategic Alliance (NLSA) on the London 
Development Agency (LDA) website. The NLSA is a sub-regional organisation set up 
to raise the profile of North London and develop the potential of the sub-region. One of 
its stated priorities was "To support the development of key sites including the National 
Athletics Stadium at Picketts LocV (LDA, 2001 a) and contact details were given for 
the NLSA. Again initial contact was encouraging and in the autumn of 2002 1 re- 
contacted the co-ordinator of NLSA who was based at Enfield council - who I knew 
had not been directly involved but given their role and local knowledge I hoped would 
be able to give me some pointers. I was supplied with a list of five people along with 
brief information about their area of expertise and only one of the names suggested was 
on my initial list. 
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Into the field 
The people suggested by my local contacts formed the first w4ve of interviews. 
Potential respondents were initially sent a letter outlining the research and requesting an 
interview (see Appendix Two). An infonnation sheet was attached (see Appendix 
Three). The letter was followed up by either/or phone calls and e-mails. All seven 
people approached agreed to be inter-viewed and several contacted me to arrange the 
interview. Interviews were conducted at a time and place that was convenient to the 
respondent (see below for further details and discussion). 
At the end of the interview respondents were asked to provide names of people who 
they felt would be important for me to interview and in this way the sample 
'snowballed'. Asking people to make suggestions widened the sample to include people 
I probably would not have considered (e. g. representative of a local athletics club). 
Also, it soon became apparent that a lot of work had gone behind the scenes, and that 
the names of these "back room boys", as one person described them, did not appear in 
documents or press releases. There were other 'spin offs'. For example, despite 
extensive document and internet searches, I had been unable to locate London 
Intemational Sport, whose name I had come across (e. g. House of Commons Select 
Committee reports, GLA documents). However one of the respondents was able to give 
me a contact name and number. In addition some respondents gave me documents, 
such as minutes of meetings and internal reports that I would not otherwise have had 
access to. 
I asked if I could name the person making the suggestion when I made the initial 
contact. This strategy proved both useful and interesting, Personal recommendation did 
seem to help to open doors, and respondents would often make remarks about the 
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person who had sugge. sted them. In some cases, people said it was probably 'not worth' 
mentioning them in the letter, for example several people were unsure if they would be 
remembered by senior people or whether their name would have any influence. The vast 
majority of the time people were happy to be mentioned. Occasionally, I was 
specifically asked not mention them by name, in a couple of cases this was because of 
strained relations between the individuals and in others it was because of differences 
between organisations. As Duke (2002) has noted asking for suggestions not only 
generates the sample but it is also a means of generating data about networks - who 
knows whom, who values whom and perceptions of where and how an individual fits 
into the network. 
Initially the names suggested tended to be other local players, (this was not surprising 
given that I had begun at the local level), a mixture of people with very specific 
expertise (e. g. transport, planning), the comment often being 'you really need to talk to 
X about that' and people with a broader overview (e. g. local councillors). Although the 
'elites' of my original list were mentioned, it was often accompanied by an 
acknowledgement that they might prove to be difficult to access. As the data collection 
proceeded, fewer new names were being suggested -I had already interviewed or 
contacted many of the people who were suggested to me. 
Information was obtained from 26 respondents (24 men and 2 women). In the interests 
of anonymity it is not possible to provide details of those interviewed, but the sample 
did include national, London and local politicians, Chief Executives and other senior 
management figures from sporting bodies and the local authority as well as middle 
managers from these organisations. Twenty five people were interviewed and one 
person supplied written responses to the interview questions. Of the interviews, 22 were 
91 
conducted face-to-face and three were conducted over the telephone. Three people 
declined to be interviewed, the reasons given included not having anything to add that 
was not already in the public domain and not wishing to comment on confidential 
matters. Other respondents were sought but despite follow up calls and letters I was 
unable to secure an answer or speak to the potential respondent as I was unable to get 
past the 'gatekeepers': all these individuals were located within local or national 
government (politicians and civil servants). 
Three telephone interviews were conducted and in two cases it appeared to be my only 
means of gaining information from these sources. In one case given the multiple 
demands on the time of the individual I was pleased to have been given any opportunity 
to ask questions. In the other case, it soon became apparent that what began as a simple 
follow up telephone call (to an interview request) was turning into an interview and 
moreover, it was going to be my only 'shot' at that individual. In a third case, a focused 
discussion was conducted over the telephone which both clarified a specific issue and 
made it apparent that a full face-to-face interview was not required. I was aware from 
the outset that I needed to take a pragmatic approach to data collection and be willing to 
compromise in order to obtain data of some description (e. g. telephone interview, 
written response). 
Although I stated in my letter that I would contact people, I did supply my contact 
details and several people contacted me agreeing to see me and either suggesting or 
requesting dates- this was a pleasant surprise. Those interviewed included individuals 
from the local authority, sporting bodies, the Lee Valley Regional Park Authority, 
higher education and councillors (see Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1: Sample according to the primary function of the organisation the 
respondent represents and scale at which the organisation. operates. 
Scale/Function Sport/leisure* Govenunent Business Higher ed. Total 
Local 2 7 0 0 9 
Sub-regional 5 0 1 1 7 
Regional" 1 2 0 0 3 
National 4 2 0 0 6 
International 1 0 0 0 1 
13 11 1 1 26 
Source: Compiled by author 
Notes: 
Includes voluntary sector, public sector and NDPBs. 
Regions refers to organisations with a London wide remit. 
Respondents are classified according to the primary role of the organisation they represent, so 
that the local authority sport and leisure officer is included in 'local government'. 
Organisations are classified according to their main level of operation i. e. local authority 
classified as 'local goverriment' 
Interviews lasted between 40 minutes to an hour and half, although most were just 
under an hour. The vast majority of interviews were conducted at the respondent's place 
of work. Others venues included the respondents home (a few worked from home), and 
a hotel coffee shop. With permission the interviews were tape-recorded and detailed 
notes were then made from these recordings. Immediately after the interview field notes 
were made. There were also opportunities for more informal conversations, for instance 
while being accompanied out of a building, which acted as an important adjunct to the 
formal interviews. 
Talking to elites: questions of access and power. 
Ostrander (1995) argues that social scientists rarely "study up" (p. 133) and that this gap 
in our knowledge acts to obscure and thus maintain the position of elites within society. 
Researching the 'powerful' presents different challenges - methodological and ethical - 
to studying 'down' (Cormode and Hughes, 1999). The characteristics of those under 
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study, the power relations between them and the researcher and the politics of the 
research process differ between elite and non-elite research (Moyser and Wagstaffe, 
1987; Hertz and Imber, 1995). One of the challenges is gaining access. Elites are often 
well 'guarded' by personal assistants and the like, and it is often necessary to use 
'levers' such as personal contacts and institutional affiliation to gain entry (e. g. 
McDowell, 1998). Obviously without access there can be no research so that 'the first 
acceptance already feels like success -a small victory' (Cochrane, 1998, p. 2124). I 
recognise that feeling of elation as a request translated into an interview, particularly at 
the start of my fieldwork when I was slightly concerned that no one would agree to 
speak to me and later on when I secured interviews with more senior people (e. g. Chief 
Executives). However, this 'victory' Cochrane argues, highlights the weakness of the 
researcher in the process 'as dependent on the researched, who by definition, are used to 
running things' (Cochrane, 1998, p. 2124). When studying elites the researcher is often 
in the position of supplicant, "requesting time and expertise from the powerful with 
little to offer in return" (McDowell, 1992, p. 213) - this is perhaps particularly true of 
the lone PhD student. My inability to get past some gatekeepers, despite my persistence 
was a stark reminder of my dependent position. 
Researchers must be able to demonstrate a good deal of prior knowledge of the field 
(Hakim, 2000) as gaining entry will probably involved being 'checked out' by the 
respondent (e. g. Ostrander, 1995; Duke, 2002). This 'checking out' took a number of 
forms. Some respondents enquired as to whether I had read certain documents, others 
offered me copies of documents, whilst'others would make comments such as "You've 
probably already read.... " or "Have you looked at .... ? ". Several of my respondents 
remarked that I seemed to 'know my stuff, although in earlier interviews I made it clear 
that my knowledge had been gained from reading reports and documents and that I was 
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there to elicit their particular expertise and their 'take' on events. As the interviews 
proceeded my knowledge and confidence increased and that was one of the reasons that 
I deliberately kept the most senior people until later. There were also occasions where I 
was quite 'up front' about the limitations of my knowledge, for example, the 
complexities of transportation planning. 
In order to gain and maintain access, researchers often have to put on a 'different skin' 
(Cochrane 1998, p. 2124), for example, through their dress, and demeanour researchers 
create an air of 'respectability understood by the researched' (Cochrane, 1998, p. 2124). 
I certainly took care in how I presented myself (e. g. wearing smart clothes), I wanted to 
appear 'professional', someone to be taken seriously. McDowell (1998) in her study of 
City of London bank workers described the different persona she adopted depending 
upon whom she was interviewing. For example, with older, fierce senior women she 
would be 'brusquely efficient' and with younger men she was 'superfast, well-informed 
and definitely not to be patronised' (McDowell, 1998, p. 2138). For Cochrane (1998) 
there is a worry that the critical researcher might surrender themselves too muclilo the 
researched and that taking on that 'different skin' can shape the way the research agenda 
is pursued. 
The effect of the gender of the interviewer is uncertain and subject to discussion, but 
may be significant. Cochrane (1998) describes how in one study he was involved in 
interviewing senior local government officer and local business, it was apparent that the 
response depend upon who was doing the interviewing. Cochrane, a man of "roughly 
the same age and wearing the regulation suit and tie" (Cochrane, 1998, p. 2126) elicited 
formal responses, whilst when his younger female colleague interviewed the same 
people they talked more freely and gave more thorough explanations. Schoenberger 
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(1992) suspects that it is easier for her as a woman to gain access to corporate elites than 
for a male colleague "because as a woman I am less threatening, more intriguing, or 
presumed to be a better audience for the recounting of exploits. On the other hand, once 
in, my male colleague probably does not have to deal with paternalism, flirting, or 
scepticism about his ability to grasp technical subjects" (p. 217). It is difficult, 
McDowell (1998) observes, as a lone researcher to assess whether gender has any 
effect, either in gaining access or the responses one elicits. The overwhelming majority 
of people I interviewed were men (24 men and I Woman), with three of the men being 
interviewed over the telephone and the other 21 face-to-face and the one woman face- 
to-face. Although I am unsure as to whether being a woman made any difference to 
getting an interview, there was certainly some curiosity as to why I was interested in the 
LVNAC project and staging of major sporting events in London. At the time I did not 
give much thought to these enquiries, but on reflection perhaps given that sport, urban 
governance and politics tend to be male domains maybe it seemed to be a strange choice 
for a woman. 
The choice of venue for the interview was very much left to the respondent. This was 
primarily to facilitate access and in most cases the inter-views were conducted in their , 
work place either in the respondent's office or a meeting room. Fitz and Halpin (1994) 
suggest that when interviews take place in the respondent's social space, their position 
of power is reinforced, but in practical terms it can be difficult to arrange interviews in 
cneutral' venues. Indeed some neutral venues can have other draw backs, for example, I 
found the hotel coffee shop an awkward place to conduct an interview - it was noisy 
and busy with a lot of background activity. As Duke (2002) notes, there are ways of 
using the physical space so that the researcher ýnd respondent are in more 'equal' and 
1 Information was obtained from 26 people - 24 men and 2 women but one of the women supplied written 
information. 
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4neutral' positions. Like Duke (2002) 1 was able on most occasions to avoid the 
'behind-the-desk' scenario and conduct the interview in another part of the office either 
around a table or on comfortable chairs. 
Some researchers (McDowell, 1998; Duke, 2002) have reported that interviews with 
elites were constantly interrupted by phone calls, letters to sign and enquiries from other 
staff. I was struck by the fact that on the whole I was given the undivided attention of 
the respondent. There were, of course interruptions, mostly phone calls (many let 
answer machines pick them up) but generally they were dealt with swiftly, often with a 
"I'm in a meeting I'll call you back7 and others had personal assistants who dealt with 
calls. Although I had requested 30-45 minutes of a respondents time I often got longer, 
despite on occasion pointing out that I was taking up more time than I had anticipated 
and even reminding people they had another meeting to attend. When arranging the 
interview some respondents clearly stated that they would give me an hour and 
'booked' me in for an hour. The importance of time was apparent in arranging the 
interview, perhaps as Duke (2002) reflects it is because elites are used to everything 
being 'urgent' and done in short time frame. Some respondents were anxious to fit me 
into their diaries within a week or two of my initial contact and many would ask what 
my deadline was. In contrast, it took me months to even get a 'yes' or 'no' from others, 
which may have been a reflection of their workload or their perception of the value of 
the research. In a couple of cases, people agreed to talk to me but at a later date once 
their work commitments allowed them. In one case the promised interview never took 
place, with arrangements being und one (all contact was via a gatekeeper) and eventually 
I decided given the interviews I had done in the intervening period that little would be 
gained from another attempt. 
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I took a number of steps in order to maximise my chances of being granted access. Prior 
to approaching elites I spent time reading around the area and identifying key players 
and events. I then interviewed people who had been involved on a day-to-day basis in 
order to increase my understanding and credibility and I used the names of other 
respondents (with their permission) and wrote on university headed notepaper. To an 
extent this strategy worked -I was able to interview senior people from the local 
authority, local business and two of the key organisations involved in the project (Lee 
Valley Park Authority and UK Athletics). However, my success was mostly in 
interviewing what has been referred to as the 'local elite' (i. e. senior officers in the local 
authority, Councillors, local business people). Indeed, in many ways I experienced 
fewer problems than I envisaged and on the whole, people were enthusiastic, 
accommodating and generous with their time. However, I faced difficulties and closed 
doors when I tried to speak to others with either a higher personal profile or from 
organisations with a higher public profile. 
In relation to one sports organisation, I initially approached a middle manager who had 
been suggested to Me, although the respondent who made the suggestion was unsure 
whether the manager would agree to speak to me. He declined, saying that the 
organisation "do not get involved in such projects" and that he "would not tell me 
2 
anything that was not in the public domain" .I was directed to the Select Committee 
reports which I explained I had already read, and the most I could secure was the 
promise to clarify any factual queries I had by e-mail or telephone. As the interviews 
proceeded I hoped that a 'way in' would present itself but it did not; no one I spoke to 
was either able or willing to help open the door. I then wrote to a member of the senior 
management team, who I knew through official sources (e. g. Select Committee reports), 
2 Telephone conversation with middle manager of sports organisation, November 2002 
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and the grapevine, could give me an insight into the organisations' role in the LVNAC 
project and into the staging of mega and major sports events in the UK. I received an 
interesting reply from the senior manager- the organisation would be happy to help, the 
middle manager (the one had originally approached) would contact me shortly to 
arrange to see me, which he duly did. In this case going to the 'top' had paid off and it 
was a strategy that I used with other organisations including the DCMS. However, in 
the case of the DCMS it did not work - the senior person had moved to another section 
and did not want to comment, another politely declined stating that the Goverrunent/ 
DCMS perspective was well documented in public reports and statements and that 
"there is nothing that I could add to what is already on public record'A . This can be 
interpreted in a number of ways. First, the policy of 'open government' means that there 
really is nothing to add as the full account is in the public domain, although from the 
accounts given by other players this seems unlikely. Indeed the 'value' of conducting 
interviews as opposed to just relying on the House of Commons investigations was soon 
apparent as respondents were often very candid, offered opinions not just 'straight 
accounts and also had had time to reflect on events. Second, civil servants do not want 
to be quizzed about an embarrassing incident and can use the existence of Select 
Committee reports to justify this stance. It may be that even had I secured interviews 
they may not have been very enlightening. Ball (1994) in his study of education policy 
found that serving politicians and civil servants were more reticent than those who were 
retired or "out of office". I interviewed several people that were either about to leave 
their posts or had already left. These interviews were rich, with respondents being frank 
and open about events. Civil servants are also bound by civil service rules and the 
Official Secrets Act and can not answer all questions, although this does not preclude 
the researcher from asking them (Ball, 1994). 
E-mail response from a civil servant working in the DCMS to my request for an interview, May 2003. 
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Changing and challenging times: researching contemporm policy and politics 
Researching contemporary policy and politics proved to be stimulating and productive 
but at times challenging. The dynamic nature of policy-making and politics means that 
over the course of the study there have been many changes at national, city and local 
level. Much of what and who were in place in 2000-2001 are no longer there. Indeed 
even at the time of the fieldwork (late 2002/early 2003) people had moved or were in 
the process of moving on and policies and structures had changed. However, many of 
the issues have remained 'live' - as evident in the bid for the London Olympics and 
now as preparations are made to stage the 2012 Games - and this has both complicated 
and strengthened this thesis. In terms of this thesis it was important to locate and 
analyse the LVNAC project in its contemporary context, whilst at the same time 
considering what has changed and what these changes may mean for future projects. 
A nwnber of difficulties were encountered as a result of external events and two 
examples will be used to illustrate the issues. Firstly, I had been disappointed but not 
surprised by the initiýl refusal from the middle manager of the sports organisation. I was 
aware from media reports, official documents and from the interviews I had conducted, 
that the organisation was troubled and divided and was going through a period of 
intense change so perhaps would not be receptive to an outsider questioning them about 
a 'failed' project. Secondly, the fieldwork was undertaken (November 2002 onwards) 
during a time when the UK (along with other countries) were on the verge of war with 
Iraq. I was very aware of this when I was trying to contact politicians - particularly 
when the time came to follow up my initial letter with e-mails or calls- my request for 
an interview about staging major sporting events in London felt so trivial that I was 
embarrassed to make contact. In one case I did send-an e-mail, in which I emphasised 
that I was hoping that the person would agree to speak to me 'some time in the future' (I 
got no reply). In another case I postponed making contact as it seemed inappropriate 
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and unlikely to generate a positive response. I also put off making initial contact with 
other politicians. It was also at this time that the possibility of London bidding for 2012 
Olympics was being debated and the Cabinet were expected to discuss the bid at the end 
of January 2003 and make a decision, but this has been postponed indefinitely because 
of the Iraqi crisis (Wintour and MacKay, 2003)4. The BOA and other sporting bodies 
understood and supported the Governments position (BOA, 2003a). In both the 
instances cited - the organisation. undergoing restructuring and the government facing 
war- outside events had overtaken and made it more difficult to negotiate access but this 
is very much part of researching in the 'real' world. 
Maintaining anonymity in a nwned case stud 
Prior to the interview issues relating to anonymity and confidentiality were discussed 
with each respondent. I informed respondents that although they would not be identified 
the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre project would be, as it would be impossible to 
place it within the broader context if it was not identified, and all the respondents agreed 
with this. Full accounts of evidence given to the House of Commons Select Committees 
are publicly available (some conunercially sensitive infonnation was not published) but 
some respondents were still reticent and indeed one person declined to be interviewed 
citing "matters of confidentiality" that he felt "unable to comment owý5 . Although some 
respondents said that they did not mind being identified or their comments being 
attributed, others welcomed anonymity and stressed how important this was. Although 
guarantees can be made that statements and quotes will not be attributed, names will not 
be used and generic titles adopted (e. g. senior manager) it still may be possible for 
individuals to be identified particularly by colleagues, as one person put it "There is 
4 The decision to proceed within a London bid for the 2012 Olympics was made in May 2003. 
5 E-mail received from a senior manager of a sports organisation, February 2003. 
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only one of Me,, 6. This is not an uncommon problem, for example McDowell (1998) 
expresses concern that the respondents in her study of the "relatively small and close- 
knit world of banking" would be recognised by their colleagues "where my attempts at 
anonymity may be insufficient to disguise them7 (McDowell, 1998, p. 2144). As the 
study progressed I came to realise that I probably would not be able to use many direct 
quotes, rather I would have to embed the views of individuals into the text. I was aware 
that even the phrases that an individual uses can reveal their identity and I was anxious 
not to break the promise I had made. I was also told things 'off the record' or 
specifically asked not to use some material other than as background and I will be true 
to my word. As Palmer (2000) notes the critical researcher can be left in an 'ethical 
bind'. During her fieldwork about the Tour de France bicycle race, Palmer (2000) 
witnessed events and was given first hand accounts of drug taking, which left in her no 
doubt as to the widespread abuse of drugs in professional cycling. However, the 
conversations were 'off the record' and Palmer (2000) did not use the material in her 
thesis. However, several years later the story 'broke' and the cyclists whose confidences 
she had been keeping, started talking to the worlds press about their own drug taking 
and so Palmer (2000) decided that she could now write a critical anthropological 
account. 
Respondents were informed that the main outcome of the research will be a doctoral 
thesis and that findings will be presented at conferences and publication sought in peer 
reviewed j oumals. There are various strategies in addition to those outlined above that 
can be employed to protect respondents, but at the same time ensure that the research 
enters the public domain. For example, papers can be sent to respondents prior to 
publication, although it is important for the integrity of the research that it is made clear 
interview with a senior manager, local authority, March 2003. 
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that this 'checking' is to ensure that a respondent is not compromised (e. g. by 
inadvertently revealing their identity) and not an opportunity for them to edit or alter the 
interpretation or conclusions (Ostrander, 1995). 1 have offered to send papers to 
respondents. Again some felt this was unnecessary whilst others requested it before I 
even had a chance to offer. 
As noted above, it is essential that respondents understand that being sent papers is not 
an opportunity for them to 'censor' the research findings prior to publication. I always 
emphasised that I was engaged in an academic piece of work and that I was not out to 
&expose' or compromise anyone. This however, does not mean that I will refrain from 
being critical or not report the shortcomings of organisations, but any criticisms will be 
the product of thorough analysis of the data and underpinned by theory. Palmer (2000) 
and Sugden and Tomlinson (1999) highlight the importance of maintaining the integrity 
of the researcher- in Palmer's case on La Socijtd du Tour de France that oversees the 
Tour de France bicycle race and Sugden and Tomlinson's (1999) work on FIFA, the 
governing body of world football. For Sugden and Tomlinson (1999) a healthy 
scepticism is essential when gathering the views of individuals or organisations and 
they stress the importance of relating different accounts to each other and of interpreting 
them. In both cases, the researchers emphasise the need to construct the 'bigger picture' 
and they regard this as the key difference between journalism and investigative social 
science (Palmer, 2000; Sugden and Tomlinson, 1999). 
Management and analysis of data 
With the permission of respondents the interviews were recorded (no one refused), and 
in the case of the telephone interview detailed notes were taken at the time. General 
observations and 'off the record' remarks were noted down as soon as practical after the 
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interview. Each tape was listened to and detailed notes'were made. I also amassed a 
variety of documentary sources including minutes of meetings, unpublished internal 
reports 7 that I added to my collection of official published material (e. g. House of 
Commons Select Committee reports) and this material was examined in tandem with 
the interview data. 
While listening to the recording of the interview and making notes I was looking for 
themes, similarities and differences in the accounts, 'odd cases' and new leads. The 
process of analysis began with the first interview and quite soon into the fieldwork, 
themes began to emerge. This was followed by a period of concentrated data analysis in 
late summer and autumn 2003. A word processor was used to assist in the organisation 
and management of the data but I decided against using a qualitative data analysis 
computer packages (I considered using NU*DIST) as I concluded that the analysis 
would not be enhanced by using NU*DIST. Stanley and Temple (1995) compared the 
word processing package Word for Windows with five specialist programmes, 
including NU*DIST and should consider using a good word processing package (e. g. 
Word for Windows) as their basic analytical aid, and that only if they want to do 
something that this package cannot do should they consider using a dedicated package. 
I used Miles and Huberman's (1994) framework as it has been found to be particularly 
useful for case studies (Robson, 2002). Miles and Huberman (1994) regard data analysis 
as comprising of three concurrent 'flows of activity': data reduction, data display and 
conclusion drawing/verification. Analysis involved coding the data and writing memos 
The majority of this material was supplied to me by respondents, although I was able to obtain some 
from other sources e. g. the English Sports Council minutes are available via their website 
(www, sr)ortengland. org. uk). 
8 As part of my research training I took a module on advanced computer software techniques. I was 
trained in the use of N-LJ*DlST and SPSS, and completed two assignments using each of the packages. 
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in order to reduce the data and then displaying the data. Miles and Huberman (1994) 
suggest a number of ways of displaying data, for example, matrices (i. e. tables with 
rows and columns) and networks (i. e. a set of boxes or 'nodes' with links between 
them) which I adopted in order to 'plot out' the data and this helped me 'make sense' of 
the data. Conclusions were drawn from the data, using a number of tactics to generate 
meaning, for example, noting themes, patterns and trends. These three flows of activity 
along with the process of data collection formed a continuous iterative process. The 
products of analysis form Chapter Five of the thesis. 
The literature was then revisited in the light of the analysis of the interview data and 
documentary sources and more detailed and focused comparisons made with other cases 
in order to further develop the concepts and themes that emerged from the analysis. The 
processes of reviewing literature, analysing data and making comparisons were tightly 
interwoven and involved going back and forth between the literature, data and 
comparative material to take the analysis forward. 
Rel2orting the findings 
Whqn it came to reporting the findings, the nature of this research -a narned case study 
of a contemporary event - presented a number of challenges. The key issue was the 
need to find a way of capturing and conveying the different voices and perspectives 
without compromising anonymity and confidentiality. Given the networked nature of 
the LVNAC project - as clearly illustrated in Figure 6.1 in Chapter Six - individuals, 
their opinions and how they present them are often well known to other members of the 
network either through personal contact, documents, the media or the 'grapevine'. 
Although the LVNAC project may now be consigned to history, many of the 
organisations and individuals have ongoing relationships and care needs to be taken not 
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to jeopardise these. As already noted, the specificity of many of their roles makes it is 
difficult to 'hide' individuals behind generic job titles and organisational affiliation. It is 
for these reasons that although the interview data is very rich, in presenting the findings 
in Chapter Seven, although quotations have been used much of what was reported has 
been embedded in the text. For the most part quotations do not bear any information 
about their origin?. Although it could be argued that this approach means that some of 
the richness of the data is lost, it reflects the practicalities of conducting 'real world' 
research and the obligations and responsibilities that this entails (i. e. taking steps to 
preserve anonymity). 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has set out the research design and methods used and explained why they 
were adopted and also presented a reflexive account of conducting the research. The 
methods used were employed to as they allowed issues of multi-level governance, 
policy networks and urban regime theory to be examined. Many, although not all, 
potential problems can be anticipated and other peoples accounts of conducting research 
can be invaluable in helping to decide the most appropriate strategies to adopt. For 
example, earlier work on researching elites proved to be useful and gave me important 
'tips' and 'pointers'. Not all issues or difficulties can be anticipated and the researcher 
has to respond and adapt the research if necessary whilst still trying to retain the focus 
of the research. For example, at the outset of my research I could not have known that 
there was going to be a war just at the time I was seeking to interview MPs or that a key 
organisation would undergo major re-structuring. The process of conducting the Lee 
Valley case study also led me to conclude that it would be neither wise nor productive 
9 This includes gender as only 2 of 26 respondents were women. 
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to conduct a case study of the WNS project. In some instances, it may be that you can 
not 'do' anything about the issue but just be aware, for instance one can not change ones 
gender but you can be aware that it may have an effect. 
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Chapter Four 
Case Study - The Lee Valley National Athletics Centre project 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter tells the 'story' of the LVNAC project; one that begins in December 1999 
with the decision to remove athletics from Wembley National Stadium ()XINS) and 
concludes in October 2001 with the demise of the LVNAC project. In order to set the 
context to the project the governance of London is described. London has undergone a 
number of changes over time and the LVNAC occurred at the time of a significant, 
historically- specific governance transition. Examining the history of London 
governance will further understanding of shifts in governance forms, networks and 
'urban regimes'. Then background information about the Upper Lee Valley and Enfield 
set out to in order to 'paint' a picture of the locality, its characteristics and the issues 
facing it The evolution of the project is described, starting with the selection process 
and moving on to consider the key issues that faced the project, the players 
(organisations and individuals), critical events and decisions. This Chapter draws on a 
variety of sources including official documents, press releases, unpublished'papers and 
minutes of meetings, and the accounts given by respondents. 
BACKGROUND: THE WIDER LONDON CONTEXT 
London is a vast, sprawling metropolis and as such governing it has always presented a 
number of challenges and a variety of 'solutions' have been tried'. Part of the problem 
is the sheer size of London so that any arrangements are likely to be complex. Related 
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to this is the persistence of local interests - it has proved difficult to marry the needs of 
London as a whole with those of local authorities. Furthermore, as Rao (2003) argues 
central government regards the governance of London as too important to be left to 
Londoners and that it is unlikely Ministers will give up their powers. 
One of the experiments in governing London was the Greater London Council (GLC). 
Created inl 963 and abolished in 1986, it was intended to be a new type of authority 
focusing on strategic planning and metropolitan infrastructure. The GLC had area wide 
responsibilitieS2 whilst the local authorities were responsible for providing local services 
including housing and local planning and in addition, some powers were shared 
between the GLC and local authorities 3. The key characteristic of the GLC was meant to 
be its ability to distance itself from traditional local authority practice and to function as 
a truly regional body (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, pp. 28-29). Although the GLC described 
itself as a 'regional authority, in terms of its constitution and its internal organisation, 
the GLC was "essentially a local authority writ large" (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, p. 29). 
The continuities with the London County Council (LCC), which it replaced were 
striking4 and some authors, (e. g. Rhodes and Hastings, 1972) argue that the difficulties 
encountered by the GLC were rooted in these continuities and its conventional 
organisation, whilst Hall (1963) argued that it was suited to conditions that had existed 
25 years earlier. Within ten years Conservative borough leaders were calling for its 
abolition, but the GLC survived until 1986 when it was finally abolished by the 
Conservative government 5. 
1 See Pimlott, B. and Rao, N. (2002) Governing London, Oxford: Oxford University Press, for an 
historical overview of the governance arTangements for London from the 1830s onwards. 
2 The area wide responsibilities covered planning policy, fire and ambulance services, main roads and 
traffic, refuse disposal (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, p. 28). 
3 These shared powers included parks and open spaces, main sewerage and land drainage and aspects of 
housing and environmental health (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, p. 28). 
4 For example the committee structure was hardly changed and II of the 14 chairmanships were taken by 
former LCC councillors (Rhodes and Hastings, 1972). 
5 See Pimlott and Rao (2002, pp. 3143) for a detailed account of the events leading up to abolition. 
109 
Goveming London without an unitM auth2jty 
Following the abolition of the GLC in 1986, London was left without an overall 
strategic body, which made it one of the few major cities in the world without 
metropolitan government (Travers et al, 1991, pp. 64-66). London governance was left 
in the hands of government ministers, the London boroughs, and an array ofjoint 
arrangements. The result was that decision making became very fragmented and power 
shifted to Whitehall (Newman and Thornley, 1997; Pimlott and Rao, 2002). At 
metropolitan level, abolition of the GLC created a power vacuum and over time the 
private sector moved into to fill this vacuum, promoting 'partnership' between business 
and goverment (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, p. 45). Pimlott and Rao (2002, p. 45) argue that 
although 'partnership' was promoted as a "panacea for London's ills", by the mid- I 990s 
"the limits of partnership served only to highlight the gaps in the overall management of 
the metropolis". 
What had emerged in the absence of a unitary authority was a particular form of 
governance based on intense interaction between large numbers of partners including 
statutory, voluntary and private organisations. Coalition building, interagency working 
and the forging of partnerships became the order of the day, but this systern_ was not 
only very complex, there was also little democratic accountability or strategic co- 
ordination (Newman and Thornley, 1997; Hebbert, 1998; Tomaney, 2001; Pimlott and 
Rao, 2002). This 'network mode' of governance as it has been termed, was not unique 
to London, indeed it has become increasingly common throughout the UK (Kleinman et 
al, 2002). However, in London it had taken on particular form, partly as a result of the 
economic and political importance of the capital and also the history of relations 
between central government and London over the centuries (Hebbert, 1998). 
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In London, networking was also a practical response to the absence of an overall 
strategic body (Kleinman et al, 2002). Newman and Tbornley (1997) identified two 
distinctive features of London governance during this period. Firstly, the key role 
played by central government in fostering and supporting these new governance 
networks and in particular in drawing in business. Secondly, the overlapping nature of 
the new. governance networks, with many individuals and organisations being members 
of more than one network that created vertical and horizontal linkages. 
A new unitM authorily for London 
The possibility of the re-establishment of a London wide strategic authority was high on . 
the agenda of the in-coming New Labour government in 1997 6. In May 1998, following 
the publication of a White Paper 7a referendum on the proposals was held. Although the 
turn out was low (34.6%), 72% of Londoners voted in favour of a Mayor and Assembly 
(Pimlott and Rao, 2002, p. 70). 
In May 2000, following a turbulent campaign, elections were held for the Mayor and 
Assembly members and the GLA headed by Mayor Ken Livingstone came into 
operation in July 2000. Ken Livingstone had been the last leader of the GLC and stood 
as an independent following his failure to become Labour candidate 8. He won 
convincingly, but on another low turn out of 33.65 per cent (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, p. 
94). Throughout the campaign it had been apparent that Ken Livingstone had the 
6 New Labour were elected in May 1997 and in July 1997 a consultative document setting out proposals 
for the creation of a Greater London Authority (GLA) with an elected Mayor were published (DETR, 
1997). 
7A Mayor and Assembly for London. (DTEF, 1998). 
8 See D'Arcy, M. and Maclean, R. (2000) NiAtmare! The Race to Become London's Mayor for a full 
account of the strategies employed by New Labour to prevent Ken Livingstone becoming Labour 
candidate, his expulsion from the Labour party following his decision to run as an independent and 
eventual victory. 
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support of Londoners of all political persuasions and that people were prepared to set 
aside their usual political allegiances to vote for him (Pimlott and Rao, 2002, p. 9 1). 
The GLA9 covers the thirty two London boroughs and the Corporation of London and is 
new kind of local authority designed to provide city wide strategic government for 
London. It is unlike any previous local or regional government in Britain (Travers, 
2002). Firstly, the Mayor is elected for a single constituency of 'Greater London', an 
area with a population of 7.3 million and over 5 Million electors. Furthennore, within 
British politics the Mayor is in a unique position combining representative and 
executive functions. The Mayor determines policies, sets the GLA budget and makes 
board appointments. The 25 member Assembly scrutinizes the activities of the Mayor. 
The GLA's main areas Of responsibility are transport, policing, economic development 
and fire and emergency planning and four 'functional bodies '10 funded by the GLA are 
responsible for these key areas. Other functions include culture, media and sport, the 
environment, public health and inward investment. The GLA does not have any 
responsibility for key local services: education, housing, social care or infrastructure. 
Mayoral duties include making appointments to the functional bodies (although he does 
not appoint all board members) and producing strategies for London on key issues 
including spatial development (known as the London Plan), transport, culture and 
economic development. These new arrangements came on stream shortly after the 
World Athletics Championships had been awarded to London for 2005 and the LVNAC 
project unfolded during this period of transition. There will be further discussion of 
London governance in Chapter Seven. 
9 The key responsibilities for the Mayor and Assembly were set out in the GLA Act (1999) see Pimlott 
and Rao (2002) for a detailed discussion of the provisions of the Act and the passage of the Act through 
Parliament. 
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BACKGROUND: THE UPPER LEE VALLEY AND ENFIELD 
The site of the proposed national athletics stadium was situated in the heart of the Upper 
Lee Valley an area that runs from the M25 motorway in the north, to Leyton in the 
south, taking in a l3km corridor of mostly industrial and commercial uses, bordering on 
the Lee Valley Regional Park and its large reservoirs (LDA, 2003). The Upper Lee 
Valley cuts across three London boroughs - Enfield, Haringey and Waltham Forest and 
has been identified within national, regional and local policy frameworks as an area of 
deprivation. The area has received funds from several sources including the European 
Regional Development Fund (EDRF) (the Upper Lee Valley has Objective 2 status), the 
Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and has been identified as one of five priority 
regeneration areas by the London Development Agency and as a key regeneration 
corridor by the Mayor of London in the Spatial Development Strategy 12 (SDS) (known 
as the London Plan) (GLA, 2004). Enfield, Haringey and Waltham Forest are all 
eligible for Neighbourhood Renewal Funds based on Indices of Multiple Deprivation 
2000 measures (SEU, 2001). 
The Upper Lee Valley Objective 2 area covers 22 wards in the London Boroughs of 
Enfield, Haringey and Waltham Forest and a population of 152,500 (GOL, 2000, 
p. 102). The award of Objective 2 status means that an area is able to benefit from 
financial assistance provided under European Union Structural Funds 13 . Historically, the 
10 These are Transport for London (TfL); the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA); the London 
Development Agency (LDA) and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA). 
11 The other areas are the Lower Lee Valley (including Stratfor 
- 
d, Leeside through to the royal docks and 
Hackney Wick); City Fringe (parts of Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Islington and Camden); RoyallWembley 
and London Riverside (including Barking and Dagenham and Havering Riverside) (LDA, undated). 
12 The Upper Lee Valley was first identified in the initial proposals published by the Mayor in 2001 
(GLA, 200 1). 
13 Two types of funding are available the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is used to 
finance improvements in infrastructure, productive investment, local development and the environment. 
The European Social Fund (ESF) is used to finance training activities and human resource development. 
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Upper Lee Valley was a major centre of manufacturing in London, producing a variety 
of products including textiles, electrical and mechanical products, food processing and 
household items. However, since the recession of the late 1980s the area has witnessed a 
decline in manufacturing industry and with it the most significant local employment 
sector. New employment has been limited and what has occurred has been mostly in the 
retail, leisure and other service activities. Other than manufacturing, the key 
employment sectors are distribution and hotel and catering, (accounts for about 28% of 
local employment) and public services (18%) whilst there are relatively low levels of 
employment in the business and financial services sectors (GOL, 2000, p. 102). The 
average unemployment rate (9.8%) was more than twice the London average (4.41/o) 
and with some wards in Haringey experiencing much higher levels 14 (GOL, 2000, 
p 103). There is a large ethnic minority population and one in three people from this 
group is officially unemployed (GOL, 2000, p. 109). 
The area's ability to attract new business investment is hindered by several factors (see 
Figure 4.1 for a summary), including the poor public transport system that does not link 
up the areas of employment with the areas of high unemployment and a lack of the 
skills required by inward investors. However, the GOL in its Objective 2 Single 
Programming Document for London 2000-2006, points to positive developments within 
the area. Firstly, there has been according to GOL a "relatively benign economic 
period", with slight growth in employment (I% for the period 1991-1997 and 3% 
growth in the period 1996-1998) (p. 102). Secondly, there is evidence that some of the 
manufacturing decline has been arrested and key companies (e. g. Merck Sharpe and 
Dome) have remained in the area rather than relocate as planned. Thirdly, developments 
14 All the objective 2 wards in Haringey have unemployment rates over 10%, whilst in Coleraine it is 
16.5% and Park it is 18.5% (source, Objective 2 Single Programming Documcnt for London 2000-2006, 
GOL 2000, p. 103. ) 
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under the previous Objective 2 programme such as the Innova Science Park, Lee Valley 
Technopark and London Lee Yalley Business innovation Centre provide foundations for 
further work. 
Figure 4.1: Summary of the Upper Lee Valley Objective 2 area 
AREA UPPER LEE VALLEY 
Borough coverage Enfield, Haringey and Waltham Forest. 22 wards 
Population 152,500: 50% of population from an ethnic minority 
Employment Total employment of 56,8000 
Major sectors: manufacturing and textile and food processing 
Potential in food industry and hotel catering 
Average unemployment rate of 9.85 (more than twice the London 
average) rises to 18.5% in Haringey 
I in 3 of the etlmic minority population is unemployed 
Transport and infrastructure Poor physical environment 
Lack of suitable sites and premises 
High concentration of derelict buildings 
Poor transport links 
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Picketts Lock: the proposed site of the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre 
The proposed site - Picketts Lock - is located in the London borough of Enfield which 
combines areas of deprivation, particularly in the East of the borough, with more 
affluent areas. The site is adjacent to some of Enfield's most disadvantaged 
communities. Both Ponders End and Edmonton are located within the Upper Lee Valley 
ERDF Objective Two area and are also included in the LDA's 68 Priority Community 
Regeneration Areas. Pickett's Lock forms par-t of the Lee Valley Regional Park and is 
owned by the Lee Valley Regional Park Authority (LVRPA) and is designated Green 
Belt (as is all of the Regional Park). The location of the proposed National Athletics 
Centre on the site of the existing Lee Valley Leisure Complex and Camping and 
Caravan Park is shown on the map (Figure 4.2) and Figure 4.3 reproduces a computer 
generated image of stadium in situ. Although the majority of the site has an open 
landscape there are also built facilities including a Multiplex cinema, multi-sport leisure 
centre (Lee Valley Leisure Complex), bars and restaurants and an 1100 space car park. 
The site is bordered by a main road (A 1055 Meridan Way) to the west, industrial estates 
to the north, the River Lee Navigation Canal to the east and sewage works to the south. 
The area surrounding Pickets Lock is built up to the north, south and west and includes 
light and heavy industrial estates and the Edmonton Incinerator plant. The Lee Valley 
Railway line runs to the west and beyond the railway line is a residential area. However, 
to the east, beyond the canal are two reservoirs (William Girling and King George's) 
that form part of a Site of Special Scientific Interest (LBE and LVRPA, 2000). 
The site is currently not well served by public transport and most visitors to the leisure 
centre and cinema arrived by car. The nearest station is about I km north of the site at 
Ponders End, with trains running to London Liverpool Street to the south and Stansted 
Airport to the north. However the capacity of the line is somewhat limited. The nearest 
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interchange mtith the London Underground (Vict. Oria.,, hne) is at Tottený, - F 
T 
-7n I -l-'iich 
is three stops to the s-- i-a ý-) - ? onde-. s End. The site is senred by busýes - ý-l '. -- 
links to EcIrrionton Green ar. -i Enfield Town (9krn' both o-ý*-, v'-. *: 'ý. -, 'lave, -; '---,.. -. )r. s 
and. are served by a number of bus routes (LEER zz, - LVRPA, 2- Ji. 
F; -, ý: rre 4.3: 0-niputer generated ! mage of the proposed Lee Valley National 
iý I 11 ý -', 2s ce-ý- "., I- 
. sinkl r, ýplaces London', le April 2002. BBC Sport. Available fýom: So,, rce: BBC (2002a)'He'g 
[Accessed via Google images 100ctober2005). 
The Lee Valley Leisure Complexwras constructed in the 1970s and was ovraeýý and 
managed by the LVRPA, bur. by 2000 had become very expensi,,, e - --. d was 
approaching the end of its useable life. The LVRPA, %vere seeking to redevelop the sAte 
but other leisure developm. ents IocL.: /,, ne-. AILt wasn--)t to replace like 
with E ke, and so LVRPA were seeking al t *,,, -s. As pan of the process of finding a 
new use for the site LVIR TA had approached Sport England about possible development C., 
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opportunities. Thus, when the search for a site for a High Performance Centre for 
Athletics and the National Athletics Stadium began, Sport England informed LVRPA. 
The troubled origins of the National Athletics Centre Project: Wembley National 
Stadium 
In 1994 plans were put forward to construct a tri-sport -football, rugby, athletics- 
national stadium similar to the Stade de France in Paris and it was hoped that the 
stadium would help attract major and mega sporting events to the UK. After a 
competitive bid process Wembley was chosen as the site of the English National 
Stadium in 1996. The existing football stadium was nearing the end of its life and for 
the Football Association (FA) it represented a way of off setting some of the 
considerable costs of mdevelopment (Houlihan, 2003). However, the Wembley National 
Stadium" (WNS) project has been dogged 16 by problems which the House of Commons 
Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee concluded were a result of a mixture of- 
"self-inflicted injuries, ambiguous Government support and poor supervision by Sport 
England" (House of Commons, 2002, p. 5). The main problems have been related to 
escalating costs, problems securing, private finance and design issues, particularly in 
balancing the differing needs of football and athletics. 
There was an array of parties who had an interest in the WNS development (see Figure 
4.4). However, their agendas differed and there were a number of points of contention. 
The- governing bodies of the sports (the FA, UK Athletics and Rugby Football League) 
that would be played at the stadium all had an interest, but the FA had both the biggest 
stake and the greatest influence, a situation which reflects the predominance of football 
15 It is commonly referred to as Wembley National Stadium rather than the English National Stadium. 
16 The original completion date was November 2002 but in fact demolition work did not begin until 
October 2002 (Burton, 2002) and it was recently announced that the 2006 FA Cup final will not be held 
there as planned in May but at the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff (BBC, 2006). 
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within sport in the UK 17 . Neither UK Athletics nor the Rugby Football League was in a 
financial position to contribute to the cost of the stadium. Furthermore, football was' 
going to be providing the majority of events and UK Athletics made it clear that only 
the World Athletic Championships or the Olympic Games would fill the proposed 80- 
90,000 capacity stadium. 
Figure 4.4: WNS - key players at a glance 
Football Association 
UK Athletics 




WNSL (subsidiary of FA) 
British Olympic Association 
London Borough of Brent 
Possible commercial lenders 
Source: compiled from various House of Commons 
Culture Media and Sport Select Committee reports. 
Although the National Stadium project had not set out to select an Olympic venue, the 
British Olympic Association (BOA) took an interest and became involved in questions 
of design and capacity. However, the BOA did not commit itself to focusing anyluture 
Olympic bid on Wembley and made no financial contzibution to WNS. The House of 
Commons Select Committee was critical of the role played by BOA, arguing that the 
BOA exercised undue influence on a project that it was equivocal about (House of 
Commons, 2000, p. xi). 
UK Sport and Sport England as the two NDPBs responsible for sporting matters were 
important in the process. UK Sport was responsible for attracting major events to the 
UK but did not have access to funds for capital projects whilst Sport England granted 
17 Ownership of WNS lies with English National Stadium Trust and another trust Wembley National 
Stadium Limited (WNSL) was created to raise the finance and take the project forward, it is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the FA. 
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E120m in lottery funding which was the largest ever grant for a sporting project. 
However, it does appear that Sport England having handed the money 18 over lost any 
power or direction it had over the FA. 
Central government of course had a stake in a 'national' stadium but seemed to be 
unclear as what its role should be and this was reflected in a series of uncertain, 
interventions which did little to clarify issues or forward the decision making process 
(Houlihan, 2003). The development of WNS was central to plans to regenerate the 
Wembley area and this meant that the local authority - Brent - had a strong interest in 
the project and was keen to build upon the opportunity19. Thus, from the outset there 
were a number of players involved with varying motivations, commitment, resources 
and influence. However, what was absent was a unitary body to forward London's 
interests or locate the development Within broader plans for London. 
The designers proposed that the stadium be configured for football/rugby and converted 
to athletics mode through the construction of a temporary platform or deck in the event 
of England securing a major athletics event (e. g. World Athletics Championships) that 
would require such a large capacity stadium. The platform solution was seen as a way of 
avoiding the sightline problems of the alternativeS26 and it also meant that 
football/rugby fans would be close to the action. Initially, the platform solution was 
welcomed but in December 1999 the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sport (Chris Smith) announced that having considered a consultant's report on the 
design he had dec. ided that it did not represent a 'solution' and athletics would not 
longer be held at WNS but that a separate athletics stadium would be established. This 
18 Most of the money was spent on buying the site (see later for discussion). 
19 The local authority argued that the stadium represented "the best chance of reversing over two decades 
of economic decline in the Wembley area" (House of Commons 2000, Appendix 10, para. 1.2). 
20 The alternatives were to have a permanent running track surrounding the pitch or a track housed under 
retractable seating (as in the Stade de France). 
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announcement led to a proposal to build the LVNAC as an alternative venue to present 
with the bid for the 2005 World Athletics Championships. However, this was not to be 
the end of the problems for WNS 21 and the project has been subject to considerable 
scrutiny 22 and was to provide a troubled backdrop for the LVNAC project. 
Selecting the site for the National Athletics Centre 
The decision to remove athletics from the WNS set in train a series of events. Given that 
the Government and UK Athletics were committed to hosting the 2005 WAC in 
London, a working party 23 was formed to find a new. venue as soon as possible. Time 
was of the essence as UK Athletics, having already been granted an extension, had to 
submit an outline bid to the IAAF by the end of January 2000 and a full bid by early 
April 2000. The site selection process was facilitated by Sport England, DCMS and UK 
Athletics but because of its role as lottery funder, Sport England was not involved in the 
final decision. However, Sport England did provide a written evaluation of each site 
considered 24 Discussions were held with landowners and local authorities and by mid- 
March Hackney Wick, Picketts Lock and Hillingdon House Fann were the "front 
runners" and Crystal Palace and Twickenham the "reserve options" (House of 
Commons 200 1 b, p. 126). The 'front runners' all involved building new stadiums and 
whilst both Crystal Palace and Twickenham already had existing stadiums and the cost 
21 WNSL was unable to secure the necessary private finance to fund the development and in Spring 2001 
turned to central government for financial assistance. The government ordered a review conducted by 
Patrick Carter. He recommended that four'tests' should be met before the project proceed. Three of the 
tests - value for money of the procurement contract exposure of relevant papers to the National Audit 
office for scrutiny, improved corporate governance were quickly resolved, but the fourth - securing 
private finance- was a sticking point and it was not until autumn 2002 that a deal was struck with a 
German bank. 
22 The House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee has considered WNS five times 
(House of Commons, 1999; House of Commons, 2000; House of Commons, 2001 a; House of Commons, 
200 1 b; House of Commons, 200 1 b), the National Stadium Review led by Carter (Carter, 2002b) and also 
several 'sub' studies (see House of Commons, 2002a for details). 
23 The working party comprised of the DCMS, UKA, Sport England, UK Sport, Government Office for 
London and the British Olympic Association. 
24 These were Hackney Wick, Picketts Lock, Crystal Palace, Southall, the Linford Christie Stadium, RAF 
Northolt, Cricklewood, Hillingdon House Farm and Twickenham. 
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of refurbishment would be lower than a new build, both sites presented problems around 
accessibility, transport and planning (House of Commons, 2001b, pp. 129-130). Picketts 
Lock was chosen by UK Athletics as the 'best' but by no means 'perfect' site. Indeed as 
with all the sites a number of issues were flagged up from the outset. Sport England in a 
pre-selection paper identified the 'risks' at Picketts Lock to be Green Belt planning 
issues, transport infrastructure, athletes accommodation and the potential costs of 
decontamination of the site (House of Commons, 2001b, p. 129). At all the sites 
questions were raised about accessibility and transport, but perhaps this is not surprising 
given the inadequacies of London's transport infrastructure as well as the availability 
and cost of suitable land. The outline costs were estimated at between E90-120m. 
So what did Picketts; Lock have in its favour? The site was large enough to 
accommodate the development and available for free from the owners - the LVRPA. It 
should be noted that site acquisition cost the WNS project dearly in both time and 
money. Negotiations to acquire the land were protracted, delaying the start of the 
project and the site cost fI 06m, thus swallowing up most of the f, I 20m lottery award. 
Furthermore, the LVRPA were also prepared to make capital and revenue contributions 
and to manage the project and it was it was at this point that they emerged as a key 
player. As the area was one that had been defined within European, national and local 
frameworks as one with significant deprivation this opened up possible funding streams. 
In addition, the London borough of Enfield (LBE) was supportive primarily as they 
wanted to harness the regeneration potential of the development. This support 
contrasted to the situation at Crystal Palace, where relations with Bromley council had 
been strained for sometime. At Hillingdon House Farm, Hillingdon council could at 
best be described as "passive', 25 and one respondent argued that local councillors had 
25 By Sport England in a pre-selection paper (House of Commons, 2001b, evidence, p. 129). 
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effectively "scuppered" the project with their narrow view of the council's roles and 
responsibilities. Another factor that may have attracted UK Athletics is that North 
London is a strong athletics area, home to successful clubs including Enfield and 
Ha ringey Athletics Club and Barnet Shaftesbury, and as such was an appropriate place 
for a national athletics centre. 
THE LEE VALLEY NATIONAL ATHLETICS CENTRE AND THE WORLD 
ATHLETICS CHAMPIONSHIPS 
Bidding for the World Athletics Championships 
For some time, a number of organisations and individuals, including UK Sport, the 
26 
governing body of athletics , and Len Hatton (Chair of WAC bid) had been working to 
try to bring the World Athletics Championships (WAQ to Britain but had lacked a 
suitable venue. It was well known that the IAAF was keen to see London stage the 
WAC in line with their desire for capital cities to play host. It should be noted that the 
Championships are awarded to a city not to a country. Since 1997 the plan to bid and 
stage the WAC have been closely linked with the development of WNS and the original 
intention was to bid for the 2003 WAC but this was predicated on the WNS being 
completed and with the athletics platform in place. Although the bid was prepared, as 
the deadline neared, it became apparent that Wembley would not be ready so the 
decision was made to bid for 2005. The decision to remove athletics from the WNS 
development meant an alternative venue was required for the bid. An outline bid was 
submitted to the IAAF in January 2000 by UK Athletics based on an unnamed and 
unchosen London venue (House of Commons, 2001b, p. xi). The bid was primarily 
funded by UK Sport. 
26 Initially the British Athletics Federation (BAF) which went into liquidation in 1998 and was then 
succeeded by UK Athletics in 1999. 
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In April 2000 a delegation27 led by the Secretary of State Chris Smith travelled to Paris 
and submitted two bids to the IAAF - for the 2003 World Indoor Athletics 
Championships based in Birmingham and the 2005 World Athletics Championships 
based at the new Lee Valley National Athletics Centre, London. Many respondents 
drew attention to the presence of a letter from the Prime Minister, Tony Blair pledging 
his personal commitment and that of the government to deliver the 2005 WAC and also 
Chris Smith's robust announcements: "the government will do all it can to help UK 
Athletics to stage the most successful World Championships ever"28 . Such public 
statements of support by senior government figures gave those involved in the project 
confidence. London was awarded the 2005 Championships, to be staged at the proposed 
Lee Valley National Athletics Centre and Birmingham the 2003 World Indoor Athletics 
Championships to be held at the existing Indoor Arena. It was the first time that the UK 
had secured the rights to host the World Athletics Championships. 
Taking the National Athletics Centre proiect forward Part I: the players 
Having- being awarded the Championships it was time to take the project forward to 
deliver the stadium for the WAC in August 2005 and this involved a large number of 
players from a variety of organisations working together (see Figure 4.4; Figure 4.5; 
'Who's Who' in Appendix Four). It is important to note that at the 'core' of the project 
were UK Athletics, LVRPA and LB Enfield, who had no history of collaboration and 
had 'come together' for the purposes of this project. 
27 Other members of the delegation included DCMS civil servants, UK Athletics, UK Sport, London 
2005; LVRPA; officers and councillors from the London Borough of Enfield (House of Commons, 
2001a). 
28 Quoted by LVRPA in written evidence to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee (House of 
Commons, 2001b, p. 87). 
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Figure 4.5: The Lee Valley National Athletics project - key players according to 
the primary scale of operation within a multi-level governance system 
International National Regional Sub-regional Local 
IAAF Cabinet Mayor/GLA LVRPA Enfield council 
DCMS LDA Middlesex Uni. Stakeholders Grp. 
Sport England LIS NELSN Local community 
UK Sport TfL 
UK Athletics 
London 2005 the organising Committee for the WAC worked across the system. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Legend: 
DCMS- Department of Culture, Media and Sport 
Authority 
GLA: Greater London Authority 
Network 
IAAF - International Association of Athletics Federations 
LDA- London Development Agency 
LIS- London International Sport 
LVRPA: Lee Valley Regional Park 
NELSN- North and East London Sports 
TfL: Transport for London 
WAC- World Athletics Championships 
The 'core'team 
The LVRPA is an independent statutory authority established under the Lee Valley 
Regional Park Act 1966. The LVRPA came into being in January 1967, although the 
idea of reviving the neglected and largely derelict valley, which runs through 
Hertfordshire, Essex, North and East London to create a 'green wedge' to act as a 
'playground' for Londoners pre-dates the Second World War (LVRPA, No date). The 
1960s saw are-interest in the idea, particularly amongst local authorities led by the then 
Mayor of Hackney. The LVRPA's remit under the Act is broad, encompassing all 
aspects of leisure, sport and recreation, including nature conservation, provision of 
informal recreational activities and more formal sport facilities. Its prime purpose is to 
serve the regional population rather than the local population. The LVRPA is funded 
from the council tax base of Hertfordshire, Essex and Greater London through an annual 
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levy and also receives income from its facilities and services. 29 The board of LVRPA 
comprises of councillors from Hertfordshire and Essex as well as twelve London 
Boroughs including Enfield, Haringey and Waltham ForesOo who have either been 
elected or appointed by their home authority to serve the Park Authority. The business 
of the LVRPA is conducted through a series of committees, steering groups and panels, 
whilst the professional management of the LVRPA's business activities is carried out by 
a small team of senior staff led by the Chief Executive. Up to the time of the LVNAC 
project the LVRPA had generally been associated with small and medium scale projects 
within its recreational and sport remit and had not been involved with broader 
regeneration activities. 
The LB of Enfield is situated in the very north of London. It has a population according 
to the 2001 Census of 273,559 (ONS, 2003) and at the time of LVNAC project it was 
Labour controlled. The then leader of the Council, Doug Taylor took an active role in 
the project, as did the lead member f6r regeneration (Del Goddard) and his opposite 
number in the Conservatives (John Jackson), who was also the Enfield member of the 
LVRPA board. Councillors Goddard and Jackson were both very experienced 
councillors and John Jackson had served on the LVRPA board for many years. A 
number of council officers were involved in the project from a variety of departments - 
leisure, regeneration, planning and transportation. For Enfield council, their primary 
motivation in supporting the LVNAC project was its regenerative potential. 
UK Athletics is the national governing body of athletics, and it is UK Athletics that 
makes the submission to the IAAF for major events with the support of other bodies, 
29 The annual levy was EIO. Irn for 2003/2004 and E4.6m was received from its facilities and services in 
2002/2003 (LVRPA, No date). 
30 The others are Tower Hamlets, Hackney, Newham, Barking and Dagenham, Camden, Redbridge, 
Harrow, Westminster and the City of London. In total there are 28 members of the LVRPA board. 
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e. g. UK Sport. UK Athletics has limited resources and is heavily dependent upon public 
funding through UK Sport and Sport England. 
Fig. 4.6: Lee Valley National Athletics Centre project: map of key players 
TfL 






Core project team 
LVRPA 
Local NT UKA LBE 
I N&ELSN I 
Independent inquiry 
led by Patrick Carter 
DCMS 
London 2005 11 Cabinet 
Legend. 
DCMS: Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
LDA: London Development Agency 
NELSN: North and East London Sport Network 
IAAF: International Association of Athletics Federations 
London 2005: Bid/organising committee for WAC2005 
TfL: Transport for London 
LBE: London Borough of Enfield 
LVRPA: Lee Valley Regional Park Authority 
UKA: UK Athletics 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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Beyond the 'core'team: otherplayers involved with the Lee Valley National Athletics 
Centre project. 
Beyond the 'core' were a number of other organisations and individuals that had a part 
to play. Some such as Sport England played a central role, whilst others had a more 
peripheral role such as the LDA and the North and East London Sports Network 
(NELSN). Also, for some players the level of involvement varied according to the stage 
of the project, for example UK Sport played a central role in securing the WAC 2005 
but took more of a backstage role in relation to the specifics of the LVNAC. What is not 
clear is to what extent the different roles taken by players were the product of the 
natural evolution of a project or the result of outmanoeuvring by other players or a 
reflection of context and circumstances. For example, the low key role of the LDA may 
have reflected the fact that it was a new organisation. Other peripheral players were 
important because of the networks they linked the LVNAC project into, for example 
London International Sport (LIS). London International Sport was formed in 1994 in 
response to London's failure to become the nominated city for British bids for the 2000 
Olympics and 2002 Commonwealth Games (in both cases it was Manchester). One of 
the key reasons for this failure was thought to be the absence of a strategic authority for 
London, so as a 'second best' approach a small organisation made up of pan-London 
bodies 31 with an interest in sport was formed. Its main objectives were to attract major 
international events to London and to ensure that events were used to benefit the 
development of sport. Through its work LIS has accumulated, knowledge, 
understanding and connections, for example, the Chair of LIS became the Chair of 
London 2005 bid committee. Other players had very specific roles, for example, 
Middlesex University in providing athletes accommodat; on through the development of 
a new campus at Tottenham Hale. 
31 Members of London International Sport included the Association of London Government, London 
Chamber of Commerce, London First, sports bodies and the London Tourist Board. 
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Although the GLA and Mayor were just around the comer, they did not exist when 
several key decisions were made, including choosing the site for the National Athletics 
Centre and the awarding of the 2005 WAC to London. The election of Ken Livingstone 
and the London Assembly in May 2000 changed the face of London governance and 
had profound implications for the LVNAC project. In planning terms a development of 
that scale had to be referred to the Mayor for consideration and he could direct refusal if 
he felt it was in conflict with his adopted policies and proposals. The entire site is 
designated Green Belt and there are strict controls on developments in the Green Belt at 
a national, strategic and local level. The fundamental aim of Green Belt policy is to 
prevent urban sprawl by keeping land permanently open. Although the site had already 
been developed (i. e. leisure centre), the footprint of the proposed LVNAC was much 
bigger than the leisure centre it would replace and so any departure from planning 
guidance had to be justified and a strong case presented. Some respondents suggested 
that the site was only 'technically' Green Belt, given that it was located between an 
incinerator and a sewage works and only Green Belt because all of the Lee Valley 
Regional Park is. There was also the issue of how the proposal fitted, or not as the case 
may be, into the Mayor's overall strategic spatial development plans for London. 
Another key issue for the project was transport, which is one of the Mayor's main areas 
of responsibility through the functional body Transport for London (TfL). What is 
unclear is exactly where the Mayor stood on the question of whether the proposed new 
station and the planned upgrades to the Lee Valley Railway line 32 were 'desirable' or 
'essential' and whether the Mayor would have only supported the planning application 
if the plans for a new station were progressed in parallel. There was certainly a desire on 
the part of both the LB Enfield and TfL to have the majority (ideally 80 per cent) of 
32 The West Anglian Route Modernisation Enhancement (WARME) programme was already in place but 
scheduled for many years into the future (see later for discussion). 
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people travelling to the site by public transport. As with the LDA there is the question 
of how much TfL being in its infancy influenced the process and whether it would have 
been different with a more mature organisation. 
TakinR the National Athletics Centre project forward Part II: meetinas and forums 
As for any major project, a number of forums and meetings were held, which ranged 
from small 'head to head' meetings_of key personnel through large ministerial led 
forums to public consultation meetings (see Figure 4.7). Weekly progress meetings 
were held at the LVRPA. They were attended by representatives of UK Athletics, Sport 
England, LB Enfield and occasionally the DCMS. There were also fortnightly 
"technical" meetings, where issues such as design were considered. These involved in 
addition to the above organisations, external consultants engaged on the project. There 
were. also 'break out meetings' that dealt with specific issues and were sometimes 
required to deal with difficulties or differences of opinion between players. A minister- 
led forum was established, the Lee Valley Stadium Forum. Its members included 
national, regional and local bodies and its terms of reference were "information 
exchange between interested parties and identification of difficulties" (House of 
Commons, 2001b, p. 88). According to respondents, these meetings were large, often 
with 30-40 people present. The high attendance was thought to reflect the presence of a 
Minister and a desire to be seen and heard by the Minister. The Forum was generally 
referred to as a 'talking shop', where civil servants 'talked at' the people attending the 
meeting and very little progress was made. The first meeting was held in June 2000 but 
it is not clear how many were held (estimates ranging from 4-6 33). 
33 For example, Sport England in its evidence to the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select 
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A local National Athletics Centre Stakeholder Board was set up by the regeneration 
team at LBE. It was chaired by Peter Lyne, a local business man who also chaired the 
North London Learning and Skills Council. The purpose of the Stakeholder Board was 
to try to ensure that the regeneration potential of the LVNAC was realised. Its 
membership was broader than the Lee Valley Forum and in addition to the 'usual 
suspects' included representatives from business, amongst them, London First, the 
London Tourist Board and British Airport Authorities (BAA) from Stansted Airport. 
The BAA were keen to secure, as were others, the early implementation of the planned 
upgrade of the Lee Valley Railway line which would allow both airport passengers and 
employees easier access. Stansted experiences difficulty in filling vacancies as locally - 
unemployment is low and although there is a pool of potential labour in the Upper Lee 
Valley, the existing rail service means that its is difficult for people to take up those 
jobs. The rail improvements would not only improve access up to Sta, nsted but also 
down to the City of London, another major employment centre. The GOL identifies the 
poor transport linkages between areas of employment and areas of unemployment as a 
barrier to new business investment (GOL, 2000). Although the West Anglian Route 
Modernisation Enhancement (WARME) programme was already planned by 2000, it 
was for some years hence, and what Enfield council and others (e. g. business) wanted 
was to use the Championships as a way of fast tracking the WARME programme. 
Indeed the regenerative potential of the LVNAC stadium was the primary rationale for 
LB Enfield's involvement in the project and they wanted to use it to drive through a 
range of developments, the most significant being the transport upgrade. However, not 
everyone shared LB Enfield's belief in the regenerative potential of the project, in 
particular LVRPA and it was to prove a contentious issue, which at times led to impasse 
- it is theme that will be discussed in the next chapter (Five). 
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Public consultation was carried out in March and April 2000. This consisted of a series 
of staffed exhibitions at a variety of venues within the borough and meetings with local 
residents and users of the existing leisure facilities. In addition, information was made 
available through a variety of means such as newsletters, websites and local libraries. 
The exhibitions included models, pictures and plans for the proposed stadium, 
information on the likely environmental impact of the stadium, transport issues and 
community benefits. Members of LVRPA, UK Athletics staff and consultants were on 
hand to answer questions and visitors were asked to complete a questionnaire about the 
proposals e. g. their thoughts on the proposed new station. 
In addition to these formal meetings, the LVNAC project was the subject of much 
infonnal ongoing discussion between players. These discussions were conducted in 
person, over the phone and by e-mail. Also as well as project specific networks, the 
LVNAC project tapped into other established networks such as the North and East 
London Sport Network (NELSN) and the sub-regional transport group for advice, 
comment and support. These networks undertook work on behalf of the project, for 
example, the NELSN lobbied the GLA and LDA on behalf of the project. 
As is evident from Figure 4.7, there was a considerable degree of overlap with the same 
organisations meeting around the different tables, or perhaps the same table but on a 
different day. Although it did not seem to be to be difficult to get representatives around 
the table, respondents reported that it was much harder to collect together those in a 
position to make decisions. 
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Feasibili! y reports and questions of funding 
A series of studies were commissioned. In the first instance an initial feasibility study 
was conducted funded by Sport England and LVRPA. The study began in June 2000 
and reported in October 2000 and assessed a number of issues including viability, 
design and transport (see Figure 4.9 on next page). Sport England and LVRPA assessed 
the findings and felt that it had been demonstrated that the project was feasible, 
although there were a number of challenges including a gap in capital funding and the 
long-term viability of the stadium. The LVRPA then applied to Sport England for 
funding to support in depth studies into the technical and financial viability of the 
project. Sport England entered into a funding agreement with the LVRPA and set it 
eleven development tasks which related to issues such as planning, costs report, and 
signing up an event profile with UK Athletics. None of the core team was in a position 
to underwrite the stadium development and thus in May 200 1, UK Athletics, LVRPA 
and LB Enfield made a joint application, as the newly created National Athletic Centre 
Joint Venture Consortium (NACJVC), to Sport England for funding to build the 
National Athletics Centre. The NACJVC applied for f. 65.43m (E67m budget allocation 
minus the feasibility costs) and set out in detail what they hoped to achieve and what 
facilities would be available at the LVNAC (see Figures 4.8 and 4.10). 
Figure 4.8: The objectives of the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre as set 
out by NACJVC 
To provide a venue for the 2005 World Athletics Championships; 
To provide a permanent National Athletics Centre for Athletics, both in terms 
of defined competition and world class needs; 
To provide a High Performance Centre for the training of elite athletes; 
To provide the basis for the local athletics club and community development 
programmes; 
To contribute towards the local health and fitness strategies, the alleviation of 
social exclusion, and regeneration of the area. 
Source: Evidence given by Sport England to the CMS Select Committee about the 
application for Lottery Funds received from NACJVC in May 2001 (House of 
Commons, 2001b, p. 53). 
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Figure 4.9: Feasibility, viability and funding: a chronology 
June 2000-October 2000: Stage I Feasibility study 
Funded: Sport England E240,000; LVRPA E165,000 
Considered: Viability; design; cost; planning; business plan; transport and environmental issues 
Outputs: Projecl brief, business plan and technical reports e. g. transport, landscape and ecology 
Verdict: Project feasible but identified a number of challenges e. g. capital funding gap, long term 
viability. 
November 2000- May 2001: Stage 2 Viability study 
Funded: Sport England E1.33 million; LVRPA E340,000 
As part of the Lottery Funding Agreement Sport England set LVRPA II development tasks to be 
completed by 3 1" May 2001 
Considered: Detailed work on design; cost; business plan; event profile; planning application and 
associated transport, environmental and socio-economic impact studies 
Mýy 2001: Lottery FundingApplication 
Application by National Athletics Centre Joint Venture Consortium (NACJV`Q - LVRPA, UK Athletics 
and LB Enfield, to Sport England for F. 65.43 million (the allocated E67m minus feasibility costs). 
I ffh June 2001: Meetings of Sport England's Council (4h) and Lottery Pane (I ) 
Decision not to approve NACJVC application at joint meeting in July 2001 because of concerns: 
Capital costs (funding gap and underwriting) 
Planning (transport, green belt, section 106, planning risk); 
Legal eligibility (project vehicle); 
Long term legacy (revenue income; and 
Sporting legacy (impact on regional athletics facilities) 
Lack of a signatory for the EOA 
LVRPA, UK Athletics and LB Enfield that the decision about the lottery application has been deferred to 
the 2d July joint meeting. 
Trevor Brooking, then Chair of Sport England meet with the new Secretary of State for Culture Media 
and Sport Tessa Jowell to explain why the application had not been approved and decision made to 
launch a review led by Patrick Carter. 
July 2001: Carter Review commences 
2d July: Joint meeting of Sport England's Council and the Lottery Panel approved approach. 
2 nd July: Tessa Jowell announced that Patrick Carter will conduct a review 
Sport England defer lottery application decision until conclusion of Carter review 
All work on the project ceases as there is no funding in place. 
August 2001: Carter Review completed 
3 1" August: Carter review delivered to Sport England and DCMS but not to LVRPA, UK Athletics or LB 
Enfield despite requests to do so. 
October 2001: Carter Review conclusions announced - 
4'h October: At a meeting at DCMS Tessa Jowell informs LVRPA and London Borough of Enfield (and 
UKA in a separate meeting) that project will not proceed. The reasons given were transport, 
accommodation and total cost of 2005 WAC event as reported by Patrick Carter. 
Source: Compiled by author from evidence given by LVRPA and Sport England to CMS Select 
Committee (House of Commons, 2001b) 
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Sport England assessed the application on the basis of the eleven development tasks that 
had been set in November 2000 and as well as the standard criteria applied to all lottery 
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applications . Sport England's members identified a number of areas of concem 
including capital funding, legal eligibility and long term legacy (see Figure 4.9). The 
concerns about capital funding centred on the gap between the allocated funding 35 and 
the estimated cost of the stadium - the gap stood at approximately El 0-1 5m- and how 
that gap was going to be plugged. A major concern of Sport England was the legal 
eligibility of the applicant - any applicant for lottery funding has to be able to repay 
lottery funds if the project is not completed. None of the partners of the NACJVC felt 
able to underwrite the costs of the NAC project on their own and stressed that it was a 
national project. 
Figure 4.10: The proposed facilities at the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre 
" In 2005 Championship mode 43,000 seats would be provided, with 13,00 being 
temporary and uncovered 
" Post 2005, in legacy mode 20,000 seats would be provided (13,000 temporary seats 
would be removed and a further 10,000 screened off) 
"A legacy High Performance Centre incorporating: 
>6 lane indoor 200m track; 
>6 lane 60m sprint track located within the 2000m track; 
> indoor throws area; 
> outdoor throws area; 
> and outdoor 400m training/warm up track; and 
> provision for sports science and medicine facilities 
At a cost of circa E100m 
Source: Evidence given by Sport England to the CMS Select Committee about the application for Lottery 
Funds received from NACJVC in May 2001 (House of Commons, 200 lb, p. 53). 
Although LVRPA, UK Athletics and LB Enfield stated their intent to create a project 
delivery vehicle (the NACJVC was the first step in the process) which would share the 
risks, Sport England did not appear to be convinced, stating in their evidence to the 
3' The standard criteria for Lottery funding applications are viability (financial and otherwise), technical 
feasibility, value for money, eligibility/project delivery, express demand and legacy for sport (evidence to 
House of Commons, 2001b, p. 53). 
35 A potential L67m from Sport England, f5m from LVRPA,; Egm from Capital Modernisation Fund, f4m 
LDA, f2m Objective 2 status - grand total of E86m, NACJVC had estimated that a further f3m would be 
available for stadium naming rights. 
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Select Committee that they: "still needed to seek legal clarity should a default occur in 
respect of a future lottery agreement that the project consortium will be collectively and 
individually responsible for the repayment of grant" (House of Commons, 2001b, p. 
55) Sport England raised two issues about the legacy. Firstly, in relation to revenue 
income they questioned both the sums and the arrangements, arguing that the 
projections were overly optimistic and that arrangements were not secure enough (both 
charges were refuted by members of NACJVC). Secondly, there were concerns that 
either the LVNAC would displace events from established regional stadiums or that if 
events continued to be held across the regions that there would be insufficient events to 
justify the existence of the LVNAC. 
The LVRPA reported that they had been told that the funding decision had been 
deferred to the joint meeting of the Lottery Panel and the Sport England Council in July 
(House of Commons, 2001b, p. 91). However, it appears from the evidence presented 
by Sport England to the Select Committee (2001b, p. 57) that in essence the decision not 
to approve the application was made at the June meeting of the Lottery Panel and that 
this approach was reaffirmed at the joint meeting in July following a meeting between 
the then Chair of Sport England, Trevor Brooking, and the newly appointed Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport, Tessa Jowell. On the 2nd July 2001, the same day as 
the joint Council- Lottery Panel meeting, Tessa Jowell announced an inquiry into the 
LVNAC to be led by Patrick Carter who was already conducting an investigation of 
WNS. 
By 2000 Sport England were firmly embedded in the process of developing WNS and 
had already spent f, 120m of lottery funds. Subsequent Culture, Media and Sport Select 
Cornmittee reports (House of Commons, 2001 a; House of Commons, 2002a) have been 
critical of Sport England, arguing that it had failed to meet the standards expected of a 
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public body and that its performance had been "deficient to the point of dereliction" 
(House of Commons, 2002a, p. 8). In relation to the lottery grant to Wembley National 
Stadium Ltd (WNSL), the Select Committee concluded that the money had been handed 
over prematurely before the viability of the project had been demonstrated and this 
amounted to a "cavalier and egregious use of public funds" (House of Commons, 
2001b) p. vii). Furthermore, that Sport England were "slack, slovenly and supine" 
(House of Commons, 2002a, p. 8) in monitoring the progress of the project. For 
example, although WNSL breached the Lottery Funding Agreement, Sport England did 
not enforce any sanctions. Given this background and the belief within Sport England* 
that there was no justification for a stand alone athletics venue of this size (House of 
Commons, 2001b, p. 59) it is perhaps not surprising that Sport England appeared to be a 
reluctant partner in the process. 
Design and the planning application 
The Secretary of State (Chris Smith) launched the stadium design in March 2001 and 
reiterated government support, stating: "The stadium is the best thing to happen to 
athletics in the UK for a generation. All of us, from all political parties and from all 
parts of the world of athletics must now step up our efforts to ensure that this new 
stadium becomes a reality". 36 The design was well received (see Figure 4.3 above for 
image) and following a series of assessments on issues including environmental impact 
and transport, the planning application was submitted to London Borough of Enfield in 
May 2001. Although LB Enfield had an interest in the regenerative potential of the 
project, it also had to discharge its responsibilities as the Planning Authority and steps 
were taken to ensure that these roles were kept separate. The timetable for the 
development was tight and there were concerns that the Mayor would 'call in' the 
36 Quoted by LVRPA in their evidence to the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select 
Committee (2001b, p. 90). 
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development and thus slow the process down. In order to lessen this possibility, the 
planners worked in conjunction with the GLA. In September 2001 the LVNAC 
development received outline planning consent from the LB Enfield. 
Changes in govemance at London and national level 
The summer of 2001 saw significant changes to the face of London governance as 
outlined earlier in the Chapter. It was not clear what the arrival of the Mayor and the 
GLA would mean for the LVNAC project. There were concerns that the Mayor would 
create difficulties in relation to planning but also hopes that the Mayor would 
underwrite the WAC. The Mayor appeared to be equivocal, neither coming out strongly 
in favour or against the project, which was in strong contrast to his vocal support of 
Wembley Stadium. Nicky Gavron (the then Deputy Mayor and local Assembly 
Member) appeared to play a more active role in supporting the LVNAC. 
In June 2000 a general election was held and New Labour, under the leadership of Tony 
Blair was returned for a second term. The New Labour manifesto included a 
commitment to develop a first class athletics stadium to stage the 2005 WAC (House of 
Commons, 2001b). In the ensuing cabinet reshuffle, both Chris Smith (Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport) and Kate Hoey (Minister for Sport and Tourism) 
were replaced, with the PM arguing that he needed to bring in 'new blood'. and this 
meant that "the likes of Chris Smith and Ann Taylor, both of whom had a very 
distinguished record in Govemment.... had left the Government" (PMOS, 2001, a). 
Chris Smith had made the decision to remove athletics from WNS and was a strong 
advocate of the LVNAC. Tessa Jowell became the Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport. When journalists raised questions about her qualifications for the DCMS 
post, the PMOS replied that she had "impressed" the PM in her roles at Department for 
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Education and Employment and Department of Health, and that at the DCMS "there 
were some difficult and challenging issues that were sitting in her in-tray" (PMOS, 
2001, a). Richard Caborn arrived from the Department of Trade and Industry to be 
Minster for Sport and Tourism. The Sports Minister post was upgraded to -Minister of 
State level, which was said to be a reflection of the role that the PM thought sport can 
play in tackling social issues such as drug misuse, crime and social exclusion (PMOS, 
2001b). 
The Carter Review 
Shortly after her appointment, Tessa Jowell took action on one of the 'challenges' in her 
in-tray by announcing that a review would be conducted of the LVNAC project by 
Patrick Carter 37 . Carter, who had previously investigated Manchester Commonwealth 
Games, had already been tasked with a review of WNS and the two reviews were done 
concurrently. The tenns of reference were as follows: 
d "In the light of the Government's manifesto commitment to ensure that a first class 
athletics stadium is available for the World Athletics Championships in 2005, 
determine whether the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre can be funded and 
managed in its current fonnat. 
a Determine what alternatives might be feasible" (Carter, 2001, p-2). 
The Review team consulted many, but by no means all, of the players involved in the 
LVNAC and bringing the WAC to London. Part of the process involved attending the 
2001 WAC held in Edmonton, Canada3s. The Review team delivered its report to 
DCMS and Sport England on 31st August 2001. Other key players, such as LVRPA, UK 
37 He has since been made Lord Carter of Coles. 
39 Members of staff from LVRPA, LB Enfield and UK Athletics also attended the Edmonton games as a 
means of learning at first hand the issues involved in delivering the WAC. 
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Athletics and LB Enfield did not receive copies nor were they inforined of the findings 
until the day in October when they were told that the project had been cancelled. 
Carter (2001) raised a number of concerns in relation to the financing of the project, 
transport links and the provision of athletes' accommodation. Carter calculated that the 
capital cost of the project was El 12.2m, with the capital cost of the stadium coming in at 
E97.3m (see Figure 4.11 for details) which was in line with even very early estimates 
and a capital gap of ; E26m which again was within the 'ballpark' of figures from the 
LVNAC team 39. However, a key difference was the way in which Carter regarded the 
Lottery Funding from Sport England. From early on there appears to have been an 
assumption that a total of E67m. 40 would be available from Sport England but this is not 
how the sum was treated by Carter - it was treated as uncommitted funding - which 
indeed it was, but by presenting it in this way the capital gap became E97.5m. 
Carter also questioned the costs involved in staging the WAC, arguing that as the IAAF 
retains the right to the bulk of the commercial income from the WAC and imposes a 
financially onerous contract on host city, the WAC could cost the public sector over 
E35m (Carter, 2001, p. 12). Sport England had already earmarked up to; El5m towards 
the revenue costs of staging the WAC (House of Commons, 200 1 b, p. 12 1). Although 
long term revenue funding had been identified, it still left an annual deficit. of E270m 
and Carter claimed that the deficit was likely to be greater than this and questioned the 
long term security of the revenue funding. Again the argument was that the public 
sector would be left to shoulder the costs. 
39 In the spring of 2001 the LVNAC project team had identified a capital funding gap of E15 -f 23m 
(House of Commons, 200 1 b, p. 90) 
40 E60m from the Lottery Fund (including the famous E20m to be returned by the Football association 
from WNS) and f7m towards the English Institute of Sport high performance centre. 
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Capital cost of stadium 97.3 Lottery funding (Sport England) 1.7 
Potential cost overrun' 4.9 LVRPA funding committed 5.0 
Review team contingency 10.0 CMF* committed & announced 8.0 
Committed capital funding 14.7 14.7 
LIDA funding" 5.0 5.0 
Objective 2 European FundingA 0.5 0.5 
Lottery funding applied for 65.3 65,3 
Capital funding with no identified 
source 
26.7 26.7 
Capital cost of project 112.2 Potential cost to public sector 14.7 97.5 112.2 
Source: Adapted from Carter (200 1, p. 9) 
Legend: 
Capital Modemisation Fund (Government funding) 
LDA funds would have been towards transport infrastructure and landfill tax 
A Objective 2 funds would have been for site preparation, enabling works and post WCA fit out) 
I Assessed by cost consultants 
Carter argued that since the commitment was made to host the 2005 WAC there had 
been significant increases in the cost of building the venue and running the event and 
moreover, that it was highly likely that the provision of the athletes accommodation and 
transport infrastructure would require substantial expenditure. He concluded that there 
was a significant risk that the WAC would be a costly, sub-standard event and the 
LVNAC project represented poor value for money. These conclusions were accepted by 
central government and Sport England, who had already raised doubts about the project. 
However, Carters conclusions were challenged by other players. For example, in 
relation to both transport and accommodation, Carter questioned the strategies proposed 
by the LVNAC team. They in turn questioned the Car-ter Report. Bill Glad from London 
2005 argued that the Review Team "seemed determined not to develop an 
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understanding of these particular issues (transport and accommodation) and they overly 
discounted the available information to produce simplistic and incorrect conclusions" 
(House of Commons, 200 1 b, p. 116). A number of other players (e. g. LVRPA, UK 
Sport) were critical of the Carter Report and the manner in which it had been conducted, 
and they used the Select Committee inquiry as a means of expressing these reservations 
either verbally or in written memoranda (House of Commons, 2001b). 
Carter considered alternative venues and concluded that that there was no suitable site 
in London, arguing that the other sites posed as great or even greater challen gesthan 
Picketts Lock and he suggested that a non-London venue be sought. A range of 
alternatives including Manchester and Sheffield were assessed. Carter also raised the 
possibility of withdrawing from the event if the IAAF would not agree to a non-London 
venue. 
Cancelliniz the LVNAC project and losing the World Athletics Championships. 
Sport England and DCMS received the Carter Report at the end of August 2001 and 
meetings were held between the two parties. At a meeting between the Secretary of 
State and the Chair of Sport England, it was agreed that the LVNAC project should not 
proceed and that an alternative venue would be found (House of Commons, 200 1 b, 
p. 65). Officials from DCMS and Sport England held discussions with Manchester and 
Sheffield City Councils, but the cost of delaying the refit of the Manchester stadium for 
Manchester City FC was prohibitively expensive, so Sheffield was chosen. The 
proposal was to refurbish the existing Don Valley Stadium that had been developed for 
the 1991 World Student Games. 
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On the 40' October 200 1, following further discussions with Sport England, Tessa 
Jowell informed UK Athletics and in a separate meeting, LVRPA and LB Enfield that 
the LVNAC project would not be proceeding. These parties received a briefing on the 
Carter report prior to meeting the Secretary of State. For all of them it was their first 
glimpse of the report and this was an issue raised by all the core players in their 
evidence to Select Committee (House of Commons, 2001b). For example, LB Enfield 
conunented: "Therefore the report could not be challenged for its factual content, basis 
and validity of assumption or its conclusion. It is difficult to see how ministers can 
make a balanced judgement in this way" (House of Commons, 200 1 b, p. 10 1). 
On the same day, in discussions with UK Athletics, Tessa Jowell raised the possibility 
of offering Sheffield as an alternative. Although UK Athletics agreed, they reiterated the 
doubts they had already expressed to Patrick Carter and the DCMS about the 
acceptability of a non-London venue to the IAAF and also expressed their 
disappointment in not being included in the discussions earlier. The IAAF was 
contacted and a meeting arranged for the next day at Heathrow Airport4l. Tessa Jowell, 
Richard Caborn, together with UK AtMetics, Sport England and Patrick Carter, met 
with the President, Lamine Diack and General Secretary, Istvan Gyulai, of the IAAF. At 
this meeting the IAAF was informed of the outcome of the Carter review and was 
offered Sheffield as an alternative venue for the 2005 WAC. In addition, the 
govenunent suggested that the IAAF bi-annual conference that coincides with the WAC 
be staged in London and raised the possibility of the goverment and the IAAF 
developing a bursary programme for athletes in developing countries. The IAAF 
President thought that the Council would be unlikely to agree to the proposed move and 
would rather re-open the bidding process. His prediction proved to be correct. At the 
41 Members of the IAAF were en route to the World Half Marathon Championships in Bristol. 
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next meeting in November the IAAF council decided to re-open the bidding process, 
and although the UK were welcome to put in a new bid based on Sheffield they chose 
not to and the 2005 WAC were awarded to Helsinki, Finland. 
Picking up the pieces after the cancellation of the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre 
In the wake of the collapse of the London 2005 WAC, the government made a series of 
announcements. Firstly, that a review of sport policy would be conducted by the then 
Policy Innovation Unit (now the Strategy Unit) and this would include a review of 
major events policy-. the Game Plan was published in 2002 (DCMSISU, 2002). 
Secondly, that athletics would receive a substantial investment. Thirdly, that the f4m 
from the CMF had been earmarked to part fund a legacy sports facility in the Lee Valley 
Regional park. In March 2005 plans for a high performance athletics centre - the Lee 
Valley Athletics Centre (LVAC) - were unveiled. The LVAC is due to open in 2006 and 
it will provide training and indoor competition facilities (UK Athletics, 2005b). The 
facilities are very similar to those proposed for the LVNAC but the key difference is the 
provision of seating -a thousand permanent seats as compared to 20,000 in legacy 
mode (see Appendix Five for more details of the LVAC). The E16 million funding 
package comprises M million as promised from the CMF, 0 million from Sport 
England (via the Lottery) and E5 million from LVRPA (UK Athletics, 2005b). 
However, the announcement was not without controversy, with some commentators 
arguing that the facilities would be better located in the proposed Olympic Park in 
Stratford and that the LVAC was only going ahead as central government felt it had to 
compensate the LVRPA and LBE for the disappointment of the LVNAC not going 
ahead (Goodbody, 2005). 
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The House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee had first announced its 
intent to consider the LVNAC project in July 2001 but issued new terms of reference in 
the aftermath of the cancellation. The Committee had already considered the progress 
towards staging the 2005 World Athletics Championships as part of wider studies 
(House of Commons, 1999; House of Commons, 2000; House of Commons, 2001 a). 
The Committee under the Chairmanship of Gerald Kaufman, Labour MP for 
Manchester Gorton, took oral evidence from invited witnesses and received written 
submissions from a variety of bodies, including key players such as LVRPA, LB 
Enfield as well as other interested parties and individuals such as BOA and Greenpeace. 
In March 2001, the Committee had raised doubts (House of Commons, 2001 a) about the 
LVNAC project. There were a number of concerns related to the capital gap, the 
absence of an underwriter for the event, the quality of the stadium, transport and 
infrastructure issues, the tight timetable, the long term viability of the stadium and the 
impact of its existence on existing athletics venues. The Committee considered that the 
Carter report. vindicated their earlier pronouncements and also noted that the core 
players had worked diligently, had made progress and had repeatedly sought 
clarification from the government about key issues such as the funding gap, but to no 
avail (House of Commons, ý00 I b). 
The Committee argued that the government should decide whether or not it wants to 
host major sporting events in the future and welcomed the Strategy Unit review (see 
above). For the third time they called for a Minister for Events, whilst others such as 
UK Sport, UK Athletics and Carter called for a single agency who would be involved 
from the outset, would have access to funds and have the ability to sign contracts on 
behalf of the government (House of Commons, 2001b). 
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SUMMARY 
This Chapter has set out the background to the LVNAC project, described how the 
project evolved from early 2000 until its demise eighteen months later in October 2001. 
The origins of the LVNAC in the difficulties of another mega-sports project were not 
portentous and central government displayed a high degree of ambivalence. Although 
central government made public statements of support there was always a feeling of a 
lack of commitment to the LVNAC project. The project unfolded during a period of 
significant changes in the governance of London with new structures and personnel. 
Furthermore, support for the LVNAC was not forthcoming from the new Mayor of 
London. This lack of Mayoral backing was perhaps more significant given his 
championing role in relation to Wembley Stadium and also that he had announced his 
intention to pursue a London Olympic bid. In addition, the sub-regional actors were 
weak and this meant that there was no strong north London lobby working on behalf of 
the project. Finally, the various sport bodies did not have a shared vision of the LVNAC 
and this had the potential to undermine the project. 
Fig. 4.12: London and the 2005 World Athletics Championships: a brief chronology 
Dee 1999: Plans to include athletics at WNS dropped. Proposal to build a 
national athletics centre. 
Jan-March Search for site. Lee Valley chosen 
2000: (stadium, High Performance Centre). 
April 2000: 2005 WAC awarded to London. 
June 2001: Labour government elected for second term. Tessa Jowell replaced 
Chris Smith as Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. 
Richard Caborn replaced Kate Hoey as Sports Minister. 
July 2001: Government announced review of LVNAC project (Carter Report). 
August 2001: DCMS and Sport England receive Carter Report at end of August. 
Oct 2001: Government announced LVNAC project would not be going ahead. 
IAAF rejected Sheffield as an alternative. UK lost rights to stage 
WAC. 
ource: Complied (and updated) from evidence given by LVRPA to the Culture, Media and Spo 3elect 
Committee (House of Commons, 2001b, pp. 87-91). 
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During the lifespan of the LVNAC project (see Figure 4.12) a great deal of work was 
done, particularly on the part of the core LVNAC team and London 2005 to forward the 
project and much was achieved. However, despite all their efforts, it was the 'risks' 
flagged up at the outset which were to prove to be the projects undoing. The next 
chapter (Five) will set out the findings of the analysis of the case study material within 
the framework provided by this chapter (Four) and thus take the next step in trying to 
explain why the LVNAC project failed. 
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Chapter Five 
The Lee Valley National Athletics Centre project: findings from the 
case study 
INTRODUCTION 
Having 'set the scene' in Chapter Four, this chapter will report the key research 
findings. It draws upon both the interview data and documentary sources, such as House 
of Commons Select Committee reports, and builds upon the themes and issues 
identified from the wider literature. For the purposes of clarity, this chapter is divided 
into two broad sections, with the first section, focusing on governance issues and the 
second section, concentrating on sport issues. There are of course points of convergence 
and overlap. 
The final section groups together the twelve explanations given for the failure of the 
LVNAC project in readiness for the next step in analysis. The explanations fall into 
three broad categories. First, explanations related to central government and 
governance. Second, explanations linked to city governance generally and London 
governance specifically. Third, explanations connected to sport governance. In the 
subsequent two chapters these explanations will be considered in the light of 1he 
experiences of other nations, cities and events in order to develop a better understanding 




Modem governance is a highly complex process and the case study of LVNAC project 
encapsulated many of these complexities along with the dynamic nature of governance. 
Chapter Four mapped out the broad range of actors involved in LVNAC project and 
also the various spatial scales that they operated in. The formal meetings and forums 
were outlined along with the design, planning and development process (e. g. feasibility 
studies) and key events were listed. Thus, Chapter Four gave us the background in 
which to consider the issues highlighted by the inter-view and documentary data. The 
next section is an examination of governance 'in action': the roles played by different 
actors, the relationships between actors, the evolution of governance arrangements and 
the interaction of these factors in the case of the LVNAC project. 
Central govemment and the LVNAC project: a tale of promises, prevarication and 
political 'cold feet'. 
Both the interviews and documentary sources (i. e. House of Commons Select 
Committee reports, Carter geport) highlighted the pivotal role played by central 
government in the LVNAC project. 
The Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee (the Select Committee from now on) 
had considered specific projects (e. g. WNS, LVNAQ and also the approach taken to 
staging major and mega sporting events more generally. In its reports the Select 
Committee repeatedly criticised central government for not having a clear mega-event 
strategy and for not taking the strategic lead in such projects (House of Commons, 
1999; House of Commons, 2000; House of Commons 2001 a; House of Commons, 
2001b; House of Commons, 2002a). The Select Committee argued that because mega 
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events are dealt with in an ad hoc rather than integrated manner this had led to the 
difficulties (e. g. delays, funding shortfalls) experienced by major sporting and cultural 
projects (House of Commons, 1999; House of Commons, 2000; House of Commons, 
2001a; House of Commons, 2001b). The Select Committee maintains that this lack of 
clarity about the role of central government has caused confusion about the roles and 
responsibilities of the various actors (e. g. governing bodies, private sector) and led to a 
series of uncertain interventions by central government in relation to major projects. 
From the outset the Select Cornmittee expressed doubts about the LVNAC project in 
relation to underwriting, cost control, timetable guarantees and legacy function' (House 
of Commons, 200 1 a, p. xxxix) and agreed with the decision not to proceed with the 
project (House of Commons, 2001b, p. xv). However, they were critical of central 
government's role in the process, stating that its report on the LVNAC project: 
threads its way through the sorry and convoluted way in which a national 
athletics centre at Picketts Lock was plucked out of the air by the Government 
and then abruptly dropped. It is a saga of how Government involved itself 
beyond it scope and powers in conjunng up a project that this Committee judged 
as unviable from the start. (House of Commons, 2001b, p. v). 
In relation to the LVNAC project there was an initial wave of enthusiasm, with the 
government making promises to the IAAF and also a manifesto commitment to deliver 
the 2005 WAC. However, as both the Select Committee (House of Commons, 2001, 
p. xv) and respondents noted the government failed to follow these words through with 
' The Select Committee noted the concerns raised by Carter in his review had been repeatedly brought to 
the attention of central government not only by themselves but by all the actors involved in the project 
(e. g. LVRPA, Sport England) (House of Commons, 200 1 b, p. xv). 
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action and that on the contrary, the government displayed a high degree of ambiguity 
about its role in relation to the LVNAC and staging of the WAC 2005. One respondent 
reported: "the government were hugely keen to stage the World Athletics 
Championships but were completely unprepared to lend a hand to make it happen. " The 
government. did not spell out its vision, take the lead, underwrite the project, nor did 
they designate, empower or create a body to lead the delivery of the project. The impact 
of this approach was a reoccurring theme within the interviews and also the Select 
Committee report (House of Cornmons, 2001b). This last point is interesting because on 
the one hand, the Select Committee thought that LVNAC project was a 'non-starter', 
whilst on the other, most respondents in this study thought that it 'could have been 
done', but they both identified the ambiguous role of central government as'a major 
factor in the failure of the project. 
So although the Select Committee felt that central government had eventually made the 
'right' decision in calling a halt to the project it placed the responsibility for the 
problems encountered firmly at its feet. The Select Committee argued that poor 
decision-making (particularly in relation to the lottery funding 2), lack of leadership and 
direction over the WN$ project had led to the difficulties it found itself in relation to the 
LVNAC: the inference being that if the WNS project had been properly managed then 
the LVNAC project would never have seen the light of day (House of Commons, 
200 1 a; House of Commons, 200 1 b). Whilst most respondents in this study thought that 
the concerns (e. g. athletes accommodation, transport) could have been overcome they 
argued that the equivocal role played by government compounded problems 
2 Sport England was criticised for paying a lottery grant of E120m to the FA 'upfront' rather than in 
stages or with conditions. Once athletics was removed from the WNS development, Chris Smith 
announced that the FA would repay E20 million of the grant. The whole episode was shrouded in mystery 
as to quite who had made this suggestion, who had agreed to it, how the sum of ; E20 million had been 
arrived at or how and when the money would be paid. The FA was not forthcoming with the money and 
the controversy rumbled qn. See House of Commons, 200 1 b; House of Commons, 2002a for full details. 
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Central government. appears not to have thought through the full implications of the 
development of the LVNAC or staging the 2005 WAC. The Select Committee criticised 
the initial decision to remove athletics from the WNS development that led to the 
LVNAC project (House of Commons, 2001b, p. x). They argued that the then Secretary 
of State, Chris Smith acted "beyond his proper responsibilities" and that the decision 
"was taken in a hurry and on flimsy and subjective grounds" (House of Commons, 
2001b, p. x). In his review of the LVNAC project, Patrick Carter concluded that central 
government had committed itself to host the World Athletics Championships before the 
full implications were known, in particular the measures required to provide the 
accommodation and transport required for the event (Carter, 2001, p. 5). Several 
respondents argued that this was characteristic of their general approach to mega-events. 
It was apparent in both the WNS and LVNAC projects that insufficient attention had 
been paid to the issue of how they fitted in with other developments. For example, it 
was unclear what role WNS would play in any future Olympic bid 3 and the place of the 
LVNAC in relation to existing regional athletics stadia (e. g. Gateshead) was uncertain 
(House of Commons, 2001 a, p. xxxviii). 
Central government having realised the potential cost, extent of infrastructural 
improvements required and the challenge of creating a viable stadium faced a choice. 
Central government could have backed the project, committed resources and the 
majority of respondents maintained that with political will "it could have been done". 
Alternatively, central government could have quickly called a halt to the project, but 
instead they let the project, as one respondent remarked "stumble along a lot of different 
stages" until a crisis point was reached in the summer of 2001. This pattern of 
indecision, delay and problems, particularly with funding was a repeat of other mega- 
3 See House of Commons (2000) for an extended discussion. 
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projects (e. g. WNS, Millennium Dome). The repetitive nature of these problems was 
highlighted by Carter (200 1) and also by the Select Committee who opened their report 
on the LVNAC project by borrowing Oliver Hardy's 4 stock phrase, "This is another fine 
mess... "(House of Commons, 2001b, p. v). 
Central government did not take the lead instead this was left to a tri-partite group 
consisting of a Regional Park Authority (LVRPA), a local authority (LBE) and the 
governing body of athletics (UKA). They all had slightly different agendas and little 
power, authority or resources to forward the project. Although the LVRPA as 
landowners were seen to be in the 'driving seat' in reality there was no authoritative 
leader who could make decisions, command resources and direct other actors, nor a 
clear chain of command or hierarchy. The core team made substantial progress on 
issues such as stadium design and on planning, but when it came to the 'big' issues such 
as transportation they faced considerable barriers. The core team recognised that even 
collectively they did not have the power, authority or resources to 'make' the Strategic 
Rail Authority upgrade the railway: that lay in the hands of central government. The key 
actors were therefore left to find alternative solutions to these problems e. g. transport. 
These solutions necessarily involved compromise and so were open to criticism. The , 
key actors were in a 'no win' situation. The diff-use nature of network governance seems 
to have allowed the government to distance itself from the whole project and forgo any 
responsibility for the difficulties. In addition, central government appeared to be 
reluctant to accept that the solutions often required action on their part and without it, 
little progress could be made. 
4 One half of the comic duo (Stan) Laurel and (Oliver) Hardy. 
155 
The majority of respondents believed that the government never displayed the necessary 
level of commitment to the project and that such backing is a pre-requisite of a 
successful mega-sporting event, in the succinct words of one respondent: "... if it isn't 
underwritten and supported by the government then it won't happen". In its report on 
the LVNAC project the Select Committee reiterated the need for central government to 
accept that it had a pivotal role to play in hosting large-scale sports events and once 
agains recommended the appointment of a Minister for Events (House of Commons, 
2001b, p. xxvii). Amongst respondents opinion was divided as to whether central 
government should have taken a 'hands on' role or an 'in the wings' approach to staging 
major and mega events 6. However, there was agreement that the uncertain and uneven 
approach taken was'a key factor in the demise of the project. For example, the 
government was seen to "dither" over whether to back the project or not and this left 
key actors working in an enviromnent of uncertainty. 
Respondents felt that this uncertainty and lack of confidence created or compounded a 
multitude of problems. For example, the unwillingness of central government to 
underwrite the WAC or to make guarantees to bridge the funding gap was thought to 
send out negative messages to potential sponsors, funders and users of the stadium. In 
relation to the legacy function of the stadium, attempts to find an anchor tenant were 
hampered by the uncertainty over the whole project - no rugby or football. club was 
going to commit themselves to a stadium until there were cast iron guarantees that it 
would be built. There was, as one respondent explained a "whole nervousness about the 
project". In terms of securing private sector sponsorship, several respondents felt the 
government 'shot itself in the foot' by its indecisiveness, as one remarked: 
5 This was the fourth time that the Select Committee had called for a Minister in the Cabinet office to be 
designated as Minster for Events since 1999 (House of Commons, 1999). 
6 The concepts of 'hands on' and 'in the wings' will be discussed in the next Chapter (6) in relation to 
how different governments approach major and mega sports events. 
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... it (was) quite clear that the private sector sponsorship would be no problem 
provided there was a certainty that the government would underwrite and if the 
government said it would underwrite publicly then it would not have needed to 
underwrite because the private sector would have come on board. 
However, Carter (2001) drawing on studies commissioned by the LVNAC team (by 
Ernst Young and PMP Consultancy) concluded that income from sponsorship/naming 
rights was unlikely to be significant. Furthermore, a number of factors including 
planning issues, competition and an "unattractive location" meant that commercial 
potential of the LVNAC site was limited (Carter, 2001, pp. 17-18). In other words, 
Carter (2001) argued the private sector were absent because the LVNAC project was 
commercially unattractive rather than because of government action or inaction as many 
respondents maintained. Certainly the private sector was less involved in the LVNAC 
project than one might expect. We have already identified two possible reasons - 
uncertainty over the whole project and a perception that the project had limited 
commercial potential but there may be other factors at play. Firstly, the LVNAC project 
was rather 'out of the blue', as one respondent remarked: "there was no real context for 
the World Championships in Enfield". There had been no long running local campaign 
to develop the stadium or host a major sporting event for its sporting or regeneration 
potential. Thus, in terms of building up interest and securing support from all sectors, 
developing and mobilising networks, exploring the commercial potential and tapping 
into funding streams the LVNAC project had a lot of work to do. A second linked point. 
is that the LVNAC project was not integrated into broader plans (sporting or socio- 
economic) at national, city or local level and this gave rise to questions about the 
stadium's legacy function. The Select Committee (House of Commons, 2001 a), Carter 
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(2001) and Sport England (House of Commons, 2001b, pp. 53-56) all expressed great 
reservations about the viability of LVNAC project. 
This disconnection from other areas of policy probably reflected the lack of a strategic 
approach and also the prevailing governance system, which despite the calls for 'joined 
up' government still tends to operate in departmental 'silos'. All the respondents 
emphasised the complexities of delivering a mega-sporting event and the need to get all 
the pieces of the 'jigsaw' to fit together, as one explained in relation to the LVNAC: 
There were solutions there, if the will was there, and again this comes back to 
political will to make something happen and actually advance projects that are in 
the pipeline to achieve a broader goal. This is the problem with our system we 
still work very much in silos, you know advance this particular part of the 
transport delivery, advance this bit of the education sector delivery, advance this 
bit of high performance sport delivery, advance this bit of event staging delivery, 
bring the m together and that all just got too difficult. 
In its report on the LVNAC project the Select Committee argued that before embarking 
on any more major or mega sports projects central government needed to decide and 
state categorically whether or not it wanted the UK to host such events (House of 
Commons, 2001b, xxvi). Furthermore, if the answer was 'yes' to staging major sporting 
events then it needs to be clear why the UK is doing this, i. e. to promote the nation, as 
part of a broader policy to promote sport. (House of Commons, 200 1 b, xxvi). In relation 
to the larger events the Select Committee maintained that the government needed to 
decide whether it was prepared to fund such ventures to a "realistic" level. It was clear 
that the approach taken to the LVNAC and similar projects - of making "fanfare 
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commitment to host events" with the "presumption that private sector support will 
bridge the gap" - had not worked (House of Commons, 200.1b, p. xxvi). The implication 
of both the Select Committee report (2001b) and Carter review (2001) was that it would 
be better for the UK not to bid for sporting events than to do so badly. 
The question remained as to why having giving assurances to the IAAF, central 
government then got 'cold feet'? For most respondents the answer lay in 'the Dome 0: 
I think there was a very specific reason and that, of course, was the Dome which 
was such a disaster and the government had taken such a central role, in fact in 
many ways it was only the government that was keen on it. 
If you try and rank what killed Picketts, numbers I to 10 are Dome, Dome, 
Dome, Wembley, Wembley, Wembley, Commonwealth Games, so the climate 
in government -'we cannot handle big budgets, we can not afford with an 
election coming up in 2005 another one of these, can we get away with cutting 
our losses'? 
Another respondent linked the legacy of the Dome with London's governance 
arrangements: 
but the problem was always going to be with the lack of strategic authority in 
London and even with the GLA now, it couldn't do it effectively, who is going 
7 The costs spiralled (it cost E628m in grants from government, National Lottery and Millennium 
Commission), it failed to attract visitors (5.5 million of the 12 million target) and was dogged by 
problems around the content and purpose of the Dome, construction delays, legacy function. The Dome 
received lots of negative publicity. See Gray (2003) for an account of the Dome and the way it was 
managed by government. 
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to underwrite a bid, particularly in the case of the WAC, the stadium, the only 
body that can effectively do it is the government but the government don't like 
underwriting to a level that they don't know precisely and that is of course one 
of the legacies from the Dome where costs mounted and they were very 
concerned about what actually happened. 
Thus, context and timing played a key role in making central government risk averse. 
The spectre of the Dome was seen to dominate the thinking of the government, not just 
in relation to the LVNAC project but throughout its approach to 'big' projects and the 
Select Committee had repeatedly reported on these 'failures' and made 
recommendations to rectify or prevent further problems (e. g. House of Commons, 
20 00a; House of Commons, 2000b; House of Commons, 2001 a). The ongoing nature of 
the Dome 'problem' was thought to be another important factor in the governments' 
hesitant approach and that without some form of 'closure' that government would 
continue to find it difficult to 'move on'. At the time of the interviews (early 2003), the 
debate about whether London would bid for. the 2012 Olympics provided a clear 
example of the wariness of the current government to take on another 'big' project. As 
one respondent observed: "Well the fact is that we are having this debate -will they, 
won't they -it's hardly a good start. If you don't start like a sprinter starts, forget it, 
because every other city is doing it, what message is that for a start. " In fact that the 
government did 'go for it' and announced in May 2003, after a number of delays' its 
support for a London bid for the 2012 Olympics. The 'story' of the bid for the London 
Olympics and the role played by central government is very different from what has 
been just been set out in relation to the LVNAC project and it will be considered in 
Chapter Seven. 
8 These delays were at least in part a result of British government's involvement in the growing crisis in 
Iraq and the war in Spring of 2003. 
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In summary it is possible to identify explanations about why the LVNAC project failed 
which are rooted in national level governance: 
e The LVNAC project suffered from a lack of leadership at national level. 
a Central government did not display total commitment to the LVNAC project. 
e The LVNAC project was notembedded into broader strategic plans at national 
level. 
9 Central goverment was 'risk averse' following the recent and on-going difficulties 
with large-scale sporting and cultural projects (i. e. Dome, WNS). 
London govemance in transition 
The WAC were awarded to London in April 2000 and a month later - after an absence 
of fourteen years- London once more had a unitary authority and also elected its first 
Mayor. The Mayor and GLA took up office in July 2000 so the LVNAC project evolved 
during a period of transition. However, its roots are firmly in the pre-GLA 
arrangements. The Mayor had no input into either the decision to bid for the WAC or 
the site for the NAC. These decisions were made in a vacuum, as although the 
Mayor/GLA was around the comer, the new governance arrangements were not in place 
and the identity of the Mayor a matter of speculation. For those concerned with the 
LVNAC the arrival of the Mayor brought with it both hopes and concems. There was a 
hope that the Mayor would publicly support the project, use his powers to assist the 
development and underwrite the WAC. There were also concerns, primarily on the 
planning side, as the Mayor has the power to refuse planning pennission to large-scale 
I- 
projects if they are in conflict with his adopted policies and proposals and a particular 
issue for the LVNAC was its location within the Green Belt. 
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The plans for a London WAC pre-date the restoration of a pan-London authority by 
many years and the lack of city government had always presented a challenge, as the 
awarding body the IAAF requires the host city to sign an Event Organising Agreement 
(EOA) and thereby underwrite the event. Other British cities have underwritten sporting 
events, for example, Manchester City Council underwrote the 2002 Commonwealth 
Games. From the evidence presented to the Select Committee (House of Commons, 
2PO 1 a) there appears to have been an assumption on the part of those trying to bring the 
WAC to London that central goverranent, in the absence of city government would take 
on this role. The creation of the GLA meant that there was now a 'city' to sign the EOA, 
and hopes were pinned on the Mayor, and although he was approached, he refused to 
sign it, arguing that he did not have the financial resources to take on such a risk (House 
of Commons, 2001a, p. xxxiii). Amongst respondents there was some understanding of 
the Mayor's position, with many arguing that Mayor's limited access to resources 
reflected his limited power: 
There is no mechanism to allow it, I took it (EOA) to the GLA and asked the 
legal people to look at it and see what could be done but the view at that stage 
was no, it is just not part and parcel of what the Mayor can do, but that is 
changing, but I think it is partly to do with the bizarre set up of the GLA where 
the Mayor has in some respects less power than manager of a local authority. 
And something that is vety difficult to explain to the international sporting 
community, is that a city like London, that the Mayor of London doesn't have 
that amount of money in his pocket and while the GLC would have done, the 
GLA doesn't which is a significant shift which actually makes London arguably 
the worst place in Britain to bring a major event. 
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In his evidence to the Select Committee on staging major events in March 2001, Chris 
Smith, the then Secretary of State acknowledged that given the limited resources at his 
disposal, the Mayor was not in a position to act as guarantor (House of Commons, 
2001 a, p. xxxiii). So although London once again had city-wide government, its limited 
powers and financial resources meant that for the purposes of the EOA for the World 
Athletics Championships nothing had changed and there was still a gap. 
The inability of the Mayor to underwrite the WAC meant that the organisers turned to 
the government, and in March 2001 UK Athletics expressed confidence to the Select 
Committee (House of Commons, 2001 a, p. xxxiv) that the government would take the 
lead role in resolving the issue. However, the government was reluctant to underwrite 
the project themselves, arguing to the Select Committee (House of Commons, 2001 a, 
p. xxxiv) that "in most cases, it is primarily for the bidding city and relevant governing 
bodyto .... ensure that any risk .... is underwritten". Central government approached other 
bodies but none felt they were in position to underwrite the event. Both Sport England 
and UK Sport argued that their statutory frameworks prevented them from underwriting 
sporting events, the UKA did not have the financial resources, whilst for the LBE or the 
LVRPA to underwrite an event of this nature, would as one respondent put it "be 
madness". So all eyes were back on the government, but they maintained their position, 
arguing that it would set a precedent and that other cities had underwritten events. The 
Select Committee adopted a similar stance arguing that the government would have to 
justify what amounted to a change in policy (House of Commons, 2001 a, p. xxxiv). The 
veracity of this argument was questioned by respondents, who in turn argued that events 
like World Indoor Athletics Championships underwritten by Birmingham and the 
Commonwealth Games underwritten by Manchester were much smaller events and thus 
the risk was much less than for the WAC. Also as large metropolitan authorities they 
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could accept those risks. Some respondents maintained that it was the role of central 
government to underwrite mega-sporting events which they argued should be treated as 
national events and thus not the responsibility of the host city. 
It should be noted that whilst central government argued that bodies such as the GLA, 
Sport England or UK $port should underwrite the WAC, it was government that had 
imposed the limits on the power and resources of these bodies. On the one hand, it could 
be argued that the GLA's inability to sign the EOA is an example of the 'success' of 
this approach as it clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of the financial shackles 
placed upon it. On the other hand, it also illustrates the drawbacks, as one respondent 
commented: "its (government) hands are tied by the legislation it itself has enacted to 
empower these bodies". So although the government found itself in difficulties over the 
EOA they were to a large extent of their own making and the question as to who could 
be signatory was never resolved. 
The inability of the Mayor to underwrite the WAC is illustrative of what one respondent 
described as the "emasculated mayoral system" established in London. Although there 
is evidence from his first term that Livingstone has actively sought to increase his 
powers and resources, he does not enjoy the powers that Mayors in other cities do (e. g. 
New York, Paris). The governance of London is highly complex and there is a plethora 
of actors, as one respondent explained: 
you are dealing with so many parties in London, the governance of London in 
terms of 32 London boroughs and the GLA is complicated enough, particularly 
when the site abuts more than one London borough it gets even more 
complicated, but on top of that in terms of some of the service deliverers you've 
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got Tff,, Strategic Rail Authority, London Underground, the LDA - the LDA 
had a role to play, suddenly all these parties, where as in city like Paris, the 
Mayor controls just about everything and he just says 'do it' and it happens and 
that is the difference, we haven't got the governance of London sorted. 
So although with the arrival of the Mayor/GLA London had an overall strategic body, it 
still lacked in the words of one respondent "a big overarching authority with resources 
and clout". Certainly early analysis of the governance changes concluded that the GLA 
"despite having a Mayor who is strong within the system as it operates, is a weak 
authority in terms of its service powers and financial capacity" (Travers, 2002, p. 787) 
and that many of its powers are circumscribed. For some respondents this lack of a 
strong Mayor and city authority was crucial, because, they argued, strong, unequivocal 
political leadership at the city level is an essential ingredient of success for mega and 
major sporting projects, citing Paris and Manchester as examples. 
In the absence of a unitary authority central goverm-nent has played a major role in the 
governance of London and the re-instatement of a unitary authority and election of a 
Mayor could be viewed as an example of the 'hollowing out' of the state, with powers 
being displaced downwards. However, as others have argued (e. g. Taylor, 2000; 
Goodwin et al, 2002) when new institutions are created state power is often simply re- 
located, so that as one part of the state is 'hollowed out' another is 'filled in'. The GLA 
and Mayor are products of central government thinking and although powers and 
responsibilities have been vested in the new institutions and offices, central goverment 
has retained control over many key areas and thus ensured its continued importance in 
the governance of London. As we have seen in relation to the EOA such an approach 
can paradoxically bestow roles and responsibilities on central government that they 
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would rather not have: central government wanted the GLA/Mayor to underwrite the 
WAC but the system the government had established simply would not allow it. In a 
similar way, neither UK Sport nor Sport England could take on this role because of the 
limits placed on them by the government. 
Standing on the sidelines: the role of the Mqyor and GLA 
As already noted central government did not provide consistent leadership or charnpion 
the LVNAC project. Respondents hoped that the Mayor would come out Uly and 
publicly behind the LVNAC project. Some respondents regarded him as the natural 
champion of the project, as one local authority officer explained: 
I don't think we ever identified a champion for the project, I don't know to what 
extent you need to if you have the Mayor on board - he would automatically 
become your champion wouldn't he? It had to be branded the London Games it 
wasn't going to be the Enfield games, if it happened at all, as far as the IAAF 
were concerned this is international, it's the London Games. 
In fact the Mayor remained very much on the sidelines he was, in the words of one 
respondent "remarkab ly mute on the subjecf'. This silence was regarded as significant 
at the time, particularly given his vocal support of WNS which Jay in his former 
constituency of Brent. The word that was used repeatedly to describe the Mayor was 
equivocal, for some respondents this was an unfortunate product of timing, whilst for 
others it was a calculated political decision on the part of the Mayor. 
Respondents pointed to the fact that the Mayor was "finding his feef 'and the GLA and 
the functional bodies were young institutions, with personnel settling in to their new 
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roles and that there was general uncertainty about what they were meant to be doing and 
how they should go about it?. For example: 
The LDA always seemed to be hesitant about what their role was and how they 
could link with sport, and at the time they said to me this is our role, this, this 
and this, which isn't sport, but sport does fit into all of their key objectives, but 
just not in an obvious way, but at the time I don't think there was anybody there 
to talk to about how sport could play a role. 
This was contrasted with the situation at the time of fieldwork (end of 2002/start 2003): 
Whereas now the LDA has just funded through the Lee Valley (Park Authority) 
a E40,000 project to assess the regenerative potential of sport in the Upper Lee 
Valley. So if they had done something like that around this project it could have 
been really helpful because again it could then pull in other people. 
Respondents supported their argument by drawing a comparison to the very different 
approach taken by the Mayor to the London bid for the 2012 Olympics: 
Well the Mayor has come out in support of the Olympics and is talking about 
London tax payers making a contribution to the Olympics, so I think now, yes, I 
think it would have made a difference, but it was too early then ... 
itWas timing, 
it was too early. 
9 Travers (2002) in an early analysis of the impact of the governance changes noted that a great deal of 
time was spent during 2000 and 2001 simply putting in place new officer structures and making new 
appointments. Although most senior posts were filled by summer of 2001 many lower level posts were 
still being filled early in 2002. Furthermore, many staff were inhe. rited from predecessor bodies e. g. 
London Ecology Centre and they did not necessarily have the skills and background to run the country's 
fist Mayoral government. 
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... for most of the time they weren't that engaged with it, Ken (Livingstone) 
backed it officially spoke in support of it, Nicky (Gavron) did work on it ... but 
generally it was relatively low key, certainly in comparison to the Olympics 
very, very much low key and I think part of that is a new organisation with a 
very strange structure which is what the GLA has and just needing to bed down, 
it's taken three years to bed and its probably still bedding down. 
However, other respondents argued that this equivocation was the result of political 
manoeuvring. Although a variety of 'theories' were forwarded by respondents, they 
shared a perception that Ken Livingstone and central government were involved in 
some behind the scenes 'horse trading': 
I don't think it had anything to do with them being a new body, also with the 
GLA it's the LDA. I think they wanted to sit on the fence, at no point did the 
Mayor make a positive statement... And I actually think what happened was that 
the government presented him with a deal, saying you can have Wembley or 
Pickets Lock but not both. 
what I believed happened here, one hears on the grapevine that the GLA and 
of course Enfield were keen to see those transport improvements, the question is 
did the GLA put a gun to the government's head and say right we will give 
planning permission for the stadium if you give the green light for the WARME 
(West Anglia Route Modernisation Enhancement) programme. 
168 
What is interesting in these two examples is that in one, central government are seen to , 
be the ones wielding power over the GLA and in the other it is the GLA exerting power 
over central government. Although it is very difficult to establish the 'truth' of these 
claims, they do illustrate several points. Firstly, respondents recognised that many key 
decisions are neither made in, nor communicated through, formal arenas (e. g. Lee 
Valley Stadium Forum). Moreover, key actors within the LVNAC project felt that there 
were times when either themselves or other key actors had been excluded from the 
strategic decision making process. At this point it should be noted that many 
respondents felt that the 'reasons' given for the cancellation of the project were 
"excuses" and that the 'real' reasons were never articulated publicly. Secondly, there 
was an understanding that the relationship between the Mayor and central government is 
not clear cut and far from being fixed it is constantly being negotiated. This is perhaps a 
reflection of the complex, dynamic and evolving nature of modem governance in 
general and more specifically of the arrangements for London. In addition, at the time 
of the LVNAC project relations between the Mayor and central governinent were 
strained following the expulsion of Ken Livingstone from the Labour Party. By the time 
of the Olympic bid relations had improved and the Mayor was readmitted to the Labour 
Party in 2004. 
Several respondents argued that in relation to the LVNAC project the Mayor played his 
hand carefully, weighing up what was in it for London and also for him as a politician 
with an eye on a second term in office and waited to see how the 'big' issues (i. e. 
transport) evolved: 
I think the fact that he had just arrived had nothing to do with it because he 
could have seen it as an opportunity to have a big project on his hands and he 
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didn't, he never did. So he either sensed, his political nose told him that central 
govenunent would never support it or he knew that he wouldn't want to divert 
resources, which he could have done. 
The project unfolded during the early days of the Mayor/GLA and one of the first tasks 
of the Mayor was to produce a set of strategic planslo for London, including a spatial 
plan but these were not complete at the time of the LVNAC project and thus there was 
no overall strategic plan in which to locate it. Furthennore, although earlier strategic 
documents did identify the Upper Lee Valley (ULV) as an important regional corridor, 
it was as respondents noted no secret that North London and the ULV did not top the 
Mayor's list of priorities. The Mayor's interest lies in East London, central London and 
the Thames Gateway and this was reflected in early documents such as the Towards the 
London Plan" (GLA, 2001) and announcements that any Olympic bid would be. 
focused on the regeneration of East London and the Lower Lee Valley. By the time of 
the Olympic bid the strategies were broadly in place and it was clear that the Olympics 
had an integral place in these plans for London. 
Within the interviews the role of the Mayor and GLA were strong themes. However it 
should be noted that the Mayor and GLA were largely absent from the official reports. 
The Select Committee's consideration of the role of the Mayor was limited to the issue 
of underwriting the WAC (House of Commons, 2001 a, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv). In fact the 
main report on the LVNAC project - Unpicking the Lock., the WorldAthletic 
Championships in the UK (House of Commons, 2001b) - did not discuss the role of the 
Mayor and GLA. Similarly, the Carter review (2001) made no reference to the Mayor 
10 The Mayor has to produce eight strategies on biodiversity; spatial development, economic 
development; transport; culture; air quality and waste and noise. 
" This was a precursor to the spatial development plan which was renamed the London Plan. 
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and the GLA were mentioned only in passing. This contrast in emphasis between the 
respondents, many of whom were intimately involved in the LVNAC project and the 
cofficial' reports is interesting and it highlights of the value conducting interviews 
looking beyond the 'official' reports. Although in part it is a reflection of the focus and 
function of the Select Committee 12 and the remit of the Carter review 13 , it perhaps hints 
at how the Mayor and GLA were perceived at the time - of limited 'help' in resolving 
problems and driving the project forward and that the 'solutions' lay firmly in the hands 
of t he central government. Whether the limitations on the Mayor and GLA were thought 
to be because the arrangements were still 'bedding in' or inherent and immutable is not 
apparent. However, as the Olympics have shown the Mayor and GLA can play a key 
role in large-scale sports projects. In the LVNAC case they played a key role by 
inaction. 
In summary it possible to identify explanations about why the LVNAC project failed 
that are rooted in London level governance: 
" The governance of London was in transition and the new arrangements were in the 
process of 'bedding down'. 
" The Mayor of London did not have the power, authority or resources to forward the 
LVNAC project, or to underwrite the WAC 
" The Mayor of London was equivocal about the LVNAC project which had been 
designed before he came into office. 
" The LVNAC project suffered from lack of leadership at city level. 
41 The LVNAC project was not embedded into broader strategic plans at city level. 
12 "The Culture, Media and Sport Committee is appointed to examine on behalf of the House of 
Commons the expenditure, administration and policy of the DCMS and its associated public bodies". This 
statement appears at the beginning of all reports e. g. House of Commons, 200 1 a, p. ii. 
13 The terms of reference were: 1) In the light of the government's manifesto commitment to ensure that a 
first class affiletics stadium is available for the WAC in 2005, determine whether the LVNAC project can 
be funded and managed in its current forinat. 2) Determine what alternatives might be feasible. 
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Institutions and individuals: roles and relationships 
It has been established that the LVNAC project suffered from a lack of consistent 
leadership, with central government and the Mayor apparently unwilling to take up the 
mantle and non of the core team (LVRPA, UKA, LBE) not being a position to. In 
addition there was no strong sub-regional partnership to lobby for north London. From 
the literature we know that successful mega sporting events are frequently the product 
of long-standing partnerships that have worked towards hosting an event for many 
years. - This process often involves repeated bids for events, the refining of ideas, shifts 
in organisations and personnel. Whilst for the LVNAC project the core team was a new, 
untested partnership working to a deadline on a project that had had little 'lead in' time. 
Each actor brought identifiable resources to the partnership. The UKA brought the 
WAC, the LVRPA the land, capital and revenue funding, LBE local support structures 
and revenue funding and all brought networks that could be drawn upon. For example 
for the LBE this included connections with local and sub-regional business players, sub- 
regional transport groups and adjacent local authorities. The UKA was well connected 
into athletics and sports networks nationally and most importantly internationally with 
the JAAF. The core team was inter-dependent and because even collectively their 
resources were somewhat limited they were heavily dependent on external players 
including Sport England and central government. Similarly, in a study of three 
American Olympic cities 14 , Burbank et al (2001) found that these cities were reliant on 
external actors to forward their Olympic plans. 
Sport England controlled the bulk of the funding available for the Project. This placed it 
in a powerful position vis b vis the core team. Many respondents were critical of the 
approach taken by Sport England, arguing that from early on it was evident, as one 
14 Los Angeles, Atlanta and Salt Lake City. 
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respondent commented that "they were not particularly keen on this project and that 
made it difficult" and they acted in ways that slowed down and even stalled the project. 
Sport England set the core team eleven tasks which the core team had to achieve before 
3 I't May 2001 in order to secure the lottery funding of E67m. 15 and relations between the 
core team and Sport England were often strained with both 'sides' feeling that the other 
was not being fully co-operative. A key issue was that in the eyes of Sport England 
none of the core team was a suitable applicant for a lottery grant of up to E67 million. 
An applicant had to take on the responsibility for any cost overruns and underwrite the 
construction of the stadium. None of the three core players were as one respondent 
(from the core team) commented: "in a position or had a desire to stand up and say we 
will fund a El 00m project - at the last resort we are there. " This last point was one 
highlighted by the Select Committee in its first inquiry into the LVNAC project (House 
of Commons, 2001 a, p. xxxvi) and also by Carter (2001, p. 7). As one respondent 
explained this: 
... gave opportunities 
for Sport England to say 'there you are you don't really 
want the project' and so on and so on, and there would be this oscillation, well 
actually it's government's project they should be standing behind it and they' 
would say 'Well we don't, look at Manchester the local authority is standing 
behind' and 'We'd say we are not really the local authority it's the GLA', and it 
just went on and on. 
One of the eleven tasks was to "negotiate a consortium agreement" (Carter, 200 1, p. 15) 
which would have distributed the risk and responsibilities appropriately between the 
three parties. The core team expended a great deal of time, money and energy on 
15 See Carter, 2001 pp. 14-16 for full details of the eleven tasks and the extent of progress made on each. 
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attempting to draw up a Joint Venture Agreement but it was never finalised 16. Most 
respondents argued that the government should have acted as guarantor rather than 
shifting the risks onto small organisations, but the failure to come to an agreement also 
reflected the nature of the relationships, particularly between LVRPA and LBE. 
The relationship between the LVRPA and LBE was strained, co-operation was limited 
and both drew criticism from other organisations. A number of respondents (from LBE 
and beyond) argued that the LVRPA regarded the LVNAC project as 'theirs' and made 
every effort to retain control, tending to work in isolation rather than in partnership. The 
LBE attracted criticism (from LVRPA and beyond) for "wanting something for 
nothing" - the fact that Enfield did not make a capital contribution was raised 
repeatedly in the interviews and also. in the local press 17 . This episode illustrates some 
of the difficulties of partnership working, especially under pressure of time. The LBE 
and LVRPA were ostensibly partners but much of the time were locked in dispute and 
although their agendas were described by respondents as "overlapping" or even 
"complementary" it was the differences rather than the similarities that mattered. 
Another area of contention was the revenue funding which was estimated at a million 
pounds a year, although Carter suggested that "realistically, it could be fl. 5 million per 
annum" (Carter, 2001, p. 8). The core team argued that the revenue funding had been 
secured, with commitments from LVRPA, LBE, UKA and the London Marathon Trust. 
Carter (2001) contested this claim arguing that there was a gap of around E270,000 per 
annum and moreover that as none of the core team were in a position to underwrite the 
project, there was no guaranteed source to meet any revenue deficit (Carter, 2001, p. 8). 
16 Six of the eleven tasks were not completed to the satisfaction of Sport England (Carter, 200 1, p. 12). 
17 The Leader of the Council wrote a letter to the local paper in response to the comments arguing that 
"'Me council was not the bidder or sponsor of the staditun but was a supporter of the bid" (Enfield and 
Haringey Independent, 200 1). 
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Sport England was also not convinced, arguing that the revenue funding was never 
"committed", as a member of the core team explained: 
Sport England needed more than confidence, a kind of guarantee that revenue 
funding would be in place and we gave that guarantee ... but that somehow 
wasn't enough, it was sort of we want to see hard evidence that a leading 
professional rugby club would use the stadium or that 'where is the hard 
evidence that there will be three major athletics events in it' and you weren't in 
position to give that because it was 'I'm not going to sign up to that until I know 
it, will be built', I mean it was all of that dreadful vicious circle, that you couldn't 
break into. 
The core team understood some of Sport England's reservations, particularly in relation 
to underwriting the project but felt that the government should have stepped in and 
acted as guaranior. Respondents were aware that Sport England had got its "fingers 
burnt" over WNS 18 and understood why, as one respondent commented "had to take a 
fairly firm and consistent line, does not mean to say I agreed with this, but I did have 
sympathy for the position they were in". There was a feeling that that they were 
working in the "shadow" of WNS which continued to "rumble olf'. Moreover, 
respondents believed that Sport England was firmly committed to WNS and that they 
were working under government duress. Some respondents suggested that Sport 
England deliberately employed delaying tactics to undermine the project, whilst others 
felt as one remarked that Sport England "were just sitting on the fence, really what they 
were doing was hoping it (LVNAC project) was collapsing whilst WNS would rise 
18 The Select Committee severely criticised Sport England for the "premature" grant of the; E120m lottery 
funds to the FA before the WNS project was shown to be clearly viable (House of Commons, 2001b, p. 
vii). 
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again". Sport England maintained that they werejust doing theirjob working within the, 
legal framework set out in the Lottery Act and was aware that at times this made them 
ccunpopular". 
Sport England had consistently argued against a stand alone athletics stadium, but as a 
NDPB Sport England they were left in an invidious position because they could not 
refuse to work on the LVNAC project. However, they did not have to do more than their 
'job' and Sport England's approaclý can be seen as a form of resistance to govenunent 
power. Furthermore, several respondents reported that Sport England used its extensive 
network to work against the project (e. g. lobby politicians about the potential negative 
impact of the LVNAC on regional stadia or grassroots sport). Respondents felt this 
'behind the scenes' activity was important in fuelling opposition to the LVNAC within 
political circles and this Ending lends support to Castells (2004) proposition that power 
lies within networks not institutions. In relation to the core LVNAC team (LVRPA, 
UKA, LBE) Sport England was in powerful position as the 'gatekeeper' to the main 
source of funds -the lottery funds - this power, although specific was nonetheless 
important, as without the lottery funds the project could not proceed. Sport England also 
had the 'ear' of government and was able to pass on its concerns about the project19 
directly to the Secretary of State whilst the core team had less direct access to Ministers. 
It was evident throughout this research, from both documentary sources and the 
interviews that although organisations were important, so were the people that inhabited 
them. The case study approach seemed to illuminate the micro-politics of the project, 
and it was soon apparent that any analysis of the LVNAC project had to take into 
19 These were capital costs, funding gap and underwriting issues; planning and transport issues; long term 
legacy and revenue funding; the sport legacy and impact on other UK venues which bad been identified in 
November 2000 and which Sport England believed had not been tackled by LVRPA by June 200 1. when 
they applied for the balance of the L67 million (House of Commons, 2001b, p. xiii). 
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account the people - their motivations, ambitions and actions- that had tried to shape the 
project, take it forward, rein it in or even put a halt to it. As one respondent argued: 
Remember all these things are done by individuals they are not really about 
organisations, life is not about organisations but individuals within organisations 
or individuals using organisations... Institutional structures don't of themselves 
carry anything, they never actually drive anything, they administer things yes, 
but they can take it backwards as well as forwards, it's to do with key 
individuals that actually make the difference. 
The importance of individuals was apparent at all levels of the project. At national level 
Chris Smith, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport up to June 2001, 
forwarded the project within central government circles and his departure from office 
removed a key ally. His successor, Tessa Jowell, was equally important but she took a 
very different approach to the project - so although they held the same post within the 
same government they followed very different paths 20 . As far as the Select Committee 
were concerned all that had changed between March 2001 when the government 
expressed 'confidence' in the LVNAC project and June 2001 when they expressed 
calarm' was the Secretary of State: the challenges facing the project were those that had 
faced it from the outset (House of Commons, 2001b, pp. xvi-xvii). The Select 
Committee concluded: "As far as we can see the shift in policy arose when a Secretary 
of State who was inexplicably wedded to the project was replaced by one who was not". 
(House of Commons, 2001b, p. xvii). Some respondents believed that Tessa Jowell was 
brought in to 'kill off the LVNAC project and that the Carter review was simply a 
20 This disjuncture between the agendas and actions of the two ministers, links with the concern voiced 
by respondents that the low 'value' given to sporting matters within British policy and political circles 
allows individual ministers to pursue their own beliefs. 
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device and that the decision to abandon the LVNAC had already been made. They 
pointed to out that key actors e. g. UK Sport were excluded from the review, proposals 
put together in response to the concerns raised by Carter were "completely ignored" in 
the report and the core team were not given an opportunity to comment on the report 
prior to publication. This suggests that central government did take a (belated) 
leadership role and decided to cancel the project. 
At city level as has been noted the Mayor, Ken Livingstone, was conspicuous by his 
absence and the low-key nature of the role he played has been accentuated by his high 
profile role in relation to London's Olympic bid. There were high hopes of what the 
Mayor could doý and that his support could have made a 'difference'. In fact his silence 
and inaction were probably as important and although he argued that he was not in a 
position to give, for example, financial support, in relation to the Olympics he has been 
able to find ways around these institutional barriers (i. e. Olympic precept). 
There were also individuals that were important in overcoming day-to-day problems 
and thus helped to keep the LVNAC project 'on track'. For example, as will be 
discussed later, the LVRPA and LBE held very different opinions about the 
regenerative potential of the project and this was a constant source of tension. Although 
both 'camps' were critical of each other, and there were a number of sticking points, 
they never reached an impasse. This was in part due to the efforts of several individuals 
who managed to keep the channels of communication open. For instance, one person 
with a foot in both camps acted as a go-between. He was trusted and respected by all 
and was able to 'smooth' the way, often through informal means and also by facilitating 
small meetings. Although a 'small cog', this individual played a significant role in the 
overall project because their actions prevented small problems escalating into big ones. 
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Peck (2001) argues that the state is a 'peopled' organisation rather than an "insulated 
domain of anonymous 'policy makers' and authorless policy conventions"' (P. 45 1). 
Although there was much evidence to support this claim, what was also interesting 
within this study was that there were state organisations that appeared to be almost 
people less. For example, apart from the Ministers, the staff of the DCMS remained 
nameless and faceless: they were referred to as 'civil servants' or simply the DCMS. 
This is not to say that the civil servants were not influential, indeed respondents felt that 
they exerted a great deal of (negative) influence but. that they were invisible and 
anonymous. This may have reflected a lack of enthusiasm for the LVNAC project in 
particular and/or simply reflect the workings of the DCMS. Within this study 
respondents generally portrayed civil servants as being good at prevaricating and for 
finding reasons not to say 'yes'. In other organisations, staff were more visible (e. g. 
LVRPA, UKA) and respondents spoke about both individuals and the organisations 
they were associated with. 
From the literature it is clear that a champion from politics, sport or business can play 
an important role in the promotion and delivery of sporting bids. For example, the 
prominent role played by Manchester entrepreneur Sir Bob Scott in promoting 
Manchester's Olympic (Cochrane et al, 1996). In contrast, the LVNAC project never 
had a consistent 'champion'. Whilst some respondents saw Chris Smith as a champion 
of sport and specifically of the LVNAC, his vision, understanding and desire to* promote 
sport was not thought to be shared by others within government or the civil service. 
Although respondents believed that Chris Smith had partly won the argument he was 
not able to totally "knock out" the opposing forces. So once Chris Smith had been 
removed from office there was no one at a senior level to take the project forward. 
However, others felt the project never had a 'champion' from government or athletics. 
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Interestingly, several respondents recall discussions with Chris Smith about bringing an 
'outsider' in to champion the project, but no one could remember his name, background, 
or whether he had ever been offered the 'job' or whether he had turned it down. 
Whatever the case, this champion did not materialise. Several respondents within sport 
felt that more could been done to bring an athlete on board earlier 21 and they pointed to 
the high profile campaign by the likes of Olympic gold medallist Sir Steve Redgrave on 
behalf of the 2012 London Olympic bid. This lack of a champion may have been rooted 
in the project's short and peculiar gestation, arising as it did from the decision to remove 
athletics from WNS and a need to quickly find an alternative. So that unlike other 
projects such as the Olympics or MCG it did not evolve in an organic way with plenty 
of time to build up and tap into networks and for a 'natural' champion to emerge. 
In summary it possible to identify explanations aboutwhy the LVNAC project failed 
that are rooted in relationships between organisations and individuals: 
" The LVNAC project did not have a consistent champion from politics, athletics or 
business. 
" The LVNAC project arose from problems with the WNS Project and there was little 
time for the plans, partnerships and relationships to evolve and mature. 
21 By the summer of 2001 several athletes had lent their support to the project. For example, the planning 
application for the LVNAC was delivered to LBE by the athlete Dwain Chambers accompanied by local 
junior athletes. Given that Dwain Chambers tested positive in 2003 for a prohibited substance and was 
subsequently banned from competition for two years (BBC, 2004b) it may be that this support would 
have been of little value. 
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SPORT AND THE LEE VALLEY NATIONAL ATHLETICS CENTRE 
The overwhelming majority of respondents in this study, both those familiar with the 
workings of sport and the 'newcomers', argued that their experiences had led them to 
conclude that the governance of sport in Britain is fundamentally flawed 22 and that sport 
is generally undervalued by politicians and policy makers. Respondents identifled 
'faults' at all points and levels of the system and compared the UK with other nations to 
illustrate their points and respondents described how these issues 'played out' and 
impacted on the LVNAC project. The Select Committee has called for major reform of 
the governance of sport arguing that within the current system there are too many bodies 
with overlapping responsibilities and no clear lines of accountability (House of 
Commons, 1999; House of Commons, 2000: House Of Conunons, 2001 a, House of 
Commons, 2001b). 
Sport or regeneration?: Competing visions of the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre 
The LVNAC project has its roots in the troubled Wembley National Stadium (WNS) 
project and it arose from a ministerial decision not to proceed with the athletics platform 
at WNS. These rather strange origins were reflected in the lack of a clear vision. The 
LVNAC project was hampered by a multiplicity of visions forwarded by the different 
players. There was a great deal of shared enthusiasm, and on the surface there appeared 
to be much to unite them. However, delving below the surface revealed crucial 
differences that were played out during the course of the projeCt23 . There were two 
broad visions and a number of subtle variations. For some respondents the LVNAC 
22 MiS was also the conclusion of an independent review - Raising the Bar- conducted by two former 
sports ministers, Kate Hoey and Chris Moniyhan (2005), and they called for fundamental reform (see 
Chapter Six). 
2' A strength of in-depth interviewing is that gives opportunities for issues to be teased out and the 
nuances to be explored. 
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project was primarily a sporting project and their hopes and ambitions were sporting - 
hosting the prestigious World Athletics Championships (WAC), creating a legacy for 
athletics, providing facilities for the development of elite athletes and also providing 
opportunities for community participation. So although the ambitions were wide 
ranging encompassing different spatial levels (national, regional, sub-regional and local) 
and also varying levels of athletic ability (novice to elite) they were all finnly within the 
arena of sport. 
The second vision, whilst embracing these sporting aims, emphasised the regenerative 
potential of the LVNAC. For respondents in the regeneration 'camp', sport per se was 
not as important as what sport could 'do' for the Upper Lee Valley, as expressed by one 
respondent: 
of course great excitement - partly from the point of view of putting us all on 
the international sporting map, but more importantly the thought of how this 
could attract lots and lots of people to the area, to this part of north London and 
the regenerative impact that might have, plus a legacy sports facility of the first 
order, all combined to make it a really exciting project. 
The hopes and aspirations of these respondents were centred on improving transport 
links, -creating employment and business opportunities and putting Lee Valley on the 
map. Although these visions had much in common, the differences were to prove to be 
fundamental and created on-going tensions between two members of the core team - the 
Lee Valley Regional Park Authority and London Borough of Enfield (LBE). 
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The LVRPA regarded the project as primarily a sports project commensurate with their , 
role as sub-regional body: 
(The LVNAQ fitted in perfectly with our sports development remit and policy 
because it did give access to athletes at all levels and all kinds of abilities but it 
was particularly aimed at the performance and excellence level -training the 
champions of the future which is where we sit in this continuum from grassroots 
to world performance level. 
Whilst for the LBE it was about regeneration: 
there was no other sensible reason for the council going into this if it isn't the 
regeneration benefits, why would you sign up underwrite part of the revenue 
deficit for years to come, there is no justification at all from the council point of 
view other than regeneration. 
Respondents from the LVRPA argued, firstly, that regeneration was not within its 
remit24 (a point challenged by others) and secondly, they did not accept that the 
LVNAC had regenerative potential. This stance was consistent with the conservative 
nature of the organisation. Furthermore, the LVRPA saw the regeneration agenda as a 
dangerous distraction from the task in hand, namely building a national athletics centre 
and hosting the World Athletics Championships (WAC). The LVRPA respondents 
thought that the project was less likely to proceed if the regeneration agenda was 
pursued, whilst those from LBE and others (all had an interest in the Upper Lee Valley), 
believed that it was more likely to proceed if the other benefits were delivered (i. e. jobs, 
24 Subsequent to the LVNAC project the LVRPA has taken on a regeneration role, for example they now 
have a Regeneration Department (LVRPA, No date). 
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transport upgrades). The other actors in the 'regeneration' camp included, local 
politicians, local business players and local institutions such as the Learning Skills 
Council and Middlesex University, all of whom shared an interest in revitalising the 
Upper Lee Valley. Thus, there were fundamental differences in scale and complexity of 
the project as envisioned by the two camps, a perception on the part of some 
respondents that these visions were mutually exclusive and all of this was compounded 
by the strength of feeling that each camp had its own vision. Interestingly, the success 
of the London Olympic bid was rooted in the ability to marry the 'sporting' vision with 
the 'regeneration' vision which had eluded the LVNAC project. 
Both 'camps' tried to shape the project, for example, LBE set up the Stakeholders 
Board, chaired by a prominent local businessman to consider broader issues, as a way to 
counter what they saw as the narrow focus of the LVRPA. These moves were resisted 
by the LVRPA who did not recognise the Stakeholders Board as a "legitimate" group 
and as one neutral observer pointed out "they (LVRPA) picked and chose what they 
listened to. " Within interviews, respondents from both camps set out their case with 
conviction and in a well-rehearsed manner: it was not the first time they had argued 'the 
point'. They marshalled evidence to support their argument and also to challenge the 
counter-argument. Respondents expressed frustration at the stance taken by the other 
camp and their intransigence in the face of the 'evidence' and it was evident that these 
feelings were mutual. Interestingly, the other member of the core team the UK Athletics 
(UKA) appeared to keep out of this dispute- it was very much LVRPA and LBE 
(supported by others in the Upper Lee Valley) - it seemed to be rooted in local politics 
with each organisation (and individuals within those organisations) trying to control the 
direction of the project. Both sides argued that their differences would not have really 
"mattered" if there had been clear vision and leadership from central government. 
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However, having done a volteface on athletics and WNS, central govenu-nent failed to 
spell out its vision for the LVNAC and this provided 'space' for different visions to 
emerge. Although respondents from LBE and LVRPA felt that ultimately the dispute 
over regenerative potential did not affect the outcome, it probably did little to instil 
confidence in them or the project. 
Sport England did not advance a clear vision of the LVNAC which given their stance on 
the concept of a stand alone athletics stadiums was perhaps not surprising. Neither did 
the Mayor and GLA and once again this is not that remarkable given that they came in 
to being after the LVNAC project had been set in train and it was unclear as to how or 
even if, the LVNAC would fit into the Mayor's plans for London. As already noted it 
soon became apparent that the LVNAC did not have a central place in the Mayor's 
vision for London. 
Thus, the LVNAC was dogged by the absence of a unified vision, which allowed 
competing visions to emerge and meant that the project was pulled in different 
directions and was open to criticism on all fronts. This lack of clarity about what the 
project was for and what it was trying to achieve was probably rooted in the approach 
taken to mega-sporting projects and events by central government - reactive and ad hoc 
rather than planned and strategic with little direction and leadership. The LVNAC was 
very much a product of this ad hoc approach. It was a reaction to difficulties 
encountered with WNS and also the need to provide a venue for the WAC and its long- 
term role was neither clear nor secure (House of Conunons, 2001 a). There was little 
lead-time for differences between the various actors to be 'thrashed out', for the 
partnerships to mature and roles be negotiated (perhaps for some actors to step to one 
side or even be 'dropped' and replaced). Also, without an overarching authority for 
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London in the initial phase of the project there was no strategic framework to locate the 
LVNAC in or properly assess the 'pros' and 'cons' of the project for London. 
The value of sport 
Many respondents believed the approach taken by the government to the LVNAC 
project specifically and also to other major sporting projects (Wembley National 
Stadium, Manchester Commonwealth Games) reflected the value placed on sport and 
the place of sport within British politics. It was a strong theme running through the 
interviews and comparisons were often made with other nations to illustrate the 
perceived drawbacks of the British approach. Respondents argued that if governments 
framed these events in purely economic terms then no events would ever be staged or 
venues built, and that this argument applies equally to other cultural amenities: 
... 
if you look at it cold economic point of view there is no justification for 
having Picketts Lock, there is no justification really for having Wembley, there 
is no justification for a Royal Opera House, no justification for having museums 
or art galleries, just for money in and money out but what a society has to do is. 
to decide that ... these are monuments. 
As one respondent explained, "society has to make a choice, this is worth doing" - in 
other words recognise that arts and sport have value beyond money. Respondents felt 
that in general British governments had difficulties embracing this concept for sport, 
and contrasted this with other countries, for example, France, arguing that they have a 
different value system where sport has an equal standing with the arts. For example, 
one respondent recalled discussions with French officials about the subsidy of the Stade 
de France (SdF) by the government and whether this was ap olitical problem: 
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(The French official replied) 'Why should it be, this is the cost of us being 
France, this is, the national stadium, we are proud of our facilities, we are proud 
of who we are, we are proud to do well in sport, this is not a political issue, why 
should it be? - we support culture, we support literature, we support sport'. 
Respondents argued that this de-valuing of sport by successive British governments 
means that although* central government is prepared to subside the arts (i. e. galleries, 
theatre, ballet, opera) they are not prepared to do the same for sport. Several 
respondents pointed out that central government provides a; E25 million annual subsidy 
to the Royal Opera House (via the Arts Council) which appeals to a very small 
proportion of the population, but are not willing to provide similar amounts to sporting 
projects that appeal to a larger proportion of the population and provide global exposure 
to the host city and nation. Respondents recognised that some sports, in particular elite 
level football, generate large income streams and in these instances there is little 
justification for government subsidy. However, as they pointed out many less high 
profile and minority sports, including athletics have limited resources and argue that in 
these cases central government subsidy is justified. 
Respondents argued that successive British govenunents have failed to grasp the 
intrinsic value of sport and that this is evident in the approach to sport. Respondents 
pointed out that for many years sport was left in a policy wilderness and although in 
recent years there has been much more activity on the policy front, respondents argued 
that: "sport is not on the political agenda, it's a nonsense to suggest it is. " Any credence 
that sport has gained within political circles in recent years was seen to be because of 
perceptions about what sport can do - in terms of regeneration, social inclusion and 
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health gains. So if sport has a value in the minds of politicians and policy makers it is 
instrumental rather than intrinsic. As one respondent observed in relation to Ken 
Livingstone: "... he is not the slightly bit interested in sport - it is what it can do" and 
his strong advocacy for WNS and the 2012 London Olympic bid is rooted in his belief 
in their potential social and regenerative impacts. Many respondents argued that 
although there had been a great deal of political rhetoric about the value of sport in 
terms of issues such as promoting social inclusion and reducing youth crime, there had 
been little by the way of action. 
Respondents also suggested that many in the political and policy arena remain sceptical 
about what sport can do. For example, the Policy Innovation Unit (PIU now the 
Strategy Unit) suggested in its review of sport policy (DCMS/SU, 2002) that there was 
no evidence to support the claim that ma or sports events led to increased participation, 
as one respondent explained: 
I mean you could look at it the other way round -'We think it happens but we 
aren't sure - their attitude as economists was 'we just don't believe it happens'. 
I think anybody who is involved in sport knows that when you get - the sort of 
Steve Redgrave fifth gold medal he got in Sydney, what actually happened the 
following day was that people were queuing up to join rowing clubs. An 
increase in participation in sport that can happen in the short term ... butyou 
have to work at it, it doesn't happen automatically, you have to work at it to 
sustain it and that has been what has been missing. And probably what should 
have been in the report is that you can establish a linkage but you have to work 
at that linkage. 
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Central government was criticised by respondents for repeatedly making judgements 
about the 'value' of sport based on narrow economic criteria and doing little to facilitate 
the delivery of sustained sporting and social benefits. One of the key criticisms of the 
Carter Report was that Patrick Carter, appointed by the government to conduct reviews 
of LVNAC and other projects (WNS and MCG) had a limited view of the 'value' of 
sport. As one respondent commented: 
his (Carter's) modus operandi is to employ hard nosed accountants because its 
KPMG (accountancy firm) that do it basically under his direction, who are very good at 
knowing the cost of everything but haven't got the concept of the value of anything. 
Carter also attracted criticism from the Select Committee for his limited knowledge of 
sport policy particularly in relation to hosting mega and major events 25 and for 
excluding key actors including UK Sport the agency that leads on such events from the 
review26 (House of Commons, 2001b, p. xiv). 
In a similar vein, within policy and political circles, there appears to be very strongly 
held opinions, but little constructive debate about the merits (or otherwise) of 
supporting grassroots spok or elite level sports or whether you need to promote and 
support both. Within this study respondents argued that "you can and should have both" 
and that it is a false argument to separate the two. However, respondents recognised that 
there is a vocal camp that believes that hosting international events is a waste of money 
and the money should be spent on grassroots sport. Several respondents pointed out that 
25 He also attracted criticism from respondents for his apparent lack of knowledge of goverriment 
transport policy when he complained that there was insufficient provision for car parking at the proposed 
LVNAC. 
26 Not only were UK Sport not consulted but they were not sent a copy of the report and were left to print 
a summary off the web (House of Commons, 200 1 b, p. xiv). 
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such views had been expressed by senior members of government, including Tessa 
Jowell (Secretary of State since June 2001): "... she said in Select Committee that there 
is no reason to have these things and that it is not even good from the point of view of 
the sports people because they don't care, that is what she said. " 
In relation to the LVNAC project one respondent argued: 
The trouble with that camp was that they could not appreciate that the notions of 
pride, focal point, not just physical focal point but the actual event itself would 
carry young people into recognising what high quality sport actually was about 
and although it was athletics I don't think it matters that much it would still have 
a washout effect. 
Equally there are others within the sporting world that feel that resources should be put 
into developing elite athletes by providing dedicated facilities and financial support 
rather than focusing on community facilities. Respondents argued that the LVNAC 
project was about providing both: 
That was the argument all the way along you can't separate the two, you can't 
have grass roots athletics without stadia facilities for people to use and why do 
our elite athletes have to use such crummy facilities, the New River (local 
athletics facility) is a case in point, why do they have to use these facilities and 
you can not separate the two ... unless you 
fund both angles you are going to lose 
out and you obviously can't have one without the other but there is a much 
stronger link but the government keeps separating them. 
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The elite-grassroots debate has been a reoccurring theme in the considerations of the 
Select Committee on staging major events (House of Commons, 1999; House of 
Commons, 2001 a; House of Commons, 2001 b). Although the debate was not at the 
forefront of the LVNAC project it was thought to be an important undercurrent with the 
grassroots camp working behind the scenes and lobbying government against the 
LVNAC. 
Sport institutions 
A broad spectrum of sports organisations were involved in the LVNAC project. They 
varied in size, remit and the spatial level at which they operated (see Figure 5.1). The 
IAAF, as the international governing body for athletics awarded the WAC to London 
for 2005, set the terms and conditions that had to be met and was the ultimate arbiter 
about the location of the 2005 WAC. Acting against the advice of both UK Sport and 
UK Athletics central government 'offered' the IAAF Sheffield as an alternative location 
for the 2005 WAC. Many respondents felt that in making this decision central 
government displayed a profound lack of understanding of the workings of international 
sport bodies. As one respondent commented: "They are very powerful bodies and they 
see themselves as political organisations and most of their top members are politicians 
or at least connected to politics". Several respondents pointed out that the IAAF has 
more, member nations than the United Nations and is very powerfW within the Olympic 
movement and as such is not an organisation to "let down". Indeed the decision by the 
IAAF to re-open bidding rather than accept the British governi-nent's offer of a non- 
London venue was a clear demonstration of their power. 
Amongst respondents there was a general feeling that the government had 
underestimated the damage to Britain's reputation and the political importance of sport. 
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Those from within the sporting world in particular, felt that the incident would linger 
long in the memory of the international sporting world: it should be remembered that 
there are strong connections between organisations and a great deal of overlap of 
membership of bodies such as the IOC, FIFA and IAAF. - This obviously begs the 
question as to why the government would risk its international reputation. It may be that 
the domestic 'fall out' in post-Dome Britain of supporting another major project was 
thought to be potentially more damaging or that the government, because it neither 
valu es nor understands sport or misread the situation. 
The fragmented and complex nature of the governance of British sport has been the 
subject of critical debate by the Select Committee (e. g. House of Commons, 1999; 
House of Commons, 2001 a; House of Commons 2001b). They have repeatedly stated 
that it requires streamlining, particularly in relation to bidding for and hosting major and 
mega sports events (House of Commons, 1999; House of Commons, 2001 a; House of 
Commons 2001b). Following their inquiry into the LVNAC project the Select 
Committee stated that "the question remains as to who should be responsible for 
delivering these projects (House of Commons, 2001b, p. xxvIi). The problem as they 
saw it was that nobody in the present "muddle of local agencies, sports and governing' 
bodies and funding Councils" has the power and authority to drive major projects 
forward (House of Commons, 2001b, p. xxvii). 
At national level the DCMS, UK Sport and Sport England all played important roles, 
although they were working to what at best could be described as overlapping agenda 
and at other times different agendas. UK Sport had strategic responsibility for bringing 
major and mega-sports events to the UK and along with the UKA had been instrumental 
in Securing the 2005 WAC. Although UK Sport through the lottery can support the costs 
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Figure 5.1: The Lee Valley National Athletics Centre: the sports organisations 





DCMS Department of Culture, Media and Sport 
EHAC Enfield and Haringey Athletics Club 
IAAF International Association of Athletics Federations 
LBE (S/L) London Borough of Enfield (sport and leisure) 
LIS London International Sport 
London 2005 Organising Committee for the London 2005 World Athletics Championships 
LVRPA Lee Valley Regional Park Authority 
NELSN North and East London Sports Network 
Sport Eng. Sport England 
UKA UK Athletics 
UK Sport UK Sport 
Source: Compil ed by author 
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of delivering events, the responsibility for funding the development of facilities lies 
. with 
Sport England, again via lottery funds. Sport England was not convinced of the 
merits of a stand alone athletics stadium and remained strongly committed to the tri- 
sport WNS project, but given its status as an NDPB working at 'arms length' from the 
government, it found itself in the position of key actor in the project. Th e DCMS did not 
give a clear lead, and was perceived by others to be ambiguous about the project. UK 
Athletics as national governing body for athletics took a lead but its small size, recent 
history of bankruptcy and reliance on public funding placed it in a position of 
dependency. Although UKA brought with it the WAC - which in itself was a big 
4prize'- it was not able to make a capital contribution or underwrite the project. 
At city level, London International Sport (LIS) was a pan-London organisation, formed 
in the absence of a strategic authority for London, with the aim of attracting 
international sporting events to London and ensuring such events were used to benefit 
the development of spoq. Although small, it was a well connected organisation with 
links with sporting bodies, public and private sector, and had been working with the 
BOA on a potential London Olympic bid since 1997. LIS supported the LVNAC project 
and acted as broker, working behind the scenes, LIS drew together people, organisations 
and knowledge and came up with 'solutions' to the three main issues raised by Carter. 
However, LIS lacked authority and there was no discussion of these proposals by Carter 
in his final report. The LVNAC project evolved during the early days of the GLA but 
under the new arrangements there was no designated body leading on sporting matters 
nor was it clear quite how sport fitted into the remit of the new bodies. 
At sub-regional level LVRPA was the key player as they owned the land on which the 
LVNAC was to be built and although experienced in developing sub-regional facilities, 
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they had never been involved in a project of this size or complexity. The LVRPA is 
unusual in London in being a sub-regional body with a sport and leisure remit and this 
coupled with LBE's willingness - in contrast to many other local authorities - to support 
sporting facilities that have more than a local role were important factors in the decision 
to site the proposed National Athletics Centre at the Picketts Lock site (there was 
another potential Lee Valley site in Hackney). Indeed several respondents highlighted 
the problems encountered in establishing sub-regional facilities in London. As one 
explained: "I think there is a huge problem that we recognise in the area that any facility 
has to be based in a local authority yet that local authority does not have a sub-regional 
remit they are worried about their local voters and council tax payers". Local authorities 
in London appear to find it difficult to tic into sub-regional facilities and there seems to 
have been a gap, with no obvious organisation either able or willing to take on the role 
of funding and supporting sub-regional facilities. This situation is perhaps not surprising 
given the governance arrangements for London which lacked strong sub-regional 
structures and several respondents expressed a hope that the GLA would address this 
issue. 
The NELSN operates at the sub-regional level and is concerned with large-scale events, 
new facilities in the sub-region and their role in regeneration so that the LVNAC project 
was a central concern. However, there was a feeling amongst respondents that the 
NELSN contacts e. g. with athletes who could have backed the project, were not fully 
utilised by the LVNAC project team. At local level, the Enfield and Haringey Athletes 
Club (EHAC) whilst very successful on the track and field, like other athletes clubs 
operates on a 'shoe string' budget, highly dependent on volunteers to run it and in 
constant negotiations with local authorities over facilities (Enfield and Haringey). Club 
subscriptions and fees are kept low in order to promote accessibility and the club is 
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financially reliant on the tea bar and bar takings. For the EHAC the LVNAC project 
offered excellent training facilities. However there were some concerns about 
accessibility by public transport and guarantees were being sought in regards club house 
facilities and pre and post event arrangements (i. e. access to facilities). Like other local 
authorities, Enfield is a key provider of community based sport facilities but as was 
noted above its primary interest in the LVNAC project was regeneration not sporting. 
Although officers from the leisure department were -instrumental in preparing and 
promoting the 'case' for Picketts Lock, once the site had been chosen they took on a 
more back seat role and it was the regeneration, planning and transportation teams that 
came to the fore. 
Sport institutions and scalar relations 
In summary, the LVNAC project involved a multitude of organisations with a sporting 
remit operating at and across different levels of governance. At international level the 
role of the IAAF was clear, but at other levels of governance there was less clarity about 
the roles and responsibilities of the various bodies. This probably reflects the 
complexity of the governance arrangements for sport in the UK, the nature of 
governance more generally and more specifically London's governance arrangements. 
Figure 5.2 presents a summary of the 'value' and 'place' of sport at different spatial 
levels with a particular focus on London and the LVNAC project. At national level the 
ambiguous posit ion of sport on the political agenda and uncertainty over it 'value' has 
contributed to a lack of strategic thinking about mega-sporting events that was evident 
in the LVNAC project. The LVNAC project was not part of an integrated government 
strategy rather it was the 'by-product' of difficulties encountered with another major 
sports project. 
196 
Figure 5.2: A summary of the 'value' and 'place' of sport at different spatial levels 
in the UK with particular reference to London 
National 
On the political agenda? 
" Sport has tended to be on the periphery of policy and politics. Long periods of neglect punctuated 
by periods of activity and interest. Little appreciation of the intrinsic value of sport but increased 
interest in the instrumental value of sport, that what it can do e. g. tackle social exclusion, urban 
regeneration, health gains. 
" DCMS relatively new and weak within government, but sports minister recently upgraded. 
" Lack of central government strategy e. g. for bidding for and hosting mega-sporting events 
" Fractured and complex governance system - two NDPS (UK Sport and Sport England), plethora of 
NGBS. 
Regional/City 
Sport as part ofthe competitiveness of city-regions 
Some second tier cities e. g. Manchester, Sheffield have used sport strategically: 
0 Placed great emphasis on the instrumental value of sport, in particular used sport as a tool for place 
marketing, and urban regeneration. 
0 Pursued a mega-event strategy, i. e. they have bid for large-scale, high profile sporting events, with 
the intention of using them as a centre piece for urban development. For example, the primary 
rationale behind Manchester's pursuit of the Olympics (unsuccessful) and Commonwealth Games 
(successful) was regeneration. 
Large metropolitan authorities e. g. Manchester, Birmingham can underwrite events and provide funding. 
The arrival ofthe MayorlGLA: a new dawnfor London? 
" Poor record on bidding/hosting mega events 
" Lack of world class sports facilities 
" But with no overall city government 1986-2000, there was no 'host city' to underwrite events, co- 
ordinate or provide a strategic lead on sport in general or on mega and major events. 
Overall city government reinstated in 2000: 
" Mayor/GLA pursuing a mega-event strategy, LOB 2012 focuses on the regeneration of East 
London. 
" New Aquatics centre built as part of the bidding process 
" LDA is trying to build a London 'brand' 
" Sport on the agenda, features in Mayoral strategies e. g. EDS, reports and proposals. 
Sub-regional 
'No man's land' 
In London difficult to get sub-regional facilities (e. g. 50m pools, High Performance Centres) 
established. Although capital costs often met by Sport England with lottery money, LAs reluctant to take 
on running costs of SR facility and neighbouring LAs do not want to support a facility that is not within 
their boundary. LAs tend to regard SR facilities as a drain rather than an asset. 
LVRPA- a sub-regional body and the athletics High Performance Centre fits is remit perfectly. 
Lack of a body to co-ordinate and oversee sub-regi2nal facilities, so it is left to individual LAs 
Local 
Everydayface of sport 
" Local authorities: 
" Key provides of community facilities e. g. leisure pools, indoor sports halls 
" Coaching especially for children and young people 
" Work in partnership with voluntary organisations (i. e. clubs) and private sector to provide facilities, 
development opportunities. 
Most sports activity continues to be delivered by voluntary organisations with clubs relying on 
volunteers (e. g. coaching, administration, fund raising). 
The place of sport varies from one LA to another, e. g. sport may or may not have a designated 
department. Sport is not high on the agenda and vulnerable to budgetary cuts in the face of financial 
pressures. LAs are reluctant to take on sub-regional facilities as they are wary of the on-goina costs. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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Respondents highlighted how the lack of a unitary authority for London, left the city in 
a weak position in relation to both bidding for and delivering major sports projects (see 
Figure 5.2). There had been a long term under investment in world class sports facilities 
and an absence of strategy and co-ordination on sporting matters. The LVNAC project 
straddled the pre-GLA and GLA eras, but was rooted in the pre-GLA arrangements and 
although there were great hopes about what the GLA and Mayor could do they were to 
remain unfulfilled in relation to the LVNAC project. However, since then sport has 
become central to the Mayor's plans for London with the 2012 Olympics. At city level 
sport has been identified as a tool for regeneration and a means of promoting London as 
a 'brand', whilst at a community level it has been identified as a way of improving 
social cohesion and promoting social inclusion (LDA, 2001b; Sport England, 2004a; 
GLA, 2003b; GLA 2003c). 
At sub-regional level the LVNAC project brought into strong relief the difficulties 
experienced in London in establishing and sustaining sub-regional sports facilities such 
as the High Performance athletics centre planned for Lee Valley. With no overall body 
in London to co-ordinate and oversee sub-regional facilities it has been left to individual 
local authorities who have proved to b6 reluctant to provide a 'home' for facilities that, 
they generally regard as a drain rather than an asset. The support of the local authority 
(Enfield) was an important factor in favour of the Picketts Lock site, along with the fact 
that the site was owned by one of the few sub-regional bodies with a sport remit 
(LVRPA). New sub-regional facilities- a velodrome, an aquatics centre and hockey 
centre- are being built as part of the Olympic bid 27 , as well the Lee Valley 
National 
Athletics Centre 28 . 
27 These facilities would have been built whether or not London had been awarded the 2012 Games 
28 See Appendix Five for details of the development. 
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On a local level the majority of sporting opportunities are provided either by the local 
authority or through clubs run by volunteers. Although facilities may be council owned 
(e. g. running track, swimming pool, sports hall), the sports clubs are primarily ran by 
volunteers from the local community. For example, the Enfield and Haringey Athletics 
Club is dependent on volunteers to run the club and provide coaching. Another 
important provider is the private sector, in some cases the private sector provides both 
the facilities and coaching (e. g. private gym and fitness centres) and in other cases they 
utilise council facilities (e. g. private swimming lessons in a council pool). A key 
concern in relation to the LVNAC project was how the facilities were going to be 
accessed by the local community. 
In summary it possible to identify three explanations about why the LVNAC project 
failed that are rooted in the governance of sport: 
" The British political system tends to under value sport and it is not integral to 
policy. 
" The governance of sport in the UK is weak and flawed. 
" There was no strong consistent champion from sport. 
SUMMARY 
Figure 5.3 draws together the reasons given for the failure of the LVNAC project and 
maps out how these factors inter-reacted. The LVNAC project was played out against 
the background of a culture within UK politics that has traditionally under valued sport. 
This context is important as it informed so many of the decisions taken in relation to the 
LVNAC project. Central government has had an ambivalent relationship with sport and 
its place on the policy agenda has been insecure. The governance of sport is complex 
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and fractured with numerous bodies with overlapping responsibilities and R=y lines of 
accountability. Given this culture it is perhaps not surprising that central government 
has not adopted a strategic approach to mega-sporting projects but rather approached 
them in ad hoc manner. It has not always been clear why the UK has bid for events, 
what they hoped to achieve in hosting particular events, how they fitted into either the 
broader sport landscape or regeneration agenda and problems have been encountered in 
delivering projects (e. g. WNS, MCG 2002). All these issues were evident in the 
LVNAC project. Furthermore, the LVNAC unfolded during a period of transition for 
London, not only was there not a well-established pan-London authority but it soon 
became evident that the LVNAC project did not fit into the Mayoral plans for London. 
Central governments negative experiences with other 'big projects' meant they were 
risk averse to such projects. In the case of the LVNAC its roots in the problematic WNS 
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This chapter has reported the key research findings, drawing upon both the interview 
data and documentary sources. In reflecting upon the failure of the LVNAC project, 
respondents spoke not only what about they thought went 'wrong' but also what they 
believed was required to deliver success. From their accounts and also from documents 
(e. g. Select Committee reports, minutes of meetings), it has been possible to identify 
twelve explanations as to why the LVNAC project failed. This chapter represents the 
first step in analysis and for the purposes of clarity the explanations were separated. 
However, the explanations fall into three categories and for the next stage of analysis 
the explanations will be grouped as follows: 
Central govemment and govemance 
1. Central government did not display total commitment to the LVNAC project. 
2. The LVNAC project did not have a strong consistent champion from politics. 
3. The LVNAC project was not embedded into broader strategic plans at national 
level. 
4. Central government was 'risk averse' following the recent and on-going difficulties 
with large-scale sporting and cultural projects (i. e. Dome WNS). 
5. The LVNAC project arose from problems with the WNS Project and there was little 
time for the plans, partnerships and relationships to evolve and mature. 
London and citv govemance 
6. The governance of London was in transition and the new arrangements were in the 
process of 'bedding down'. 
2Q2 
7. The Mayor of London did not have the power, authority or resources to forward the 
LVNAC project, or to underwrite the WAC. 
8. The Mayor of London was equivocal about the LVNAC project which had been 
designed before him came into office. 
9. The LVNAC project was not embedded into broader strategic plans at city level. 
Sports govemance 
10. The British political system tends to undervalue sport and sport is not integral to 
policy. 
11. The governance of sport in the UK is weak and flawed. 
12. There was no strong consistent champion from sport. 
Together these explanations meant that there was: 
1. Lack of leaderships at national, city and local level. 
2. Lack of a clear, coherent vision. 
More generally, the LVNAC project was operating within a political culture of 
'undervaluing' sport and a lack of clarity about what sport is for (e. g. promotion of 
nations, health and fitness). 
The rest of this thesis will examine these elements within a wider context. By placing 
these findings from the case study within wider literature on mega sports events (and 
also the recent London Olympic bid) it will be possible to explore and develop these 
explanations in a comparative context to gain insights into the relationship between the 
success or failure of mega sporting projects and governance issues. The next chapter 
(Six) will focus on national and cultural issues in relation to sports governance in 
general and mega-sporting events in particular. Whilst Chapter Seven will examine city 
203 
level issues including the specifics of London and the London Olympic bid. Some of the 
explanations cut across different spatial levels, areas of policy and politics e. g. 
leadership and such cross cutting issues will be examined in both chapters. 
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Chapter Six 
The nation state and sport 
INTRODUCTION 
The findings of the case study demonstrated the critical role of central goverm-nent in 
the LVNAC project. More specifically it was the failure of central government in key 
respects - the ambivalence of their leadership, commitment and strategy - that was 
fundamental to the failure of the LVNAC project. In addition, the LVNAC project 
occurred at a specific historical moment when central government was highly sensitive 
and 'nsk' averse to involvement in mega projects per se. The case study also 
established that alongside the role of central government two other factors were 
important. Firstly, the complex governance of sport made it difficult to provide the 
necessary leadership, strategy and unified vision. Secondly, the project took place 
within an enviromnent and national political context where sport is 'undervalued'. 
This chapter seeks to explore these factors in more detail. Firstly, comparisons will be 
made with other nations. Secondly, consideration will be given to the importance of 
these factors more generally to the staging of successful mega sports events. 
Specifically this chapter will examine: 
e How the role and approach of central govenu-nent to mega sports events varies 
and how this translates in relation to key factors; commitment, strategy, 
leadership, vision and resources. 
9 How the particularities of sports governance relate to national and international 
contextý 
e The value of sport within national -and political cultures. 
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THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL STATE 
The national state's motivation for involvement in the hosting of mega sports events 
reflects a variety of factors related to prestige, sense of nation and promotion of the 
nation on a global stage. The manner of state involvement necessarily reflects the 
particularities of the operation of national state systems as well as attitudes towards 
sport and large-scale projects more generally. 
An overview of selected maior and meRa-sports events 
As a starting point in this examination of nation states and mega sports events Figure 
6.1. presents an overview of the organisation, funding, main legacies and the 'verdict' 
(i. e. general perception) of ten mega and major sports events held in various nations 
between 1976-2004. The examples were chosen because they illustrate the diversity of 
approaches taken by both nations and cities, highlights the risks as well as the benefits 
of hosting such events and also the varied roles played by all levels of government. 
Even at a glance the different roles played by national governments are evident. For 
example, the US federal (national) government had no input organisationally or 
financially into 19ý4 Los Angeles Olympics, whilst the French national government 
was a key player in the organisation and funding of the FIFA World Cup held in 1998. 
Interestingly both events were hailed as successes and illustrate the point that there is no 
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one route to success. In certain cases, sub-national government is important (e. g. state 
level for the Sydney Olympics). In some instances e. g. Barcelona, Manchester, city 
government played a central role in driving the whole process (bid to delivery), 
investing money and other resources (e. g. personnel), whilst in others e. g. Atlanta, LA, 
Sydney, city government had aI united role. The sources of funding and cost of mega 
events also varies, with some events being funded from the public purse (e. g. Montreal), 
occasionally from private sources (e. g. LA) and more commonly from both private and 
pub lic sources (e. g. Sydney Olympics, Rugby World Cup in Cardiff). The costs range 
enon-nously and reflect the different approaches taken, with in some cases (e. g. 
Barcelona, Manchester) heavy investment in infrastructure (e. g. public transport), whilst 
in others the focus was on sport venues (e. g. Atlanta). The high costs of Athens were to 
a large extent due to delays in construction which mean there was a costly 'push' (e. g. 
24 hour working) to get the venues completed on time (BBC 2004b; Laurence, 2004) 
and also the increased security costs post '9/11'. It is also evident from the table that 
4success' comes in a variety of forms and whether an event is perceived as 'successful' 
or not depends partly on the time frame. For example, immediate success may be 
tempered by legacy problems, "ith cities being left with underused or even empty 
facilities, for example, Sydney and Athens. Also highlighted are the 'risks' of hosting' 
large-scale sports events, with Montreal and Sheffield both being left with considerable 
debts and Atlanta being remembered primarily for its organisational problems (e. g. 
transport chaos) rather than events on the field. Having taken a brief overview of mega- 
sport events and nations states, the next section will explore ideas that emerged from the 
case study data about the different approaches taken by national govenunents to mega 
events. 
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A ! ypology of national gOvermnent approaches to mega-sports events 
In the case study there was agreement that national government backing was a pre- 
requisite of a successful major or mega sporting event, with examples being given to 
support this view (e. g. French goverment support of the 1998 FIFA World Cup). 
However, a diverse range of opinions was expressed as to what exactly the role of 
government should be and once again examples were given to back the various 
arguments. From the case study data and literature it is it is possible to identify three 
approaches (see Figure 6.2) along a continuum with at one end a 'hands on' approach 
and at the other end a 'hands off approach. It is important to note, firstly, that these are 
ideal types and are being used as a heuristic device - in reality the approach taken by 
national governments is far 'messier' and less clear cut. Secondly, these categories are 
not fixed and as discussed below there is evidence that national governments shift 
between these positions over time. 
Figure 6.2: National government and the delivery of mega and major sporting 
events: a typology of approaches 
'Hands on' 'In the wings' 'Hands oj 
Leadership Central government City government or; Private sector 
private sector or; 
NGO 
Primary scale National city Unclear 
Underwritten by Yes Yes No 
central government 
Contribution to Yes Yes No 
funding 
Strategy Yes Yes Maybe 
Cross-departmental I Yes Yes No 
support I 
Compiled by author 
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The 'hands on' approach is perhaps best exemplified by France and Australia', where 
national government has taken the view that mega sports events are of national 
importance and as such they should take the lead. As one respondent argued: 
In my view and if you look at international experience this is definitely the case, 
these projects can only work if the government takes the lead and actually 
becomes the lead partner in developing the project ... if you look at Sydney 
Olympic Games or the French World Cup in all those instances the government 
is taking a very leading role in ensuring that this is delivered on time. 
A strong lead by central government usually means that there is a focus on national 
gains, such as pride and prestige rather than the benefits to the host city or regionper se. 
Events are seen through a 'national' lens i. e. what will the economic benefit be to the 
nation, rather than the regeneration benefits to'a city or part of a city. 
The 'in the wings' approach was advocated by respondents who were wary of allowing 
central goverment to get too close, believing that there are good reasons for 
maintaining distance and suggested that rather than increasing the level of government 
intervention, central government should stand back. As one respondent argued: 
Total commitment and will from the government and then get the hell out of the 
way for delivery. You know get a champion, get appropriately skilled people, 
1 It should be noted that although the New South Wales state government was primarily responsible for 
the bid for the Sydney Olympics and the delivery of the games Jobling (2000) argues it would have 
remained a dream without the support of the federal government, who not only committed resources but 
also granted permission to NSW to borrow substantial funds to enable construction to begin early and 
boost the bid's chances of success. 
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never mind niceties and democratic accountabilities - sod them, get a team of 
people who can deliver it and then leave them alone and stop tampering - say I 
will underwrite, no problem with the money, this is what you said it will cost, 
bring it in. 
Some respondents believed that the decision to bid for major and mega events should be 
city based and the stagirig of the event led by the city with central government backing 
rather than led by central government. Others thought that as long as there was total 
commitment from the government (i. e. underwriting, funding) and robust project 
management structures had been put in place then a variety of different organisations 
could take up the mantle. For one respondent: 
I would say... get absolute government guarantees to support the bid ... and 
putting in the right project management to make sure it is delivered- that has to 
be the key for a major national, international event or facility... that can be done 
in different ways, either the government can take the lead, or if it doesn't want to 
directly take a lead then it, and perhaps the GLA doesn't want to take a lead then 
perhaps they put in the people and resources to make sure that who ever are the 
delivery agents can do it and that has to be the main lesson. 
The Barcelona Olympics are an example of the 'in the wings' approach. The Games 
were very much a product of city government - it was the Mayor of the city council 
who proposed the idea as a means of urban regeneration. Although the city leaders led 
the bid and subsequent delivery of the Olympics, it was with the support of both 
regional (Catalonia) and national governments. For example, although the infrastructure 
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changes are usually credited to the city council in fact the national government made a 
substantial financial contribution to the Games and associated developments 2 (Varley, 
1992). Short (2003) argues that the success of the Barcelona Games was in part because 
the three scales of nation, region and city all benefited in some way. Spain enhanced its 
reputation as an efficient democracy, Catalonia got a economic boost and strengthened 
its identity and Barcelona improvements to its infrastructure and image. In this case the 
'in the wings' approach probably reflects the regionalised nature of governance in 
Spain. 
The 'hands on' approach and the 'in the wings' approach are both underpinned by a 
coherent, co-ordinated strategy. There is a key difference in scale, as noted above the 
'hands on' approach tends to focus on national priorities. For the 'in the wings' 
approach the focus of activity is the city/region, rather than the nation. This is not to say 
that national considerations are not important, rather that they are secondary to those of 
the city and this reflects the city led nature of the approach. 
The third approach in the typology, - the 'hands off' approach - does not arise from the 
LVNAC data and although it represents an extrapolation from this data, examples of the 
'hands off approach can be found within the literature. The approach taken to the 
staging of the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles was very much 'hands off- it was 
private sector led and funded without the financial support of federal, state or city 
governments. The success of LA Games runs counter to the argument forwarded in the 
case study that the support of national government was essential. However, within this 
2 Marshall (1992) argues that one of the main aims of Barcelona's Mayor was to use the Olympics as a 
tool to lever money from national govemment to augment the modest sums usually available to Spanish 
city councils. 
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approach the private sector needs to be confident that they will be able 'to get on with 
the job' without interference from national, regional and city governments. Government 
at all levels have to provide the frameworks (i. e. through policies, legislation) for the 
private sector to operate in. This approach probably reflects the governance 
arrangements of American cities and the leading role played by business in shaping 
cities and also the fact that there is no federal support for sport (Houlihan, 1997; Carter, 
2005a). The roots of the bid lay in a desire to promote and enhance the image of the city 
of LA, but the organisers did not seek'to change the infrastructure of the city or leave it 
with numerous new sportSý facilities. In the case of the LA Games sport was harnessed 
for its commercial potential and with great success as the games generated a handsome 
profit. However, it should be noted that it is rare for mega-sporting events not to involve 
the input of national government and within the case study the total commitment of 
central government was viewed as essential to the delivery of a successful mega event. 
The LVNAC project provides a clear example of UK government's approach to staging 
major and mega sporting events in recent years. It is an approach characterised by 
ambiguity, muddle, uncertain interventions and lack of a co-ordinated strategy as central 
government shifts between the different positions outlined above. Within the LVNAC 
project central goverment did not take a clear lead on the project - they were not 
'hands on' - but neither did they designate, empower or create a body to lead the 
delivery of the LVNAC nor did they underwrite the project or WAC- they were not 'in 
the wings'. Central government did not leave it to the private sector to work 
unimpeded- they were not 'hands off. * Moreover, central government shifted between 
these positions during the LVNAC project, as it has with other large scale projects (e. g. 
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WNS, MCG). The result was ambiguity and lack of clarity about the role and 
responsibilities of the various players including central government, governmental 
departments, regional and -sub-regional government and sport bodies. 
Although there are advocates of a 'hands on' approach within the British political 
system 3, there exists a traditional 'lukewarm' attitude towards 'grand projects' that has 
been exacerbated in recent years by problems with 'grand projects' such as the Dome. 
As already noted within the case study there were no calls for central government to 
take a 'hands off approach, indeed the emphasis was on central government as a key 
player in the process. In shifting from one position to another central government 
seemed to be attempting to find a new position between a strong central state and a 
liberalised free market, a 'middle way' where central government acts as an enabler and 
stands 'in the wings'. This reflects wider debates both within New Labour and 
internationally about the changing role of the state and its relationship with private and 
'third' sectors. However, as has been very evident with the problems encountered with 
'grand projects' finding this balance is not a straightforward process, rather it is one that 
involves constant renegotiation and rethinking. The review of mega and major events as 
part of a broader review of sports policy (DCMS/SU, 2002), following the abandonment 
of the LVNAC project was part of this process and the Olympic bid provided an 
opportunity to put into place what had been leamt from both the review and experience. 
What is interesting is that the subsequent London Olympic bid shows signs of finding 
this balance and displays characteristics of the 'in the wings' approach. However, given 
that there were points along the trajectory bid where central government support did not 
3 For example, since 1999 the House of Commons Select Committee on Sport, Media and Culture has 
repeatedly called for a Minister for Events (House of Commons, 1999; House of Commons, 2000; House 
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seem to be forthcorning4, it was really only in the latter stages of the competition that 
this 'label' could be assigned5. Unlike in earlier bids, the decision by central 
government to support a bid for the 2012 Olympic was informed and considered 6 
Central government provided high level cross-departmental support and approved a 
public funding package 7 jointly, "ith the Mayor8. The Mayor acted as a constant 
champion for the 2012 bid, with the Olympics being central to hi .s vision for London 
and the vehicle for the regeneration of East London9. As the bid progressed, particularly 
following the replacement of the initial Chair (Barbara Cassani) with Seb Coe and the 
changes he made to strengthen the teamlo, the bid team appeared to gain the confidence 
of central government and conversely the bid team seemed to grow in confidence: there 
was a synergistic relationship. What remains to be seen is whether this relationship can 
be sustained and the actual Games delivered alongside the infrastructural improvements 
in 2012. (There will be further discussion of the Olympic bid in the next chapter (7)). 
of Commons, 2001a; House of Commons 2001b), to assume "direct responsibility for a Government 
strategy on major events of international status" (House of Commons, 1999, p. xxxii). 
4 For example, there was much deliberation about whether the government would back the bid or not. 
This was variously interpreted by respondents and the media alike as necessary caution or not giving the 
'right' impression. 
5 MacKay (2005) argues that "In less than two years the Prime Minister has gone from being a sceptic to 
a supporter, prepared to travel 6000 miles on the eve of a G8 summit he is hosting to lobby IOC 
members" (p. 3) and that this was largely due to the efforts of Seb Coe. 6 For example a feasibility study was commissioned (Arup, 2002), the proposals were scrutinised by the 
Select Committee (House of Commons, 2003), a ftinding package agreed with the Mayor and a cabinet 
level conunittee considered the bid and made the decision to proceed. 
7 The funding package is worth up to E2.375 billion, including E1.5 billon from a special Olympic lottery 
(Kelso, 2005, p. 30). 
8 The Mayor found a way round his limited resources via an Olympic precept that will cost the average 
household living a council tax band D property) E20 a year starting from the financial year 2006-2007 
(GLA, 2003). 
9 The Olympics will act as the engine for a E7 billion regeneration of London's infrastructure and E800 
million redevelopment of the Lower Lea Valley (McRae, 2005). 
10 For example, he strengthened the role of the Chief Executive (Keith Mills) and brought in MI 
Associates headed by Jim 8loman who was Chief Operating Officer for Sydney 2000 to work on the 
technical side of the bid (BBC 2004c). 
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This shift in approach is not unique to the LIK. In the case of France, the approach to 
staging major sporting and cultural events has traditionally been interventionist and 
reflective of a 'strong' state and a long term commitment to 'grand projects'. However, 
there is evidence that this is changing, Newman and Tual (2002) argued that radical 
changes in the governance of urban renewal means that the construction of the Stade de 
France (SdF) and the hosting of the 1998 World Cup were probably some of the last 
expressions of French centralism. Although the decisions on location, design and 
management of the SdF were made by the President and Prime Minister, the impacts of 
the SdF on the development of the area have been managed through complex 
arrangements of inter-communal and inter-governmental co-operation. Moreover, 
Newman and Tual concluded that: "This inter-communal and multi-level process has 
come to represent the French style more than the wave of the Presidential hand" (2002, 
p. 832). In both examples national government are adapting to broader changes in 
governance and the evolving role of the nation state. 
Summary 
What is evident from the case study data and supported by the literature is that there are 
a variety of approaches to staging major events and they reflect the prevailing 
governance arrangements. For example, the leading role taken by the French 
government in developing sporting facilities and hosting major events has reflected the 
centralised nature of the French state. These different approaches all have their 
advantages and disadvantages: there is no 'right way'. For example, a highly centralised 
system may get the project delivered swiftly but a lack of engagement can often lead to 
legacy problems and alienate certain groups" The difficulties encountered by the UK 
" This was the case in Sydney and will be discussed in the next chapter (Seven). 
216 
with mega-sports projects have arisen from a tendency to shift between the three 
positions and thus there has been lack of clarity of approach. What is also clear is that 
the relationship between governance and mega-events is dynamic and interactive, 
developing as a result of bidding for and hosting events (e. g. Manchester) and also as 
governance arrangements change (e. g. in France). The LVNAC project seems to have 
been a step in the process of learning how the nation and London more specifically 
should approach mega-events and the London Olympic bid allowed the nation and 
London to put this new knowledge into practice. 
THE GOVERNANCE OF SPORT 
The case of the LVNAC demonstrated the complex and fragmented nature of sports 
governance in the LJK and how this limited its ability to act effectively. This is linked 
into a political culture that undervalues or is ambivalent towards the value of sport. The 
aim of this section is to explore how particular this situation is to the UK. From Chapter 
Two we know that nations organise the govemance of sport very differently, that the 
arrangements for the governance of sport often reflect more general governance 
arrangements and the value placed upon sport varies from nation to nation. For 
example, in France there is a system with clear divisions of responsibility radiating from 
a central government department and this reflects a governance system where the State 
has traditionally played a. central role. In fact 'sports governance' is unique worldwide 
because of the very powerful position of international bodies which-will be explored 
before turning attention to the governance of sport within the UK. 
217 
Intemational govemance of sport 
So far the discussion has focused on the governance of sport within the borders of 
nation states. However as was noted in Chapter Two the governance of sport goes well 
beyond the boundaries of nation states. It is the world governing bodies, such as IOC, 
FIFA, and IAAF that award the mega events to nations and cities and this in itself 
means that they wield a great deal of power. Research 12 has shown that the world 
governing bodies are some of the most powerful and undemocratic institutions in the 
world (e. g. Jennings 1996; Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998; Palmer, 2000; Short 2003). 
Sugden and Tomlinson (1998) argue that "organisations like the 10C, lAAF and 
Fidiration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) are part of the apex of a 
multibillion dollar global sports economy. As such, these bodies have much to show off, 
but even more to hide" (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). They are International Non- 
Governmental Organisations (INGOs) with global remits but they are not accountable to 
any particular national government or governments. Sugden and Tomlinson (1998) have 
argued they are important because they outflank nation states and threaten borders and 
often regard themselves as above the jurisdiction of nation states. They certainly are not 
beholden to nation states, for example, the IAAF displayed no hesitation in informing 
the British government that they could not switch the 2005 WAC from London to 
Sheffield and the bidding process would be re-opened. Similarly, FIFA has attempted to 
override decisions made the European Court 13 and British courts 14 (Sugden and 
Tomlinson, 1998). Sugden and Tomlinson (1998) suggest that FIFA is also an Off- 
12 These organisations are challenging to research, see Sugden and Tomlinson (1998; 1999) and Palmer 
for discussion on the methods they employed to get beyond official accounts. 
13 For example, the 'Bosman' ruling on the transfýr of players (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1999). 
14 For example, about Welsh teams playing in England (Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). 
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Shore Financial Centre (OFC) that is a centre that hosts financial activities that are 
separated from major regulating units (i. e. states) by geography and/or by legislation. 
International sporting bodies are not representative bodies. They are the preserve of 
rich, well connected men1*5 in which personal and business connections intertwine with 
business (e. g. Jennings, 1996; Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998). As Short (2003) points 
out, a quick glance at the biographies of the IOC members reveals a membership 
dominated by rich business people: corporate lawyers, presidents of business groups and 
company directors figure prominently. World governing bodies are often headed up by 
very powerful individuals whose influence extends well beyond the specific 
organisation and sport 16. sUg den and Tomlinson's (1998) research on the structures, 
values and ideologies of FIFA and Palmer's (2000) work on the La Societe du Tour de 
France (they oversee the Tour de France bike race) revealed how their strength came 
through their networks and alliances. From their research it is evident that many of the 
connections, networks and alliances aTe only made visible at launch parties and other 
similar events to which access is carefully controlled (Sudgen and Tomlinson, 1998; 
Palmer, 2000). 
Events in relation to the London Olympic bid support these earlier findings. In replacing 
Barbara Cassani, an American business woman, new to the world of international sport, 
with Lord Sebastian Coe, as Chair of the London 2012 Olympic bid, the Organising 
Committee highlighted the immense value of Coe's personal and professional 
15 For example, in 2002 seven of the 123 members of the IOC were women (Short, 2003, p. 5). 
16 For instance, Dr Joao Havelange, President of FIFA for over twenty years, was to be found on a 
number of influential boards and committees and was a member of the IOC (Sugden and Tomlinson, 
1998). 
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connections. Coe is as a former Olympic champion 17 , personal friend of IOC members, 
and member of the IAAF committee, and as such is well known within international 
sporting circles (Goodbody, 2004a; Mackay, 2004) and it also means that Coe knows 
the 'rules of the game'. 18 In addition, Coe as a former Member of Parliament has 
connections within the British political establishment and again knows the 'rules of the 
game'. Cassani was chosen for her business acumen, but she did not possess these vital 
sporting and political networks and having an American heading up a British bid may 
have struck some IOC members as odd. These factors probably combined to make her, 
with hindsight, an unlikely and unwise choice to lead the London bid. 
Over the years large scale corruption within the IOC has been uncovered'9 and 
following the corruption scandal surrounding the 2002 Winter Olympics held in Salt 
Le City 20 the rules have been tightened. For example, IOC members are no longer 
pennitted to visit the bid cities or receive gifts of any kind (Mackay, 2003). Short 
(2003) argues these reforms were minor and that the IOC, along with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and World Bank remains "an 
important, undemocratic, unaccountable globalising organisation" (p. 5). The 
shortcomings of these institutions seemed to be 'glossed over' by national and city 
governments in the pursuit of mega events. National and city governments go to great 
lengths to secure events, making ambitious promises and major development decisions 
on the basis that they are bidding for an event - London 2012 is a clear example of this. 
17 Seb Coe won four Olympic medals in total, two gold medals for the 1500m (1980 and 1984) and two 
sliver medals for the 800m (1980 and 1984). 
18 One 'rule' that is often reported in the British press is that at IOC meetings and gatherin 0s the bid team 
should stay in the bar until the last IOC member has left. This was one of the 'rules' that Cassani found 
difficult to follow (Kelso, 2003). 
19 See Simson and Jennings (1992) and Jennings (1996) for accounts of corruption within the Olympic 
movement. 
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The wisdom of this approach has been called into questiorý' the argument being that 
national and city governments should be making such decisions independently on based 
national and city needs, not leaving them to a group of external actors with their own 
agenda. 
SPORTS GOVERNANCE IN ENGLAND 
Having considered sports governance in comparative context in Chapter Two it is clear 
that arrangements are highly diverse and reflect the particularities of state systems, the 
role of voluntary bodies and wider attitudes towards sport. What is also evident from 
this comparison and from the case study is the UK system's: 
* lacks of a strong central government department; 
* lack of a stronger and well resourced voluntary organisation; 
a lack of strong sub-national state bodies to take a leadership role; 
a lack of strong autonomous local bodies (such as colleges). 
The following discussion focuses on the arrangements and policy in place at time of the 
LVNAC project (1999-200 1). However, since then there has been a lot of activity on the 
sport policy front, many changes have either taken place or are in train and the key 
reports and developments will be highlighted. 
20 T'he leaders of Salt Lake City, Utah, USA spent $I m (E560,00) in cash and favours on IOC delegates 
and their families in order to secure the right to host the 2002 Winter Games (Mackay, 2003). 
21 For example, in relation to the LOB Kate Hoey, Sports Minister 1999-2001, argued in an interview for 
the BBC that: "If we want to regenerate London, regenerate London, but don't wait for 123 IOC members 
to decide we are going to regenerate iV'(BBC/Hoey, 2004). 
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A multitude of organisations have responsibility for sport in the UK. Some 
organisations have a UK remit, others a national one, whilst others are concerned with 
one sector of sport (e. g. athletics) and in the key'ones at the turn of the twenty-first 
century are set out in Figure 6.3. They have evolved ad-hoc over time and. the result is a 
complex, fragmented and overlapping system (Roche, 1993; Henry 2001; Houlihan and 
White, 2002; Oakley and Green, 2001; DCMS/SU, '2002). 
Figure 6.3: Key organisations involved in sport in England 
I National 
DCMS 
Other Government departments e. g. DfES, 
ODPM 
" Sport England Regional Offices 
" Regional Cultural Consortia 
" Regional Sports Boards 
" Government Offices 
" Regional Federations of Sport and Recreation 
County Partnerships 
NGB regional and county level 
on Govern 
" UK Sport 
" TJK Sports Institute 
" Sport England 
" English Institute of Sport 
" National Governing Bodies (NGBs) 
40 National Sports Organisations (NSOs) inc. 





NGB local level 
" Local Sports Councils 
" Local Sports Clubs and Associations 
" Private Health and Fitness Clubs 
" Further and Higher Education Institutions 
0 Schools (private and state 
Source: adapted by author from DCMS/SU (2002), p. 38. 
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Within government structure sport falls under the remit of the Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS). The two main governing bodies, English Sport Council 
(commonly known as Sport England), and UK Sports Council (commonly known as 
UK Sport) are Non Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs), that is they have a role in the 
processes of national government but are not government departments or part of one 
and thus operate at arm's length from Ministers. UK Sport and Sport England began 
operating under a Royal Charter in 1997 and are accountable to Parliament through the 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. Their work is scrutinised by the House 
of Commons through the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee and the Public 
Accounts Committee. Members of the Councils are appointed by the Secretary of State. 
Prior to 1997 the development of sport rested with the GB Sports Council, which also 
had an UK wide remit on issues such as international affairs (Sport England, No date). 22 
This streamlining of the organisational structure in 1997 was the result of debates going 
back a decade and presented in the government policy paper Sport: Raising the Game 
(DNH, 1995). Oakley and Green (2001) argue that the origins of the restructuring lie in 
the 1980s Conservative government's desire to reduce state intervention in all areas of 
social and economic policy. Under the revised structure the GB Council was abolished, 
and was replaced by Sport England, and UK Sport was established to focus on high 
performance sport at the UK level and to take a lead among the four home countries 
Sport Councils in the areas of strategic planning, co-ordination and representation. One 
area of responsibility for UK Sport was attracting and running major events. 
Sport England was given two main roles. Firstly, to develop and maintain the 
infrastructure of sport in England. Secondly, to distribute the National Lottery funds to 
22 Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland already had their own Sports Councils (Sport England, No date). 
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grass root and major sporting projects. Sport England is fundedjointly by the 
government (via the Exchequer) and through the National Lottery: the exchequer 
funding is primarily used to maintain sports infrastructure whilst the national lottery 
funds are used for the development of sport (Sport England, No date). The new structure 
inherited a number of problems, as Tony Banks, then Minister for Sport pointed out: 
"We have 112 recognised sports in Britain. We also have 397 governing bodies, five 
Sports Councils and four ministers. It's nonsense. " (Banks, quoted in Miller, 1998). 
Oakley and Green (2001) argue that the underlying tensions and conflicts in this revised 
structure revolved around two issues. First, there was the background of increasing 
devolution and deference to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Second, originally 
UK Sport was conceived as a pan-British authority that would have a strong role 
throughout sport, but it ended up with very limited funding and as a consequepce had 
little power to achieve its aims. As Roche (1993) argues: "Authority may or may not 
follow money, but power certainly does" (p. 80). UK Sport was not given any Lottery 
distribution rights. In contrast, Sport England was endowed with over 80 per cent of the 
UK's lottery fund. Certainly within the LVNAC project Sport England's control over 
lottery funding meant that they wielded considerable power23. In 1998 an attempt was 
made to return both power and authority to UK Sport when it was announced that UK 
Sport was to become a Lottery distributor and that it would "work alongside a Sports 
Cabinet" chaired by the DCMS minister (DCMS, 1998 cited in Oakley and Green, 
2001, p. 83). The weaknesses in the structure are evident in relation to major events, 
with UK Sport being responsible for attracting major sporting projects and Sport 
England responsible for funding them. The Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee 
23 In addition, the exchequer grants allocated to the central UK Sport were limited compared to those 
given to the home country Sport Councils. 
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(House of Conunons, 2002a, p. 24) concluded that this division of responsibilities 
contributed to the problems of both the Wembley National Stadium development and 
the aborted LVNAC. 
The beginning of the 21" century has been a time of uncertainty and instability for Sport 
England, with changes in the senior management team 24 and a drop in lottery income of 
around E100m. in the past four years (Chaudhary, 2002a). In 2003 following the 
recommendations of the Game Plan 25 Sport England was restructured 26 and has shifted 
away from being a service provider to focus on strategic development, with the 75 stand 
alone Sport England progranimes being replaced by two strategic funding platfonns 
(DCMS, 2004, p. 14). The National Governing Bodies Investment Platform will provide 
funding for modernisation of governing bodies with ftinding being concentrated on 20 
priority sports. The other platform - Community Investment - will deliver Lottery 
funding via the nine Regional Sports Board. These reforms have been implemented by a 
new Chief Executive (Roger Draper) and new Chair (Lord Patrick Carter). Some 
concerns were raised that the appointment of Carter was a political move by the 
government to oversee the reform of Sport England and help attract private investment 
for projects (Chaudhary, 2002a). 
The reform process did not end there. Following the award of the 2012. Olympics to 
London, central government announced reforms to streamline the way sport is organised 
24 David Moffet was appointed as Chief Executive in January 2002 following a period with a 'caretaker' 
CE, in October 2002 he announced his decision to leave in March 2003 -he actually left shortly after the 
announcement and once again there was an Acting CE - Roger Draper - who had arrived at Sport 
England in September 2002, he was appointed CE in March 2003 and announced his departure in 
February 2006. Trevor Brooking stepped down as Chair in October 2002 and Patrick Carter was 
Y0 nted in November 2002. 
Tpohhe Gaine Plan was the report of the review of sports policy announced following the abandonment of 
the LVNAC project and loss of the 2005 WAC. See later in this chapter for further discussion. 
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and to clarify the responsibilities of UK Sport and Sport England (DCMS, 2005a). In 
particular there is going to a clearer organisational distinction between elite and 
community sport (DCMS, 2005a). In the future UK Sport will have full responsibility 
for the funding and development of elite sport: this involves the transfer of some 
responsibilities from Sport England to UK Sport27 . The aim is to create an integrated 
gone stop' system that takes the athlete from talent identification through to winning 
medals (DCMS, 2005a). Sport England will focus on encouraging greater participation 
and development of grassroots sport through its regional sports boards (DCMS, 2005a). 
A key aim of these changes is to boost Britain's medal tally at the 2012 Games, and it 
represents a continuation of a process that began following the poor performance of 
British athletes at the 1996 Atlanta Games that led to a programme of investment in 
elite athletes that has paid off with improved performances at subsequent Games. 28 it 
also mirrors the actions of other nations, notably Australia, who having secured the 
Olympics wanted to ensure plenty of medals for home athletes 29 . 
National goveming bodies 
Within the UK each sport has at least one national governing body (NGB) which 
oversees rules and competitions and delivers funds, with the emphasis being on coaches, 
26 This has involved halving the number of staff and in doing so reducing staffing costs by E12 million 
(DCMS, 2004, p. 14). 
27 From April 2006 the responsibility for the World Class Potential Programme for Olympic and Para 
Olympic Sports, the Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme (TASS), London 2012 Scholarships and the 
funding and directing of the English Institute of Sport (EIS) will transfer from Sport England to UK Sport 
England (UK Sport, 2005). 
29 In Atlanta (1996) Britain got 15 medals, following an investment of almost $1.5 billion (Short, 2003) in 
Sydney (200)) Britain got 28 medals and in Athens (2004) 30 medals were won following an investment 
of E68 million in athletes (Burgess, 2004). 
29 The Australian Sports Commission implemented a six year elite development programme aimed at 
winning 60 medals. One of the programmes, the Olympic Athlete Programme received over A$400m 
from combined federal and state funding (Magdalinski, 2003). The medal tally of 58 medals was a record. 
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officials and administrators. Examples include UK Athletics and the Football 
Association which are the NGBs for their respective sports. There are over 300 
governing bodies for the 112 recognised sports in the UK (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 39), and 
there is no one umbrella organisation3o. This large number is in part because there are 
subsets of some sports (e. g. representing women). There is also some Home Country 
representation. But it means that for most sports there are rival organisations comp6ting 
for resources. Sports Councils give the NGBs money to deliver programmes, e. g. in 
1999-2000 Sport England gave the English NGBs; El2m (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 39). In 
contrast in France there is one national governing body per sport and they all belong to 
one umbrella organisation 31 
It has been recognised that the tradition of amateurism in British sport has left many 
NGBs ill equipped for the modem world. For example, the Carter (2005b) sport review 
highlighted that NGBs often lack the necessary resources and skills to attract 
commercial sponsorship at the grassroots level32 and many NGBs are heavily reliant on 
funding from bodies such as Sporting England and UK Sport. In recent years the 
emphasis has been on modernisation, with UK Sport running a government funded 
Modemisation Programme and as noted above a major part of Sport England's work is 
now focused on modernising governing bodies and providing ftinds for. modemised 
bodies to deliver on a number of objectives including coaching development and 
30 In fact the umbrella organisation the Central Council Physical Recreation represents 270 of them 
(CCPR, 2005). 
31 All sporting federations belong to the umbrella organisation Comitj National Olympique et Sportif 
Francais (Dine, 1998). 
32 Sponsorship at grassroots levels is estimated to be 15 per cent of the total according to a survey 
conducted by Mintel in 2002 and used as supporting evidence by Carter (2005a, p. 22 ) 
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volunteering. Furthermore many NGBs have recently been or are currently subject to 
33 34 
review and reform, including U. K Athletics and the FA 
Another important national body is the British Olympic Association (BOA)35. It is one 
of two hundred National Olympic Committees, (NOCs) recognised by International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) and is one of only six NOCs that do not receive government 
or public finance: funds are raised by commercial income (sponsorship and licensing) 
and through a nationwide appeal. There are 35 governing bodies of Olympic sports and 
these provide an elected representative to form the NOq which is responsible for 
decision and policy making (BOA, 2000). The NOC has exclusive authority to 
designate the city that can apply to organise the games in its country. Although the 
Olympic Games were held in London 1908 and 1948, the 2012 Games are the first to be 
secured via a competitive bid. Following unsuccessful bids by Birmingham and 
Manchester, the BOA decided that the only British city that stood any chance of hosting 
the Olympic was London and that any future bid would centre on London. In May 2003 
the Government announced that it would support a London bid for the 2012 Olympics 
and provided funding for the bid 36. In May 2003 London was short-listed and'along 
with Paris, Madrid, New York and Moscow became a candidate city and in July 2005 
33 Since 2002 UK Athletics have been working with UK Sport on a modernisation project. Following the 
recommendations of the Foster Review (2004) UK Athletics will be leaner and have a more strategic role, 
whilst a new body Athletics England (replacing the Amateur Athletics Association of England) will have 
operational responsibility for delivering all aspects of athletics except the management of elite athletes 
and anti-doping work primarily through nine regions or 'hubs' . The new structure is due to be rolled out in April 2006. 
34 A structural review of the FA conducted by Lord Bums reported in August 2005. Bums (2005) 
concluded that changes in football (e. g. increased TV revenues, sponsorship) means that the FA is in need 
of reform to enable it to function effectively. His proposals include a restructuring of the FA Board, a 
more representative FA Council, a Regulation and Compliance Unit and a Community Football Alliance. 
35 It was formed in 1905 as the National Olympic Committee (NOC) for Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. 
36 Central government and the LDA both provided f 10 million for the bid and London 2012 raised a 
further E9 million of private funding (DCMS, 2005b). In fact London 2012 was left with a budget surplus 
of E 1.4 million pounds that will be returned to the DCMS and LDA (London 2012,2005). 
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London was awarded the 2012 Olympics. The BOA now has a key role to play in the 
delivery of the 2012 Games and has a strong presence on the Organising Committee 37 
Regional Bodies 
There are a number of regional bodies with a direct interest in sport and in the time 
since the LVNAC project the role of regional bodies has been and continues to be 
developed. For example, the functions of Sport England have been increasingly 
devolved to regions and regional bodies are seen as integral to improving the local 
delivery of sport (Carter, 2005a). These developments reflect the wider New Labour 
agenda of seeking to strengthen the regional tier of governance. 
There are nine Regional Sports Boards (RSBs) which were established to draw together 
key regional sport stakeholders (e. g. regional agencies, local authorities, voluntary and 
private sectors) and provide 'one voice' for each region (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 40). The 
members RSBs have no executive function and work in partnership with RDAs, 
Regional Assemblies and Sport England's nine regional offices and are levering in 
almost E2 for every pound spent (Carter, 2005a, p. 29). Some RSBs have overseen the 
formation of County Sport Partnerships (CSPs) to deliver Sport England programmes in 
partnership with local authorities and other sub-regional stakeholders, such as the 
county level arms of NGBs (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 40). The development of CSPs has 
been accelerated 38 so that they can be a key 'building block' in a 'single system' for 
sport in the community (Carter, 2005a). 
37 The 16 strong LCOCG board includes the new BOA Chair Chris Moynihan (elected October 2005), the 
BOA Chief Executive (Simon Clegg) and three IOC members (HRH Princess Anne, Phil Craven and 
Craig Reedie (until recently Chair of BOA). (BBC Sport, 2005). 
38 There are 45 CSPs, 20 were 'flit for purpose' by September 2005 and the remaining 25 will be by 
March 2006 (Carter, 2005a). 
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Each Government Office in the Region (GOR) has a DCMS representative who is 
responsible for all DCMS policies. In addition, Regional Cultural Consortia (RCC) 
bring together the activities of the DCMS in the regions and they are responsible for 
drawing up a culture strategy in the region. Finally, Regional Federations of Sport and 
Recreation bring together representatives of Governing bodies at the Regional County 
level, as well as the regional arms of the National Sports Organisations. Some 
individual NGBs have regional and county structures, but there is a lot of variation in 
structure, and boundaries overlap (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 40). The "defining feature" of 
the new structure for UKA is its nine regions or 'hubs' with key decision making 
powers being devolved as far as possible to the regional level and a streamlined central 
office (Foster, 2004, p. 3). 
Although local authorities do not have statutory duties in relation to sport and leisure, in 
reality they are the biggest provider of sport facilities and also provide opportunities via 
sports development teams and officers, who work with the voluntary sector, schools and 
community (DCMS/SU, 2002). However, sport has often found itself down the list of 
priorities and since the 1980s there has been a considerable re-direction of funds 
towards education and social services (Carter, 2005a). One of the results is that local 
authorities have been left with ageing facilities that are costly to maintain and 
unattractive to users who have had their expectations raised by private sector investment 
(e. g. private gyms and fitness centres) (Carter, 2005a). Local authorities also work in 
partnership with the private and voluntary sectors to provide sport and recreation 
facilities. In recent years, local authorities sport policies have highlighted the role of 
sport as a lever for community development (DCMS/SU, 2002; Sport England, 204b). 
On a local level, a large amount of grassroots sport is provided through professionally 
or voltintarily run clubs, many of which are affiliated to NGBs. There are about 110,000 
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sports clubs in the UK mostly run by volunteers - there are an estimated 1.5 million 
volunteers working in these clubs which is about three times the number of people 
employed in the sports sector (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 40). 
Complexily and fragmentation 
The govemance of sport in the UK is highly complex and fragmented. Even a brief 
examination reveals that in England a myriad of organisations are involved in the 
governance of sport. The system is fractured and complex, leaving organisations with 
over lapping responsibilities, no clear lines of accountability and there is duplication of 
effort. This complexity and fragmentation were clearly evident in the LVNAC project 
and a major factor leading to its failure. 
This situation is in part due to broader changes (e. g. increasing professionalisation and 
commercialisation of sport) that mean that structures have become 'out of step' with 
modem sport. This is perhaps particularly true of NGBs with their roots in amateur 
sport. Furthermore, although sport is currently the focus of much policy activity, this 
has not always been the case and sport has often languished on the margins of policy 
and politics and thus has been left behind. 
The international dimension of sport governance is an important one particularly in 
relation to mega events as the decisions lie in the hands of world governing bodies. 
Central government requires a thorough understanding of how each world governing 
body operates and needs to invest time and energy into establishing good working 
relationships. However, the prevailing system of sports governance and the 
undervaluing of sport within the British political system have meant that both the level 
of understanding and the quality of relationships has often been poor. This was apparent 
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in the LVNAC project when central government offered a non-London venue to the 
IAAF who had made no secret of their desire for the World Athletics Championships to 
be staged in London. World governing bodies exert considerable power but are neither 
democratic nor accountable, and this situation goes largely unchallenged by nation 
states. Although this is somewhat surprising, it perhaps reflects the value placed on 
hosting mega sports events within the current globally competitive climate. 
In the case of the Olympic bid the UK were able to overcome the problems of the sports 
governance system. In this respect a number of contributory factors can be identified. 
Firstly, central government appeared to deal with the IOC in a better manner and a great 
deal of effort was put in to establishing links and forging relationships 39 . Secondly, the 
strong lead taken by the Mayor and central government seemed to instil confidence in 
the bid on the part of the IOC. Thirdly, the various sporting bodies, central government 
and the Mayor appeared to focus on the task in hand and this is probably a reflection of 
the size and nature of the 'prize'. Fourthly, unlike many NGBs the BOA is not 
dependent upon central government for funding and this gives it a greater degree of 
independence and strength that enables it to take a 'fin-n line' with the governmeneo. 
The problems have been recognised by both central government and the sports world 
and currently steps are being taken to simplify structures, clarify responsibilities and 
improve the flow of funds to elite and community sport. The DCMS/SU review (2002) 
considered the current governance arrangements for sport and concluded that the current 
39 In the months leading up to the decision key figures including the Secretary of State'(Tessa Jowell), 
Ken Livingstone (Mayor) lobbied on part of the London bid intensively travelling the world to do so. The 
lobbying efforts of PM Tony Blair and his wife Cherie were regarded as crucial in 'selling' the bid. In 
particular the three days in Singapore before the bid in which the PM attended a number of private 
meetings with IOC members, private IOC party where the Blairs and Coe "worked the room 
impressively" so that when they left they had seen over 70 IOC members (Mackay, 2005). 
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system was too complex, there was duplication of function and that the lack of a clear 
'cascade' of strategy leads to confusion. A number of changes to the way sport is 
organised and funded were recommended. In particular, Sport England (as noted above) 
and UK Sport have become smaller bodies, with more decisions being taken at the 
regional level and they are acting as investors rather than deliverers of services and 
programmes. Other measures include creating clear frameworks of accountability, 
performance indicators, and less duplication of function. Furthermore, further 
government investment in sport is predicated on the delivery of organisational reform 
by the sport bodies (DCMS/SU, 2002) - the message to sport bodies appears to be 
'deliver the reforms or no more money'. This was certainly the message conveyed by 
the Minister of Sport, Richard Cabom, when he addressed the 2003 CCPR annual 
conference. He stressed that sport bodies (from Sport England through to local clubs) in 
receipt of Public funds had to produce evidence of their effectiveness, meet government 
set outcomes and milestones, and failure to do so would lead to the withdrawal of public 
funding (DCMS/Cabom, 2003). Whilst acknowledging that there are organisations that 
have been over reliant on public funds, and in some cases they could be more 
entrepreneurial, many within the sports world argue that that the government should be 
the primary funder of sport, particularly for young people (Goodbody, 2003). 
However, the reforms to date do not alter the fundamental structure of sports 
governance and some commentators argue that they are insufficient. For example, in an 
independent review - Raising the Bar - two former Sports Ministers Kate Hoey and 
Chris Moynihan (2005) maintain that without radical overhaul the situation will not 
I 
significantly improve for elite or community sport. Amongst other things, they call for 
the abolition of UK Sport and Sport England and the creation of one body (Sports 
40 The BOA was adamant that it would only submit a bid based on London and without total commitment 
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Foundation) to oversee the management of sport, but given that the government had 
commissioned it own review (Carter, 2005b) and made a pre-emptive announcement4l 
about the streamlining of support and ftinding of elite sport it seems unlikely, at least in 
the short term, that the government will act on its recommendations 42. 
THE VALUE OF SPORT: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO AND 
RELATIONSHIP WITH SPORT 
A constant refrain from the LVNAC case study was the 'lack of value' assigned to sport 
within the British political system. From the literature it appears that within the UK the 
attitude of central government to sport has varied over time and has often reflected the 
personal attitude of the incumbent Prime Minister. For example, Margaret Thatcher 
was not interested in sport and whilst she was at the helm the Conservative governments 
of 1979-1990 largely ignored sport (Houlihan and White, 2002). Her successor, John 
Major, was a sport enthusiast, an enthusiasm shared by several senior colleagues, 
notably David Mellor and Kenneth Clarke and sport secured a place on the political and 
policy agenda (see Figure 6.4). In 1995 the newly formed Department of National 
Heritage published a strategy document -Sport: Raising the Game43 (DNH, 1995) - this 
was the first central government policy document on sport for twenty years (Houlihan 
and White, 2002, p. 66). This in contrast to other nations, for example, France where 
sport has been at the heart of French government since the mid-twentieth century and 
from central government it would not proceed with the bid. 
41 The announcement about elite sport being transferred to UK sport was made on 16'h September 2005 
and Raising the Bar was published on 22 nd September 2005. Perhaps not surprisingly UK Sport did not 
lend its support to the proposals, with the Chair, Sue Campbell arguing that "the last thing that is needed 
now is more change" (BBC/Farquhar, 2005). 
42 Although the appointment of Chris Moynihan, co-author of Raising the Bar, as Chair of the BOA may 
mean these proposals get a better hearing than they might otherwise have done. 
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the Ministry of Youth and Sport and the Ministry of Education are responsible for most 
physical and sporting activities in France (Dine, 1998). 
The current New Labour government (1997 onwards) has produced a number of policy 
documents and made changes in the way sport is governed and ftinded (see Figure 6.4). 
However, Sport England and UK Sport continue to work at 'arm's length' from the 
goverment. Oakley and Green (2001) suggest that the ann's length principle is 
ideologically supported by the amateurism principle of sport being above politics and 
money and therefore, some, argue government should have little to do with sport 
(Oakley and Green, 200 1). Quangos, such as Sport England are sometimes justified on 
the grounds that they offer independence and continuity in policy. However, there may 
be other reasons that goverment does not want to be directly involved in policy 
formation. Coalter (1990) argues that governments seek to 'depoliticize' policy areas 
where there is a little political capital and great political danger from government 
involvement. An example of political sporting conflict linked with govenunent/sPort 
relationship is the development of a national stadium at Wembley (Houlihan, 2003). 
Oakley and Green (2001) argue that a quango, helps deflect criticism of government 
when things go wrong but this does not prevent them taking the credit when things go 
well. 
Following a review of British sports policy and governance structures in the period 
1995-2000, Oakley and Green (2001) concluded that it had been a period of 'selective 
re-investment' with subtle changes in emphasis since New Labour came into office and 
the 1998 National Lottery Act. Oakley and Green (2001) suggest that government 
43 It focused on school sport and excellence and many of the proposals could be funded from the new 
National Lottery (Houlihan and White, 2002). 
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influence and intervention is increasing despite the rhetoric that the 'arin's length' 
principle is being maintained (DCMS, 1998 cited in Oakely and Green, 2001, p. 83): the 
appointment of a close government ally -Patrick Carter- to the Chair of Sport England 
is perhaps an indication that the government is keen to influence the direction the 
organisation takes. 
Figure 6.4: Selected key sporting developments and events in the UK 1992-2005 
1992 Department of National Heritage formed 
1993 National Lottery Act passed 
1995 Raising the Game (DNH), first government policy document for 20 years. First National Lottery 
Grants distributed. 
1996 Euro'96 successfully staged. Poor results at Olympic Games, Atlanta, USA 
1997 Re-organisation of Sports Councils, abolition of GB Sport Council, formation of Sport England 
and UK Sport. General election, New Labour elected, DNH renamed Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport. 
1998 New National Lottery Act. UK Sport given limited lottery distribution powers 
1999 Policy Action TeamlO: Arts andSport (DCMS) report on the potential role of arts and the sport 
in promoting social inclusion 
2000 A Sporting Futurefor, 411 (DCMS) set out government priorities (increasing participation, access 
and equality, excellence). World Athletics Championships (2005) awarded to London. England 
failed in its bid to host 2006 FIFA World Football Cup. Improved perforinance at Olympic 
Games, Sydney, Australia. 
2001 A Sporting Futurefor All. The Government's Game Planfor Sport (DCMS), an action plan with 
set targets for key players i. e. Sports Councils, NGBS, local authorities. UK lost staging rights 
to 2005 WAC. ElOOm 'rescue package' (govemment/Sport England/Manchester City Council) 
for Manchester Commonwealth Games. 
2002 Manchester Commonwealth Games a success. Game Plan: a strategy for delivering 
government's sport and physical activity objectives published (DCMS/SU). 
2003 Birmingham hosts 9h Indoor World Athletics Championship to great acclaim. BOA supported 
by central government and London Mayor submit an outline bid for London to host 2012 
Summer Olympics. Sport England restructured and streamlined. 
2004 London becomes a candidate city for 2012 Olympics. 
2005 London awarded the 2012 Olympics in July. Review ofnational sport effort and resources 
(Carter). National Sports Foundation created. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
236 
Houlihan (1997) and Henry (200 1) suggest that the formation of a ministry with a 
clearer sport reMit44 in 1992 - the Department of National Heritage (DNH) - was part of 
a general trend towards centralised control that had begun in the Thatcher years. Also, 
in linking sport and arts with tourism the formation of the DNH recognised the 
economic potential of sport, particularly in city and national promotion. There is 
evidence that government has increased its control over sport policy since the fonnation 
of the DNH. In a study of the governance of the then new DNH, Taylor (1997, p. 464) 
identified four power sources at its disposal: ministerial activism; systematic scrutiny; 
legislation, policy guidance and review, and finance. Taylor (19 97) argues that the DNH 
exerted a great deal of control over its policy network by conditioning the networks 
operations. However, the DCMS, as it is now is, may not have as much control over 
policy as it would wish. For example, DCMS/policy community relations were put 
under the microscope in relation to the redevelopment of a national stadium at Wembley 
using Sport England lottery funds. The plan was for a multi-sport stadium, but concerns 
were'raised as to whether the proposed design would be able to meet the differing needs 
of football, athletics and also be a potential Olympic stadium. Initially Sport England 
was criticised for putting the needs of football before those of athletics and an Olympic 
bid; very much in the way that Coalter (1990) describes the depoliticization role of 
quangos in being blamed for policy failure (Oakley and Green, 200 1, p. 84). However, a 
DCMS Select Committee report argued the case: "for stronger Government leadership, 
to impose strategic coherence, to engage all Goverm-nent Departments concerned with 
events and to provide the focal point for decision making on matters of national 
importance" (House of Commons, 2000, p. xiv) and called again for the formation of a 
44 The Department of National Heritage was established in 1992, it combined responsibilities for arts, 
sport and tourism. It is now the Department of Culture, Media and Sport. 
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Minster of Events 45 . Oakley and Green (2001) argue that the Select Committee's 
statement provides evidence of the ambiguous power relationship between the DCMS 
and the wider sport policy community. Moreover, Oakley and Green (2001) suggest that 
the statement could be seen as justifying increased government intervention in "a 
(terminally) fragmented, but increasingly symbolic, policy area" (p. 85) and thus add 
weight to the argument that there is trend towards centralisation. More recently, ajoint 
DCMS/Strategy Unit review of sport policy recommended the formation of a mega 
events and projects centre within the DCMS reporting to Ministers there and in the 
Treasury: "Central government will consequently be actively involved from the 
beginning of any proposed mega event project" (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 17) and in 2003 
the DCMS Olympic Games Unit was established as a 'Centre of Expertise' (DCMS, 
2004). A new post of Director of Sport in the DCMS was created in October 2002 to 
oversee the implementation of the review's recommendations. 
Although New Labour came into power in May 1997 it was not until April 2000 46 that 
the government set out its strategy for sport in Sporting Futurefor All (DCMS, 2000a). 
The priorities were increasing participation, access and equality, excellence and four 
core policy areas were identified: sport in education; sport in the community; sporting 
excellence and modernisation. What made Sporting Futurefor All (DCMS, 2000a) 
distinctive, particularly in comparison to Raising the Game (DNH, 1995) was the 
emphasis on implementation and working groups were set up to take the strategy 
forward (Houlihan, and White, 2002). The resulting Action Plan (DCMS, 2000b) set 
targets and identified which organisation should take the lead for each of ten areas and 
this document formed the basis of The Government's Planfor Sport (DCMS, 2001). 
45 They had first made this proposal in 1999 in a report Staging International Sporting Events (House of 
Commons, 1999). 
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Houilhan and White (2002) comment that many in the sports world, who for many years 
had complained about the lack of government interest in sport, were rather taken aback 
by the prescriptive nature of theAction Plan (DCMS, 2000b) and The Government's 
Planfor Sport (DCMS, 2001). 
Following on from the abandonment of the LVNAC project and loss of the 2005 WAC 
central government announced a review of sport policy. It was conducted by the DCMS 
and Strategy Unit with the aim of clarifying the current state of sport and refining the 
government's objectives (DCMS/SU, 2002). In relation to sport, the government's key 
objectives are to, firstly, increase participation in sport because of the health benefit s of 
being physically active and the concerns about the low level of participation compared 
with other countries 47 (DCMS/SU, 2002). Secondly, to increase international success 
because of the 'feel good' factor that success in the sporting arena generates for the 
whole nation. Although the perception is that the UK fares badly on the international 
sporting stage, the review suggested that this is not entirely the case. For exampl e, 
across sixty sports the UK is ranked 3 rd in the world 48 (after USA and Australia), but the 
UK have not done well in the sports that are of most interest to the general public e. g. 
footbalb cricket 49 , tennis. When a world ranking is built on the UK's ten most popular, 
sports then the UK's ranking falls to IOh (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 29). 
46 Sport had been considered earlier in relation to social inclusion and neighbourhood renewal (DCMS, 
1999). 
47 England's participation rate in sport and physical activity (at least 3 times/week) is 21%. This compares 
unfavourably to other European nations such as France (24%) and Germany (27%), and a long way 
behind the world leaders Canada (39%), Australia (46%)and Finland (52%) (Carter, 2005b, p 14). 
48 The World Sport Index awards points for success based on each country's share of medal success or 
top 3 placings (male and female) in 60 sports across 200 countries. The index was devised by UK Sport 
(DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 29). 
49 The success of England's cricket team against Australia in the 2005 Ashes Series should have a 
positive impact on the ranking. 
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In relation to staging mega sporting events, the review concluded that the economic, 
social and cultural benefits of hosting such events, are difficult to measure and the 
evidence to date is limited. The review noted that whilst the UK successfully hosts 
major sporting events each year (e. g. Wimbledon Lawn Tennis Championships, the 
London Marathon), with little government involvement, difficulties have been 
encountered with the 'mega events' (i. e. Olympics, FIFA World Cup etc) when there is 
need for substantial infrastructure investment (DCMS/SU, 2002). They went on to argue 
that in the past there has been poor investment appraisal, management and co-ordination 
for some of these events and that in the future, if major new fýcilities are required, the 
economic and regeneration benefits should be carefully balanced against all costs, 
including opportunity costs (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 13). The DCMS/SU Review advised 
central government: "To adopt a different approach to hosting sporting mega events. 
They should be seen as an occasional celebration of success rather than as a means to 
achieving other government objectives" (DCMS/SU, 2002, p. 15). This report was 
published during the period in which a decision was being made about a potential 
London Olympic bid and there was much speculdtion as to what the outcome of this 
process would be, with most commentators - voicing their opinions primarily in the 
media - suggesting that the government would not support a bid. In fact, central 
government lent its support to the London Olympic bid, on the basis that it would drive 
through the regeneration of East London, provide employment and boost tourism 
throughout the UK, in other words, contrary to the advice of the DCMS/SU, although 
government had certainly taken a more measured approach. 
As noted above this process of review and reform has continued. For example, Lord 
Carter was asked to examine how to achieve better co-ordination of effort and resources 
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and also to consider the proposal to involve the public and private sectors together in a 
new National Sports Foundation (NSF) (Carter, 200b). Interestingly, the request for the 
review came from both the Chancellor and the Secretary of State, which is perhaps an 
indication of the increasing importance attached to sport. Certainly within the case study 
there was a belief that without 'buy in' from the Treasury sporting projects would 
continue to struggle. In addition, it is doubtless that the Chancellor wants to get 'best 
value' from government expenditure on sport and the NSF50 - which was announced in 
the 2005 budget (HM Treasury/Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2005, p. 146)- fits in with 
other government funding initiatives that involve public-private partnership. The NSF 
represents a continuation of the government's partnership approach to both the 
provision and funding of sport that extends across the board from community through to 
elite facilities. 
From this examination it is clear that central government has not been a constant 
champion of sport, with long periods of neglect being punctuated with periods of 
interest and activity and this has led to a lack of strategic thinking on sports matters. 
Indeed it is hard to think of another area of government policy that could be ignored for 
so long. In other nations sport appears to be more integral to policy and politics, 
although the emphasis may vary, for example, the focus in Finland in on participations' 
50 At the time of writing (October 2005) there is little information available about the NSF, although it is 
known that the DCMS will provide funding of E27.5 million over the period to 2007-2008 as match 
funding i. e. it must be matched by additional sport sponsorship/investment from the private sector (HM 
Treasury/Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2005, p. 146). The Lawn Tennis association was an early recipient 
of NSF funds with the Chancellor announcing in May that the NSF would invest E5.25m into British 
tennis over two years (LTA, 2005). 
51 Finland has high participation rates, adult participation is 52% and although there is a decline in the 20- 
40 years age group after that there is a steady increase with 60% of 60 year olds participating frequently. 
Since 1991 there have been three national campaigns aimed at improving adult participation (Carter, 
2005a, p. 8). 
241 
whilst in Australia it has been on elite sport 52 (DCMS/SU, 2002; Carter, 2005a). 
Compared with other nations public investment in sports infrastructure in England is 
low, with France and Finland having the highest spending 53 (Carter, 2005a, p. 16). 
Interestingly, Germany spends less 54 but seems to benefit from the spending power of a 
thriving club base 55 and significant levels of 'social sponsorship' of club sport 
programmes and competitions (Carter, 2005a, p. 16). 
Within England amateur organisations play a central role in delivering sporting 
56 
opportunities particularly through conununity sports clubs . In England club assets are 
either owned by the local authority or privately purchased and are run on amateur/ 
voluntary basis and are mostly single sport. As we saw in the LVNAC project clubs 
have to rely on bar takings and membership fees (although these are often relatively 
IOWS). In France substantial state investment means that there a large number of 
clubs 58 , they are owned and financially supported by local government (communes) but 
the day-to-day running is transferred to federations (Carter, 2005b, p. 15). In England 
club membership falls off dramatically. after school-leaving age and is consistently 
below that of Germany and France across all ages (Carter, 2005b, p.. 15). 
52 In 1999-2000 elite sport consumed 78% of the sports budget (Hogan and Norton, 2000, p. 210). 
However, Australia also has high consistently participation rates from aged 16-65 years at around 46 % 
(Cater, 2005b, p. 14). 
53 England spends E36 per capita whilst France spends EI 10, Finland E84 (Carter, 2005b, p. 16). 
54 Only E30 per capita. 
55 Germany has fewer clubs than England but their average membership base is four times greater. Club 
assets are both municipal and privately owned, they are privately run and affiliated to regional bodies of 
sport. Only half of clubs have their own facilities but they and others use municipal facilities (Carter, 
2005b, p. 15). 
56 There are over 106,000 community sports clubs in England (Carter, 2005a, p. 30). 
57 In 2000 the average participant paid E146 (for membership and/or facility hire) or f 12 per month. This 
compares to E43 in the private sector or around E40 for a BSkyB sports subscription (Carter, 2005a, p. 3 1). 
58 60 per cent more than England, revenue subsidies sustain a low average membership base of 60 people. 
Two thirds are single sport clubs and third are multi-sport clubs (Carter, 2005b, p. 15). 
242 
It is clear that within the British political system there is confusion and conflict over ' 
what the 'value of sport' is. Although there are individuals within the political system 
who place a great deal of value on sport per se, in general sport is valued for what it can 
do. First, some value sport for its health benefits and see it as key in tackling the health 
problems associated with physically inactivity. Second, for others the value of sport lies 
in the national glory and feel good factor that is generated by the success of elite 
athletes particularly on the international stage. Third, sport is viewed as a valuable tool 
of social regeneration, particularly at the neighbourhood level and also a source of 
employment within the burgeoning sport and leisure sector. Fourth, sport is valued as a 
tool of physical regeneration, for example, the building of large stadia and associated 
infrastructure. There is evidence from the literature that sport can do all of these things 
but what is also clear is that, firstly, not all sport projects can deliver on all fronts and at 
times there have been unreal expectations. Secondly, these benefits are not conferred 
automatically and active mechanisms are required to maximise benefits to individuals 
and communities. 
These debates are not unique to the UK but other countries deal with these tensions 
differently. For example, the French emphasise the mythic and heroic nature of sporting 
endeavour and regard success of the international sporting stage as 'good for the spirit'. 
Although sport has risen up the British political and policy agenda in recent years, New 
Labour has been unable decide on either the priorities or importance of sport, as was 
evident in the initial lack of enthusiasm for the London Olympics. Consequently there 
has been lack of direction. Although the London Olympics will provide direction it also 
reopens the elite - participation debate and the social- physical regeneration debate. The 
London Olympics presents an opportunity to take sport for-ward at elite and community 
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level, although there is a lot catching up to do, particularly in terms of facilities and 
provision for conununity sport. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Having made comparisons with other nations it is clear that national governments adopt 
a variety of approaches to mega sports events. At national level, the extent of 
involvement varies across nations, cities and events and reflects wider political systems 
and cultural attitudes. 
It is evident that there is no simple governance system that is 'best' for delivering large- 
scale sports events. Firstly, different governance systems have different advantages and 
disadvantages. For example, centralised systems can get things done quickly, but this is 
frequently at the expense of engagement and legacy considerations. This can result in 
legacy problems and lead some groups to feel excluded. Secondly, the relationship 
between governance and events is dynamic and interactive and develops as a result of 
both bidding for and hosting events. 
Whilst there is no one best system, there do appear to be two elements essential for 
success in mega-sporting events. Firstly, national governments need to be explicit about 
what their role is and the limits of that role. Secondly, politicians and policy makers 
have to demonstrate commitment to and confidence in the project. This can be done in a 
variety of ways, including underwriting projects, providing resources and legislative 
powers. 
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The governance of sport is unique in its diversity of bodies and their varying levels of 
professionalisation and power. At one end of the scale, the international governing 
bodies of sport, in particular the IOC, FIFA and IAAF who award the rights to the 
mega-sporting events are some of the most powerful and most undemocratic institutions 
in the world and to which national governments are often beholden. Whilst at the other 
end, there are sporting organisations with few resources, little power and which are 
heavily dependent on volunteers to function. 
At national level, within the UK, sport has not had a firm place on the political and 
policy agenda and this has been reflected in the way sport has been governed and also in 
the shifting positions towards mega events. In the UK at national level the governance 
of sport has been dogged, firstly, by the sheer numbers of organisations in existence and 
secondly, by the tradition of amateurism. Many of the organisations have overlapping 
responsibilities and this has led to a highly complex and fragmented system of 
governance, clearly evident in the LVNAC project and a factor in its failure. The 
amateur roots of organisations have left many of them ill equipped to face the 
challenges arising from the increased professionalisation and commercialisation of 
sport. Although much work has been done to rectify these shortcomings, the project to 
modernise the governance of sport is on going and not without controversy as there will 
be 'winners' and 'losers' with some organisations taking on new responsibilities, whilst 
others lose them and some organisations cease to exist altogether. Furthermore, the 
reforms to date do not fundamentally alter the existing structure and there are questions 
as to whether they are sufficient to deliver change. 
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The LVNAC project does appear to have been the 'last straw' triggering a train of 
events, which previous troubled projects- despite the numerous reviews, reports and 
recommendations - had failed to do. The key difference with the LVNAC was that at 
national level, central government finally stopped and took stock, for example, ordering 
a review of sport policy (DCMS/SU, 2002). Moreover, there is evidence that central 
government has learnt some lessons. For example, it took a much more measured 
approach to the London Olympic bid. However, for a long period central government 
has displayed contradictory attitudes to sport and although New Labour has a shown a 
renewed interest in sporting matters, as we have seen these contradictions persist and 
even the early stages of preparing for the London Olympics saw the renewal of these 
debates. This contradictory attitude reflect broader issues about the role of central 
goverment, the extent to which power should be devolved regionally and locally and 
the role of the voluntary and community sectors. 
This chapter primarily foqused on national governments, whilst the next chapter will 
turn its attention to cities and once again will take a comparative approach. 
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Chapter Seven 
Cities and mega sports events 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the focus will shift from the nation state to the city and the role played by 
cities in the bidding for and hosting of mega sport events. From Chapter Two we know 
that cities use sport in a variety of ways and that mega sports events have become an 
important instrument for the economic development of cities. The inter-city competition 
to host mega sports events is fierce and this competitiveness is reflective of a broader 
process of global inter-city competition. Cities are engaged in a constant process of 
competition with each other in an attempt to attract and retain both human and 
economic capital, to promote the city on a global stage and improve its status (Newman 
and Thornley, 2004). This competition is both cross national and within nation, so that 
London, for example, competes with both Tokyo and Manchester. 
The LVNAC case study demonstrated the crucial role of city governance and how its 
failure in important respects contributed to the failure of the project. The LVNAC 
project suffered initially because of a lack of commitment, leadership and vision at city 
level and latterly because of scepticism from new city leadership about its value. As a 
result the LVNAC did not fit into the V Mer sporting landscape nor have a place in 
broader plans for London. The LVNAC project unfolded during a unique period in the 
history of London as it moved from being without city-wide govermnent to once again 
having a unitary authority. The case study cast a spotlight on London's governance 
arrangements during this period of transition and highlighted the inherent weaknesses of 
the new arrangements and the part played by central government in shaping the new 
institutions and the powers and resources at their disposal. The LVNAC case study 
247 
raised issues not only about the specifies of London governance but also about city 
governance and mega sports events more generally that warrant further investigation. 
This chapter seeks to explore these issues in more detail, through comparison with other 
cities that have bid for and hosted mega sports events. In particular, it will consider 
how the role and approa ch of city level government to mega sports events varies and 
how this translates in relation to key factors - commitment, strategy, leadership, vision 
and resources. In addition, it will examine the relationship between city level 
govermnent and other levels of government (national and sub-national) in relation to 
mega sports events and how this influences both the success of the event and. its legacy. 
Finally, the specifies of London will be examined in more detail including the Olympic 
bid 
CITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE PART 1: AN OVERVIEW 
Mega sports events have become a key tool for city leaders striving to reinvigorate or 
re-imagine cities. As we have seen from the overview of ten mega and major sports 
events set out in Figure 6.1 in the preceding chapter, the role played by city goverment 
varies considerably. The approaches taken differ due to factors such as city 
characteristics, national state structures but also reflect 'evolution' over time. This 
evolution is in part a result of cities learning from past experiences - from those of other 
cities as well as from their own experiences - but also changed contexts. 
The context in which mega-events are planned and executed has not only changed over 
time, for example the increased role of the media (see below), but also has varied over 
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time. For example, some events have been the subject of boycotts' as a result of 
international political events. Indeed an important element of post-war Olympics has 
been boycotts 2 and threats of boycott 3, but in recent years this threat has declined as the 
end of the Cold War and apartheid in South Affica have reduced the main points of 
friction (Short, 2003). This does not mean that boycotts have gone for good, the nature 
of international politics means that the potential for conflict is never far away, but they 
are not a current feature of mega-sports events. 
The media has played a significant role in the globalization of mega-sports events and 
also transformed the economics of events. Short (2003) argues that the growth of the 
Olympics and their increasing globalisation was closely linked to television coverage 
that could transmit images worldwide. Coverage has increased steadily. In 1960 twenty 
one countries saw coverage of the Rome Olympics Games 4 (Short, 2003), whilst 220 
countries watched the 2004 Athens Olympics5 (IOC, 2005). The story is similar for the 
FIFA World Cup 6 and although the World Athletics Championships do not command 
7 the same audiences they are, as was noted in Chapter One growing . It 
is not only the 
global audience that has increased exponentially but the revenues obtained from 
1 For example, the USA boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games in protest at the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the boycott included West Germany, China, Japan and Canada. In retaliation the USSR and 
Eastern bloc countries boycotted the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. 
2 'Me 1956,1976,1980 and 1984 Summer Olympics were all subject to boycotts (Short, 2003). 
3 The threat of boycott by African and Eastern European countries in 1968 forced the expulsion of South 
Africa from the Olympic movement because of the policy of apartheid (Short, 2003, p. 11). 
4 The US television company CBS paid $660,000 for the right to fly film from Rome to New York, while 
Eurovision transmitted the first live coverage of the Games (Short, 2003, p. 7). 
5 There was 3,800 hours of live Olympic coverage during the Athens Games (IOC, 2005). 
6 The 2002 FIFA Football World Cup held in Korea and Japan attracted audiences of 28.8 billion in 213 
countries compared to 13.5 biflion in 166 countries in Mexico in 1986 (FIFA, No date). This number 
dwarfs the number of actual spectators, according to the FIFA website 2.7 million people attended the 64 
matches (hqp: /I%vww. fifa. com accessed 9 December 2005). 
7 Preliminary data indicated that there was 16% more dedicated programines than for the 2003 WAC in 
Paris. Eurosport coverage (broadcaster in Europe) generated a cumulative audience of 57 million which 
was a 50% increase on Paris. In addition for the first time there was live web-cast of 70 hours of action in 
the USA which was available on subscription basis (IOC, 2005, p. 5). 
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broadcasting rights 8 and the associated sponsorships deals. Mega sports events are now 
totally corporatized, providing a large global audience of consumers and an opportunity 
to sell goods and services worldwide (Short, 2003). In addition, the way in which 
broadcast deals are negotiated has changed so that the rights are sold as a 'set'. For 
example, the rights for the Summer and Winter Olympic Games from 2000 to N08 
were sold in one package9 with the IOC retaining a percentagelo and the rest being 
distributed to the host Olympic committee. This means that Olympic cities have greater 
financial security and are able to plan their budget earlier" which makes the Olympics a 
more attractive proposition (Shoval, 2002; Preuss, 2003). 
Over time the experiences of cities have become iconic and stylised. So we have the 
'failure' of the 1976 Montreal Olympics, the 'capitalist' 1984 Los Angeles Games, the 
'regeneration' Gaines in Barcelona 1992 and the 'spectacle' of Sydney 2000 embedded 
into history and frequently re-run in the media, official reports and enquiries. These 
readings reflect as much the 'readings' that the media, politicians and spin doctors wish 
to Place on such events as they do any 'objective' evaluation. These readings are 
selective and partial and represent a very simplified account of the events which by their 
very nature are highly complex. Difficulties encountered whilst not necessarily denied 
are certainly not given the consideration they warrant, for example, the Sydney Games 
are generally perceived and presented in a positive light despite the significant legacy 
problems. Similarly early problems with ticketing at the 1998 FIFA World Cup in 
France were soon forgiven and forgotten once the competition got underway (Dauncey 
a For example, the total broadcast revenue from the 1960 Rome Olympic Games was US$I million by 
2004 for the Athens Gaines it was US$1,476.9 million. In fact the 1964 (Tokyo) and 1968 (Mexico City) 
Games did not generate substantial broadcast revenue, US$900,000 and US$50,000 respectively but from 
1972 (Munich) onwards the amount has increased Gaines on Games from US$ 17.8 million in 1972. 9 The European Broadcasting Union paid US$1.44 billion for this package and NBC US$3.57 million for 
the North American broadcasting rights (Roche, 2000). 
10 From 1998-2002 the IOC share was 40 per cent, from 2004 it rose to 51 per cent but increases in total 
revenue means that cities are receiving larger amounts to host the Games (Shoval, 2002, p. 585). 
11 Both Athens (2004) and Beijing host for 2008 knew well in advance that income from these sources 
would generate revenues of approximately two billion dollars (Shoval, 2002, p. 586). 
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and Hare, 1999), whilst the organisational problems experienced 12 at the 1996 Olympics 
in Atlanta were brought to the attention of the world by the media 13 These examples 
illustrate firstly, the intense focus on the event itself and the importance of the media 
attention in producing the 'image' of the event and secondly, the tendency for the media 
to pay little attention to impact and legacy of events. 
The initial plans for the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games were modest and self financing. 
However the Mayor decided to capitalise on the Olympics and they became a 'grand 
project' for the redevelopment of the city 14 . Federal (national) government 
- did not give 
the City of Montreal a financial guarantee, so the Organising Committee of the Olympic 
Games (OCOG) had to stage the Games relying solely on financial support from the 
City 15 (Preuss, 2003). The award of Games coincided with an economic downturn and a 
period of global inflation, factors that added to the financial burden of staging the 
Games. In addition, there was considerable local opposition to staging the Games, 
labour disputes and technical and construction problems resulted in major cost over runs 
(Chalkley and Essex, 1999). The result was massive debt for the CitY16 . Furthermore 
12 'nese included transport problems moving the athletes to events, with some being delivered late for, 
events of delivered to the wrong venues (many drivers did not know the way) and the severity of the 
traffic congestion called into question the decision not to invest in new roads or the public transport 
system (Chalkley and Essex, 1999, p. 3 3 8). The Atlanta OCOG were so confident of their state of the art 
media system that they did not do a 'dummy run' (Miller, 1996). The IBM results system quickly 
collapsed, the statistical data was often inaccurate, there were delays in compiling results and world 
records went unreported (Letts, 1996). The European Broadcast Union, a consortium of overseas stations, 
threatened to seek the return of some of the US$250 million they had paid for the media system (Brodie, 
1996). 
13 Whitelegg (2000) and Chalkley and Essex (1999) point out that the media took a dim view of the 
Atlanta Games and relations between the media (especially the foreign press) and the organisers were 
strained and the organisers reacted badly to the criticisms. Whitelegg (2000) notes that "The IOC, some 
top competitors and veteran sports writes united in their claim that the Atlanta Olympics were the worst 
organised in living memory" (2000, p. 811). 
14 Extensive sporting facilities, an Olympic Park and Olympic Village were built and improvements made 
to the infrastructure including constructing a new airport, new roads and extending the subway system 
(Chalkley and Essex, 1999). 
15 At the end of the Games private revenues generated by the OCOG amounted to 5% of the funds 
required, the remaining 95% was provided by the public sector and special financing means (Olympic 
Committee Montreal, 1976, p. 59 cited in Preuss 2003, p. 254). 
16 Montreal at the close of the twentieth century the predicted cost of CAN$250 million stood as a yet to 
be paid off CAN$2.4 billion (Whitelegg, 2000, p. 80 1). Montreal's taxpayers are paying off the debt via a 
special local tobacco tax and it is due to be paid off by 2005/06 (Preuss, 2003, p. 254). 
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Montreal's experience made other cities risk averse and as a result there was only one 
candidate for the 1984 Olympics 17 - Los Angeles. 
The LA Games were a highly commercial affair, initiated by business players and led 
by an entrepreneur (Peter Uberroth) with minimal input from government -city, state or 
federal. The city Of LA18 was keen to avoid the debts of Montreal and it forced the IOC 
to waiver its rule that the host city had to assume financial liability for the Games 19 
(Burbank et al, 2001). The local organising committee along with the US Olympic 
Committee assumed financial liability for the Games and set out to stage the Games in a 
way 20 that meant that the costs could be covered by commercial sponsorship. In effect 
the city of LA handed the Games over to the organisers and there was little public 
control or oversight of Olympic activities (Burbank et al, 2001). The LA Games had 
little impact on the urban landscape but it achieved the desired boost to the image of LA 
as a good place to do businqss in and also to visit. Corporate and media sponsorship 
were key sources of income, there were record television audiences 21 and the Games 
generated a profit of US$225 Million22 (Burbank et al, 200 1) and this led to them being 
dubbed the 'capitalist' Games. The commercial success of the LA Games was key in 
renewing interest amongst cities in hosting the Olympics and Burbank et al (2001) 
argue that the LA Games created "a new paradigm for hosting mega events" (p. 53). For 
17 The 1980 Olympic Games had already been awarded to Moscow. 
is 17here was considerable local opposition on the grounds of costs, potential environmental damage and 
disruption to everyday life and city officials were divided on whether to support a bid. The Mayor 
promised to deliver the Gaines without costs to the taxpayers (Chalkley and Essex, 1999; Burbank et al, 
2001). See Burbank et al (2001) for an extended discussion on the politics of the LA bid and Games. 
19 Given that LA was the only candidate city the IOC probably did not have much choice in the matter. 
20 This was done by using existing sporting facilities and accommodation over a wide geographical area 
and no major infrastructure work was undertaken (Essex and Chalkley, 1998). 
2'For example, over 180 million Americans watched the LA Games (The Economist, 2000, p. 33). 
22 The US$225 million profit was shared between the USOC, national sports federations and the Amateur 
Athletic Federation of Los Angeles but not the City of LA (Burbank et al, 2001, p. 166). The USOC set 
up a non-profit organisation - US Olympic Foundation- to benefit sport in the US with its 40% share of 
the profits from the Games and also its share of the commemorative Olympic coins sold by the US 
Government. The aim was to maintain in perpetuity the original funding (US$I I Im) and to distribute the 
investment income to the USOC and twenty years on the US Olympic Foundation continues to be a key 
source of funds for US sport (Carter, 2005a, p. 9). 
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Preuss (2003) the LA Games marked the transition from Games that were largely 
dependent on public money to Games that were increasing reliant on private finance. 
Barcelona used the 1992 Olympics to place itself on the map, assert its independence 
from Spain and as a tool for economic development and regeneration. The fact that it is 
cities, not regions or nations that bid to host the Olympics was important (Marshall, 
1996), and as noted earlier it was not the first time that the city had used an international 
eVent as a catalyst for urban renewal. In economic terms Barcelona was facing a crisis 
with large scale industrial closures and high levels of unemployment. However, the 
programmes 23 that were put forward as necessary to stage the Games were viewed as 
having social purposes within the city's strategy (Marshall, 1996). Unlike the LA 
Games where the private sector had led the organisation of the Games and strongly 
influenced their shape and outcome, in Barcelona; the public sector was the main .7 
driver. 24 As noted above Barcelona has taken on iconic status and over twenty years 
later cities continue to draw inspiration from its achievements in transforming not only 
the urban landscape 25 but also the image of Barcelona26. 
23 Marshall (1996) argues that "The ring roads, the new drainage system, the new telecommunications 
inftastructure, the residential districts, the transformed old port - all were seen as having both social gains 
and contributing to economic regeneration" (p. 149). 
24 For example, although total private investment arising directly or indirectly from the Games was twice 
the public expenditure (Varley, 1992, p. 22), in the majority of projects, funding and control remained 
public, via companies controlled in various proportions by the public administration (Marshall, 1996, 
g. 151). 
Probably the greatest transformation was the site of the Olympic Village was on land that was occupied 
by declining industries and was separated from the rest of the city by and from the coast by two railway 
lines. The redevelopment included restructuring the rail network, constructing a coastal ring road, 
building the Olympic Village, a new marina, restructuring of the sewage system and regeneration of the 
coastline. The development created a continuation of the Example district and connected the city to 5 km 
of coastline - the new beaches and waterfront facilities provide leisure opportunities for the city's 
inhabitants and visitors (Chalkley and Essex, 1999. pp. 386-387). 
26 One area in which this change of image has impacted positively is in tourism with Barcelona now being 
a leading city-break destination. 
253 
CITIES IN COMPARISION PART 11: SELECTED CASES STUDIES 
In terms of unpacking the relationships between competences and structures of city 
governance and their relations to the national state and how this impacted upon the 
realisation of mega-sports events, there is a need to consider selected case studies in 
further depth. Two cases will be considered - Sydney Olympics and Manchester 
Commonwealth Games. As well as demonstrating important differences in city 
governance, they were both major precursors to the LVNAC project and actively 
informed thinking on mega events at the time. 
Sydney, Manchester and the LVNAC 
Before considering Sydney and Manchester in more detail, it would probably be useful 
to briefly compare them with the LVNAC project (see Table 7.1). The case of 
Manchester and the MCG 2002 provides a particularly useful comparison with the 
LVNAC project given the time overlap, 27 the fact that both cities operate within the 
same national frameworks and the different outcomes of the projects. In both Sydney 
and Manchester 'assets' can be identified that were lacking from the LVNAC project. 
Whilst there is some overlap between the two lists, they are not coterminous which 
s upports the earlier argument that there is more than one route to 'success'. The Sydney 
Olympics benefited from the following: 
9 unified vision; 
9 sub-national (state) goverment that could provide financial resources and 
leadership; 
e commitment of central (federal) government; 
* mature partnerships. 
27 Although the time overlap was short -the 18'h months life of the LVNAC project (April 2000- October 
200 1) - it was at a significant time for the MCG as it was in difficulties and received EI 00m additional 
funding in summer 200 1. 
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Figure 7.1: Brief comparison between Sydney Olympic Games, Manchester 
Commonwealth Games and the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre. 
Sydney Olympics 2000 Manchester MCG 2002 LVNACandWAC2005 
The event Olympic Games. The Commonwealth Games. World Athletic 
'big prize' for nations Biggest multi-sport event Championships, one of the 
and cities. held in UK since 1948 'big three'. Never staged 
in UK 
The city Largest in Australia '2 nd Cityi Capital 
City governance City authorities minor Manchester City Council No unitary authority when 
player (MCC) lead partner in the bid submitted/awarded. 
bid. MCC underwrote the New unitary body (GLA) 
MCG, promised that from May 2000 but unable 
council tax payers would to underwrite WAC. 
not incur any debt. 
Origins of bid Part of mega event Part of mega event Arose from government 
strategy. strategy pursued by MCC decision to remove 
and partners since 1980s. athletics from WNS. 
Unsuccessful bids for 
1996/2000 Olympics. 
Primary rationale Promotion of Australia Regeneration of East No unifying rationale. 
Manchester Sport vs regeneration. 
Partnerships Strong -public private Established. Strong New and untested. 
sectorlinks public-private sector links. 
Long history of co- 
operation. 
Role of central Key role 'Drawn in': from 'Let go': High profile 
government 4supportive' to significant commitment at start but 
funder and Cabinet appeared to get 'cold feet'. 
Minister given Cancelled LVNAC, 
responsibility for MCG. decision that led to loss of 
2005 WAC. 
Leadership and NSW (state) government MCC clear leader. Owned No clear leader or owner. 
ownership led. by 'Manchester'. Several Lacked a champion. 
champions. 
Context Sport integral to national Queen's Golden Jubilee. Problems with MCG and 
identity. Problems with WNS and WNS. 
LVNAC. 
Funding Public (state and federal MCC (E86m); Sport LVRPA (f5m); Sport 
government) and private. England (E I 55m); DCMS England (up to E67m was 
30% public funding. (E35.5m) available); CMF (f. 8m) 
July 2001 -fI 05m Sport England reluctant to 
'rescue package' from release funds. Capital gap. 
MCC/DCMS/Sport 
England' 
Facilities and Multiple new builds. Multiple new builds Athletics stadium (43,000 
costs Cost of approx. L2,534m Cost of approx.; E190m seats for WAC, 20,000 in 
(MCC E40.75m; Sport legacy mode) and High 
England; E135.5m) Performance Centre. 
Estimated cost E90-100m 
Legacy Under utilised facilities. Legacy use of facilities Legacy function of 
Tourism boost. secured prior to MCG. stadium uncertain. Not 
Part of broad regeneration integral to broader plans. 
project. 
Compiled by author from various sources. 
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Whilst the MCG had the following 'assets: 
* unified vision; 
*a city council that could provide financial resources, albeit limited, as well as 
leadership and had a strong sense of ownership; 
commitment of central government; 
mature partnerships; 
*a project that was firmly embedded into broader plans for the city. 
A key difference between Sydney and Manchester was the level of governance that 
shaped and led the process. In Sydney it was the state (sub-national) goverment and 
federal (central) government that were the key drivers whilst in Manchester it was the 
city authorities. A consequence of this difference was that the Olympics were planned 
with national and sub-national needs in mind rather than those of the city itself, whilst 
the MCG was integral to wider socio-economic plans for the city. This difference 
probably at least in part accounts for the inadequate legacy planning in Sydney. It is 
also important to remember that in. contrast to the LVNAC project, both the Sydney 
Olympics and the MCG enjoyed the commitment and support of central goverm-nent. , 
The 2000 Sydney Olympl*cs 
The Sydney Olympics were a sporting and cultural spectacle providing a showcase for 
Australia 28 and Australian athleteS29. Sydney 2000 exemplifies the national use of mega 
sports events for national promotion and national sports. glory and is reflective of the 
importance of sport and sporting success to Australia's national identity. The Olympics 
28 The tourism benefits of the Sydney Olympics were reported to be L2.4 billion of the total 94.2 billion 
(Arup, 2002, p. 8). Arup obtained the figures from the IOC official report and Ministerial statements 
reported in the press (Arup, 2002, p. 8). 
29 Australia were 4a' in the medal table with 58 medals whilst in the previous . Games (1996 Atlanta) they 
had been 12'h with 12 medals (Short, 2003, p 11). 
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had only been staged in the Southern Hemisphere once before 30 and Australia had been 
striving to bring the Olympics back 'down under' ever since. Sydney's bid to stage the 
2000 Olympics was the third attempt in successive Olympiads by Australian cities 31 and 
Sydney had been harbouring ambitions to host the Olympics since the 1920s (Jobling, 
2000, p. 258). Organisationally the Games ran like clock work - in strong contrast to the 
1996 Atlanta Games that were beset with organisational difficulties - and received 
much praise for the structures that had been put in place to ensure the timely preparation 
and smooth operation of the Games. In terms of delivery Sydney raised the benchmark 
for subsequent events and this impacted on the MCG 2000. However, what Sydney also 
demonstrates is the drawbacks of an approach in which national and sub-national 
government set the priorities and dominate the process and where local government has 
little input or power. The Olympics were planned with national and regional needs in 
mind rather than those of the city and its inhabitants and once the 'show' was. over 
Sydney was left with sporting facilities it did not need and uncertainty over the future 
development of the Olympic Village. 
In Sydney Olympics the state (sub-national) and the federal (national) government were 
the main players and this reflects Australia's three-tiered system of governance and the 
sub-ordinate role of local government 32(. Stilwell and Troy, 2000). Furthermore, local 
government is a product of state government and state government may reduce or 
remove its powers and responsibilities (Stilwell and Troy, 2000). Under special 
Olympic legislation the New South Wales (NSW) state government created two special 
3" The Summer Olympics were held in Melbourne in 1956. 
31 Brisbane bid for the 1992 Games and Melbourne for the 1996 Games (Jobling, 2000). 
32 The federal and state governments have their powers defined in the constitution, whilst local 
government is not recognised. Although the powers of the federal government are constrained by the 
constitution, its tax revenue means that it is economically dominant and thus able to exert greater power 
than state governments. (Stilwell and Troy, 2000). 
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planning agencies 33 . This legislation consolidated and centralised planning powers with 
state government and with statutory authorities that were responsible to that government 
thereby removing some planning powers from local governments (Owen, 2002). The 
NSW state did not want local government, which otherwise wouldý have been the 
consent authority, to be able to delay the development of the Olympic facilitieS34 
(Searle, 2002). This 'streamlining' of the planning process was intended to 'fast track' 
developments and indeed most of the facilities were ready nearly a year a head of the 
Gaines (Owen, 2002). 
However, the centralisation of planning powers meant that theOlympic developments 
were planned primarily from a regional or national perspective and in isolation from 
local planning. The state government and OCA were focused on staging a mega-event, 
presenting the best image to a global audience and maximising macro-economic gains 
and were less concerned than local governments about the local, site-specific impacts of 
venues 35 (Owen, 2002). The overriding concern for OCA was to get the venues built on 
time and to specification and this resulted in reduced openness, accountability and 
public participation 36 (Owen, 2002). There were positive legacies for communities but 
the benefits tended to be unequally distributed, with middle class areas gaining more 
than more disadvantaged areas (Owen, 2002). In a highly critical account of the Sydney 
Games, Lenskyi (2002) highlighted community issues such as local opposition, negative 
impact on social housing, the role of the media and racism. The tight timetable and 
deadline of the Games meant that there was little room for delay and the Olympic 
33 The Olympic Co-Ordination Authority (OCA) which was responsible for delivering the venues and the 
development Homebush Bay. The Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA) was responsible for 
all transport - Olympic and also getting the populace of Sydney around on their day-to-day business 
(House of Commons, 1999). 
34 These powers have been used to forward other major urban developments such as Sydney's Darling 
Harbour redevelopment (Stilwell and Troy, 2002). 
35 Owen (2002) conducted a study of three local council areas. 
36 It should be noted that Owen (2002) found evidence of resistance to the anti-democratic tendencies of 
entrepreneuralism. with managerial and democratic concerns continuing to be important to some councils 
and there were also examples of community resistance. 
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legislation enabled OCA to proceed without taking much account of the views of local 
communities - priority was given to the Games. 
The OCA succeeded in getting the venues ready in good time for the Games and they 
fulfilled their Olympic function very well. Part of OCA's remit was to ensure that the 
Olympic sporting facilities were properly utilised after the Games, but even before the 
Olympics were staged, there were indications that the two large venues, built for the 
Olympics were going to struggle to find a long term role (Searle, 2002). Stadium 
Australia operates at a loss and although it has been converted (partially at government 
expense) for Australian Rules Football and has secured some key matches, its future is 
by no means certain (Sydney Morning Herald, 2005). The Stadium's problems are a 
result of a number of factors, including a dearth of major events and also competition 
for the few events that exist. The competition comes from smaller, state-controlled 
stadiums, in particular the Sydney Football Stadium located close to the city centre. 
Another important factor is the relatively small attendance at most matches which is a 
product of the nature of Australia's national sporting leagues and Sydney's place in 
them (Searle, 2002). The SuperDome - the indoor venue built for the Olympics - has 
suffered similar difficulties. From its opening the SuperDome 37 has failed to attract 
audiences from the smaller, State- controlled Sydney Entertainment Centre and in 2004 
its lease was put up for sale on the international market (Cashmere, 2004). Sydney 
simply does not need these venues. 
The choice of Homebush Bay 38 a de-industrialised neighbourhood in need of 
regeneration as the Olympic site was presented as a key element of the bid (Searle, 
37 The SuperDome is the largest indoor stadium in Australia with a capacity of 2 1,000, but almost no 
indoor events in Sydney require more than 10,000 seats (Searle, 2002, p. 854). 
38 The site was identified in the 1970s and was large enough to accommodate most venues and the 
Olympic Village, and its proximity to the city centre reduced travelling times for both athletes and 
spectators (Jobling, 2000). 
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2002; House of Commons, 1999). However, little attention appears to have been paid to 
, 
the post-Olympic function of the Olympic Park until after the Games were over. The 
development of the Olympic Park fell under the auspices of OCA, but the initial 
proposals were viewed as insufficient by the venue operators (Searle, 2002) and it was 
not until 2001 that the OCA invited architectural and urban designs practices to put 
forward their visions for a post-Olympic Park, and OCA unveiled their draft master- 
plan to create a 'vibrant' town centre with retail outlets, restaurants, bars and residential 
development. However, the master-plan was criticised on a number of fronts, in 
particular, for placing too much emphasis on current commercial potential39 of the site 
at the expense of its long-term potential as a sustainable community (Royal Australian 
Institute of Architects, 2001). A revised draft master plan contained some modifications 
but overall kept the structure of the initial draft and Searle has little confidence that the 
master-plan can: "generate a vibrant, fine-grained neighbourhood of the kind that 
attracts patrons to rival venues" (Searle, 2002, p. 857). 
Although the Sydney Games are often upheld as an example of how to deliver a 
memorable event and cities continue to draw on the experiences and expertise accrued 
by the Sydney teanýo other cities have probably learnt as much from what Sydney got 
'wrong' as from what it got 'right'. In particular, the legacy problems have influenced 
the approach taken to hosting mega- events. Both Manchester and London paid a great 
deal of attention to legacy issues and embedded Olympic developments and 
regeneration projects into broader plans for the city. Interestingly Athens did not plan 
for the 'day after' but they have advised London to starting planning immediately 
(Sports Illustrated, 2005). The Greek government has attracted criticism for this lack of 
39 Searle (2002) argues that: "It was essentially a developers' tabula rasa, containing little more than 
simple land use and density controls" (p. 856). 
40 The MCG 2002, the London Olympic bid team and now the 2012 Olympic team included personnel 
from Sydney. 
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post-Olympic planning 41 which has resulted in many venues being either empty or 
under utilised and their future uncertain (BBC/Galpin, 2005; Sports Illustrated, 2005). 
In addition, in inviting bids for the 2012 Olympics the IOC made it clear in its bidding 
criteria that host cities should not be left with expensive, unused facilities after the 
Games (O'Cormor, 2004; Vigor et al, 2004). 
Manchester Commonwealth Games 2002 
The Manchester Commonwealth Games followed in the footsteps of the Barcelona 
Olympics in using a mega-sports event as a tool for economic development and urban 
regeneration. They are also both examples of cities where city goveniment played a 
major role in driving the whole process (bid through to delivery). In both cases the city 
authorities were trying to project a new image of their city - as vibrant, a good place to 
visit and do business in - and assert a distinct identity, strengthen their position vAthin 
the global city hierarchy. 
In order, to fully understand the differences between the MCG and the LVNAC project 
it is necessary to take several steps back and trace Manchester's path to the MCG. 
Manchester is part of the group of cities (along with Sheffield, Birmingham and 
Glasgow) that are regarded as 'second cities' in the UK after London. As van den Berg 
et al (2002, p. 5 1) observe: "they share the challenge of finding their own competitive 
niche in the British urban system". Manchester like many other cities suffered as a 
result of the decline of its industrial base and this led to significant social and economic 
problems. Since the mid 1.980s Manchester has actively used sport to 're-imagine' the 
41 There 'was a change of government five months prior to the Games and the current Conservative 
government blames the previous Socialist administration for this lack of post- Olympic planning (Sports 
Illustrated, 2005). However, a year later ( August 2005) the plans were still vague and the empty venues 
costing E 100 million a year to maintain (BBC/Galpin, 2005). 
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city and as a tool for regeneration 42 , putting itself forward as a candidate to be the 
British nominated Olympic city for 1996 Summer Games. 43 The bid was initiated not by 
the city, but by a private entrepreneur, Sir Bob Scott, who was an important figure in the 
Manchester business world. Manchester was chosen to be British candidate city. 44 
Although unsuccessful in its bid 45 , undaunted Manchester put itself forward to be the 
candidate for the 2000 Olympics, but this time Manchester City Council actively backed 
the bid. The bid was well organised, better resourced and strong public-private 
partnerships had been established (Cochrane et al, 1996). Manchester once again 
secured the nomination this time beating off London. 46 A major drawback to a London 
bid was the lack of a unitary authority to back London or underwrite or co-ordinate the 
bid whereas Manchester had the city council (Hill, 1994). In other words the 
governance of London was seen as a 'problem'. 
Peck and Tickell (1995) and Cochrane, Peck and Tickell (1996) examined Manchester's 
Olympic bids within the context of globalisation and 'new urban politics'. The politics 
of the Olympic bids symbolise the 'new urban politics' - with its emphasis on growth, 
place-marketing and public-private partnerships. During the 1980s Manchester city 
council (MCC) was a "citadel of municipal socialism" (Peck and Tickell, 1995, p. 56)' 
but it was transformed still under the same Labour administration to "a metropolis of 
Olympian expedience in the 1990s" (Peck and Tickell, 1995, p. 56). During this period 
there was a burgeoning of public-private partnerships, an increasing accommodation of 
business interests and an emphasis on Manchester's growth potential. A group of 
business players (including Sir Bob Scott) dubbed the 'Manchester Mafia' come to the 
42 UP to this period Manchester's sport reputation was based on being the home to two football clubs - 
Manchester City and Manchester United -it lacked experience and its sports infrastructure was limited. '3 Manchester had been beaten to the 1992 nomination by Birmingham. 
44 Birmingham was the other city in the running to be candidate city. 
45 The 1996 Olympic Games were awarded to Atlanta. 
4's At one point there had been three rival bids from London, one dropped out and the other two made an 
uneasy and fragile alliance to bid on behalf of London (Hill, 1994). 
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fore during this period. They were the private end of public-private partnerships and 
could be found on the boards of a myriad of organisationS47 . Although "going for gold 
became synonymous with going for growth" (Peck and Tickell, 1995, p. 56), the authors 
concluded that what had emerged during this period was a 'grant coalition' rather than a 
'growth coalition' with the money being drawn into the area being in the form of 
government grants rather than through private enterprise (Cochrane, et al, 1996). 
The 2000 Olympic bid focused on urban regeneration in deprived East Manchester" 
and the plan was to create a 'new town' within the city. The regeneration of depressed 
inner city areas was firmly on the central government's policy agenda and this coupled 
with a strong business presence enabled the bid to make successful overtures to the 
Department of Environment. Hill (1994) argues that securing Environment was 
important because: "If the bid had been seen as a sports issue, it would have been 
downgraded to fit into the scale of expenditure associated with sport: as it was, the 
E55m development aid (for that is what it was) received from the Department of 
Environment was, of course, a sizeable sum" (p. 353). Manchester city council had by 
taking the private sector on board and by focusing on the growth and regeneration 
elements of the bid successfully played central government's game. 
Manchester did not win the 2000 Games 49 but van den Berg and colleagues (2002, 
pp. 54-55) argue that "it was a 'race worth losing'. " Firstly, the bid boosted 
Manchester's international profile. Secondly, the bidding process led to increased co- 
operation between the various key players in the city and improved relations between 
47 Training Enterprise Councils, Urban Development Corporation, East Manchester Partnership, North 
West Business Leadership Team and the Olympic Committee (Cochrane et at, 1996). 
48A once thriving industrial area it suffered badly in the economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s and 
effectively lost its industrial base. For example, between 1970-1985 it lost 60 per cent of its economic and 
and employment base (Russell, 2003). Initiatives to 'kick start' the area failed, the population declined 
and the area scores highly on a wide range of indicators of deprivation (Russell, 2003). 
49 The 2000 Olympics were awarded to Sydney. 
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the city and central government. Thirdly, it led to improvements in a number of 
strategic areas including transport, telecommunications and tourism. Fourthly, the bid 
instilled a new confidence and sense of civic pride. Finally, it generated E200 million, 
including 05 million of capital investment from central government. During the 
bidding period two sports venues were builtso that are well utilised 51 . However, the 
plans for the Sport City Stadium were shelved along with the major regeneration 
programme for East Manchester. The city council still believed that a major sporting 
event could act as a catalyst and it was with this belief that led to the decision to bid for 
52 the 2002 Commonwealth Games , which Manchester secured in 1995. 
What is evident is that by the time Manchester secured the Commonwealth Games, a 
great deal had been learnt from its earlier bids. Manchester presented a unified vision 
and the MCG was firmly embedded into broader plans for the city. City leaders had a 
clear vision and belief in what a mega-sport event could do for Manchester, they were 
prepared to commit resources and take a leading role. Furthermore, mature partnerships 
were in place and all this put Manchester on a good footing to take forward this highly 
complex project.. This is all in marked contrast to the LVNAC project. So why was 
Manchester with its networked system of governance able to successfully pursue a 
mega- event strategy while London was not? The answer may lay in the nature of the 
networked system that developed in the two cities during the 1990. In Manchester the 
partnerships were public-private and focused on market led regeneration, so suitable for 
a mega-event strategy. In London the partnerships were more public- third sector based, 
so Ile National Cycling Centre (the Manchester Velodrome) in East Manchester and the Manchester 
Evening News Arena, a multifunctional venue (i. e. used for conferences, concerts as well as sports 
events) in the city centre with excellent access to public transport networks 
51 For example, the Velodrome has staged 1995 World Cycling Cup; 1996 World Cycling 
Championships; 2002 MCG; 2003 World Track Master's Cycling Championships (from www. P-ames- 
legacy. com/cgi-bin/index. cRi/34 )[Accessed 18 Feb 2004]. The Arena is home to a basketball team and an 
ice hockey team and the matches played by both teams are well attended (van den Berg et al, 2002), 
52 It is a multi-sport event held every four years in one of the 70 countries of the Commonwealth. The 
Commonwealth comprises of countries that were fon-ner British colonies including Australia, Canada, 
India, Pakistan, Jamaica, Nigeria and South Africa. 
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focused on community based regeneration, so not a model that works well for mega- 
sports events. 
The award of the MCG allowed the plans to regenerate East Manchester to be revived. 
In 1999 the New East Manchester Urban Regeneration Company 53 was established to 
oversee the area's regeneration. A long term plan 54 was formulated with the twin 
overarching aims attracting people and business back to the area. The area has also been 
the focus of a range of central govenunent initiativesss and all this activity has led Ward 
(2003) to describe East Manchester as the "most Policy thick (area) in Britain" (p. 123, 
original emphasis). The regeneration programme for East Manchester is ongoing and it 
will be some time before it in certain whether the aims and aspirations of New East 
Manchester have been transfonned into reality. Brown (2001) and Ward (2003) have 
raised concerns that the entrepreneurial thrust of the redevelopment and the need to 
demonstrate 'success' may mean that the needs and wishes of the residents have been 
set aside. 
Although the MCG were declared an all round 'success' (CPC, 2000), during the course 
of preparations a number of problems arose and there were many that doubted that 
Manchester could 'pull it off. The bid was essentially a local one, with Manchester city 
53 New East Manchester as it is known was one of the first three Urban Regeneration Company's to be 
created in the country. It comprises of English Partnerships, the North West Development Agency, MCC 
and local communities. New East Manchester coordinates budgets and remits of others working in the 
area. 
54 The plan was set out in the New East Manchester Regeneration Framework 2001. Its aims includes 
doubling the local population to 60,000 over a 10-15 year period, building 12,500 new homes, renovating 
7000 existing homes, creating a new business park, creating a new town centre, creation of over 10,000 
newjobs in the area and the raising of educational attainment above the city average (Source: 
Commonwealth Games Legacy, Manchester 2002 available from www. gameslegacy. com [Accessed 18 
February 2004]. 
55 Including Sure Start, New Deal for Communities, Health, Sport and Education Action Zones. 
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council (MCC) taking the leading role 56 and although central government was 
supportive its role was peripheral. MCC underwrote the bid and promised that local 
council taxpayers would not be burdened with any losses. However, by 1999 concerns 
were being raised about the organisation and funding of the MCG (House of Commons, 
1999).. The Commonwealth Games had grown in size and scope 57 , in political and 
economic significance58 and the 1998 Commonwealth Games held in Kuala Lumpur 
(Malaysia) raised the benchmark. All this meant that the plans for MCG were in many 
ways 'out of date' 59 
Central government accepted the argument forwarded by the Select Committee that. it 
was an event of national importance and thus central government should play a 
'leading' rather than 'supporting' role and invest in the MCG (House of Commons, 
1999). A Minster of State was appointed with responsibility for the MCG and links 
were forged between central government and the MCG organisers, funding committed 60 
and the MCG linked into the celebrations for the Queen's Golden Jubilee in 2002. 
Preparations continued and new senior staff brought in to deliver the MCG, along with 
personnel from the Sydney Olympics. Although significant progress was made 61with 
little over a year to go there remained concerns over the budget. Central government 
appointed Patrick Carter to review the organisation and finances of the MCG. He 
concluded that the MCG required a substantial cash injection and if that could not be 
found then the Games should be cancelled (Hetherington, 2001). Ministers did not want 
to entertain the thought that the MCG would collapse in the midst of the Queen's 
56 The MCC had direct responsibility for facility development and regeneration and delegated 
responsibility for organising the event to a Company with a separate legal identity (Manchester 
Commonwealth Games Ltd) and a subsidiary Manchester 2002 was responsible for delivering the Games. 571n the end the MCG were the largest event ever with 17 sports and 5,9000 athletes and officials - an 
increase of 20 per cent on earlier Gaines (CPC, 2002, p. 5). 
58 The end of apartheid in South Africa and the conclusion of the Cold War have increased the political 
and economic significance of the Commonwealth Games (House of Commons, 1999). 
59'lbis was compounded by the success of Sydney that once again raised the bench mark. tD 
60 Central government committed LIO million to the opening and closing ceremonies. 
61 For example, the Aquatics Centre opened ahead of schedule and other developments were on target. 
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Golden Jubilee celebrations and extra funding was found in the fonn of a; 6 I 00m rescue 
package put together by central goverment, Sport England and MCC (Hetherington, 
2001). 
The preparations for MCG 2002 involved constructing new sporting venues 62 and MCC 
was keen to avoid the problems experienced by other cities, such as Sydney, that have 
been left with expensive, underused facilities. A number of strategies were employed to 
prevent the 'white elephant' scenario. For example, the Aquatics Centre was built for its 
legacy use 63 and temporary seating was added for the Games. More significantly, prior 
to the Gaines MCC secured the post-Gaines future of the stadium, as home to 
Manchester City Football Club. Although the 'deal' struck between MCC and the club 
was criticised for favouring the club (Brown, 2001), it'did avoid the embarrassment of a 
costly 'white elephant'. 
As an event the MCG were a sporting, organisational and financial success. 64 In 
sporting terms Britain did well, with England coming second in the'medal table overall 
after Australia 65 . Moreover, the MCG demonstrated that Britain could successfully 
stage a mega sports event and given the UK's track record this was important. What 
Manchester clearly illustrates is the dynamic and competitive nature of hosting mega- 
events. Each city strives tq at least match or preferably better the last city's event and 
62 Including a38,000 capacity stadium, Aquatics Centre, Regional Athletics Arena (legacy of MCG built 
around the warm up track and training facilities), National Squash Centre, National Tennis Centre, Bolton 
Arena (multi sport with indoor and outdoor facilities adjacent to Reebook Stadium home Bolton 
Wanderers FQ and Heaton Bowling Centre (from: wivw. gameslegacy. com/cei-bin/index. cgi/34. 
63 It is used as a training facility for elite swimmers and for leisure swimming for the community. 
64 The Chairman of the Commonwealth Games Federation, the international governing body declared 
"Manchester, you are the best" (Manchester 2002,2002). Contrary to the dire predictions of financial 
disaster that emanated from Whitehall, commercial revenue (L55m) exceeded forecasts by E4.4m 
(Hetherington, 2002). This was in part due to phenomenal ticket sales with many events taking place in 
front of near capacity crowds and the contingency fund set remains largely untapped. Organisers have 
been able to return money to funders - Sport England, central government and MCC all received at least 
f2m back (Hetherington, 2002). 
65 Australia secured 206 medals (82 Gold; 62 Silver; 62 Bronze) and England secured 165 (54 Gold; 
51 Silver; 60 Bronze) (BBC, 2002b). 
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given the time period between being awarded the event and staging it, the original 
proposals can easily be superseded. In the case of the Commonwealth Games the status 
of the event itself is increasing so that the MCG had to adapt from being a modest city 
based event to one of national standing. What is also clear from Manchester is that cities 
can learn from both their own experiences and also from other cities. 
Perhaps most significantly MCG demonstrated the key role of city government in 
delivering mega sports events that can benefit the city and its inhabitants long after the 
athletes and the international media circus have left. It also confirmed the importance of 
central government in the mega-sports event process. The MCG was a success because 
both the city and central goverrunent conunitted to the event. However it should be 
noted that the MCC and its partners laid down firm foundations for the MCG and 
without those foundations it is unlikely that even with central government support such 
a successful event could have been delivered. 
UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS OF SPORT AND 
GOVERNANCE IN LONDON 
Sports events and London: a brief histor 
Sport is important to London and Londoners: approximately 45 per cent of Londoners 
take part in sport (excluding walking) once a month (Sport England, 2001). Many more 
are spectators, for example, at one the capitals' twelve premier and football league 
clubs. That sport can be used as tool for city promotion and regeneration has not gone 
unnoticed in London and it has a past history - the 1948 Olympics and the 1966 
Football World Cup- which demonstrated this role and it has been host to non sports 
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major events. In addition, London plays host to high profile calendar events, most 
notably the London Marathon 66 and the Lawn Tennis Championships at Wimbledon. 
However, apart from a few matches for Euro '96, the last mega sports event to be staged 
in the capital was 1966 FIFA World Cup. Given London's position as a global city, this 
is perhaps somewhat surprising. With its many cultural attractions and amenities 
London is regarded favourably by international sporting bodies, indeed, the IAAF made 
no secret of the fact that they wanted the World Athletics Championships to be held in 
London (House of Commons, 2001 a). Following the failure of the Birmingham and 
Manchester bids for the Olympic Gaines, the British Olympic Association (BOA) 
decided that any future bid had to be centred on London having concluded that it was 
the only British city that stood a chance of winning. 
This raises the question as to why at the turn of the twenty first century London had not 
played host to a mega sporting event for nearly 40 years? One reason is that London 
lacks international standard sporting facilities so that hosting an event entails 
considerable capital investment. For example, London has only two 50 metre swimming 
pools, neither of which meets the requirements for international competitions, and this 
compares unfavourably to other European capitaIS67 (ASA, 2002). The London Olympic 
bid 68 involved the construction of an Aquatics Centre which is currently being bui109 
and this forms part of the legacy of the bid. The award of the Olympic Games means 
that extensive sporting facilities will have to be constructed 70. However, in the past 
"The London Marathon 
' was 
begun in 1981 by former Olympic champion, Chris Brasher, and is now 
firmly on established on the international circuit for professional athletes as well as the large number of 
amateur athletes who take part. In 1981 there were 7,747 runners and in 2003 there were 46,500 and the 
race has about twice as many applications as it has places (London Marathon, website www. london- 
marthon. co. uk, accessed 5 May 2004). 
67 The National Facilities Strategy for Swimming, stated that as a mininium, there should be at least one 
eight lane 50m, pool in each quadrant of the area bounded by the M25, and that one of these pools should 
have ten lanes and be sized to stage major events such as European championships (ASA, 2002). 
68 The Aquatic Centre would have gone ahead whether the Games had been awarded or not. 
69 It is due for completion in 2008. 
70 Including an 80,000 capacity stadium, hockey complex, velodrome, multi-sport complex, tennis 
complex in the Olympic Park, Stratford, East London. In addition a canoeing slalom in Broxboume, 
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developing international standard sporting facilities in London has proved to be far from , 
a straight forward process, as evident from the re-development of Wembley Stadium 
and the LVNAC project. 
A second reason for London's poor record is that in terms of bidding for and delivering 
major sporting or cultural events is that between 1986-2000 there was no strategic 
overview or unitary authority to take the lead. Until the arrival of the GLA and Mayor 
there had been no strategic framework in which to locate sport, synchronise 
developments or tap into its potential in a co-ordinated manner. It was within this 
context that the LVNAC project was operating and the case study showed that the 
governance of London in that period was a key element in the failure of the project. The 
success of the Olympic bid within a few years of the failure of the LVNAC project is 
intimately related to changes in governance structures as well as changes in attitudes 
evolving over time. The next section will consider the relationship between the evolving 
governance of London and its significance for mega-sports events. 
London's changing govemance 
In relation to the evolution of the London's governance and its significance to mega- 
sports events three distinct periods can be identified and will be considered in turn: 
s Pre-Mayor (1986-2000); 
e Establishment of the Mayor and GLA (2000-2003); 
* Maturing Mayoralty (2003 onwards). 
Hertfordshire and a temporary indoor venue next to the Millennium Dome (this is currently being 
developed into a 20,000 seat sports and entertainment centre) (The Guardian, 2005, p. 5). 
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Pre-Mayor (1986-2000) 
The period in which London was without a unitary authority was characterised by a lack 
of strategy, vision, effective partnerships and co-ordination that impacted on London as 
there was no one responsible for thinking about London as a 'whole' or to give 'voice' 
to London issues. Governance was fragmented with government ministers, the London 
boroughs, and various joint arrangements all playing a part. The result was that decision 
making became very fragmented and power shifted to Whitehall (Newman and 
Thornley, 1997; Pimlott and Rao, 2002). In practice it meant it was extremely difficult 
to get 'big' (e. g. major transport developments) decisions made and London was 
dogged by indecision.. 
In relation to mega sporting events, one of the clearest illustrations of the problems that 
arose from the lack of a unitary authority was London's failure to become the British 
bid city for successive Olympics. The lack of a unitary authority led to a situation where 
it was possible for there to be three rival London bids vying for the 2000 Olympic 
nomination (Hill, 1994). The 2000 nomination went to Manchester with its metropolitan 
council. As already noted this failure led London organisations with an interest in sport, 
to form a small pan-London organisation in the mid 1990s - London International Sport 
(LIS). The membership of LIS was broad, including the Association of London 
Goverment, London First (business organisation), sport bodies and the London Tourist 
Board. In the absence of a unitary authority it was hoped that being pan-London would 
give LIS legitimacy and work began with the BOA on a potential London Olympic bid 
in 1997. The LIS is an example of the pan-London networks that developed in order to 
fill the gap left by the lack of a unitary authority. 
From other cities we have seen that leaders and individuals can make a difference not 
only to the success or otherwise of a project but also to the form and direction of 
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projects. Network governance systems require clear leadership and direction, 
particularly in the case of large complex projects like mega-events. For example, in 
Manchester a period of stability and continuity provided the city's leaders with an 
opportunity to take a longer term strategic view and to pursue a mega-event strategy as 
a means of regeneration. The LVNAC project began at a time when London lacked a 
leader or an overall vision, so there was no one to take forward the project or situate it 
within the overall plans for London and it suffered as a consequence (see Figure 7.2). 
The LVNAC project began to take shape in early 2000, shortly before the election of the 
Mayor and Assembly, and so the roots of the LVNAC project lie firmly in the pre- 
Mayor era. The LVNAC was planned when there was no overall strategic framework 
for London (sporting or otherwise) in which to the locate it, no 'city' to sign the IAAF 
contract to stage the World Athletes Championships, no London leader to take the lead 
an d champion the project. Furthermore, these roots continued to strongly influence the 
project even after the establishment of the Mayor.. 
Establishment ofthe Mayor and GL4 (2000-2003) 
The Mayor and Assembly were elected in May 2000 and thus the LVNAC project 
unfolded during the transitional period as the new institutions and personnel were 
coming on stream. Although many of the personnel were not new to London 
governance 71 they had new roles in new institutions that were 'bedding down' and the 
whole system was in a state of flux as it shifted to accommodate the changes. Making 
all the new appointments required by city government can take a considerable time 72 
and although most senior posts had been filled within a year, lower levels posts within 
the GLA and functional bodies were still being filled early in 2002 (Travers, 2002). 
71 A number of bodies including the London Ecology Centre, London Planning Advisory Committee and 
the London Research centre were absorbed into the GLA and personnel transferred their employment to 
the GLA (Pimlott and Rao, 2002). 
72 Evidence from Toronto, Canada -where a new Mayoral system was established in 1996- is that it can 
take over two years to make all the new appointments (Travers, 2002). 
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Figure 7.2: The LVNAC project and the London Olympic 2012 bid compared. 
KEY ELEMENTS LVNAC/WAC 2005 LONDON OLYMPIC BID 
Origins Removal of athletics from Unsuccessful bids based on 2 nd 
WNS, a need to find a venue tier cities led BOA to believe 
for WAC 2005 that only a London bid had a 
chance of success 
Sports governance WAC committee long standing BOA and LIS working on bid 
and well connected but LVNAC for 6+ years, strong sport- 
team new. politics network. 
UKA small, little negotiating 'Hard line' approach from 
power. BOA- total buy in from 
government or no bid. 
Sport England sceptical and un- G eneral support from other 
supportive. sporting bodies. 
Regional government GLA new body, on the sidelines GLA forefront of bid 
LDA peripheral role LDA central role 
Mayor - equivocal Mayor- vocal champion 
Central government The Dome and V*TNS fiascos Encouraged by the success of 
mean that there is not universal the MCG means that there is 
support from Whitehall universal support from 
departments. Whitehall departments. 
'Let's do it' approach - 'Balance sheet' approach - 
Appeared to not have thought considered deliberations before 
though the implications of either committing the government 
WAC or LVNAC. 
Leadership and champions No clear leader. Bid initially led by Barbara 
Committed team but lacked Cassani, business player, 
experience and 'clout'. replaced 2004 by Lord Coe, 
Chris Smith only champion former athlete and politician. 
within government up to June High profile, experienced team, 
200 1. Local business player including ex-Manchester 2002 
acted as champion but staff. Mayor of London key 
recognised own limitations. champion along with others 
Perceived as vote loser for from sports, politics, business 
Mayor. and in the Prime Minister in the 
latter stages. 
Perceived as vote winner for 
Mayo . 
Rationale Provide national stadium and Regeneration of East London 
centre for athletics Consolidate/reassert London's 
Regeneration potential coatested position as a world city 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Legend: 
BOA: British OlYmpic Association 
LDA: London Development Agency 
LVNAC: Lee Valley National Athletics Centre 
GLA: Greater London Authority 
LIS: London International Sport 
WAC: World Athletics Championships 
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From other cites, such as Manchester we have seen the advantages of having mature 
stable governance arrangements when hosting mega sports events. 
Although a significant issue for the LVNAC project, the problems caused by the 
transition to the GLA were essentially short term. However, more fundamental 
questions were raised within the LVNAC case study and elsewhere (e. g. Travers, 2002) 
about the ability of the new arrangements to deliver major sports projects. The Mayor's 
limited powers and resources and the continuing complexity of London governance 
were seen as factors that would militate against hosting mega sports events. Early 
research (e. g. Travers, 2002; Kleinman et al, 2002; Rao, 2003; Syrett and Baldock, 
2003) on the impact of the GLA and the Mayor on the governance of London indicated 
that there was a great deal of continuity with network governance and coalition 
building, inter-agency and partnership working continuing to be important. British 
government institutions at local regional and national level tend to evolve within their 
original legislative framework and this appears to be the case for the new arrangements 
for London (Travers, 2002). 
The governance of London remains complex 73 and central government continues to 
play an important role, with very few government institutions ceasing to operate post 
May 2000. For example, the Government Office for London (GOL), the defacto 
"regional" tier of central government remains important (Travers, 2002; Kleinman et al, 
2002). There is agreement that the creation of the GLA and Mayor does not constitute a 
significant reversal of the centralism which is characteristic of British politics and the 
new bodies have to work within the constraints of a centralist framework (Kleinman et 
al, 2002; Travers, 2002; Syrett and Baldock, 2003). Travers (2002) argued that even 
73 Travers (2002) argues that there are 
, 
in effect four different kinds of governmental institutions: central 
government departments; govermnent appointed boards; GLA and the boroughs. 
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achieving modest change was going to require the various players working together and 
that: "Securing the powers and funding for a major project such as a new railways line 
or a key sports event will often still be beyond the capacity of this multiplicity of 
organizations and individuals" (p. 788). In fact, as we have seen throughout this thesis 
such sports events often involve the construction of a new railway line in addition to 
building new facilities. 
Sweeting (2003) assessed the 'strength' of the Mayor in relation to two dimensions - 
strength within the administration and power beyond the confines of office- and 
concluded that Ken Livingstone was a type 3 mayor: that is strong in relation to the 
GLA but with limited autonomy and power in local governance. The Mayor and GLA 
functions in a political environment that limits local autonomy and like local authorities 
the Mayor and GLA owe their existence to Parliament, who also decide their functions, 
structures and sources of finance. Moreover, central government could reform or even 
abolish them, if it so wished (Sweeting, 2003). It is clear that when the GLA and 
Mayoral structures were being developed some Whitehall departments took steps to 
limit the autonomy of the Mayor 74 . Gordon (2004) argues: "the basic position of the 
Mayor and GLA as a whole is very weak, both formally and in terms of resources" 
(p. 4). Although the Mayor is powerful in relation to the Assembly, he is financially 
weak in relation to central government (Kleinman et al, 2002; Travers, 2000). The 
Mayor has no tax-raising powers and thus, London continues to be reliant on central 
government and private sector funding, with government being the key (Gordon, 2004). 
In the case of the LVNAC the Mayor argued that he did not have the resources to 
underwrite the WAC. 
74 For example, the structure of the MPA means the Home Secretary retains a great deal of power and 
under the existing legislative arrangements the Mayor would find it difficult to effect major change in the 
police service (Travers, 2002). 
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In addition, Ken Livingstone was elected in 2000 as an Independent have being 
expelled from the Labour party and relations were strained between the Mayor and 
central government. Although this independence gave him manoeuvrability and meant 
he was not tied to party politics (Kleinman et al, 2002; Syrett and Baldock, 2003), as 
Sweeting (2003) argued it meant that he was politically isolated and thus could not rely 
on party loyalty or use party connections to gain influence at other levels of government 
as some French and American Mayors have done. . 
As noted in Chapter Five one of the main res I ponsibilities of the Mayor is to produce 
London wide strategies but the LVNAC project preceded these strategies. The LDA 
began work on two key strategies quickly 75 and Towards the London Plan: The Initial 
Proposalsfor the Mayor's Spatial Development Strategy (GLA, 200 1) and the EDS 
Success through Diversity_(LDA, 200 1 b) were published in the summer of 2001 76 . The 
Upper Lee Valley, the location of the proposed National Athletics Centre was identified 
in both documents as one of the regional corridors that would be the focus of 
development. Interestingly the plans for the LVNAC were mentioned only in passing 
and in a manner that with hindsight hinted at the stance that the Mayor would take to the 
project: 
London is an important location for international, national and local sports 
activities. However, some existing international facilities are inadequate to meet 
modem requirements. To reflect its world city role, London should be able to 
host a range of world class sporting events. Proposals to accommodate these are 
currently being investigated (for example at Wembley and in the Lee Valley). 
75 For example, a draft Economic Strategy was published in December 2000 (LDA, 2000). 
76 These documents have been superseded by Sustaining Success: Developing London's Economy (LDA, 
2005) and The London Plan (GLA, 2004a). 
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These will form part of a wider evaluation of capacity to inform an Olympic bid, 
focused on East London (GLA, 2001, p. 37). 
The use of the word. 'investigate' is telling, as by then the LVNAC project was 
seemingly well under way - the project was over a year old, the stadium design had 
been unveiled and the planning application had been submitted to the London Borough 
of Enfield. Although the Upper Lee Valley and LVNAC featured in early documents, it 
was clear that the Mayor and the LDA had their sights focused firmly on the Lower Lee 
Valley, East London and the Thames Gateway for regeneration activities. From these 
early documents it is evident that although the Olympic bid was already firmly 
embedded in the Mayoral plans for London the LVNAC project was not. Furthermore, 
the appeal of the Olympics for the Mayor appeared to lie not only in its regeneration 
potential but also in its ability to consolidate London's position as a world city. The 
Mayor had vocally championed another London mega-sports project (WNS)77 but he 
did not - as many expected him to do- take up the mantle for the LVNAC project giving 
it (at best) lukewarm support probably because it did not seem to able to deliver 
significant gains for London (i. e. regeneration, status etc 
Maturing Mayoralty (2003 onwards). 
In January 2004 Ken Livingstone was readmitted to the Labour Party 78 following 
Prime Minister Blair's admission that far from being the "disaster" he had predicted, 
Ken Livingstone had done a good job as Mayor (Muir, 2004a)79. This opened the way 
to him becoming the Labour candidate for the June 2004 Mayoral election in which he 
77 Both as Mayor and earlier as MP for Brent the constituency in which the development lies. 
78 Ken Livingstone was expelled in 2000 and banned from membership for 5 years for standing as an 
independent mayoral candidate. 
79 Indeed, this move was thought to be prompted by fears of Labour losing the Mayoral election and being 
harmed in the European elections on the same day (Muir, 2004a). 
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was re-elected for a second teim with Livingstone arguing that being within Labour 
party structures would strength his ability to argue the case for London (Muir, 2004a). 
Early research Kleinman et al (2002) on the governance changes described the change 
from pre to post GLA as a shift from network governance with no centre to network 
governance with a weak centre. Nevertheless the difference is significant and with time 
the significance has become more apparent as the structures, networks and personnel 
have become established. Pimlott and Rao (2002) argued that the Mayor's success was 
dependent "upon his ability to work within the institutional and political constraints" 
(p. 20) and certainly he has proved to be adept at working within this system. 
In order to take forward his strategies, including the Olympics the Mayor has to work 
with a variety of actors, including central government, the boroughs, sub-regional 
partnerships and business and in general he has Proved to be skilled in building 
coalitions and working in partnership (Kleinman et al, 2002; Syrett and Baldock, 2003). 
Ken Livingstone has fostered a positive relationship with business and has managed to 
combine a commitment to social issues (equality, diversity and social inclusion) with a 
pro-business and pro-growth vision of London as a global city (Syrett and Baldock, 
2003). Certainly business was seen to 'back the bid', with a reported eighty one per 
cent of businesses supporting the London Olympic bid8o and the list of supporters 
included many private sector players, both individual businesses 81 and national and 
regional representative bodies 82 
so London Chamber of Commerce poll conducted 23 January 2003 and cited in BOA press release I Ph 
Feb 2003 (BOA, 2003b). 
81 By February 2003 (when the cabinet was due to announce decision as to whether central government 
would support the bid or not) 138 letters of support had been received from individual businesses (BOA, 
2003b). 
82 Including Confederation of British Industry, London First, London Business Board, London First, 
London Chamber of Commerce and Industry and other local Chambers of Commerce and Industry (e. g. 
Leeds). 
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Unlike other recent mega-sports projects (LVNAC, WNS), the Olympics were planned 
within the context of London wide strategies and neither the Mayor nor central 
government rushed into the Olympics, indeed central government attracted both praise 
(House of Commons, 2003) and criticism for its measured approach ( e. g. Observer, 
2002). 83 A great deal of background work was done on a potential Olympic bid by the 
BOA and others and a cost-benefits analysis of staging the Olympics based in East 
London was commissioned 84 (Arup, 2002). The Arup report delivered a positive 
assessment but emphasised the need for all levels of government and other agencies to 
work together on a common proposal and for political priority to be given to the bid and 
subsequent Games (Arup, 2002). In readmitting the Mayor to the Labour party, the 
Prime Minister emphasised the need for the Mayor and government to work together 
particularly on London's 2012 Olympic bid (Muir, 2004a). The Olympic bid received 
broad support from the Select Committee (House of Commons, 2003) and London 
Assembly (GLA, 2003d). Both reports highlighted legacy issues, the need for the costs, 
proposed funding and underwriting arrangements to be clearly explained and 
recommended the appointment of an Olympics Minister 85 (House of Commons, 2003; 
GLA, 2003d). 
From the outset the Mayor placed great store on London hosting major and mega 
sporting events and the title of the Cultural Strategy London Cultural Capital: Realising 
the Potential ofa World Class City (GLA, 2004b) reveals the importance ascribed to 
world class events and institutions. The London Plan was published in 2004 and 
described as: "the first democratically sanctioned, statutory, strategic plan prepared for 
London for nearly three decades" (GLA, 2004a, p. 3). The Olympics featured strongly 
93 The 'will they-won't they' question received a great of attention in the media and was exacerbated by 
the growing crisis in Iraq that led to the decision being delayed. rD 
84 Arup was commissioned in January 2002 by a 'Stakeholders Group' comprising central govenunent, 
Mayor of London and BOA. 
85 Tessa Jowell, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport has been appointed as Olympic Minster. 
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in the London Plan which has an integrative role in relation to the other strategies and 
thus according to Gordon (2004) makes it of greater importance than the other 
strategies. The EDS (LDA, 2005) identifies mega sports events as a key tool for 
marketing and promoting London, for developing London as a 'brand' as well as a 
means of forwarding infrastructure projects. Similarly mega sport events are thought to 
be an important component of business tourism, with the experiences of Barcelona and 
Sydney being drawn upon to support this proposition (LDA, 2004b; LDA, 2005)86. 
It is not just mega-sports events that have received consideration but sport more 
generally, although interestingly the initial proposals contained in the draft Culture 
Strategy London: Cultural Capital (GLA, 2003e) were criticised for not paying enough 
attention to sport (GLA, 2003e). Since then there has been a plethora of London sport 
related publications from both the GLA and other key bodies, examining sport from its 
many different angles". These studies have highlighted that sport is an important part of 
the fabric of London. For example, one study mapped out the issues facing football 
clubs and residents when clubs look to redevelop or relocate and highlighted the integral 
place of football in London's cultural and community 
-landscape 
(GLA, 2003b). It is 
also evident that sport forms a distinctive and significant sector of London's economy 88 
and there appears to be scope for sport to have a, greater role in London's economy 
(GLA, 2003a). Sport has also featured in other strategies, for example, the Children's 
and Young People's Strategy (GLA, 2004c) draws attention to the importance of 
physical activity (play and sport) to children and young people and the need to improve 
facilities and access. The possibilities presented by a successful Olympic bid thread 
96 Barcelona and Sydney both experienced an increase in business events following the Olympics because 
of infirastructural improvements and the enhanced profile of the city (LDA, 2004b). 
87 For example, increasing overall participation and improving access (Sport England, 2004a), improving 0 
sporting opportunities for young people (GLA, 2003), the part sport plays in the leisure economy (GLA, 
2003a), tennis in London (GLA, 2005a) and the socio-economic impact of football stadiums on their 
immediate vicinity (GLA, 2003b). 
88 According to the GLA study sport employs 29,000 people and generates L700 million in sales (GLA, 
2003b, p. 7) 
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through documents, for example, both the London Plan for Sport (Sport England, 
2004a) and the Children's and Young People's Strategy (GLA, 2004c) highlight the 
potential opportunities for grassroots sport that arise from London hosting the 2012 
Olympics. 
Gordon (2004) argues that given the Mayors limited financial resources the strategic 
plans for London are contingent on the being able to persuade central goverment to 
underwrite key items of investment. Although this remains the case, there are several 
important points to note. Firstly, that the Mayor has been successful in persuading the 
government to underwrite major projects, the London Olympics being a clear example 
and certainly, the London Olympics and the associated regeneration of East London 
would not have proceeded without central government as ultimate guarantor 89 . The 
Olympic bid provides an example of the importance of persuasion, patronage and 
publicity for the Mayor which Kleinman et al (2002) identified as an important means 
in which the Mayor had levered in powers. 
Secondly, the Mayor has committed London to paying a large component of the costs of 
staging the Gaines via an Olympic precept. This precept represents an extension, albeit 
a modest one of the Mayors powers and along with the congestion charge 90 
demonstrates that the Mayors powers and resources are not fixed and that there is room 
for manoeuvre. The London Olympics Bill will grant the Mayor Olympic specific 
powers to enable the GLA to fulfil its obligations as host city (DCMS, 2005c). The 
Olympic precept and the congestion charge are important precedents and it seems likely 
that the Mayor will continue to seek means to consolidate and extend his powers. 
89 Central government has guaranteed that it will act as the ultimate guarantor of the construction costs of 
the infrastructure, venues and facilities necessary for staging the Games (DCMS, 2005b) 
90 Since February 2003 vehicles have had to pay a 'congestion charge' to travel through central London 
during the hours of 07.00-18.30, Monday-Friday (excluding public holidays) as a means of reducing 
traffic congestion. The cost was initially E5 but rose in 2005 to Hand the money is used to improve 
London's public transport system. In September 2005 the Mayor announced that the congestion charging 
zone will be extended to the west from September 2007. 
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However, the power to rescind the Olympic specific powers lies with the Secretary of 
State and this should act as a reminder that the balance of power still lies firmly with 
central government. Thus, the Olympic bid benefited from the improvement in working 
relations and the restitution of trust between the Mayorand central government that 
were lacking during the LVNAC project. 
It is evident that a great deal of thought was put into the Olympic bid, that different 
levels of government were engaged with the process and also that the plans were subject 
to scrutiny and debate. This is in strong contrast to previous bids and mega sports 
projects in London, including the LVNAC project, WNS and attempts to be the 
candidate city for earlier Olympics. Perhaps most importantly central government have 
committed themselves totally, they have approved a ftinding package9l and agreed to act 
as guarantor (DCMS, 2005b). In addition the structures to manage and deliver the 
Games were set out in the bid and the legislation necessary to create them set in train 
immediately after the Games were awarded (DCMS, 2005c) and to recruit the personnel 
for the key posts 92 . There is a clear separation of responsibilities between the London 
Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG) and the Olympic Delivery 
Authority (ODA) (DCMS, 2005b). The LOCOG is responsible for the delivery of the, 
event and the ODA will manage central government's and the Mayor's interests and 
will be accountable to them (DCMS, 2005b). These arrangements are similar to those 
for Sydney 2000 and demonstrate how cities learn from each other. In the same vein 
London has learned from the legacy problems of Sydney and venues have been 
91 Central government and the Mayor have agreed a public funding package of E2.375 billion that will be 
found from London council Tax (the Olympic precept), LDA and Lottery funding (DCMS, 2005b). 
92 An interim LOCOG with Seb Coe as Chair began work immediately and by the end of 2005 Chief 
Executive should be appointed - the list of candidates include Frances Done who headed up MCG, Jim 
Sloman organising chief from Sydney 2000 and Nick Bitel, London Marathon Chief Executive. 
(BBC, 2005). The Chair and Chief Executive of the ODA were appointed in November 2005. The Chair, 
Jack Lemley, was Chief Executive of the consortium Transmanche Link that was responsible for 
constructing the Channel Tunnel (DCMS, 2005d). See below for details of the Chief Executive. 
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designed with their legacy use in mind 93 and the Mayor has promised post-Olympic 
funding for the remaining London venues (DCMS, 2005b). This not the only way that 
London has drawn on the expertise amassed from Sydney: the Chief Executive of the 
London ODA - David Higgins 
94_ was Chief Executive of the company that built the 
Sydney Olympic Village and Aquatic Centre. 
CITIES AND MEGA-SPORTING EVENTS: CONCLUSIONS 
From this examination of cities and the hosting of mega-sports events a number of 
critical points emerge. In general terrns, it is clear that cities take different approaches to 
staging such events and that 'success' comes in a number of forms. The variations in 
approach reflect local conditions and aspirations, with cities-using these events to 
promote their particular vision within the context of globalisation (Newman and 
Thomley, 2005). Despite the diversity of approaches it is possible to identify key 
'elements' required for the delivery of successful mega sporting events. Although for 
the purposes of clarity these elements will be separated, they are in reality inter-linked 
and as we have seen throughout this thesis they are not unproblematic and tensions can 
arise. 
Firstly, there needs to be a vision and clarity of purpose, this helps shape the bid, giving 
a focus and framework to work within. For example, Barcelona and Manchester were 
firinly focused on regeneration and this was reflected in the form that the events took, 
93 Some venues are temporary (e. g. indoor arena next to Dome), others (e. g. Olympic stadium will be 
scaled down) and some (e. g. five swimming and diving pools) will be dismantled and re-erected in other 
locations in the UK (DCMS, 2005b). 
94 David Higgins was Chief Executive of English Partnerships the government's national regeneration 
agency which he joined in March 2003. Prior to this he was MD and CE of the Lend Lease Group in 
Australia. In addition to the Sydney Olympic developments, the company was also responsible for the 
Bluewater Shopping Centre in Kent which is the largest retail and leisure complex in Europe (GLA, 
2005b). 
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with an emphasis on infrastructural improvements, and creating a sustainable legacy. 
London has adopted a similar approach for the 2012 Olympics. This is not to argue that 
having a clear vision is necessarily unproblematic, it is very dependent on the architects, 
and for example, it can lead to priority being given to the needs of particular groups, 
perhaps at the expense of other groups. In Manchester, although there was clear vision 
of how Manchester would benefit, it was a particular vision, one framed and dominated 
by an elite group of local business players. 
Following on from this, the whole process from deciding to bid, through delivery, to 
sustaining the legady, needs to be underpinned by strategic thinking at all levels of 
governance. Given the complex nature, costs and kudos involved, as we have seen it is 
rare for national government not play a part, indeed they often play a central role. At 
city level a mega event needs to 'fit' into the overall development of a city or run the 
risk of being dislocated from other developments both at city and neighbourhood level. 
What is difficult to achieve is a strategic framework that integrates national, sub- 
national, city and local needs, as well as economic development, physical regeneration, 
community development and social cohesion needs. For example, in Sydney the 
Olympics were planned and delivered within a strategic framework that prioritised 
national and sub-national needs to, at times, the detriment of those of the city and its 
inhabitants. 
Thirdly, mega-sporting events require strong, credible leadership to drive them forward. 
At the city level strong local leadership coupled with a clear vision can help ensure that 
the city needs are incorporated into bidding and staging of the event. For example, in 
Manchester, local actors - from the city council and the private sector- were the 
architects of the bid and central to the delivery of the MCG. However, as noted above it 
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was a particular vision, heavily influenced by an elite group of local business players. In - 
other words, a strong local presence does not necessarily mean that the needs of local 
communities or all sections of society will be forwarded. In London the Mayor was 
crucial in driving forward and shaping the 2012 Olympic bid as one that would be 
'good' for London and inclusive. However, there has been considerable opposition from 
certain communities, for example, small businesses in East London who face re-location 
or closure as the result of Olympic developments (Muir, 2004b; Smit, 2005). 
We know from Chapter Six that at the national level, the extent of involvement varies 
across nations, cities and events. However, there are two key ways in which central 
government can fundamentally undermine a mega-sporting project. First, when central 
government is not explicit about what their role is and the limits of that role. Second, if 
politicians and policy makers fail to demonstrate commitment and confidence in a 
project. As we have seen both the LVNAC and WNS projects were dogged by a lack of 
clarity about the role of central government and a lack of confidence in the project. 
Securing the requisite resources to bid and host a mega-sporting event is crucial and 
with a few notable exceptions (e. g. LA Olympics), most mega sport events are to 
varying extents reliant on public funds. Govenunents are usually keen to reduce their 
expenditure and draw in private sector funding. Even in France, there have been moves 
away from the traditionally government funded 'grand travaux'. Central government 
wanted the Stade de France to be privately financed and although in the end government 
funded almost half of it, it was the first time that the private sector had played such a 
major part in a large-scale sports project. What is important to remember is that the 
French government was standing firmly behind the project and was forthcoming with 
the rest of the funds. It does appear that if the government demonstrates commitment 
and confidence in a project - then the private sector are more likely to follow suit, as 
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was seen in the Sydney Olympics. Conversely, if the government does not appear to be 
committed and confident, as in the case of the LVNAC, then private investors stay 
away. 
Delivering mega sporting events is a mammoth undertaking, as it generally entails the 
construction of venues, improvements to transport infrastructure in addition to the 
organisation of the actu al event, and all to a deadline. In order to meet the deadline, 
specific governance bodies are often created and endowed with increased powers to 
'fast track' the process. Although these bodies are often very effective the desire to 'get 
things done' can result in opposition or certain local interests being overridden, as was 
the case in Sydney. In terms of actually hosting the event, it is evident that the 
requirements of the event need to be balanced with those of the host city. For example, 
in Atlanta the arrangements for the transport of the Olympic 'family' were divorced 
from those of day-to-day needs of the populace. The result was a shambles. Whilst in 
Sydney they were treated as a whole and a special body empowered to co-ordinate 
transport for the entire city during the Games with much better results. A related point is 
the need for organisations involved to have clear roles and responsibilities, without this, 
gaps, overlaps and confusion can arise - as they did in Atlanta. 
The number of costly 'white elephants' left behind after mega sporting and also cultural 
events is testament for the need for an exit strategy. The danger, as so evident in 
Sydney, the Millennium Dome in London and more recently Athens, is to focus on the 
event itself and not on the long term use of venues. In the case of Sydney this was 
probably the result of the dominance of central and state level government and the 
relatively small part played by the city. In contrast Manchester built venues for use at 
the MCG with their legacy use in mind and is a good example of the reflective nature of 
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the mega-event process. Coalter (2004) argues there has been a tendency to assume that 
the sporting benefits of hosting such events will 'trickle down', but the evidence 
suggests that this does not happen automatically. The result Coalter (2004) suggests is 
that cities and nations are left with a 'facilities legacy' rather than a "sporting legacy", 
because the latter requires a pro-active approach that builds routes into sport for all 
sections of the community. 
In raising this issue Coalter (2004) points to a central tension that runs through the 
whole mega-sports event debate. On the one hand there are those from the national and 
regional perspective that argue for the large-scale economic development and 
regeneration associated with mega-events, maintaining that the benefits - economic and 
sporting - will 'trickle down' to all communities. Whilst on the other hand, there are 
others, often from local agencies and the sports development field who argue that the 
money would be better spent harnessing sports potential to improve the health and 
social well being of local communities by providing community facilities, encouraging 
participation by providing routes into sport for all and using sport to reach excluded 
groups. This agenda is mostly associated with local and neighbourhood scale initiatives 
and is often overshadowed by large scale economic development projects, including 
mega-events, large scale cultural projects and improvements to transport infrastructure. 
Mega-sporting events are bound by time and space, and this gives them a tangibility 
which seems to appeal to a diverse array of actors - they are a 'project' albeit a large 
and highly complex one, with visible outcomes and an immovable deadline to work 
towards. In the case of Manchester, Peck and Tickell (1995) suggested that these 
qualities made mega-sporting events attractive to private sector players and this may be 
the case for the London Olympics. The LVNAC project seemed to have somewhat 
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limited appeal for anyone other than a few local and sub-regional business players 
probably because it was not planned within a London-wide framework nor had the 
confidence of central government. 
Hosting mega sporting events involves a myriad of players, including different levels 
and seetions of government, all with slightly varying agendas and also, external players 
such as the international sporting bodies with very specific agendas: with so many 
points of articulation tensions are inevitable. It does appear that time and 'practice' can 
help reduce these tensions. For instance, most successful events are the result of many 
years work - building up partnerships and networks, nurturing relationships, negotiating 
compromises, reworking and 'fine tuning' proposals and can involve repeated attempts 
to secure an event. Manchester is a clear exarnple of this process. However, given the 
high stakes involved in bidding for and hosting mega sporting events, there are 
pressures to secure an event quickly and this may mean trying to 'speed up' the process 
with all the uncertainties this entails. 
It could be argued that successful global cities need governance structures that pennit 
them to secure and host mega-sports events. However, it is also evident that what is 
required here is constantly evolving as the nature of these events is changing. 
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Chapter Eight 
Discussion - Conclusions and way forward 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw together the findings of the study, set Out what 
has been leamt and also suggest possible ways of taking this new knowledge forward in 
both the research and policy arenas. Firstly, a brief summary of the thesis will be given, 
along with the questions it sought to answer and the theoretical ideas underpinning it. 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into three sections, focusing in turn on 
methodology, govemance issues and sport. 
SUMMARY OF THESIS 
This thesis set out to explore the inter-relationships between'governance, sport and the 
city, with a particular focus on mega-sports events, using comparison and a cas e study. 
Mega-sports events have become important tools for cities seeking to enhance their 
global position, undertake regeneration and promote tourism. There is intense 
competition to win the rights to host such events, in particular for the 'big three' - the 
Olympics, the World Athletics Championships and the FIFA World Cup. At the outset 
of this thesis in 2001 UK and London had a relatively poor record in relation to bidding 
for and hosting mega and major sporting events. The case study - the failure of the 
LVNAC project and the loss of the rights to stage the 2005 WAC- was the latest in a 
series of large-scale sporting and cultural projects in London to encounter significant 
difficulties. All this raised a number of questions. Firstly, why had the UK generally and 
London in particular experienced so many difficulties in securing and realising mega- 
sporting events? Secondly, what was required to enable the UK and London to secure 
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and deliver such projects? Finally, for some there was a fundamental doubt that UK and 
, 
London could ever stage a successful mega-sports event. Over the course of this thesis 
as the plans to bring the Olympics to London in 2012 began to take shape and as the bid 
gathered momentum these questions became even more pertinent. 
At the same time as sport has become an important economic tool for cities, there have 
been changes in the way cities are governed. These changes are set against a 
background of a more general shift from government to governance, the involvement of 
a much broader range of actors in the process of governing and debates about what 
constitutes 'good governance'. What has emerged in some cities is a particular form of 
governance- termed network governance - based on the intense interaction of a large 
number of partners from all sectors (i. e. public, private etc). In the case of London, 
network governance has taken a particular form because of the economic and political 
importance of the capital and also as a practical response to the absence of a unitary 
authority for so long. This thesis was based on the premise that the key to understanding 
the failure of the LVNAC project and the development of other mega-sporting projects 
lay in understanding the nature of the prevailing governance arrangements. From this 
premise a working hypothesis was developed to underpin and guide the thesis, which is 
that the relative failure of the UK to bid for, and stage mega-sporting events is rooted 
within aspects of the style of network governance that has evolved in London and other 
UK cities. 
Research guestions 
At this stage it would probably be useful to remind ourselves of the main questions that 
the thesis set out to address and to set out the answers in a 'nutshell' before further 
discussion later in the chapter. 
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1. Is there a particular style (s) of governance associated with securing and delivering 
successful mega sports events? 
This thesis has clearly demonstrated that there is no one particular style of governance 
that is best suited to securing and delivering successful sports events and that different 
systems have their own strengths and weaknesses. It is also evident that there are 
different routes to 'success' but also that 'success' comes in a variety of forms and is a 
relative concept. In relation to mega-sports events the terms 'success' and 'failure' are 
full of ambiguity: depending on the criteria and time frame used the same event can be 
deemed both a 'success' and a 'failure'. However, the LVNAC proi pct was plainly a 
failure -and by examining this failure and comparing it with other nations and cities it 
has been possible to identify three key elements rooted in governance that are critical to 
securing and hosting a successful event: leadership, vision and strategy. Furthermore, it 
is apparent from this thesis that whatever the style of governance it needs to be clear (at 
all levels of governance) what the role of government is, the limits of that role and for 
government to visibly demonstrate their commitment and confidence in the project. 
2. What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the network style of governance 
in relation to bidding for and delivering mega sports events? 
A key strength of the network style of governance is that it helps forge links and 
establish relationships between the different players involved in the highly complex 
process of securing and delivering a mega-sport project. Network governance has the 
potential to produce a more 'joined up' approach to mega-sports projects and thus 
facilitate the expeditious delivery of such projects but also help embed the event and the 
associated developments into the city as a whole. However, networks can be dominated 
by sectoral interests and thus not deliver broad benefits. Network systems require strong 
leadership and the LVNAC project is a clear example of what happens without such 
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leadership. In similar vein network system benefits from having a coherent framework 
for all the players to work within, and again the LVNAC project demonstrated the 
drawbacks of not having such a framework to locate the project in. The London 
Olympic bid displayed the possibilities of a network system with strong leadership, 
clarity of vision and overall strategy for London. 
3. In the specific case of London, how do the arrangements for urban and sports 
governance influence how events are bid for and delivered? 
From this thesis it is plain that the absence of a city-wide authority for London before 
2000 had a negative influence on the city's ability to secure and deliver mega-sports 
events. In particular it meant that there was a lack of leadership and no strategic 
framework in which to locate such projects. So although London as a global city was in 
a strong position to attract major and mega events it could not capitalise on this 
advantage. In other UK cities with metropolitan government, the 'city' has played a 
critical role in securing and delivering major and mega sports projects, for example 
Manchester and Sheffield. 'Fhe critical role played by the Mayor and GLA in the 
London Olympic bid and their continuing importance in the delivery of the 2012 Gaines 
is illustrative of the significance of a unitary authority for London in the mega-event 
process. 
Theoretical framework 
In order to further understand the relationships between governance, sport and city there 
was a need to capture different dimensions, scales and inter-connections. Consequently 
the theoretical framework, the research-design and methods used within this thesis were 
adopted in order to capture the sport, governance and city relations. 
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Having reviewed key theoretical perspectives (see Chapter Two) - urban regime theory, 
multi-level governance and policy networks - two main conclusions were drawn. 
Firstly, that the theoretical framework for this thesis needed to take account of the 
follo, Aing five key elements: the local context and local actors in the political process; 
the role of central government; the nature of sectoral relationships i. e. between private, 
public and voluntary sectors; the role of networks of individuals and institutions; and - 
the importance of scale and governance operating at different levels and also between 
scales. 
Secondly, that multiple theoretical perspectives were required to provide understanding 
of a process operating over different scales and over time. Therefore, to avoid giving a 
partial account an integrative theoretical framework was constructed drawing on each of 
these theoretical perspectives, in order to provide a lens through which to look at the 
specifics of the LVNAC project and also at governance, sport and the city more 
generally. 
DISCUSSION 
Methodological issues: The value of using comparison and the case study approach in 
examining mega-sportinR events 
Mega sports events are by their very nature discrete and thus well suited to case studies. 
Taking both a comparative and case study approach produced rich, situated data and in 
doing so highlighted the importance of timing, contextual and cultural factors in shaping 
the form and outcome of the LVNAC project. The LVNAC project was bom out of on- 
going problems with WNS and played out against a backdrop of the troubled 
preparations for the MCG, the transition to a new governance system in London, the on- 
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going saga of the Millennium Dome which made central government wary of mega 
projects and within a political culture that was ambiguous about the importance of sport 
in -national life. In addition to these 'external' and more general issues, there were a 
number of 'internal' project specific issues concerned with ownership and direction of 
the project and these external and internal factors interacted to create a number of 
obstacles and challenges. 
Timing was also crucial, and perhaps if the LVNAC project had happened a year or so 
later the outcome could have been different. For example, there would have been the 
recent success of the MCG to build upon, the prospect of a London Olympic bid to 
work towards and of course the Mayor and GLA would have been in place. Although 
this is of course speculation, what it does illustrate is that the 'success' or 'failure' of a 
project is often the product of a specific historical moment. Other writers such as 
Marshall (1992; 1996) and Garcia-Ramon and Albet (2000) have emphasised the 
specificity of the Barcelona experience, arguing that history, geography and politics 
combined to create a unique historical moment that will not be repeated. This is an 
important cautionary note, particularly for policy actors, keen to replicate the 
'successes' of other cities and nations or promote a 'model' based on the success of a 
particular event. This is not to argue that policy makers or cities can not learn from each 
other (there is plenty of evidence that they can and do) rather it is to wam against 
seeking simple 'off the shelf models of 'how to stage a successful mega sports event'. 
Case studies need to be permeated by theory in order to avoid the danger of simply 
providing a description, to connect the study to broader bodies of work and to enhance 
the generalisability of the findings. Theory should inform the research questions, guide 
the study, the data collection, the analysis and the conclusions drawn. This thesis is 
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underpinned by an integrative theoretical framework constructed following the 
examination of alternative theoretical explanations of urban governance. In this thesis 
an integrative theoretical framework was adopted to avoid giving a partial account and 
also to capture the complexities and dynamic nature of governance and urban politics. 
Thus, it has been possible to make connections between the LVNAC project and the 
UK's and London's successful bid for the 2012 Olympics, and also the on-going 
debates about the central government's attitude to sport at all levels from grassroots 
through to elite. The issues are still alive and evident in the debates as the nation and 
London prepares for 2012. In this way a case study of a recent event has helped further 
understanding of the past but has also suggested changes that are needed to strengthen 
the ability of the UK in general, and London specifically to both secure and deliver 
mega-sporting projects. 
The bounded nature of mega-sporting events means that the case study approach is 
commonly employed and this has allowed comparisons to be made across nations, cities 
and events. The uniqueness of each study does, however, make objective, systematic 
comparison difficult. Therefore, care has to be taken not to overstretch the comparison, 
but it does enable connections to be made both horizontally across space and vertically 
through time. Moreover, stripping away the detail of the case studies has revealed the 
basic building blocks of mega-sporting projects. 
The whole mega-sporting event process involves constant comparison with previous 
host cities and between rival bid cities, in an attempt to secure events and deliver them 
successfully. This international reflexivity is in fact a central process driving for-ward 
the evolution of mega- event strategy; there is an ongoing international multi-vocal 
dialogue between events which shapes future events. It is not only ideas that are 
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transferred but as we have seen some of the key actors. This is all part of a more general 
dynamic, reflexive process whereby cities are trying to learn from each other in order to 
gain a competitive advantage over 'rival' cities. Cities look to each other for ideas on a 
variety of issues (e. g. regeneration, transport, tourism) and also strive to recruit key 
actors associated with successful policies and interventions. For example, Ken 
Livingstone recruited Bob Mey- the man attributed with transforming New York's 
ailing public transport system - to the task of turning around London's public transport 
system. The impact of highly paid international city experts brought into 'lead' on areas 
of city management and governance is a possible area for further research. However, it 
also apparent that cities do not always 'learn' the lessons, for example Athens is 
counting the cost of not planning for the 'day after' and like SYdney before it is left with 
costly underused facilities facing uncertain futures. 
Different policy actors interpret and use case study evidence in a variety of ways, and at 
times draw selectively on it to support their position. For example, strong evidence can 
be found that suggests that sporting-mega events can not be justified on economic 
grounds (e. g. Baade and Matheson, 2004). Nonetheless, the primary ratiqnafe for cities 
pursuing these events remains economic. Although evidence is sometimes used 
selectively, clear examples can be found of its use. The legacy problems experienced by 
Sydney following the 2000 Olympics and the Millennium Dome were reflected in the 
priority given to legacy use of the stadium post-MCG and were also evident in the 
London Olympic bid. Furthermore, the IOC is now paying much more attention to 
legacy issues when assessing bids and making the decision to award the. Olympics. 
Researching a recent event which still has resonance within policy making and political 
circles, whilst very stimulating and productive, did present a number of challenges. 
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Firstly, the dynamic nature of urban politics and policy making means that much has 
happened over the course of the thesis and there have been many changes at national, 
city and local level. Much of what and who were in place in 2000-2001 are no longer 
there, but it is important to locate the LVNAC project its contemporary context, as well 
as consider what has changed and what these changes may mean for future projects. The 
issues discussed in this thesis are still 'live' and a matter of public debate and policy 
activity. This is perhaps most evident in relation to the London Olympic bid and now 
the preparation for the London Games but also in the debates about health, obesity and 
the need to promote physical activity. This topicality highlights the value and relevance 
of this thesis but has also acted to both complicate and strengthen it. In general tenns it 
has meant that the thesis has been conducted on 'shifting sands' as reports have been 
commissioned, policies implemented and legislation enacted to take the Games forward. 
Without the Olympic bid this thesis would have simply been about the failure of yet 
another mega-sporting project and although it could have provided pointers as to what 
needed to be leamt, it would not have been able to examine some of the lessons being 
put into action. The securing of the 2012 Olympics has meant this thesis has had to 
embrace 'success' as well as failure but has also given 'weight' to tentative ideas and 
enabled them to be developed further. 
Secondly, the LVNAC project was a 'failure' that lingered in the collective memory and 
as such it is a sensitive subject. Although in general it was not difficult to secure 
interviews or information, there were cases, for instance in the DCMS, where I was 
unable to obtain an interview. Although there was a great deal of information from the 
DCMS in the public domain in the form of official reports' it did mean that this 
dimension was underdeveloped. Such problems are not uncommon when researching 
1 The existence of official reports in the public domain was the main reason given for not giving an 
interview, the argument being that there was nothing else to add. 
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recent or contemporary policy issues, but it in something that has to be borne in mind 
when planning, executing and drawing conclusions from this type of research. 
Thirdly, many of the individuals and organisations involved in the project have a high 
public profile, whilst others still collaborate with each other on other projects. In 
reporting the findings care had to be taken not to compromise anonymity or jeopardise 
these relationships, whilst at the same time retaining the integrity and richness of the 
research. Again this is part of the process of conducting research on recent and 
contemporary events. 
Governance 
This thesis has demonstrated the importance of governance issues throughout the whole 
mega-sports events process and at all levels of governance. From the initial idea to bid 
for an event through to delivery and beyond to its legacy governance issues impact on 
the shape and success or otherwise of the event. Although it is clear from this thesis that 
a successful mega-sports event can take a variety of forms, it is possible within the 
diversity to identify key elements for success that are rooted in governance. These 
elements are intimately related and interactive. Firstly, strong credible leadership is 
essential at national, sub-national, city and local level. The LVNAC project was 
hampered by failures of leadership and direction at all levels of governance, whilst the 
London Olympic bid benefited from strong leadership. The contrast between these two 
mega-sporting projects is particularly striking given their close proximity in time, 
lingering doubts about the UK and London's ability to manage mega-sports projects and 
the involvement of the same Mayor and Prime Minister. In relation to the Olympic bid 
there appeared to be a better understanding of need for strong, credible leadership, 
perhaps best illustrated by the replacing of the first Chair (Barbara Cassani) with Lord 
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Coe, a Olympian and former politician, but also by the way in which the Mayor and 
more latterlY the Prime Minister championed the bid at home and abroad. 
Secondly, there needs to a unified vision and a clarity of purpose, in other words 
everyone needs to know and agree about what they are setting out to achieve. In the 
LVNAC project there were two competing visions. One vision saw the LVNAC as a 
sporting project- building a stadium, staging the WAC and leaving a sporting legacy. 
The other vision saw the LVNAC as a catalyst for broader regenerative activity in the 
Upper Lee Valley. There was a failure to either reach a compromise or make a decision 
as to which vision to follow and this produced a fundamental fault line in the project. A 
clear vision provides a focus and framework to work within and without it a project is 
liable to be pulled in different directions, stall and fail to some degree, if not entirely, as 
in the case of the LVNAC project. The London Olympic bid presented a unified -vision 
of wbat the Games could do for East London specifically, London more generally and 
the nation as a whole. However, as has been shown in this thesis having a clear vision is 
not necessarily without its problems as any vision is the product of its architects. Thus, 
the promotion of a particular vision can mean that the needs and interests of some 
groups are prioritised whilst those of other groups are marginalised. The Atlanta 
Olympics is an example where the dominant vision was that of the city boosters and this 
led to poorer and disadvantaged groups missing out on the potential benefits of the 
Games and in some cases being further disadvantaged. Of course it remains to be seen if 
the Olympic vision proffered by the London bid can be delivered and this represents an 
important area for further research. 
Finally, the whole process needs to be underpinned by strategic thinking at all levels of 
governance so that mega-sport events 'fit' into broader strategic plans. The LVNAC 
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project is a clear example of the problems that arise when a mega-sports project is not 
part of a broader strategic approach and thus does not 'fit'. The benefits of embedding 
mega-events into wider strategic plans have been most apparent at the city level, with 
Barcelona being a key example. What can be difficult, as has been shown in this thesis, 
is to integrate national, sub-national, city and local needs and there are many examples 
of where this has not occurred, for example, the Sydney Olympics. The failure to 
articulate these differing needs manifests itself in many ways - under utilised facilities, 
missed opportunities for training and employment, debt - and these negative impacts 
are generally felt most keenly by cities and their inhabitants. This represents another 
area for further research about how the differing needs of nations, cities and citizens can 
be integrated and the barriers and challenges to this process. 
Having made comparisons with other nations it is clear that national governments play a 
critical role in the mega-sports events process and that they adopt a variety of 
approaches to mega-sports events that reflect wider political systems and cultural 
attitudes. It is also evident that no simple governance system is 'best' for delivering 
mega-sporting events, with each approach having its own advantages and 
disadvantages, so whilst a centralised approach might get things done quickly it is often 
at the expense of proper engagement and legacy planning. However, whatever approach 
is taken it is evident that there the needs to be clarity about the role of national 
government and that politicians and policy makers have exhibit confidence in the 
project (e. g. by underwriting, funding). The LVNAC project is a prime example of what 
happens when national government fails on both these fronts. 
The uncertainty and debate about what the role of central government should be in 
relation to mega sports events so manifest within the UK in recent years reflects broader 
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deliberations about the changing role of the central state. When it came to the Olympic 
bid the role of central government was much clearer and limits of that role better 
defined which suggests that network governance sYstems can leam. 
Similarly, this thesis has shown that cities take different approaches to mega-sports 
events and that 'success' comes in a number of forms. It is also evident that mega-sports 
events are an important tool for cities wishing to promote a variety of city level 
interests, including regeneration and place marketing on the global stage. Moreover, this 
thesis has demonstrated the pivotal. role of city level governance in hosting mega sports 
events. The failure of the LVNAC project was in part the consequence of a London 
without city-wide government, there was no overall strategy for London for it to be part 
of and it appeared disconnected even from the more piecemeal plans. In contrast the 
London Olympic bid was the product of the new governance arrangements with the 
Mayor and GLA proViding a coherence and structure lacking for the LVNAC project. 
The Olympic bid was deeply embedded into the Mayor's strategic plans for London in a 
way that the LVNAC was not and as in Barcelona, the London Games are being used as 
a catalyst to forward these plans. 
Governance arrangements evolve over time. However, the prevailing governance 
arrangements are a product of, and reflect what has gone before. The post-2000 
arrangements for London were described as a move from networked governance with 
no centre to networked governance with a weak centre (Kleinman et al, 2002). From the 
outset doubts were expressed (Travers, 2002) as to whether these new institutional 
arrangements would be able to deliver complex projects. The London Olympic bid has 
shown that the new arrangements are indeed capable and without the Mayor and GLA it 
is unlikely that the London Olympic bid would have even proceeded let alone have been 
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successful. However, what is also crystal clear from this thesis is that Mayor and GLA 
could not have secured or be able to deliver the Olympics without the support of central 
government. Under the current arrangements although the Mayor and GLA have shown 
themselves as adept at working effectively with a diverse array of partners from all 
sectors, they simply do not have the power or capacities to deliver highly complex and 
costly projects (sporting or otherwise) without the financial and political support of 
central government. The current arrangements for London reflect its position as the seat 
of central goverment, the desire of central govenunent to retain a reasonable degree of 
control over London matters and the continued importance and power of the nation state 
more generally. In the case of the London Olympics, the support given by central 
govemment is wide ranging and substantial (e. g. funding, legislative powers, designated 
Olympic Minister) but as we have seen the exact form that this support takes varies 
from place to place (nation and city) and also depends on the event. 
Pimlott and Rao (2002) argued that Ken Livingstone's effectiveness would depend on 
his ability to work within the institutional and political constraints placed upon him: he 
has shown that he is capable of working within the system whilst'at the same time 
pushing at the boundaries to strengthen his position. In relation to the Olympics, 
Livingstone took on a 'crusader role'. His role in relation to the LVNAC project is less 
easy to classify - he certainly was not a 'crusader' but neither was he a 'broker' in fact 
he resisted ratifying an agreement made by others and the LVNAC suffered because of 
the la*ck of Mayoral support. 
The findings of this thesis support the assertion that whilst policy networks are an 
important component of governance they do not necessarily mean a reduction in the role 
of the state (Taylor, 2000; Pierre and Peters, 2000). As we have seen the state continues 
302 
to control financial resources, legislation and grants political legitimacy and without 
these mega-sports events just do not happen- policy networks can not 'go it alone' in the 
UK. Moreover, as Taylor (2000) asserts central government can dominate policy 
networks and impose their value preferences so, for example, whether the UK promotes 
elite sport development over grass roots sport or vice versa will largely be down to 
central government rather than policy networks. 
This thesis has highlighted the dynamic and interactive relationship between 
governance and events that develops as a result of both bidding for and hosting events. 
Manchester and London are good examples of this process with both cities learning 
from their earlier unsuccessful bids (as well as other successful cities) to improve their 
chances of securing an event. Manchester was successftil with the Commonwealth 
Games once a mature partnership had evolved. As noted above, governance 
arrangements evolve and even within the short life of the GLA and Mayor there have 
been changes, albeit incremental and modest in nature (e. g. the congestion charge, 
Olympic precept) but significant nonetheless. Newman and Tual (2002) pointed to the 
moves in France away from a highly centralised approach to mega-sports projects to a 
more de-centralised one as a result of more general governance changes. Given the 
dynamic nature of governance it is evident that cities and nations have to be engaged in 
a constant process of learning and reflection, not just in relation to the specifies of 
megs-sports events but also more generally, because what might have been successfW in 
the past may no longer be appropriate. 
This thesis has shown that mega-sporting events can provide an excellent focus point 
for actors from different arenas to work together on a common agenda. In this way 
mega-sports events can act as a catalyst, as actors set aside differences to achieve a 
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common goal, which has resonance with Stone's (1989) concept of civic co-operation 
and the social production of power. However, on balance it does appear that these tend 
to be temporary alliances related to specific projects rather than urban regimes as set out 
by proponents of regime theory, although given the capacity for a mega-event to 
transform a city such alliances are nevertheless important. The LVNAC project 
demonstrated that this process of civic co-operation is not automatic, indeed 
fundamental differences remained and co-operation between actors was somewhat 
limited. 
The LVNAC project involved actors with a variety of interests and motivations and 
although all the 'usual' actors were present (i. e. from public, private and non-statutory 
sectors), the private sector was not as involved as either the empirical or theoretical 
literature would lead us to expect. There was active support and interest from local and 
sub-regional business players who saw it as an opportunity to boost the local and sub- 
regional economy. However, this was as far as it went and the LVNAC project was 
unable to secure major sponsorship or a legacy tenant for the stadium. The private 
sector can choose whether it is part of a particular project or not (and the extent of that 
involvement) and on the whole it chose not to be part of the LVNAC project. This 
situation probably reflected a lack of confidence in the project and given the ambiguous 
position of both central government and the Mayor this was perhaps unsurprising. 
Sheffield also experienced difficulties getting the private sector to support the staging of 
the World Student Games and in both cases the partnerships were new and untested so 
had no track record to build upon or use to lever in the private sector. In addition, the 
LVNAC project did not evolve organically, rather it was created from the problems 
from another mega-sports project and this contrasts strongly with other events where the 
business sector has taken a more active role. For example, the private sector was 
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integral to mega-event strategy pursued by Manchester from its unsuccessful Olympic 
bids through to delivering a successful Commonwealth Games and indeed was a key 
architect of the strategy. 
The London Olympic Games presents an ideal opportunity to explore further some of 
the issues raised by this thesis. The whole process of preparing to host the Olympic 
Games presents a huge challenge for the organising committee, central government, the 
Mayor and GLA and raises many questions. Having secured the bid, can the prevailing 
governance arrangements deliver a successful mega-sporting event? Are the institutions, 
established to deliver and manage the Games and associated developments fit for 
purpose? In the past the benefits of mega-sports events have been distributed unevenly. 
Will the London Games be any different? 
Sport and poligy makin 
In 1999 Bourdieu stated that: "Talking about sport scientifically is difficult because in 
one sense it is too easy: everyone has their own ideas on the subject, and feels able to 
say something intelligent about it" (1999, p. 15). More than a decade earlier Bill 
Shankly (198 1) had, perhaps rather more famously commented that: "Some people 
think football is a matter of life or death. I don't like that attitude. I can assure them it is 
much more serious than that. " Both these statements illustrate the essential elements of 
sport and why it presents challenges to those trying to formulate and implement policy, 
or research the area. Having conducted a case study of a mega sporting project, 
reviewed the literature and made comparisons with other nations and cities, there would 
seem to be something 'particular' about sport that makes it different from other areas of 
policy. 
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Firstly, sport is infused with emotion. This appears to make some policy makers 
uncomfortable and does not sit easily with ideas of 'rational' evidence based policy 
making. This may partly explain why policy actors often put forward 'rational' 
economic arguments to justify expenditure on sports projects, even though strong 
evidence can be found to suggest that mega sports events can not be justified on 
economic grounds. Although arguments are made for the 'feel good' factor, the 
promotion of national and civic pride, and individual achievement, they are usually 
secondary to broader economic arguments. There seems to be a reluctance to 
acknowledge that such factors are integral to sport and have 'value', probably because 
they are very difficult to measure and the prevailing policy environment places such 
store on measurable outcomes. However, given that the economic benefits of large-scale 
sports projects have proved to be uncertain and uneven, perhaps policy makers would 
be wise to consider and take account of the 'other' factors, or run the risk that such 
projects will continue to fall short of expectations. 
Secondly, the 'value' and legitimacy of sport as an area of policy is contested, and 
varies across space and time. The UK government has shown contradictory attitudes to 
sport over time and displayed a great deal of ambiguity. The tendency in some quarters 
is not to regard sport as a 'serious' subject of study or policy, partly because people 
think they 'know' about sport and have nothing to learn, or because they think sport 
does not 'matter'. For some policy actors sport has an intrinsic value of its own, but as 
we have seen throughout this thesis most governments - at national, regional and city 
level - value sport for what it can do, for exam ple, in terms of regeneration, health and 
tourism. Certainly within the current UK context the renewed interest in sport is linked 
in with concerns about the adverse effects of physical inactivity on health. It should of 
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course be remembered that these arguments about what sport can do are not universally 
accepted and indeed are often challenged. 
Follovving -on from the last point, this thesis makes it apparent that there is some 
confusion in the minds of politicians and policy makers about what sport can do, and 
also when and how the potential benefits can be delivered. There is a tendency on the 
part of some politicians and event organisers to argue that mega-sport events can deliver 
all of these benefits most, if not all of the time, although as we have seen there is scant 
evidence to support such bold claims. The LOB bid team made much of the legacy that 
the London Olympics will leave for sport in the UK not just in terms of facilities but in 
inspiring the population as a whole to participate in sport and thus deliver on a number 
of other agendas, particularly health and social inclusion. However, as Coalter (2004) 
has highlighted, to date mega sports events have only left 'faciliti& legacies, largely 
because there has been an assumption that the sporting benefits would 'trickle down'. 
However the evidence suggests that without proactive steps this will not happen. This 
opens up a whole area of study about what mechanisms are being put in place during 
the preparations for the London Games to actively promote grassroots: sport and are they 
adequate to translate into a sustained and significant increase in participation across the 
whole population? 
There is evidence from the Ifterature that hosting mega sports events, in particular the 
Olympics has an impact on sports funding. Host nations have their eyes on the medal 
table and funds are often focused on supporting elite level Olympic ýports and at times 
this has been at the expense of non-Olympic sports and grassroots initiatives. 
Furthermore, there is already evidence from the UK that central government funding of 
elite sport is linked to performance, so that sports that do not fulfil their medal potential 
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can find their funding reduced? It is unclear 3 whether the London Olympics will lead to 
more generous funding in general or to an even more targeted approach with only a 
handful of potentially 'high return' sports being funded. This raises questions as about 
the impact of staging mega sports events on the UK's sporting landscape in the short, 
medium and longer term. In more general terms, the on-going project to modernise 
sports, governance also presents research opportunities as inevitably there will be 
'winners' and 'losers' and it may be that the London Olympics will have a bearing on , 
the direction of the modernisation project more generally. 
Underpinning a great deal of the discussions about sport and an important undercurrent 
throughout the LVNAC project was the question as to whether central government 
should focus its efforts (and funding) on elite sport, winning medals and trophies or on 
grassroots sports and increasing participation across all groups. This links into 
fundamental questions as to what sport is and its 'purpose' that have dogged sport 
policy in the UK for so long and which other nations have settled in different ways, with 
some focusing on mass participation (e. g. Finland) and others on elite sport (e. g. 
Australia). There is also a strong argument that elite and grassroots sport require equal 
support as they have a symbiotic relationship and need each other to thrive, but this of 
course has considerable cost implications. Plans to host mega-sports events seems to 
bring these tensions to the fore, perhaps because of the immense amounts of money 
involved which some argue could be better spent on improving the general sporting 
infrastructure whilst other maintain it is important to provide a showcase for elite 
2 Following moderate results at the 2004 Athens Olympics UK Sport cut funding to sports that were not 
thought to have a great potential for medals, for example, British gymnastics saw its' funding ftom the 
Olympic Medal Programme cut by 45% (Downes, 2005). 
3 There has been an ongoing debate about funding for elite athletes in preparation for 2012, with sports 
governing bodies expressing concerns about the failure of central government to swiftly commit funds 
and rumours that up to E250m has been allocated to develop Olympic athletes (Campbell, 2006). In the 
2006 Budget the Chancellor announced; E200 million funding for elite athletes to prepare for the London 
Games and E6 million funding for Schools Festivals and V million for the NSF's 2012 Kids Programme 
(HM Treasury/Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2006, p. 149). 
308 
athletes and point to the 'feel good' factor and bolstering of national pride to support 
their position. Unless the UK government either commits itself to fund sport across the 
board more generously, which is unlikely given its other commitments and the 
ambiguous place of sport on the political agenda or can find a way to resolve the 
funding issues - there are plans for a National Sports Foundation to bring in private 
funding- then these tensions will persist. 
What was evident throughout, but not a focus of this thesis was the prominence of the 
media in the mega sports events process. Not only are the broadcasting rights a valuable 
commodity and the income from them and the associated advertising a key economic 
incentive to cities but the whole mega sports event 'game' is played out in and by the 
media. There is extensive coverage and comment about the bidding process, the 
progress or lack of in of mega sports projects as well as the events themselves with 
comparisons being made with other nations and cities (a glance at the references gives 
an idea of the extent and scope of this coverage). The coverage ranges from jingoistic 
celebrations of success to gloom laden predictions of financial disaster or unfinished 
venues. What appears to be lacking is measured comment, but perhaps that is simply 
because it does not make for such a 'good story'. Examining the role played by the 
media in the mega-sports event process is an important area for further research. This 
thesis examined the LVNAC project within the context of governance but an alternative 
framework could be the role of media in the whole process. 
Finally, this thesis has demonstrated the value of studying an apparent failure. So often 
the emphasis within the policy and political arenas is on learning from success and 
failures are often overlooked as a source of positive knowledge. This thesis considered 
the failure of the LVNAC project within the context of the experiences of other nations 
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and cities, information drawn from interviews and documents and also the broader 




Interview schedule for Lee Valley National Athletics Centre Project 
Brief introduction. Permission to record. Confidentiality. Will not be identified in thesis or papers. 
Involvement 
Could I start by asking you to tell me a little about your involvement with the Lee Valley project? 
(Whenl Howl Why. What were your main responsibilities? Who didyou work most closely with? )people 
and organisations) 
Were you part of the Lee Valley Stadium Forum? (Also the Stakeholders Group) 
(What were the main purposes of the Forum? Did it 'work'? - why1why not [peoplelsize-Istructureltask in 
hand] - examples) 
Vision 
C asting your mind back to when you first leamt of the proposals for the LVNAC and hosting the WAC 
2005, can you remember what your thoughts w6re? 
What were your hopes and expectations for the development? 
In the short term? In the longer term? Local/ London/ National 
Sporting; regeneration,, community benefits; prestige 
key players 
Who would you say were the main players? 
(What made them the dominantplayers? What were relations like between the dominantplayers - did 
they work together or was there every any conj7ict? - examples. How did the dominantplayers interact 
with other stakeholders? ) 
Key issues 
What would you say were the key issues facing the project? 
Do you feel that they could have been addressed in the time available? 
(What needed to be done? By whom? Was progress being made on these issues? What were the barriers 
to progress? Were they insurmountable? ) 
Decision-making I am interested to know more about the decision making Process. Where do think the 
key decisions were made? (formal structuresl informal mechanismslunclear) By whom? (individualsl 
organisationllocall central) Did the way in which decisions were made ever create any problems 
(whaMfor whom). How transparent was the process? 
Key events 
Looking back on the project, it is possible to identify any particular 'turning points' or critical events. 
(Expand- What, When; Who was involved; Decisions made, Consequences) 
Reasons for failure 
What was your reaction to the cancellation of the project? 
In your opinion what were the main reasons the project did not go ahead? 
(Can you think ofanything that might have made a difference? [structures1people]) 
Consequences and lessons learned 
What do you think were the main consequences of the cancellation of the project? 
What steps do you think need to be taken to prevent a similar scenario occurring in the future? 
(Can youforesee any barriers? - what/who/why. Any ideas as to how these barriers could be overcome? ) 
Are there any issues you would like to raise that I have not covered? 
Before we close, I was wondering who else you think it would be finportant for me to talk to? 
Thank and close. 
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Appendix Two 
Basic interview request letter 
Insert name and address 
Insert date 
Dedr insert name 
Re: Research on the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre project 
I am a postgraduate research student based in the School of Health and Social Sciences 
at Middlesex University. I am conducting research on the Lee Valley National Athletics 
Centre project as part of my PhD studies. There is considerable interest in local 
regeneration issues at Middlesex University and this study is part of a broader body of 
work currently being undertaken. 
I am interested in the history Of the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre project, how it 
evolved, what led to the decision to cancel the project and the consequences of the 
decision. I am also keen to see if any lessons can be learnt, particularly in the light of 
the difficulties encountered by other major projects in London, such as Wembley 
National Stadium and the Millennium Dome. Having spent some time reading about the 
LVNAC project, I am now in the process of speaking to people who were involved or 
had an interest in the project. To enable me to build up a complete picture, I would like 
to elicit the views of people with varying perspectives and responsibilities in relation to 
the LVNAC project. Therefore, I am trying to talk to people from a variety of 
organisations, people who had day-to-day responsibility and also those who had a more 
strategic overview. 
I have spoken to insert name and he/she thought that you would be an important person 
for me to talk to. I would be grateful if you would consider being interviewed for this 
study. The interview would be conducted at a time and place convenient to you and I 
envisage it would take about 30 - 45 minutes. All information supplied will be treated as 
confidential and will be used for research purposes only. The main output of the study 
will be a thesis that will be submitted for consideration for the award of PhD. 
Respondents will not be identified in the thesis or in any publications. Please see 
attached sheet for ftirther information. 
I will telephone or e-mail you shortly, but in the meantime if you have any queries 
please do not hesitate to contact me at the above address or e-mail 
r. herringP, mdx. ac. uk or telephone 020 84115314 (direct line). 





Information sheet for respondents 
Research on the Lee Valley National Athletics Stadium project 
Information sheet for respondents 
What is the study about? 
In Spring 2000 the IAAF awarded the 2005 World Athletics Championships to London: 
this involved the construction of a new National Athletics at the site of an existing 
Leisure. Centre at Picketts Lock. However, in the autumn of 2001 the Government 
announced that the development would not be proceeding. This study is about the 
unfolding events, the processes and the decisions that led to that announcement. It is 
also about the impact on sport and athletics, on London and the Lee Valley, and more 
specifically on the ability of London to secure and host a major sporting event in the 
future. 
What will it involve? 
Talking to Rachel Herring, a postgraduate research student about the LVNAC project. 
The interview will be conducted at a time and place convenient to you and will take 
about 30-45 minutes. With your permission the interview will be tape recorded - this 
will only be heard by the research student. Everything you say will be treated as 
confidential and information you supply will be used for research purposes only. You 
will not be identified in the thesis or any publications or presentations. 
What sort of questions will be asked? 
I am interested in your ideas and perspective - your 'take' on events. There are no set 
questions rather a number of topics will be explored, including your role and 
responsibilities, your hopes for the LVNAC development and identification of key 
events and critical decisions. 
Who do you want to talk to? 
People who were involved or had a strong interest in the LVNAC project either in a 
professional capacity or through their role in the local community. I am keen to speak to 
people from different organisational levels, to people who had day-to-day knowledge of 
the project, those who were at 'arms length' and also those with a strategic overview. 
What are the outputs from this study? 
The main output of the study will be a thesis that will be submitted to Middlesex 
University for consideration for the award of PhD. Papers will be published in academic 
journals and presented at conferences. You will not be identified in the thesis or any 
publications or presentations. 
What if I have got any questions? 
Please feel free to contact me: Rachel Herring, School of Health and Social Sciences, 
Middlesex University, Queensway, Enfield, EN3 4SA. Tel: 020 84115314 (direct line). 
E-mail: r. fierrinanamdx. ac. uk 
THA14K YOUTERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP 
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Appendix Four 
A 'who's who' guide to the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre 
Project 
Cabinet: Prime Minister, Tony Blair, pledged his personal commitment to delivering the 2005 
WAC in a letter included in the bid presented to the IAAF in April 2000. This commitment was 
reiterated in the 2001 Labour election manifesto. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, 
viewed by respondents as key given his control over budgets. 
Patrick Carter: A businessman who led the inquiry into the LVNAC. Has been brought in by 
the current government to conduct other independent reviews, including of the Manchester 
Commonwealth Games, English National Stadium (Wembley), and Criminal Records Bureau 
(for the Home Office). 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport: Secretary of State (up to June 200 1) Chris Smith (MP 
for Islington South and Finsbury, London) made the decision in December 1999 that athletes 
would not be part of the WNS and a separate National Athletics Centre would be built in 
London. Supportive of the WAC 2005 bid and the LVNAC. From June 200 1, Tessa Jowell, 
(MP for Dulwich and West Norwood, London), she transferred from Department for Education 
and Employment and comes from a health background. Tessa Jowell announced in July 2001 
that an inquiry would be conducted in LVNAC led by Patrick Carter. On 4b October 200 1, 
Tessa Jowell announced that the LVNAC project would not be proceeding. 
Sports Minister (up to June 200 1) Kate Hoey, (MP for Vauxhall, London) a former athlete. 
From June 200 1,. Richard Caborn (MP for Sheffield Central), he arrived from the Department of 
Trade and Industry. He was involved in bringing World Student Games to Sheffield in 199 1, 
and has strong interest in regeneration. 
International Association ofAthlefics Federations: World governing body for athletics, 
President is Lamine Diack, it has over 200 members and its headquarters are in Monaco. IAAF 
is a powerful body that receives considerable income from sponsorship and broadcasting rights 
for the competition programme it runs which includes the biennial World Athletics 
Championships. 
Sport Engk7nd. Non-Departmental Public Body accountable to Parliament via the Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport. Its work is scrutinised by the House of Commons Culture, 
Media and Sport Select Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. Two main roles, ' 
firstly, to develop and maintain sports infrastructure in England and secondly, to distribute the 
National Lottery funds to grass root and major sporting projects. In relation to LVNAC they 
were the main source of funds - up E67m lottery funds were available. During period of 
LVNAC Chief Executive, Derek Casey, and Chair, Trevor Brooking. 
UK Sport: Departmental Public Body, 'sister' organisation to Sport England, role is to focus on 
high performance sport at UK level and also has the strategic responsibility for bringing major 
events to the UK and through the National Lottery supporting their delivery. Worked with the 
-M-A-thle-tics t6-ýpýit-the-tiidfo-g-etIFeý-r-fdr-thd-WAC.. -During-period-of-L-VNAC-, Chief Executivej-- 
Richard Callicott and Chair, Rodney Walker. 
London Borough ofEnfield. Local authority in which the site of proposed LVNAC located, 
supportive of proposal and keen to maximise the regenerative potential of the LVNAC, had to 
balance this with their role as planning authority for the development. 
London International Sport: Pan-London body with dual objectives of bring major sporting 
events to London and ensuring that these events are used for sport development. Led by Richard 
Sumray. 
314 
London 2005: Bid/event organising committee for the 2005 World Athletics Championships, 
General Secretary Bill Glad, Chair Len Hatton, worked very closely with UK Athletics. 
Middlesex University: The proposed new campus development at Tottenham Hale was to 
provide the athletes accommodation for the 2005 WAC. Problems with securing sufficient land 
and planning issues delayed the development and there were concerns about whether the 
accommodation would be available for 2005. 
National Athletics Centre Stakeholders Board. Established by the regeneration team at the LB 
Enfield and Chaired by Peter Lyne, a local businessman and Chair of North London LSC. Its 
purpose was to try to maximise the regeneration potential of the LVNAC. It had a broad 
membership including local, regional and national government, local and regional business 
organisations and sports bodies. 
North andEast London Sports Network: It is a partnership of organisations involved in raising 
the profile of the sub-region as a location for major sports facilities and services and to 
associated regeneration benefits. Key partners include LVRPA, L13s of Enfield; Haringey; 
Waltham Forest; Barnet and Newham, Middlesex University, London International Sport, Sport 
England, University of North London, London Sports Forum. 
London DevelopmentAgency: One of the four functional bodies of the GLA, created in July 
2001 to further economic development and regeneration in London. It is responsible for 
formulating and delivering the Mayor's economic and regeneration strategy for London. 
Government Officefor London: It is responsible for managing a range of government 
programmes in London and it aims to join up different programmes by working with key 
London stakeholders, Whitehall departments and local communities. The programmes include 
European Structural Funds, Neighbourhood Renewal Fund and LD, 4 grants. 
Lee Valley Regional Park Authority. ý It is an independent statutory authority established by an 
Act of Parliament in 1966 and financed from the council tax base of Hertfordshire, Essex and 
Greater London through an annual levy. It has a broad remit to develop the Lee Valley for the 
purposes of sport, recreation and leisure for the region. The Regional Park is long and narrow 
stretching from East India Docks Basin on the River Thames to Ware in Hertfordshire. 
UK. 4thlefics: National governing body for athletics and key player in the LVNAC project. 
Mayor and GLA: Ken Livingstone became the first elected Mayor for Greater London in May 
2001. 
Transportfor London: It is the integrated body responsible for London's transport system and 
its role is to implement the May's Transport Strategy for London and manage transport services 
across London. It is run by a management board chaired by the Mayor of London. 
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Appendix Five 
The Lee Valley Athletics Centre 
In March 2005 the plans for the Lee Valley National Athletics Centre (LVAC) were 
unveiled. The f 16 million complex is being funded by the DCMS Capital 
Modernisation Fund (CMF) - E4 million, Sport England (via the Lottery)-; E7 million and 
LVRPA E5 million. It should be noted that the LVRPA was originally going to 
contribute f. 5 million towards the cost of the construction of the LVNAC. The E4 
million from the CMF is the money that was earmarked for developing sports facilities 
in the Lee Valley when the LVNAC project was cancelled. The LVRPA are going to 
provide full revenue funding (UK Athletics, 2005) and the London Marathon Trust has 
committed 00,000 towards equipping the centre (EHAC, 2005). 
The LVAC will be largest indoor and outdoor facility serving London and the South 
East and adds to network of exiting indoor athletics centres at Loughborough, Bath, 
Manchester, Cardiff, Sheffield, Birmingham and Grangemouth (UK Athletics, 2005). 
The facilities are as follows: 
Indoor: 
* 200 metre six lane track (the first in the South of England) 
*I 10 metre sprint straight 
* Permanent seating for 500 spectators 
*A multi-purpose hall 
Full jumps and throw provisions 
Specialist sports facilities including sport science, sports medicine, physiotherapy 
and strength conditioning rooms. 
Outdoor 
* 400 metre track 
* Throws area 




The LVAC will be used for training elite athletes and for staging indoor competitions in 
the South. It will be come home to the Enfield and Haringey Athletics Club (EHAC, 
200ý). ýn addW94, the qentre will be used by schools and clubs across North London, 
Essex and Hertfordshire (UK-Mfile-66-s-, -M65ý- Work-began-in-2005 -dhd the LVAC 
scheduled to be open in the autumn of 2006 (EHAC, 2005). 
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